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THEJUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEFJUDGE
STEPHANIE K SEYMOUR
Judge Seymour was born in Battle
Creek, Michigan in 1940. She was graduated
magna cum laudefrom Smith College in 1962,
and from Harvard Law School in 1965. Af-
ter graduating from law school, Judge
Seymour practiced law in Boston, Massachu-
setts from 1965 until 1966, in Tulsa, Okla-
homa in 1967 and in Houston, Texas from
1968 until 1969. From 1971 to 1979 she prac-
ticed with the Tulsa law firm of Doerner,
Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson. In
1979, she was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
She is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and
the American and Oklahoma County Bar
Associations. Additionally, Judge Seymour
served as a bar examiner from 1973 through
1979; she served on the United StatesJudi-
cial Conference Committee on Defender
Services, 1985-87, and as chair, 1987-90.
JUDGEJOHN P. MOORE
Judge Moore was born in Denver, Colo-
rado in 1934. He received his B.A. from the
University of Denver in 1956 and received
his LL.B. from the University of Denver
College of Law in 1959.Judge Moore then
practiced law with the Denver firm of
Carbone & Wasmith until 1962. From 1962
until 1975, he worked in the Colorado At-
torney General's Office. Specifically, Judge
Moore served as Assistant Attorney General
from 1962 until 1967, as Deputy Attorney
General from 1967 to 1972, and as Attorney
General for the State of Colorado from 1972
until 1975.
Injanuary, 1975,Judge Moore was ap-
pointed to the Bankruptcy Court of the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado where he served until 1982.
Judge Moore was then appointed to the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. In 1985, he was appointed to




Judge Anderson was born in 1932. He
attended Eastern Oregon College from 1949
to 1951, and Brigham Young University from
1955 to 1956 when he graduated. Judge
Anderson then attended the University of
Utah College of Law where he received his
LLB. degree in 1960. He was Editor in Chief
of the Utah Law Review, Order of the Coif,
and Phi Kappa Phi. He then served as a trial
attorney in the tax division of the United
States Department ofJustice until 1964.
Judge Anderson subsequently joined the
law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker in Salt
Lake City, Utah in 1964 where he practiced
until he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
1985.
Judge Anderson has appeared as lead
counsel in federal courts in seventeen states,
and in the United States Supreme Court. He
has served as President and Commissioner
of the Utah State Bar. Additionally, Judge
Anderson has been a member of the Utah
Judicial Counsel and the UtahJudicial Con-
duct Commission, and he has served as
Chairman of the Utah Law andJustice Cen-
ter Committee. Judge Anderson's civic ac-
tivities include lectures at the University of
Utah College of Law, member of the Execu-
tive Committee of the Salt Lake Area Cham-
ber of Commerce, and director of numer-
ous corporations. He is a Master of the
Bench, American Inn of Court Number VII.
JUDGE DEANELL R. TACHA
Judge Tacha grew up in Scandia, Kan-
sas. She received her B.A. in American Stud-
ies from the University of Kansas in 1968
and was a member of Mortar Board and Phi
Beta Kappa.Judge Tacha then attended law
school and received herJ.D. from the Uni-
versity of Michigan in 1971.
In 1971, she was selected to be a White
House Fellow. During her year as a White
House Fellow,Judge Tacha was sent on offi-
cial trips to southeast Asia, east and central
Africa, and the European Economic Com-
munity. After her fellowship, Judge Tacha
was an associate with the law firm of Hogan
and Hartson in Washington, D.C. In 1973,
she returned to Kansas and entered private
practice in Concordia, Kansas.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the fac-
ulty of the University of Kansas Law School
in 1974. In 1979, she became associate Vice
Chancellor of Academic Affairs, and in 1981,
she became the Vice Chancellor for Aca-
demic Affairs.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in 1985.
JUDGE BOBBY R. BALDOCK
Judge Baldock was born in Rocky, Okla-
homa, in 1936, however, he grew up in
Hagerman and Roswell, New Mexico.Judge
Baldock attended the New Mexico Military
Institute, where he graduated in 1956. He
received hisJ.D. from the University of Ari-
zona College of Law in 1960.
From 1960 until 1983, Judge Baldock
practiced as a trial lawyer for the firm of
Sanders, Bruin & Baldock, P.A. In 1983, he
became a federal district judge in Albuquer-
que, New Mexico and was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in 1985. In 1988,Judge Baldock re-
ceived an Outstanding Judge Award from
the State Bar of New Mexico.
JUDGE WADE BRORBY
Judge Brorby was born May 23, 1934
in Omaha, Nebraska. He was raised in
Upton and Newcastle, Wyoming. Judge
Brorby attended the University of Wyoming
and received a B.S. in Business. He gradu-
ated with aJ.D. with Honor from the Uni-
versity of Wyoming in 1958.
Judge Brorby served in the United States
Air Force from 1958 to 1961. He engaged in
the private practice of law in Gillette, Wyo-
ming from 1961 to 1988.Judge Brorby was
appointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in 1988.
Judge Brorby served on the Uniform
Laws Commission and was Chairman of the
WyomingJudicial Supervisory Commission.
He has served on numerous Bar committees.
JUDGE DAVID M. EBEL
Judge Ebel was born in Wichita, Kan-
sas in 1940 and grew up in Topeka, Kansas.
He received his B.A. in economics from
Northwestern University in 1962 and re-
ceived hisJ.D. from the University of Michi-
gan Law School in 1965, where he gradu-
ated first in his class. While at the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School, he was elected
to the Order of Coif, the Barrister Society,
and he was Editor-in-Chief of the Michigan
Law Review.
Judge Ebel then clerked for Justice
Byron R. White of the United States Su-
preme Court during the 1965-66 term. From
1966 until 1988, he practiced as a trial law-
yer with the Denver law firm of Davis, Gra-
ham & Stubbs. In 1988,Judge Ebel was ap-
pointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Ebel's civic activities include
teaching Corporations as an adjunct profes-
sor at the University of Denver College of
Law, teaching Professionalism and Ethics at
Duke University School of Law, teaching
the confirmation class at the St.James Pres-
byterian Church and participating in numer-
ous Bar Association activities. He has served
as vice-president of the Colorado Bar Asso-
ciation and is a fellow of the American Col-
lege of Trial Lawyers, a senior judge of the
Doyle Inns of Court, and a member of the
Town & Gown Society.
JUDGE PAULJ. KELLY
Judge Paul J. Kelly, Jr. was born in
Freeport, New York, in 1940. He received a
B.B.A. in Economics and Finance from the
University of Notre Dame in 1963 and his
J.D. from Fordham University School of Law
in 1967.
From 1968 to 1992, Judge Kelly en-
gaged in a general litigation practice with the
New Mexico law firm of Hinkle, Cox, Eaton,
Coffield & Hensley. Judge Kelly served in
the New Mexico House of Representatives
from 1977 to 1981.
Currently, Judge Kelly is a member of
the Board of Visitors of the Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law and serves as Presi-
dent of the Northern New Mexico Ameri-
can Inn of Court. Judge Kelly has been ac-
tive in various Bar activities. He has served
on a New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners,
the New Mexico Appellate Judges' Nomi-
nating Commission, as a reviewing officer
and Hearing Committee chair for the Disci-
plinary Board of New Mexico Supreme
Court, as a member of the New Mexico Pub-
lic Defender Board, the New Mexico State
Personnel Board and as President of the
Chaves County Bar Association.Judge Kelly
was appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1992.
JUDGE ROBERT H. HENRY
Judge Henry was born in Shawnee,
Oklahoma on April 3, 1953. He received his
B.A. in Political Science in 1974 and hisJ.D.
in 1977, both from the University of Okla-
homa.
After graduating from law school,Judge
Henry opened a private law practice in
Shawnee and served in the Oklahoma House
of Representatives for five terms. In 1986, at
the age of thirty-three, he was elected Okla-
homa Attorney General, running unopposed
for re-election in 1990. In 1991, he became
Dean of the Oklahoma City University
School of Law, where he taught in the areas
of state and local government law and legis-
lation.
Judge Henry served on numerous com-
mittees of the National Association of Attor-
neys General, including the Supreme Court
Committee, which he chaired, and the State
Constitutional Law Advisory Board. He is
an American Bar Foundation Fellow, a Com-
missioner for Oklahoma on the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, and a member of the American
Law Institute. Judge Henry has also served
on numerous civic and educational boards
including the Oklahoma Nature Conser-
vancy, the Board of Visitors of the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma Press, and the Western
History Collection of the University of Okla-
homa. He has received the Conservationist
of the Year Award from the Oklahoma Wild-
life Federation, the Human Rights Award
from the Oklahoma Human Rights Commis-
sion, and is a member of Phi Beta Kappa.
Judge Henry was appointed to the




Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929. He graduated from Brigham
Young University in 1957 with high honors.
Judge McKay then received his J.D. from
the University of Chicago in 1960 and was
the law clerk forJustice Jesse A. Udall of the
Arizona Supreme Court for the 1960-61
term. From 1961 to 1974, Judge McKay prac-
ticed with the law firm of Lewis and Roca in
Phoenix, Arizona; however, he did take a
two year leave to serve as Director of the
United States Peace Corps in Malawi, Af-
rica. Judge McKay was a law professor at
Brigham Young University from 1974 until
1977. In 1977, he was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit. Judge McKay currently resides in
Provo, Utah.
SENIORJUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in 1915 and grew
up in Santa Fe, New Mexico. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale University in
1940. During World War II he served as a
Major in the U.S. Army and was decorated
with the Croix de Guerre. In 1962, he was
appointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit. He served as
ChiefJudge from 1977 until 1984. In 1984,
Judge Seth assumed senior status.
Judge Seth has served as director of the
Santa Fe National Bank, chairman of the
Legal Committee of the New Mexico
Cattlegrowers' Association, Regent of the
Museum of New Mexico and as a director
of the Santa Fe Boy's Club.
SENIORJUDGE
WILLIAMJ. HOLLOWAY,JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma gover-
nor, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma in 1923 and later moved to Okla-
homa City in 1927. During World War II, he
served as a First Lieutenant in the Army. Af-
ter the warJudge Holloway returned to com-
plete his undergraduate studies at the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma, receiving his B.A. in
1947.Judge Holloway then attended Harvard
Law School, where he graduated in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952,Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department ofJustice
in Washington, D.C. He subsequently re-
turned to Oklahoma City and entered pri-
vate practice. Judge Holloway was ap-
pointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in 1968 and be-
came ChiefJudge in 1984. He is a member
of Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Gamma Delta.
SENIORJUDGE
ROBERT H. McWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Sana,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in
1927 where he has lived since. He received
his A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the Uni-
versity of Denver. In 1971, he was awarded
an Honorary Doctor of Law degree from the
University.
During World War II, Judge
McWilliams served in the United States
Army and was with the Office of Strategic
Services. He has served as a Deputy District
Attorney and as a Colorado District Court
Judge. In 1961, Judge McWilliams was
elected to the Colorado Supreme Court
where he served until he was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1970. In 1984, he assumed
senior status.
Judge McWilliams is a member of Phi
Beta Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi
Delta Phi, and Kappa Sigma.
SENIORJUDGE
JAMES E. BARRETT'
Judge Barrett was born in Lusk, Wyo-
ming in 1922. He is the son of the late Frank
A. Barrett, who served as Wyoming's Con-
gressman, Governor and United States Sena-
tor.Judge Barrett attended the University of
Wyoming for two years prior to his service
in the Army during World War II. Follow-
ing the war, he attended Saint Catherine's
College at Oxford University and Catholic
University of America and received his LL.B.
from the University of Wyoming Law School
in 1949. In 1973, he received the Distin-
guished Alumni Award from the University
of Wyoming.
Judge Barrett was in private practice in
Lusk, Wyoming for eighteen years. He also
served as County and Prosecuting Attorney
for Niobrara County, Town Attorney for the
towns of Lusk and Manville and attorney for
the Niobrara County Consolidated School
District. From 1967 until 1971,Judge Barrett
served as Attorney General for the State of
Wyoming. In 1971, he was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit. In 1987, he assumed senior status.
Judge Barrett was a member of the Ju-
dicial Conference Subcommittee on Federal
Jurisdiction, the United States Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Court of Review, and




Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
Kansas, in 1929. He received his B.A. from
the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
graduated magna cuam laude from Harvard
Law School in 1955. He became law clerk
for United States Circuit Judge Walter
Huximan and subsequently practiced with
the Los Angeles law firm of Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher. Judge Logan became a profes-
sor at the University of Kansas Law School
in 1957 and was selected in 1961 as Dean of
that school. He served in that capacity until
1968. Since 1961,Judge Logan has been a
visiting professor at Harvard Law School, the
University of Texas Law School, Stanford
University School of Law, and the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School. He lectures at
Duke University Law School. He was a spe-
cial commissioner for the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Kansas from
1964 until 1967 and was a candidate for the
United States Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi, and has co-authored
books and numerous articles on estate plan-
ning, administration and corporate law. In
1977, he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

A NOTE FROM THE EDITOR
During this last Survey year, the Colorado Supreme Court issued a deci-
sion that warranted a deviation from the traditional federal appellate court
focus of the Annual Tenth Circuit Survey. During the last two years, the State
of Colorado has emerged as the definitive host of the battle surrounding equal
rights for lesbians, gays, and bisexuals. The decision of the Colorado Supreme
Court in Evans v. Romer,' is illustrative of both the divisiveness of the issue
and the challenging task of justifying a seemingly obvious legal right in the
face of ambiguous United States Supreme Court precedent.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari to hear the case
invoked the entire spectrum of emotion in our University of Denver communi-
ty: fear, joy, uncertainty, relief, and utter terror. As such, I could hardly refuse
to open up the pages of the Annual Survey to student comment on this stirring
issue.
The resulting Commentary that appears in this edition will, like Amend-
ment 2, spark fierce debate. It is this Editor's hope that such debate will be
constructive, enlightening, and undertaken with a keen awareness of the indi-
vidual, and exceptionally personal, stakes at issue.
Charlotte N. Sweeney, Editor
THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL TENTH CIRCUIT SURVEY




EvANS V. ROMER: AN "OLD" RIGHT COMES OUT
It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society
against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the
society against the injustice of the other part.'
INTRODUCTION
The timing of the decision was, at the very least, interesting. On October
11, 1994, National Coming Out Day,2 the justices of the Supreme Court of
Colorado announced the death of Amendment 22 Almost two years earlier,
Colorado voters had passed an initiative that amended the state constitution.
Amendment 2 rescinded existing laws and policies that prohibited discrimina-
tion against persons of "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual" orientation.5 It fur-
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982). Madison
opposed allowing constitutional questions to be influenced by changing "public passions" repeat-
edly put "to the decision of the whole society." Id. No. 49, at 340.
2. Michael Booth, The Battle is Far from Over, DENY. POST, Oct. 12, 1994, at A10. "Com-
ing out.., refers to a process by which individuals who's [sic] gay, lesbian, or bisexual eventual-
ly comes to understand their same-sex interests and to take action to find a way to accommodate
that and come to understanding and perhaps express it." Record vol. 3 at 85, Evans v. Romer, No.
92-CV7223, 1993 WL 19678 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 1993) (Bayless I) (testimony of John C.
Gonziorek at the trial requesting a preliminary injunction). One of the plaintiffs at the same trial
testified:
Coming out of the closet is a series of steps that you take. For me, the first step was to
come out socially. That is, to identify with other gays and lesbians and go to places
where gays and lesbians congregate. The second step for me was to come out to my
family, all of my family, and let them know what my sexual orientation was. And the
third stage was to come out professionally and identify myself as an openly gay man.
Record vol. 4 at 47-48 (testimony of Richard Evans).
3. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (en banc), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092
(1995) (Evans II). Amendment 2 provides:
No Protected Status Based On Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither
the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agen-
cies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or en-
force any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisex-
ual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the
basis of, or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Con-
stitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30 (as it would read if amended by Amendment 2).
4. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (upholding the preliminary
injunction issued by the district court) (Evans 1). On November 3, 1992, Amendment 2 passed by
a margin of 53.4% to 46.6%. Id.
5. Amendment 2 rescinded laws and policies affecting homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexu-
als. Supra note 3. In 1977, Aspen passed an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in employment,
housing, public services, and public accommodations based on numerous classifications, including
sexual orientation. ASPEN, COLO., CODE § 13-98 (1977). Boulder enacted a similar measure in
1987. BOULDER, COLO., CODE § 12-1 (1981). See Record vol. 5 at 46-47 (testimony of Leslie
Durgin, the Mayor of Boulder, noting that 51% of the people in Boulder voted in favor of adding
sexual orientation to the Human Rights Ordinance). Denver's anti-discriminatory policy was
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ther mandated that voters could only attain such a law or policy in the future
by reamending the constitution.6
Gay rights proponents challenged the measure in court.7 They advanced
primarily on the theory that Amendment 2 violated the fundamental right of
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to participate equally in the political process!
Following a lengthy legal battle, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed.9
Gay rights activists could celebrate victory over intolerance only brief-
ly.'0 On February 21, 1995, the United States Supreme Court granted the
passed in October of 1990. DENVER, COLO., CODE art. IV, § 28-91 (1990). In 1990, Governor
Roy Romer also issued an executive order prohibiting discriminatory practices in state employ-
ment. Executive Order in Celebration of Human Rights, Roy Romer, Governor (Dec. 10, 1990).
Insurance companies were prevented from determining insurability on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(l)(f)(vi) (1987 & Supp. 1992).
At trial, plaintiffs noted repeatedly that because Amendment 2 applied only to laws and
policies affecting homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals, heterosexuals would have a remedy under
law that was denied to those of other sexual orientations. Record vol. 4 at 154, Bayless I (No. 92-
CV7223) (testimony of John Bennett, Mayor of Aspen); Record vol. 4 at 208-09 (testimony of
Richard Evans, the Denver official who handles complaints concerning gay and lesbian discrimi-
nation); Record vol. 5 at 38 (testimony of Dani Newsum, the Director of Boulder's Office of
Human Rights). Plaintiffs also asserted that even if private companies chose to extend protection
to those groups, no remedy existed unless provided by the private entity itself because of Amend-
ment 2. Record vol. 5 at 57-59 (testimony of Leslie Durgin).
6. Supra note 3.
7. Opponents challenged the measure in state district court (Bayless 1). Judge Bayless grant-
ed a preliminary injunction. Bayless 1, 1993 WL 19678 at *12.
8. Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 28-33, Bayless I (No. 92-
CV7223). Plaintiffs charged Amendment 2 violated other constitutional rights: (1) the First
Amendment right to freedom of association and expression; (2) the First Amendment right to
petition the government for redress of grievances; (3) the Establishment Clause by advancing a
particular religious view; (4) the guarantee of a republican form of government; (5) the Supremacy
Clause by preventing state courts from hearing federal claims of discrimination; and (6) the plain-
tiffs claimed Amendment 2 was impermissibly vague. They also raised several state constitutional
claims: (1) an initiative cannot place legislation out of the reach of the general assembly; and (2)
the home rule provisions grant power to municipalities to enact such laws. Complaint at 6-11,
Bayless I (No. 92-CV7223).
9. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282. The Colorado Supreme Court recognized the existence of the
right to participate in the political process when they upheld the preliminary injunction issued by
the district court. Id. The state appealed the second district court's decision granting a permanent
injunction in Evans II. In that decision, the court found no compelling state interest, narrowly tai-
lored to serve that interest, and upheld the permanent injunction. Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1350.
Cincinnati, Ohio voters had enacted a similar measure at the city level one year after the
passage of Amendment 2. Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 263-64 (6th Cir.
1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3122 (U.S. Aug. 10, 1995) (No. 95-239). Issue 3 was a
city charter amendment which prohibited the city from enacting any law or policy which gave rise
to a claim of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id. Gay rights proponents challenged the
measure in federal district court and won on a variety of issues, including the right to equal politi-
cal participation. Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 433-34 (S.D. Ohio),
affld in part, vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3122 (U.S.
Aug. 10, 1995) (No. 95-239). The Sixth Circuit subsequently reversed and petition for certiorari
has been filed. This commentary will not address the Cincinnati case because of the pending Su-
preme Court action on Amendment 2.
10. See generally Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L.
REv. 1905 (1993) (discussing the increasing use of legislation to protect against discriminatory ac-
tions based on sexual orientation) [hereinafter Constitutional Limits]. Over the last several de-
cades, at least 139 jurisdictions have enacted legislation protecting gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.
Id. at 1905. The increased visibility of gay rights activism produced a movement led by funda-
mentalist religious groups to repeal those anti-discrimination measures. Valerie Richardson,
Amendment Two, Act Two; Gay-Rights Foe Builds on Colorado Victory, WASH. TIMES, June 2,
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state's writ of certiorari." Fear rippled through the gay community, though
publicly, leaders painted brave faces. 2 Review of the Colorado decision justi-
fiably produced waves of apprehension because the current conservative Court
frowns on the birth of "new" fundamental rights.'3
This commentary proposes that the fundamental right exposed by Evans v.
Romer 4 saw the light of day long before the Colorado Supreme Court took
up its inquiry. When the nation's Founders debated the structure of our gov-
ernment, protecting the rights of minorities emerged as one of their primary
concerns. 5 While bestowing the right to vote created a democratic society,
the Framers worried that the power of the ballot box could stifle minority
rights. 6 Zealous majorities could override and trample any minority at the
polls. When the Supreme Court examines the constitutionality of Amendment
2, the Justices need look no farther than the Founder's words to uphold the
fundamental right to participate in the political process. 7
1993, at Al; see also George de Lama, Colorado Springs Showdown: Gays Facing Fundamental-
ists, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 27, 1993, "News" Section, at 1.
11. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (en banc), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092
(1995) (Evans II). An increasing reluctance by the Court to grant certiorari made the decision
more significant. Last year, the Court accepted only 99 cases from the nearly 7,700 petitioned.
Adriel Bettelheim, High Court Breaks Silence, Steps into Gay-Rights Arena, DENy. POST, Feb. 22,
1995, at A4.
12. See Jeffrey A. Roberts, Gays Equate Court Battle to Brown vs. Board of Ed., DENV.
POST, Feb. 22, 1995, at A4. One of the plaintiffs worried that review would put their lives on the
line, "jeopardizing their jobs and safety." Id. "This is our Brown." Id. (quoting Richard Evans, one
of the plaintiffs). But John Miller asserted that the developing middle ground in the Court would
provide a fair hearing. Id. See Howard Pankratz, Amendment 2 Showdown, DENV. POST, Feb. 22,
1995, at Al. Rabbi Steve Foster maintained that a ruling by the Supreme Court will "give us
some clarity." Id.
13. "It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name
of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 33 (1973) (holding that public education is not a fundamental right); see also Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) ("There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the
substantive reach of the [Due Process Clauses], particularly if it requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental."); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (declaring that
there is no constitutional right to minimal housing).
Some Justices have used a broader method and found a fundamental right if it was "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977). An unenumerated fundamental right is a right not explicity granted in the Consti-
tution, but is so basic as to be "implicity in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Ronald Dworkin concludes that "unenumerated" fundamental rights
differ from enumerated rights only in their level of abstraction. They both are derived from the
text of the Constitution. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should
Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 386-90 (1992).
14. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282.
15. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
17. Many Justices place great weight on the intent of the Framers. See SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE
REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 28-30 (1989) (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist believes
that judges should not superimpose their beliefs and therefore should examine the intent of the
Framers to determine constitutional questions); CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA
AND THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSERVATIVE MoMENT 30-35 (1994) (explaining Scalia's approach
to constitutional interpretation as "textualist and originalist"). Even less conservative Justices con-
sider the intent of the Framers an important facet in clarifying constitutional issues. See e.g., U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (the opinion of Justice Stevens emphasized
and relied on the intent of the Framers to determine if states may set term limits on national repre-
sentatives).
1995]
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Additionally, the right to equal political participation has ridden silently
with us throughout the ages as the Court has travelled down the evolving path
of voting rights. As the Supreme Court examined our basic right to vote, a
doctrine emerged that recognizes more substance to the right to vote than
merely "one person, one vote."'8 The Court has acknowledged that the right
to vote is hollow without the ability to elect a representative who in turn will
have the ability to enact favorable legislation on the voter's behalf. 9
Most importantly, however, the Court's examination of Amendment 2
must supplement precedent with the most rudimentary democratic ideal: equal-
ity. Whether Amendment 2 interferes with fundamental equality depends on
two underlying questions. First, may a majority of a state's voters "fence out"
a group from participation in a level of government? Second, may a group of
citizens be denied the opportunity to ever elect a representative who can carry
their voice into the legislative halls? The Colorado Supreme Court answered in
the negative.2°
While the right recognized by Evans v. Romer finds its roots in history,
and is further granted legitimacy by democratic values, the court plowed new
ground in the area of equal protection analysis. Evans announced that a funda-
mental right to political participation cannot be denied to an "identifiable
group."'" By necessity, examination of this right requires weaving the funda-
mental right strand of equal protection analysis 22 with group concepts bor-
rowed from the suspect class strand.23 The Evans decision implied that ele-
ments used by courts to measure suspect class status 24 are also useful to eval-
uate the identifiability of the group denied political participation.' This new
"hybrid," if you will, of equal protection analysis could distract the Court from
the fundamental harm imposed by Amendment 2. In particular, the current
Court's aversion to breaking new ground26 combined with the judiciary's his-
torical reluctance to grant gays and lesbians suspect class status, 27 could
cause the Court to resist the invitation to adapt its equal protection analysis,
18. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
19. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964) (noting that the basic principle of
represenative government requires non-dilution of the electorate's vote); see also Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969) (noting that voting restrictions can be subtle as well as
obvious).
20. Evans 1I, 882 P.2d at 1350.
21. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1285.
22. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITTIONAL LAW § 16-7 (2d ed. 1988).
23. Id. § 16-23.
24. Id. § 16-23, at 1545 (describing the criteria that the Supreme Court has used in its evalu-
ation of a suspect class as: historical discrimination, immutability, and politically weak or unpop-
ular).
25. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1284-85.
26. See Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First
Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 901 (1993) (advising attorneys litigating before the Supreme
Court to get a good book on legal history).
27. See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Homo-
sexuality, as a definitive trait, differs fundamentally from those defining any of the recognized
suspect or quasi-suspect classes."), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); see also John F. Niblock,
Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REv. 153, 170-71
(1993) (summarizing the reasons courts have declined to apply suspect class status to sexual orien-
tation).
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and to leave Amendment 2's harm unremedied.
This commentary argues that the judiciary should focus primarily on the
historical origin of the right identified by the Evans court, and not get side-
tracked by the hybrid nature of the Evans court's equal protection analysis.
The harm that Amendment 2 would impose on gays, lesbians, and bisexuals is
exactly what the Framers intended to prevent when they chose a representa-
tional form of government." That a doctrine may have to be modified to
accomodate supporting that right should not preclude the Supreme Court of
this land from granting redress for the underlying harm.
Part I traces the history of the Amendment 2 litigation and details the
Colorado court's analysis from the viewpoints of both the majority and dis-
sent. Part II proposes that the Constitution's Framers intended that the struc-
ture of our government should protect us from the very evil unleashed by
Amendment 2.' Indeed, the fear of majority tyranny loomed large in the
words of James Madison. ° Part III suggests that political access may be un-
derstood in terms of vote dilution, and analogizes voting cases to Amendment
2's denial of effective participation.3 Part IV concludes that while this "new"
(old) fundamental right to political participation exists, it applies to groups
singled out in some way for different treatment.32 The proper review focuses
on defining what kind of "group" is entitled to protection in the political pro-
cess. In effect, this involves exploring the extent of a nexus between the harm
and the group it impacts. This section explores the parameters of the right
identified by Evans by using hypotheticals of other groups denied political
participation.
PART I: BACKGROUND
A. The Majority View
1. Voting Embodies "Effective" Participation.
Following the passage of Amendment 2, opponents challenged the mea-
sure in state district court.3 3 The district court granted a preliminary injunc-
tion, finding that Amendment 2 burdened "the right not to have the State
endorse and give effect to private biases."34 The Colorado Supreme Court up-
held the district court's preliminary injunction, but found that the fundamental
right burdened by Amendment 2 was instead the "right to participate equally
in the political process."35 The court first announced that it did not create this
right.36 At the inception of the Republic, "the right of citizens to participate
28. See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
29. Infra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
30. Infra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
31. Infra notes 160-94 and accompanying text.
32. Infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
33. Bayless 1, 1993 WL 19678 at *4. See supra note 8 for the various claims asserted.
34. Bayless 1, 1993 WL 19678 at * 11.
35. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282.
36. Id. at 1276.
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in the process of government" existed as a core democratic value.37 The
court's analysis then wove together a series of cases to find that an identifiable
group of people may not be "fenced out" of the political process." Each of
these cases supported the court's concern about denying "effective" participa-
tion, whether direct or indirect.
a. Direct Burdens on Voting Preclude Effective Participation.
First, the Evans court examined direct burdens on the right to vote, such
as requiring payment of a poll tax 39 or ownership of property' before grant-
ing access to the ballot box.4 These types of voting restrictions most directly
violate the Equal Protection Clause and have been consistently struck down by
the Supreme Court.42 The Evans court identified the danger of such precondi-
tions on voting rights as denying the electorate "any effective voice in the
governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives."'43
The court carefully distinguished effective participation from successful
participation, holding that only the former is protected." Although Amend-
ment 2 does not deny gay rights proponents the actual ability to vote, it does
deny them the right to effectively participate in every layer of representational
government.45 On the initial level, voters could not vote for representatives
who have the power to work toward passage of anti-discrimination laws. At
the next stage, any elected representatives who wanted to pass anti-discrimina-
tion laws could cast their vote for every gay rights measure proposed, but
Amendment 2 would prevent the enactment of any favorable legislation. While
this distinction of successful versus effective seems subtle, the court relied on
three other categories of cases to flesh out the differences.'
b. Indirect Burdens Similarly Deny Effective Participation.
Limitations and conditions sometimes burden voters only indirectly. First,
the Evans court noted that reapportionment cases held that "meaningful" par-
ticipation requires equality of voting rights.47 Reynolds v. Sims' announced
that "the overriding objective must be substantial equality of population among
the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1285.
39. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) ("[W]ealth or fee
paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications .... ).
40. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969) (limiting franchise to owners
of taxable property violates equal protection).
41. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1277.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627).
44. Id.
45. Amendment 2 would prevent the enactment of any "statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy" that provided protection from discrimination to homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexuals. See
supra note 3 for the exact language of the amendment.
46. Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1277-79.
47. Id. at 1278.
48. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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weight to that of any other citizen in the State."'49 The Evans court relied on
Reynolds to conclude that the Constitution requires not only participation at
the ballot box, but equal participation."
Similarly, the Evans court found that candidate eligibility and ballot ac-
cess cases supported the right of effective participation.5 In those cases, the
Supreme Court held that restricting access to the ballot to only candidates
affiliated with one of the two major political parties indirectly burdened the
rights of voters to effectively exercise their franchise.52 The mere right to cast
a ballot was insufficient if voters could use their vote only in a limited fash-
ion." The proper inquiry in ballot access cases is whether the challenged re-
striction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the "availability of political oppor-
tunity. 54 A court must implicitly recognize the potential fluidity of American
political life, and ensure that the state does not freeze the status quo by deny-
ing access to independent candidates.55
2. Groups Have a Right to Effective Participation in the Political
Process.
Relying on another line of cases, the Evans majority rejected the argument
that only individuals enjoy the right to effective participation.56 The court
held instead that groups of citizens have an analogous right of effective partic-
ipation.57 The court examined cases dealing with communities that had placed
extra burdens on particular laws for successful passage.5" All of the laws at-
tempted to limit the normal political processes available to a group that de-
sired to enact favorable legislation. The Evans court reasoned that these cases,
woven together, implicitly recognized that government may not deny equal
participation to a "independently identifiable group" any more than to an indi-
vidual citizen.59 Viewed together, they gave substance to the right identified
by the Evans majority.
a. A Focus on Unfair Treatment- Hunter v. Erickson'
The most troubling factor for the Evans court was the unfair treatment
49. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
50. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1276 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 1278 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968)).
52. "By limiting the choices available to voters, the State impairs the voters' ability to ex-
press their political preferences." Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173, 184 (1979).
53. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1278. "The right to form a party for the advancement of po-
litical goals means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot and thus denied an equal
opportunity to win votes." Williams, 393 U.S. at 31.
54. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964 (1982) (quoting Lubin v. Parish, 415 U.S. 709,
716 (1974)) (emphasis added).
55. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 817 (1983).
56. Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1279-82.
57. Id. at 1279.
58. See infra notes 60-84 and accompanying text.
59. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1285.
60. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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accorded to one group by the challenged measure. They first pointed to Hunt-
er, in which the Supreme Court invalidated a city charter amendment in Ak-
ron, Ohio that required any fair housing legislation to be ratified by a public
referendum." Other ordinances could be enacted directly by the city council,
with no submission to a popular vote.62 The Evans court found it significant
that, according to Justice White's opinion, Akron could require a city-wide
vote for all of its legislation, but could not single out one type for different
treatment.' Requiring more only for fair housing legislation imposed uncon-
stitutional special burdens on those who would benefit from such legisla-
tion.'
Critics (including the Evans dissent) asserted that the racial classifications
at issue in Hunter formed the basis for the decision.6" The Evans majority
spent much of its opinion answering this limited reading of Hunter. They
charged that the Hunter Court's use of voting cases, rather than a suspect class
analysis based on race, demonstrated the race context was neither a necessary
nor sufficient basis for striking down the amendment.' If the Hunter Court
had intended the decision to turn on racial discrimination, then it could easily
have relied on racial precedents.
b. A Discriminatory Purpose: Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 167
To bolster the argument that the Hunter decision was not simply based on
race, the Evans court utilized another case which expanded the concept of
unfairness to a particular group.' In Washington, the Supreme Court invali-
dated a statewide voter initiative that prohibited local school boards from
busing students to achieve racial desegregation.' The measure allowed bus-
ing for other purposes, however, such as special educational programs, over-
crowded or unsafe conditions, or inadequate physical facilities. 70 The school
board, therefore, could assign students to other schools for various reasons, but
not to achieve integration.7' The Court noted that if the voter initiative had
61. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1279 (citing Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387). Significantly, just like
Amendment 2, the ordinance not only suspended the existing ordinance forbidding housing dis-
crimination, but required the approval of the voters before any future ordinance could take effect.
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389-90.
62. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389-90. The amendment "drew a distinction between those groups
who sought the law's protection against racial ... discriminations in the sale and rental of real
estate and those who sought to regulate real property transactions in the pursuit of other ends." Id.
at 390.
63. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1279 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 1279-80.
65. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
66. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1279-80. The Hunter Court cited Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) and Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), both of which involved reapportion-
ment and not discrimination based on race. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
67. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
68. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1280-81.
69. Washington, 458 U.S. at 470.
70. Id. at 462.
71. Id.
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placed "obstacles in the path of everyone," it would have withstood the consti-
tutional challenge."
The Washington Court clarified the Hunter decision. They identified the
"simple but central principle" underlying Hunter as Justice Harlan's "neutral
principles" doctrine." Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Hunter, asserted
that facially discriminatory statutes that do not allocate power on the basis of a
neutral principle should be invalidated.74 The focus of the Washington Court
on power allocation moved the holding of Hunter outside the narrow bounds
of racial discrimination."
Not only was the burden placed on one particular issue, but it removed a
level of government participation from a certain interested group. Prior to the
state vote on the issue, local school boards had the ability to decide whether
busing was in the best interests of their district.76 Under the voter initiative,
busing advocates could no longer seek their remedy from local school boards.
A statewide vote would be required to change the busing policy, rather than a
local school board decision.77 The Washington Court noted that the initiative
burdened all future attempts to integrate Washington schools in districts
throughout the state, by lodging the decisionmaking authority over the ques-
tion at a new and remote level of government.7"
c. No Issue Singled Out- Gordon v. Lance79
The Evans majority cited one additional case to lend support to the argu-
ment that the two prior decisions (Hunter and Washington) were not racially
based, but instead turned on the faimess to any identifiable group of voters."0
In Gordon, the Supreme Court upheld a West Virginia statute that required an
increased percentage of voters to approve any bond indebtedness.8 ' The Court
distinguished Hunter because the required three-fifths majority applied to all
bond issues, and did not single out issues relating to a particular purpose, such
as school funding. 2 Only fair housing legislation was subject to public refer-
72. Id. at 470.
73. Id. at 469-70.
74. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393 (Harlan J., concurring). Harlan identified two classes of statutes.
Statutes which "have the clear purpose of making it more difficult for racial and religious minori-
ties to further their political aims" should be struck down. Id. The other category of statutes were
only enacted to provide a "just framework within which the diverse political groups in our society
may fairly compete and are not enacted with the purpose of assisting one particular group in its
struggle with its political opponents." Id. Clearly, Justice Harlan's neutral principle extended be-
yond racial classifications. The key factor in his analysis was if the statute disadvantaged (or pro-
tected, to the detriment of others) one group. Id.
75. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1281.
76. Washington, 458 U.S. at 479-80.
77. Id. While the Evans court did not specifically mention this diversion factor, the Supreme
Court in Washington found it significant. They noted that small communities who had operated
successful desegregational busing programs for years would find it difficult to gamer the neces-
sary statewide support. Id. at 484 n.27.
78. Id. at 483.
79. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
80. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1281-82.
81. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 2.
82. Id. at 5.
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endum in Hunter.3 Moreover, Gordon involved no racial classification, and
relied on Hunter without placing significance on the fact that the class dis-
criminated against in Hunter was a racial minority. 4
3. Amendment 2 Denies Effective Participation by Denying the
Opportunity to Enact Favorable Legislation.
Like the burdens placed on special groups that the Evans court examined,
Amendment 2 would restrict the ability of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to ever
participate equally in Colorado's political process. While they could cast their
vote, it would be an empty exercise because their elected representative could
represent in name only. Any favorable proposal would be doomed before the
legislative process began.
The language of the amendment itself violates the Hunter principle that
governmental power must be allocated based on neutral principles.85 Amend-
ment 2 would erect near-total barriers only for those interested in passage of
legislation that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation. Other
types of anti-discrimination ordinances could be passed at the local level. All
other groups could carry their concerns to their representatives and request
action. Only gay rights proponents must resort to the electorate for passage of
favorable laws.
Before the passage of Amendment 2, local communities had enacted legis-
lation protecting citizens from discrimination based on their sexual orienta-
tion. 6 Amendment 2 would remove this level of governmental protection
from those local citizens and provide the opportunity for remedy only by
amending the state constitution. All other citizens pursuing legislative goals
could elect representatives to lobby for their interests, pass local ordinances,
and adopt state statutes, but gay rights proponents could only take their issues
to a statewide vote.
B. The Dissenting View
The lone dissenting justice in Evans took the majority to task in its analy-
sis of, in his view, these "race" cases.8" He argued that the laws struck down
in Hunter and Washington violated racial principles.8 Justice Erickson added
another case into the mix, James v. Valtierra,"9 which he concluded was dis-
positive." The James Court upheld a newly-approved provision of the Cali-
fornia Constitution that mandated a voter referendum before approval of low-
rent housing projects.9 Prior to the constitutional amendment, each county
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See supra note 3.
86. Supra note 5.
87. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1293-1300 (Erickson J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
90. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1298 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
91. James, 402 U.S. at 139.
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and city had a public housing authority to take advantage of federal financing
opportunities.9' Significantly for Justice Erickson, the Supreme Court in
James distinguished Hunter by noting that the California provision under ex-
amination did not rest on "distinctions based on race." '93 The Court further
explicity stated that they would not extend Hunter.94
The Evans majority addressed the criticism of Justice Erickson by focus-
ing on the dissent in James.95 The three dissenters had argued that the consti-
tutional provision at issue discriminated on the basis of wealth.96 They ig-
nored the majority's use of Hunter, discussing instead the invidious discrimi-
nation against poor people on the face of the measure.97 The majority had
characterized the provision as only a benign economic classification.9" For the
dissenters in James, the issue did not fall into the narrower framework of who
warranted the protection given by Hunter. They instead examined the broader
question of who deserved suspect class status under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.99 The Evans court concluded that James, therefore, was best understood
as a case declining to apply suspect class status to the poor, rather than mak-
ing race a threshold requirement for the application of Hunter."m
To bolster this view, the Evans court further noted that the James majority
had all joined the later Gordon opinion.'0 ' The Gordon Court refused to
strike down a measure that required an increased number of voters to pass any
bond-indebtedness issues. '2 The West Virginia statute at issue involved no
racial classification."3 The Gordon opinion did not mention James."°4
Presumably, if the question turned on whether race was a prerequisite for the
92. Id. at 138.
93. Id. at 141 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391).
94. Id. Professor Derrick Bell observed that it was only Justice Black's devotion to the refer-
endum that could explain the James decision. Justice Black had written the majority opinion in
James, and was the lone dissenter in Hunter. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's
Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L.R. 1, 3-7 (1978). "[D]evotion to the referendum presents
a serious danger to the civil rights of minority groups." Id. at 6. The James decision was also
criticized by zoning and planning experts who thought the voter referendum requirements "were
not imposed out of devotion to abstract principles of direct democracy. They were imposed to
raise difficult, and frequently insuperable, barriers to the provision of needed lower income hous-
ing or to change in the municipality's existing land-use regulations." ABA ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON HOUSING AND URBAN GROWTH, HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW 93 (Richard P. Fishman
ed., 1978).
95. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282 n.21.
96. James, 402 U.S. at 144-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 143-44. The provision at issue, section 1 of California Article XXXIV provided:
No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner
by any state public body until, a majority of the qualified electors of the city, town or county, as
the case may be, in which it is proposed to develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon
such issue, approve such project by voting in favor thereof at an election to be held for that pur-
pose, or at any general or special election.
CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1.
98. James, 402 U.S. at 143 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 144-45.
100. Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1282 n.21.
101. Id.
102. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 8.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282 n.21.
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application of Hunter, the Court would have mentioned James, where the pro-
tection of Hunter had been denied.
C. Basic Values: A Representational Government
While both the majority and dissent in Evans articulate arguably support-
able positions, the initial declaration by the majority concerning the impor-
tance of citizen participation may be the most revealing of all."05 The extend-
ed discussions in both opinions may be missing the forest (the essential nature
and value of equal political participation in the structure of our government),
to concentrate on naming the individual trees (citing case law to reach a con-
clusion that has been inherent in our government since the founding fathers
created it).
What is more basic to the values of our republic than the ability of voters
to cast their ballots to pass favorable measures? The existence of the right to
equally participate lies at the very heart of our representative government."°
While Amendment 2 does not foreclose the opportunity to vote, it denies the
opportunity to pass favorable legislation. Gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, or
simply people who believe in equal access to government and a constitutional
right to non-discrimination, would have to go to the highest level of govern-
ment to advance beneficial legislation.
The denial of an opportunity to enact favorable legislative measures to an
unpopular (or any) identifiable group of voters violates the very notion of
equality upon which this country was established. As the Framers built the
foundations of our government, they sought to ensure that the power of a
majority could not usurp the rights of a minority. Their answer lay in choosing
a representative form of government, which is exactly what Amendment 2
threatens to destroy.
PART II: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN
A. The Framers' Intent
When the colonies pulled free of Great Britain's yoke, the Founders
searched for tools to protect the fledgling nation. The ballot box offered the
greatest hope." They believed the constant threat of removal by the gov-
erned served to keep the hearts of the elected representatives pure."° This in
no way implied that the Framers placed any great faith in the judgment of the
people. On the contrary, James Madison greatly feared the "passions" of "fac-
tions." °9 Madison defined a faction as "a number of citizens whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated
105. Id. at 1276.
106. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 1705, 1716-17 (1993) (arguing that voting constitutes the concept of governance, which
does not end when the voter pulls the lever).
107. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSTRUST 78 (1980).
108. See id. at 77.
109. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56-57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982).
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by some common impulse of passion or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens .. ."11o
Madison recognized that unbridled freedom at the ballot box ensured only
that majority would rule. Voting constrains the "sinister views" of minority
factions by defeat at the polls."' The danger, however, lies in the sacrifice of
minority rights to the will of the majority. If the faction is a majority, then the
power of the ballot box "enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest
both the public good and the rights of other citizens.""' 2
Madison emphasized the preservation of minority rights throughout The
Federalist. "If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the
minority will be insecure."''3 "[T]he majority, having such coexistent passion
or interest, must be rendered ... unable to concert and carry into effect
schemes of passion.""' 4 "In a society ... [in] which the stronger faction can
readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may be truly said to
reign.. . ."' ' As Robert Bork explained, there are "some things majorities
must not do to minorities, some areas of life in which the individual must be
free of majority rule.""' 6
Some commentators have argued that the Framers' concerns centered on
property rights, not a sense of justice for the "poor" minorities.' Following
that logic, unless the dispute involved property, the Framers' worries about
majoritarian tyranny would not apply. Others, however, have contended that
Madison's concerns extended not only to materialistic special interests
(factions), but also included a fear of religious "factions.""'  Madison be-
lieved that religion could inspire individuals to acts that would otherwise re-
volt their consciences."s' He observed that religion "[e]ven in its coolest
state... has been much oftener a motive to oppression than a restraint from it."'2 °
110. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 60. "If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republi-
can principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote ...." Id.
112. Id. at 60-61 (describing a "pure" democracy).
113. Id. NO. 51, at 351. Madison intended a moral dimension to the term "faction." See MOR-
TON G. WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 57 (1987).
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982).
115. Id. No. 51, at 352. Madison implies that "oppression" is when "measures are ... decid-
ed, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior
force of an interested and over-bearing majority." Id. No. 10, at 57.
116. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 139 (1990).
117. See Gordon S. Wood, Democracy and the Constitution, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE
CONSTITUTION 1-17 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1980).
118. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1013, 1022 n.16 (1984); see also DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FED-
ERALJST 76 (1984) ("It is clear from Madison's previous versions of Federalist 10's argument that
religious factions were his primary concern among opinionated parties."); Hans A. Linde, When
Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72
OR. L. REV. 19, 32 (1993) (noting that at the time of the Constitution, while "interest" had a
specific economic meaning, "passion" included envy and revenge directed against other persons
(citing David Hume's TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE) (citation omitted)). Linde observed that the
U.S. Supreme Court had linked the guarantee of a republican government with protections against
"the sudden impulses of mere majorities." Id. at 33 (quoting In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461
(1891)).
119. WHITE, supra note 113, at 133.
120. Id. at 133-34 (quoting 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 213-14 (Robert A. Rutland et al.
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Whether motivated by religion or property, Madison's concerns focused
on protecting minority factions from the power of the majority. 2' Undeni-
ably, gays provide the best example in today's society of the kind of minority
that the Framers were trying to protect: historically unpopular, and arousing
passion in those who oppose them.'22
eds., 1973)). Madison had considered the possibility that religious motives could help control a
factious majority. Id. Richardson, supra note 10, at Al; see also Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and
the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 216 (noting that many religious groups in
America condemn homosexuality).
Few could argue that the motivation and drive behind Amendment 2 was not religiously
based. Colorado For Family Values (CFV) sponsored the drive to gather signatures to place
Amendment 2 on the ballot. The mission statement for CFV provides that "Colorado For Family
Values is a non-profit coalition of Colorado citizens whose mission is to amend, through the ini-
tiative process, the Colorado State Constitution so as to prevent homosexual, bisexual and lesbian
orientation from being used as bases for the granting of protected class status or special rights."
The organization is based in Colorado Springs. Fundraising letter from Colorado For Family Val-
ues (on file with the author). Anti-gay advocates frequently recite the Bible to justify their opposi-
tion to homosexuality. Claire Martin, Many See Basic Values Under Siege, DENV. POST, Sept. 19,
1993, at D14. Evidence presented at the trial for the preliminary injunction against Amendment 2
characterized religious views toward homosexuality as "very black and white and simplistic."
Record vol. 3 at 102, Bayless I (No. 92-CV7223) (testimony of John C. Gonziorek). Describing
some of the CFV literature, Mr. Gonziorek explained, "Well, one of the articles particularly at the
end talks about after stating how horrible gay men and lesbians are, if they give up their homosex-
uality and embrace certain religious beliefs, they would be redeemed and good people." Record
vol. 3 at 103.
One particularly venonomous organization is named S.T.R.A.I.G.H.T. (Society To Remove
All Immoral Godless Homosexual Trash). Its publications include articles reprinted from other
sources, such as a Cal Thomas column equating the homosexual lifestyle with pedophilia. Cal
Thomas, Gay Rights? A Sign of American Decline?, S.T.R.A.I.G.H.T. (S.T.R.A.I.G.H.T., Denver,
Colo.), Vol. 1, Issue 4, at 1.
121. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
122. See Constitutional Limits, supra note 10, at 1906 (referring to the historical discrimina-
tion suffered by lesbians and gay men). Reported hate crimes have more than doubled from 1988
to 1993 in five major cities keeping consistent statistics. Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homo-
sexuals, and the Constitution, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 387, 409 (1994). Much of the victimiza-
tion goes unreported because of the fear of increased discrimination. Id. at 413. Violence against
gay men in particular is often gruesome and brutal. Id. at 410-11.
For only a few of the more recent discriminatory actions suffered by lesbians or gays, see,
e.g., Cheryl Clark, Action by S.D. Fails to Stem Hate Crimes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 4,
1995, at Al (listing various incidents, including: the murder of a young man whose attackers had
shouted "faggot," the whipping of one man by skinheads, and the stabbing of another man, whose
attacker had said he was "robbing queers"); Kevin Duchschere, Gay Man Alleges Abuse, Sues
Hennepin County, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), June 2, 1995, at B5 (relating story of
gay man who claimed two guards physically assaulted him); Mike Folks & Stephanie Smith,
Knight Found Guilty, SuN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Sept. 30, 1995, at lB (describing the
defendant's reaction to a guilty verdict for murdering a gay man after setting out to "roll a fag-
got"); Ernie Hoffman, Witness Says Killing Suspect Kicked Victim, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
July 13, 1995, at B4 (relating the account of a witness who said that the defendant had said he
planned to kill a homosexual a few days before he beat a man to death); Gabriel Rotello, Busted
Heads and Twisted Minds, NEWSDAY, July 13, 1995, at A31 (describing an attack by skinheads);
Scott W. Wright, Car Dealer Sued for Not Selling to Man with Aids, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICA-
YUNE, July 21, 1995, at A10 (reporting a lawsuit filed by an AIDS victim who had been called
faggot and denied the purchase of a car).
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B. Representative Government as a Control
The Framers intended representative government to curb the excesses of
"factions."' 23 They believed that the individual nature of people prevents the
removal of the causes of factions. 24 The Founders sought instead to limit its
effects.' 5 Madison did not trust the motives of the people to limit factions,
but thought that the government should instead provide no opportunity for
oppression."' Hamilton wrote that a representative government "will be less
apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those
occasional ill humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which...
beget injustice . '. . ."' Madison believed that representative government of-
fered the best cure for the control of factions by "passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial consideration."'2 s
Decisionmakers, removed from the heat of the moment, could reflect on rash
motives, and diffuse the possible effects of prejudice.'29
Representative government encompasses cooperation, coalition, and com-
promise. While individual voters may not persuade opponents to listen, legisla-
123. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982). "[T]he
majority ... must be rendered ... unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppres-
sion.... A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which the scheme of representation takes
place, opens a different prospect and promises the cure for which we are seeking." Id. Without a
representative government, a majority faction is permitted to "mask its violence under the forms of
the Constitution." Id. at 60.
124. lId.
125. Id. "[I1t is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the govern-
ment. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government." Id. No. 49, at 343.
126. See WHiTE, supra note 113, at 135.
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982).
Hamilton noted:
The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community should
govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but it
does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to
every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter
their prejudices to betray their interests.
Id. No. 71, at 482.
William Adams commented that voters, who are not subjected to a public process, are
much less likely to put personal prejudices aside in the privacy of a voting booth rather than the
legislator subjected to public scrutiny. See William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot
Initiative Challenges: Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct Democracy,
55 OHO ST. L.J. 583, 596-97 (1994).
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982) (emphasis
added). Julian Eule referred to this as one aspect of "filtering" the majority will. Julian N. Eule,
Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE LJ. 1503, 1526-27 (1990). He noted that the
Founders had an inherent distrust of democracies. Id. at 1522. At the Constitutional Convention,
Edmund Randolph "complained of the 'turbulence and follies of democracy.' Elbridge Gerry
spoke of 'democracy as the worst of all political evils,' while Roger Sherman hoptedl that 'the
people ... have as little to do as may be about the government."' See Jules Lobel, The Meaning
of Democracy: Representative and Participatory Democracy in the New Nicaraguan Constitution,
49 U. Prrr. L.R. 823, 827-28 (1988).
129. Madison noted: "[T]here are particular moments in public affairs, when the people stimu-
lated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresenta-
tions of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most
ready to lament." THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 425 (James Madison).
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tors meet over differing issues each day.'3 ° Alliances shift, and "[n]o one is
always in the majority; therefore, no one can afford to turn a deaf ear to the
needs of competing interests."'' But if a competing interest is robbed of the
opportunity to enact favorable legislation, then participation is squelched just
as surely as if a barricade had been erected at the voting booth.'32
Disempowered legislators would no longer possess the same ability to bargain.
They could still give their votes to other issues, but would be prevented from
lobbying other groups to gain votes for successful passage of their inter-
ests.'33 Participation in the elective process would be a hollow exercise be-
cause legislation may not ever be enacted on their behalf.
Amendment 2 robs gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and anti-discrimination advo-
cates of this right to representative government. Gays may elect representatives
who propose statute after statute to prohibit discrimination. The representatives
may form coalitions, and enact favorable legislation. Yet Amendment 2 pre-
vents "gay rights" bills from becoming law.'34 Amendment 2 forecloses an
avenue to equality, removes any check on the power of the majority, and
closes the normal avenues of government to gay rights proponents.
Proponents of the Amendment argue that gay rights advocates are not
robbed of their government: they may still vote, may still participate. 33 Ex-
amination of the functional meaning of a "representative" refutes this argu-
ment. Webster's defines "represent" in the context of a legislative body as "to
serve by delegated or deputed authority."'36 Further definitions include: (1)
130. Eule, supra note 128, at 1527.
131. Id. Bruce Ackerman has observed:
It was this invention of modem political science, not any increase in the quantity of
human virtue, which permitted the rational hope that Americans might succeed where
both ancients and modems had failed before them. Representative institutions permit us
to establish a regime encompassing millions of people with different religious and eco-
nomic interests. Although each faction would gladly use political power to tyrannize
over the others, their multiplicity permits the constitutional architect a new kind of polit-
ical freedom. Rather than suppressing faction at the cost of individual liberty, the suc-
cessful revolutionaries may hope to neutralize the worst consequences of faction by
playing each interest off against the others.
Ackerman, supra note 118, at 1025.
132. Matthew Coles, Equal Protection and the Anti-Civil-Rights Initiatives: Protecting the
Ability of Lesbians and Gay Men to Bargain in the Pluralist Bazaar, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 563, 574-
75 (1994) ("There are two ways to take away a group's power to participate in self-government in
a representative system. One would be to take away votes. The other would be to go to the legis-
lature and take away its power to ever enact legislation on the group's behalf.").
133. See Kathryn Abrams, Relationships of Representation in Voting Rights Acts Jurispru-
dence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1417 (1993) (arguing that the political process entails more than
access to the ballot because a voter has a continuing interest in implementation of their
preferences through the efforts of the elected representatives). Participation in the process involves
both quantitative elements, such as election procedures, and qualitative measures that pertain to
the authority of elected officials. Id. at 1418.
134. See supra note 3 for the text of the amendment.
135. Brief for Petitioners at *26, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 310026 (U.S. Apr.
21, 1995).
136. WEBSTER's THSRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1926 (1986). Madison explained
the difference between a democracy and republic: "It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and
exercise the government in person; in a republic they assemble and administer it by their repre-
sentatives and agents." THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 84 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1982).
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"to bring clearly before the mind"; (2) "to exercise the rights of."' 37 All of
these terms imply an element of performance. "Bring" is defined as to convey,
carry or advance.'38 "Exercise" is the act of bringing into play or realizing in
action.' Even more persuasive is the definition of "representation": "a state-
ment of account especially made to convey a particular view or impression of
something with the intention of influencing opinion or action.'.' "Represen-
tative" government connotes the power to bring to action, while Amendment 2
erects a barrier to movement.
The Justices who embrace plain meaning can hardly ignore the definition
set forth by WEBSTER'S, and conclude that a representative could still "per-
form" his duties of representation by his impotent presence. 4' A sterile
stand-in for gay advocates eliminates all opportunities for consummation in the
political process.
C. Checks and Balances as a Control
The separation of powers provides another buttress to contain majoritarian
bullies.'42 Every reader of American history knows of the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial checks designed to create a balance of power. Madison wrote
that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government should each
have a will of its own.'43 Each branch should have the ability to direct its
own course.'"
Not only was government oppression feared, but the threat of the masses
weighed on the Framers' minds. "If men were angels, no government would
be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal con-
trols on government would be necessary.' '45 "The divisions of power were
designed to check both the people's agents and the people themselves."'"
137. WEBSTERS, supra note 136, at 1926.
138. Id. at 278.
139. Id. at 795.
140. Id. (emphasis added). Proponents of the representation afforded gays and lesbians after
the passage of Amendment 2 would have enjoyed life before our Revolution. History buffs recall
that the colonists were "virtually represented" at that time, and King George never did understand
what all the strife was about. See ELY, supra note 107, at 82. Gays and lesbians are "virtually rep-
resented" under the passage of Amendment 2. No matter that their "representatives" have no
voice.
141. See Alex Kozinski, My Pizza With Nino, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1583, 1586 (1991) (de-
scribing Scalia's desire to defend the plain meaning of the Constitution: "Just as sure as AV's
pizza means AV's pizza, confront [in the Sixth Amendment] means confront").
Chief Justice Rehnquist believes that the source of fundamental rights must be the text or
the Framers' intentions. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX.
L. REv. 693, 695 (1976). The Court recently affirmed its approval of adherence to the Framers'
intent in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, Nos. 93-1456, 93-1828, 1995 WL 306517, at *10
(U.S. 1995).
142. In a republic, "usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into
distinct and separate departments." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1982).
143. Id. at 348.
144. WHITE, supra note 113, at 161.
145. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison).
146. Eule, supra note 128, at 1528. Even conservative commentators acknowledge the tension
between minority and majority rights. As Robert Bork observed, "The dilemma is that neither
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The Framers believed the same divide and weaken strategy could help
contain the excesses of the citizenry. 47 They did not intend for the majority
to have the power to vote this separation of powers away. Because of the
multiplicity of interests in the public, no clear majority could establish domi-
nance." "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judicia-
ry, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether heredi-
tary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny.' 4 9
The system of government created by our founding fathers relied on rep-
resentation and separation of powers to insure protection for minority factions.
Without those shields, minorities stand naked in the political process. Amend-
ment 2 effectively denies representation and an entire level of government to
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. They have no voice in their government, except
at the highest level; they may only attempt to amend their constitution. In
short, Amendment 2 places all control into the hands of the electorate, a pros-
pect that may well cause the Framers to spin in their graves. While commenta-
tors argue about the "factions" that troubled the Founders, Amendment 2 em-
braces all that the republican form of government was designed to prevent.
PART HI: ACCESS TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Evans v. Romer uncloaked a fundamental value, supported by a network
of cases.' Critics will allege that this "new" right to political participation
deserves no legitimacy because our founding fathers did not precisely define
it.' ' Conservatives frequently deny the existence of protection to any value
not explicitly stated in the Constitution, unless it is one they prefer. 2
Even the hallowed right to vote itself did not appear enumerated until the
franchise was extended to include racial minorities by the Fifteenth Amend-
majorities nor minorities can be trusted to define the proper spheres of democratic authority and
individual liberty." BORK, supra note 116, at 139. He noted that there is "more to the Court's
constitutional function than defining in so direct a fashion the rights of the individual against the
state. There is the related task of maintaining the system of government the Constitution creates."
Id. at 140.
147. Eule, supra note 128, at 1528.
148. Id.
149. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982) (emphasis
added).
150. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282.
151. See Reply Brief of Petitioners at *5, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 466395
(U.S. Aug. 4, 1995).
152. See e.g., United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2027 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting an individual's right to retain their property); Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n,
494 U.S. 1, 24 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (holding compensation is required for taking of
property); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) ("[A] most fundamental
human right, that of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is made prof-
itable.").
Yet many values have been implicitly derived from the Constitution: the freedom of associ-
ation is not mentioned in the text, but it is recognized as a derivative safeguard of an individual's
First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958). The right to travel was considered implicit in the concept of a Union. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1968).
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ment.'5 Previously the right was implicitly derived from constitutional provi-
sions that detail the qualifications for elected officials.'54 But whether found
in explicit terms via the Fifteenth Amendment, or divined in the shadows of
the term qualifications clauses, the right to vote would be barren without the
accompanying entitlement to effective participation.'55
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the fundamental character of the right
to vote in Wesberry v. Sanders.'56 "No right is more precious in a free coun-
try than that of having a choice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, they must live. Other rights, even the most
basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."'57 Even in the preced-
ing century, the Court characterized "the political franchise of voting" as a
"fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights."'58 The
Court reiterated that notion in Reynolds v. Sims:
[U]ndoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free
and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the
153. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1. The Supreme Court noted many years after ratification of the Constitution:
"[T]he Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one."
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 162, 178 (1875). Nearly half the amendments to the Con-
stitution concern the franchise and election procedures. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (procedures
for election of President and Vice President); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (apportionment rules and
limiting eligibility of Confederate officials for Congress); U.S. CONST. amend XV (vote not to be
denied because of race); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (governing election of Senators); U.S. CONST.
amend. XlX (vote not to be denied because of sex); U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (no more than two
terms for President); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (no poll taxes); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (must
be eighteen to vote).
154. Article I, § 2 established that the House of Representatives would be composed of
"Members chosen.., by the People of the several States." U.S CONST. art. I, § 2. Article I, § 4
gave the states the ability to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections" with
congressional oversight. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. Article II, § 1 established the procedure to select
the members of the Electoral College. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
"The Supreme Court has used these provisions to support the proposition that the states,
because of this inherent constitutional authority to control the electoral process, can require per-
sons to meet certain reasonable requirements before they vote in state or national elections." JOHN
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.31, at 816 (1991). The Court
has consistently recognized the right to vote, while noting that a state has a legitimate interest in
regulation. Courts have upheld, for example, the right to restrict the franchise to convicted felons,
even though they served their sentences. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 43 (1974). The
Court has upheld reasonable residency requirements. See Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681
(1973) (upholding 50 day residency requirements for voting in local elections). The Court did not
allow Tennessee to proscribe a residency of one year. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
155. The Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment to construct the fundamental right to
vote. It has recognized that the right to vote "is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
Kenneth Karst defined equal citizenship as an individual's right to be "presumptively enti-
tled to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating member.
Stated negatively, the principle forbids the organized society to treat an individual as a member of
an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant." KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMER-
ICA 3 (1989).
156. 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
157. Id. Courts examine laws that restrict voting under an equal protection analysis because
the classification separates persons "who may or may not vote in an election or that dilutes the
voting power of a particular classification of persons." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 154, §
14.31, at 818.
158. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other
basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right
of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."9
A. Vote Dilution
Voting rights have evolved to recognize that voting encompasses more
than simply the casting of ballots. 6" The individual right of ability to vote
exists together with the group right of process.' If the governing body has
drawn the lines of a district such that a group will always be in the minority,
they have denied that group the opportunity to elect a representative or pass
favorable legislation.'62 That minority vote has been "diluted" to less, and in
most cases, meaningless, weight. The U.S. Supreme Court's examination of
vote dilution cases supports the assertion that the right to vote carries with it
the right of effective participation.
The "one person, one vote" standard of Reynolds'63 established districts
of equal population, but this did not negate the possibility of gerrymander-
ing. " Justice Harlan noted:
The fact of the matter is that the rule of absolute equality is perfectly
compatible with "gerrymandering" of the worst sort .... The legisla-
ture must do more than satisfy one man, one vote; it must create a
structure which will in fact as well as theory be responsive to the
sentiments of the community.65
Two varieties of apportionment cases have plagued the courts in recent
times. Both involve drawing boundaries to influence the outcome of elections,
one on racial grounds, 66 the other on a political basis. 67 While Amend-
ment 2 obviously does not fall within the scope of racial discrimination as
such, it does involve the removal of a political voice. Both varieties of appor-
tionment cases serve to delineate the important principles.
159. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
160. See Abrams, supra note 133, at 1417-18.
161. See Samuel Issacharoff, Poliarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1833, 1857 (1992) (observing that the early
cases tried to avoid the inherent difficulties of assessing election outcomes by focusing on the
individual nature of the right). Vote dilution cases forced the Court to turn to a group-based inqui-
ry. Id. at 1859.
162. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) ("The right to vote can be
affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casing a ballot.").
163. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558.
164. The term "gerrymander" is derived from the combination of the last name of Massachu-
setts Governor Elbridge Gerry with the word salamander, which was the shape of a voting district
created in Massachusetts. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
165. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 549 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
166. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
167. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735
(1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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1. Racial Districting
The Court faced invidious racial gerrymandering head on when the Ala-
bama legislature passed a law that changed the city limits of Tuskegee from a
square to "an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure."'" The new boundaries sev-
ered almost all of the black residents from the city.'" This action deprived
these residents and no others of the benefits of voting in municipal elec-
tions.7 ° The reapportionment diminished the strength of the minority votes
to practically invisible levels.'' The Court invalidated the redistricting plan,
concluding that discrimination against a racial minority was a violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment.' The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was subsequently
amended to handle the same issues that confronted the Court in Gomillion.'73
Congress specifically added that a redistricting plan may not dilute the voting
strength of a minority.'74
But what if the districting was done to benefit the racial minority? The
Court wrestled with the issue of "benign" racial gerrymandering in Shaw v.
Reno. 7' In Shaw, white voters challenged a redistricting scheme drawn to
specifically create two majority black districts.7 6 One district was "approxi-
mately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the 1-85
corridor."'77 One legislator described it as so "bizarre" that most of the new
district's voters could be murdered by a car driving with both doors open
down the interstate.'18 Unlike earlier decisions, the Shaw Court focused on
the equal protection rights of the white voters, finding a claim of an unconsti-
tutional racial gerrymander.'79 While the purpose of the redistricting was be-
nevolent, the Court concluded that drawing boundaries based solely on race
prolonged racial tensions and stereotypes.'" The Shaw opinion, written by
Justice O'Connor, explained that such practices would "undermine our system
of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they repre-
sent a particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole."'8'
Justice O'Connor's concerns apply equally to the representatives of gay
proponents. As elected officials, our representatives theoretically carry all of
our voices to the legislative halls. Under Amendment 2, a representative
168. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
169. Id. at 341.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 346-47.
173. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1971, §§ 1973 to 1973 bb-1 (1988)).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
175. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
176. Id. at 2819.
177. Id. at 2820-21.
178. Id. at 2821.
179. Id. at 2822, 2832.
180. Id. at 2827.
181. Id. (emphasis added). A recent Supreme Court decision attempted to clarify the Shaw
decision by explaining that it was "analytically distinct" from a vote dilution claim. Miller v.
Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485 (1995). Justice Kennedy explained that the reapportionment
scheme in Shaw separated voters strictly on the basis of race. Id.
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whose constituency includes gays, lesbians, bisexuals, or anti-discrimination
advocates would work only for a limited number of voters. Because Amend-
ment 2 would limit the action of a respresentative on anti-discrimination is-
sues, it would effectively reduce the constituency of that representative.
Amendment 2 would restrict the interests represented and undermine the sys-
tem of representative democracy.
2. Political Districting
The Supreme Court has tread cautiously down the road of reviewing
voting boundary disputes based solely on political inequities. The danger of
entering the "political thicket" 8 ' restricted examination of gerrymandering
claims to those based on race because of the political question doctrine.
8 3
Courts use caution when examining claims that involve the separation of pow-
ers." 4 The Court finally declared purely political reapportionment claims jus-
ticiable in Davis v. Bandemer.a5
Davis focused on the rights of groups of ideologically similar people to
cast a "meaningful" vote. 6 Republicans, who controlled the state legislature,
passed a redistricting plan."7 Democrats did not receive a majority of the
legislative seats available in the 1982 elections, even though they received a
majority of the statewide vote."u Justice White, writing for the Court, con-
cluded that a claim "submitted by a political group, rather than a racial group,
182. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
183. The political question doctrine forbids judicial determinations of legislative actions in-
volving separation of powers. 13A CHARLES A. WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE 2D, § 3534.1 (1984).
184. Id. § 3534.
185. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). The Court had been reluctant to assert itself into the "political
thicket." 13A WRIGHT, supra note 183, § 3534. In a recent case involving racial gerrymandering,
the Court did not allow a vote dilution claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Holder v. Hall,
114 S. Ct. 2581, 2587-88. (1994). In a lengthy dissent, Justice Thomas voiced his opinion that
gerrymandering claims required the judiciary to delve into political theory. Id. at 2596 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). The Holder plaintiffs challenged the single commissioner form of government,
which exercised both legislative and executive authority. Id. at 2584. Justice Thomas maintained
that there was no workable standard for choosing the proper size of the government body. Id. at
2596 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). He further extended that reasoning to preclude
judicial interpretation of "effective suffrage, representation, and the proper apportionment of politi-
cal power in a representative democracy . I..." d. He noted that the Court's decisions have "im-
mersed the federal courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of political theory." Id. at
2592. But Justice Stevens rejected Justice Thomas' narrow reading of the Voting Rights Act and
his apparent inclination to overturn a long line of previous decisions. He explained:
There is no question that the Voting Rights Act has required the courts to resolve diffi-
cult questions, but that is no reason to deviate from an interpretation that Congress has
thrice approved. Statutes frequently require courts to make policy judgments. The
Sherman Act, for example, requires courts to delve deeply into the theory of economic
orgainization. Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act has required the courts to
formulate a theory of equal opportunity. Our work would cerainly be much easier if
every case could be resolved by consulting a dictionary, but when Congress has legislat-
ed in general terms, judges may not invoke judicial modesty to avoid difficult questions.
Id. at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 123-24.
187. Both the state senate and the general assembly had Republican majorities and the gover-
nor was a Republican. Id. at 113-14.
188. Id. at 115.
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does not distinguish it in terms of justiciability."'' 9 He explained that a group
must exhibit a "lack of political power and the denial of fair representation" so
that they had "essentially been shut out of the political process."'" Mere suf-
fering at the polls was insufficient to lodge a successful claim.9 Rather, a
group of voters had to show they were purposefully being denied access to the
political system.'
The Court placed a high burden on political gerrymandering claims. "In
this context, such a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evi-
dence of continual frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effec-
tive denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political
process."'93 The challenged statute must demonstrate not only a discrimina-
tory effect, but also a discriminatory purpose."'
The analysis of political apportionment claims applies as well to Amend-
ment 2. Denial of fair representation presents an easy hurdle for Amendment 2
opponents. Representatives must have some ability to enact legislation on
behalf of the citizens they represent. Amendment 2 forecloses that possibility.
It denies one group of voters the right to representation and the opportunity to
enact favorable legislation. Amendment 2 mandates unresponsiveness in the
legislature. Amendment 2 denies gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and anti-discrimina-
tion proponents the opportunity to influence the political process.'95 The leg-
islation they seek to pass is forever placed out of their reach. Opportunity for
effective participation comes only by amending the state constitution.'96 This
presupposes that a historically unpopular group may in some way garner
enough votes to overturn Amendment 2.' Meanwhile, although they may
still access the polls, they are denied access to the accompanying right of
effective participation.
The Davis Court mandated that a group must show not only a discrimina-
189. Id. at 125. "[U]nconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is
arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on
the political process as a whole ... ." Id. at 132.
190. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
191. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2835. The Court has judged a redistricting plan unconstitutional
because of historic and present discrimination, together with the legislature's unresponsiveness to
the group's interests. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767-69 (1973).
192. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834-35 (emphasis added). Demonstration of discriminatory intention
was required to strike down a multimember district in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 625 (1982).
A multimember district restricts the ability of a minority to elect representatives. id. at 616. "Past
discrimination had prevented blacks from effectively participating in Democratic Party affairs and
in primary elecions .... " The District Court thus concluded that historical discrimination had
restricted the present opportunity of blacks effectively to particpate in the political process. Id. at
625. The Court defined a minority as a racial, ethnic, economic, or political group. Id. at 616
(emphasis added).
193. Davis, 478 U.S. at 133 (emphasis added). Some commentators have called for relaxation
of the court's usual rule of requiring a discriminatory purpose, considering the "legislators' keen
awareness of patterns of ethnic voting." KARST, supra note 155, at 94.
194. Davis, 478 U.S. at 133.
195. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1285.
196. See supra note 3 for text of amendment.
197. See generally JONATHAN KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY (1976) (providing a history of
discrimination against gays in America); see also supra note 122.
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tory effect, but also a discriminatory purpose.'98 Amendment 2 opponents
may easily prove the discriminatory intent behind the initiative. Although most
legislation fails to overcome that normally high burden, the volumes of ven-
omous literature and video tapes circulated by the proponents of Amendment 2
should suffice to demonstrate the required discriminatory purpose."' The po-
sition paper submitted by Colorado For Family Values °° (CFV) which pro-
moted Amendment 2 made it clear that one of the Amendment's purposes was
to curtail the potential success of the gay rights movement.2"' The semantics
of "special rights" drew on the insecurities and fears of the majority.2 2 Dis-
placed by decades of civil rights, the majoritarian middle contained an ugly
element that the religious zealots tapped.2 3 The Conservative Right knew
how to play on these fears of affirmative action, and mustered up enough
hatred to pass a clearly discriminatory initiative.2
The mere fact that "the people" initiated the discriminatory action does
not insulate it from violating constitutional principles. The Court concluded
long ago that "'one's right to life, liberty, and property ... and other funda-
mental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.""'2 5 When Colorado voters attempted to apportion legislative dis-
tricts without due regard for proportional population, the Court held that con-
198. Davis, 478 U.S. at 127.
199. See David Colker, Anti-Gay Video Highlights Church's Agenda, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22,
1993, at Al (describing a video tape produced by Bill Horn, who spliced outrageous segments of
amateur tape together); see also David Colker, Statistics in Gay Agenda Questioned, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1993, at A16 (describing brochures distributed throughout Colorado).
200. Colorado For Family Values is a non-profit organization that is responsible for drafting
and promoting Amendment 2. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
*4, Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV7223, 1993 WL 19678 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 1993). Pat Robertson's
National Legal Foundation assisted Colorado for Family Values in drafting the amendment. Id.
201. Record vol. 6 at 72-75, Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV7223, 1993 WL 19678 (D. Colo.
Jan. 15, 1993) (Bayless 1) (testimony of Paul Talmey).
202. The distributed videos and brochures played on people's fears about homosexuality. The
videos focused on gay parades and suggested that all homosexuals acted out sexual practices in
public. Additionally, a public perception exists that homosexuals are more likely to molest chil-
dren. Record vol. 3 at 109, Bayless I, (No. 92-CV7223) (testimony of John C. Gonziorek at the
trial requesting a preliminary injunction). A number of studies confirm there is no relationship
between sexual orientation and child molestation. Id.
203. See Adams, supra note 127, at 588 (describing ititiative proposals which avoid hostile
epithets, but make reference to "special rights," "affirmative action," or "quotas"); see also Su-
zanne B. Goldberg, Facing the Challenge: A Lawyer's Response to Anti-Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIO
ST. L.J. 665, 669-70 (1994) (describing the appeal to prejudice that anti-gay initiatives exhibit).
"[Tihe inititative supporters appeal to the notion, popular in some sectors of American society,
that minority groups are the beneficiaries of special privileges." Id. at 670. Amendment 2 played
heavily on the "special rights" theme. "Anti-gay organizers argue that gay civil rights laws afford
'special rights' to homosexuals, giving them claims to job quotas and other reparations previously
reserved for blacks, Hispanics and other minorities." See Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights
Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 283,
293 (1994) (quoting Michael Booth, Colorado: Gay-Rights Battlefield, DENY. POST, Sept. 27,
1992, at AI).
204. See Adams, supra note 127, at 606.
205. Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, 659, affid per curiam, 368 U.S.
515 (1961) (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)
(holding public school system could not sell or lease its buildings to alleged private school, but
maintain extensive control because purpose was segregation)).
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stitutional rules still controlled citizens' actions.2" Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
General Assembly held that an amendment to the state constitution "is not
valid just because the people voted for it. 2 7 "An individual's constitutional-
ly protected right to cast an equally weighted vote cannot be denied even by a
vote of a majority of a State's electorate."20 8
PART IV: ANALYSIS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION
The Founders' words and the principles underlying voting rights make
clear that a fundamental right to political participation exists. The Evans case
focused on an "identifiable" minority being unable to effectively exercise their
franchise."° The nature of the right recognized by the Evans court, however,
depends on the proper definition of the group deserving protection.
A. What Is a "Group"?
The right identified by the Evans court cannot extend to every group who
merely supports a cause and loses at the polls. The language on the face of
Amendment 2 precludes the enactment of any anti-discrimination legislation
protecting gays, lesbians, or bisexuals except by a statewide vote to reamend
the constitution.2"0 Amendment 2 affects two groups, however: the group
who is denied the protective legislation and the group who supports anti-dis-
crimination and voted against Amendment 2. Any ballot measure creates win-
ners and losers. The right cannot be so broad as to "fence out" all of the los-
ers. Otherwise, every referendum and initiative could be declared invalid be-
cause some "identifiable group" (all the people who supported the losing posi-
tion) would be denied access to nearly all levels of government participation.
Many provisions in Colorado's Constitution that require referendums
would violate the right to political participation if its application only required
a losing "group." Voters have enacted provisions in the Colorado Constitution
requiring that some groups/issues face governmental hurdles: direct voter
approval must be gained to relocate the state capitol, 1 or to detonate a nu-
clear device.22 By dictating a statewide vote on those issues, the majority of
the state's voters have mandated that the minority sacrifice their right to repre-
sentation on that issue. Clearly, some restrictions213 on "representation" make
most Colorado residents feel good. They are happy to have the decision to
detonate in the hands of the electorate. What is it about Amendment 2 that has
206. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
207. Id. at 720 n.6.
208. Id. at 736.
209. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1285.
210. Supra note 3.
211. COLO. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
212. COLO. CONST. art. XXVI, § 2.
213. Some Colorado residents are certainly "fenced out" of political participation at the local
level, or denied representation because they really want to pass local ordinances that allow nuclear
detonation.
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produced the opposite reaction of outrage? The element of discrimination
creates this bad feeling, and serves as the touchstone for application of the
right to political participation.
B. Is One Group Treated Differently?
When analyzing the challenged measure, the determination that a "group"
has been fenced out should begin with the question of fairness.2 4 Has an
"identifiable group" been treated differently?2 5 If all groups are treated
equally, then the only "fenced out" group would be those who voted against
the proposition. This group is not entitled to the right identified by the Evans
court. They have been treated evenhandedly, and are "identifiable" only in the
sense that they all supported the losing interest. Requiring a two-thirds majori-
ty in a statewide vote to approve nuclear detonation is such an issue. That
amendment does not identify a particular group, such as those living west of
the Continental Divide, and mandate that they alone should be denied the
opportunity to pass nuclear detonation legislation. While courts have identified
the importance of this unbiased treatment of groups, the language of the opin-
ions sometimes clouds the important considerations.
1. Case Precedent Identifies the Fairness Factor.
While the substantive consideration in cases like Hunter is the fairness
accorded to the group in question, commentators on Amendment 2, like the
Evans court itself, have concentrated on defending the applicability of three
cases (Hunter, Washington, and Gordon) to the right identified by the Evans
majority.216 This preoccupation with justifying the use of Hunter muddies the
water. The first question is: Are all groups treated equally? The inquiry of
who would benefit from a particular action serves to illuminate the discrimina-
tory purpose behind the restrictive law or amendment. When the Hunter Court
identified that the city charter amendment would impose burdens on "those
who would benefit" from fair housing legislation, it was using that group to
illustrate that the unconstitutional amendment unfairly treated one group differ-
ently."7
The Evans court's use of Gordon, the bond-indebtedness case, supports
this analysis. The Evans majority noted that the Supreme Court could find no
identifiable group that favored "bonded indebtedness over other forms of fi-
nancing," unlike Hunter, where the class singled out was clear.2 8 The
214. See discussion of Hunter v. Erickson, supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
215. See discussion of Gordon v. Lance, supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
216. See Craig C. Burke, Fencing Out Politically Unpopular Groups from the Normal Po-
litical Processes: The Equal Protection Concerns of Colorado Amendment Two, 69 IND. L.J. 275,
289-93 (1993) (noting that the right to participate in the democratic process was implicitly ac-
knowledged in Gordon); Niblock, supra note 27, at 180-87 (1993) (noting that one would be hard
pressed to deny that gays were a "politically identifiable group"); Lori J. Rankin, Ballot Initiatives
and Gay Rights: Equal Protection Challenges to the Right's Campaign Against Lesbians and Gay
Men, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1055, 1097-1101 (1994) (observing that the explicit fights of free speech
and redress of grievances rest on the valve of participation in the political process).
217. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
218. Evans !, 854 P.2d at 1279. The class singled out in Hunter were those who "would bene-
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"group" in Gordon consisted only of those who lost at the polls.
2. An Identifiable Group Is Different than a Suspect Class.
When evaluating the group impacted by the challenged measure, the
"identifiable group" criterion should not be confused with the "suspect" class
criterion used to identify "discrete and insular" minorities.2 '9 Traditional
equal protection analysis protects all people from discrimination, especially
through the fundamental rights strand.22 That strand operates independently
from the suspect class strand, which provides heightened judicial scrutiny for
discrete and insular minority groups.22 ' If the "identifiable group" language
of Evans suggests a suspect class rather than a fundamental rights analysis
under equal protection, then it obscures the real concern. The proper inquiry is
whether one group or issue is singled out and treated differently. The disposi-
tive factor in Gordon was that all election matters involving bond indebtedness
required the three-fifths vote for passage. No issue, interest, or cause had been
"singled out." '222
The Evans court's entire discussion justifying the use of Hunter only
directs the inquiry away from what is truly significant.223 Gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals are treated differently from any other group desiring passage of anti-
discrimination ordinances. Communities may initiate anti-discrimination poli-
cies and ordinances and the state may enact legislation protecting all other
groups. But gay rights advocates must clear a higher hurdle: statewide voter
approval. They are prohibited from seeking protection except by amending the
state constitution.224
C. The Nature of the Harm
Under fundamental rights analysis, this singling out an "identifiable"
group for different treatment requires the court to apply strict scrutiny to the
challenged measure.225 To survive strict scrutiny, the state must show a com-
fit from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations." Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
219. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Factors
which courts use to determine if a group is a suspect class include historical discrimination, politi-
cal powerlessness, and immutability. TRIBE, supra note 22, § 16-23, at 1545.
Evidence presented in the first trial defined the nature of a minority group:
A minority group is generally considered to be any group of individuals who have some
characteristic which is viewed as highly salient by the majority group and usually nega-
tively valued, and that one characteristic or cluster of characteristics is viewed to confer
similarity and it's believed that all people are of the same group, and that there is gener-
ally some consistency to the way the majority group treats the minority group, and
there's ususally some consistency in the way the minority group responds to that treat-
ment.
Record vol. 3 at 99, Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV7223, 1993 WL 19678 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 1993)
(testimony of John C. Gonziorek).
220. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 154, § 14.3, at 575.
221. Id.
222. Gordon, 403 US. at 5.
223. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1280-82.
224. Supra note 3.
225. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 154, § 14.3, at 575.
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pelling interest."' The court balances the asserted state interest against the
nature of the harm inflicted by denying the identifiable group the opportunity
to enact favorable legislation. Examination of the harm, therefore, can help
illuminate the right identified by the Evans court.
Consider the following hypothetical scenarios. First scenario: Colorado
voters pass a constitutional amendment that prevents the enactment of any
ordinance, policy, or statute that would restrict smoking in any way. In the
future, anti-smokers will have to reamend the constitution to gain protective
legislation. Second scenario: While health advocates desperately gasp for
breath, another constitutional amendment is passed by Colorado voters pre-
venting the enactment of any anti-discrimination legislation that protects blue-
eyed citizens. Are these groups entitled to the same protection under the right
identified under Evans? A fundamental right to political participation should
apply to everyone, right? Wrong.
The groups harmed by these laws (anti-smokers, people who have blue
eyes) are fundamentally different. Are anti-smokers and blue-eyed people
similarly situated to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals? If not, what is it about
Amendment 2 that makes its application so onerous? I suggest that it is the
nature of harm that is inflicted on the group by the denial of representation
and the resulting inability to pass favorable legislation. Prevention of the deto-
nation of a nuclear device except by a popular referendum sits at one end of a
continuum of harm. The risk of less representation to proponents of nuclear
power provides fewer nuclear blasts. Denial of civil rights reposes at the other
because the harm infringes on the very foundations of the government. The
guarantee of liberty and equality formed the basis of our Constitution. Some-
where in between on the continuum lies the prohibition of anti-smoking laws.
The risk of more smoke in our environment seems more injurious than the
possibility of a fewer number of nuclear detonations. At the same time, the
increased possibility of inhaling smoke does not rise to the same level of
injury as the denial of civil rights. Granted, the non-smoker may not breathe
deeply in a restaurant of his/her choice. While there may be some long-term
health implications from second-hand smoke, the harm inflicted on that non-
smoker is simply not as burdensome as preventing an entire group of people
from attaining equal civil rights. Non-smokers can seek smoke-free-environ-
ments, but groups denied civil rights cannot seek a different government.
D. Nature of the Group
If the harm is the prevention of civil rights legislation, whether of blue-
eyed people or gays, does that always entitle the group to survive strict scruti-
ny? I suggest another continuum. In this analysis, the harm is inextricably
linked with the nature of the group. The likelihood that blue eyed people suf-
fer or have suffered discrimination is small.227 While they have no control
226. Id.
227. See Winer, supra note 122, at 432 (advocating that conservative Justices examine reality
when they begin "slippery slope" arguments). "Could one not have argued in 1964 that the [Civil
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over the color of their eyes, eye color does not make them politically power-
less. Some Republicans even have blue eyes. Gays, lesbians, and bisexuals fall
near the other end of the spectrum. Gays, lesbians, and bisexuals have been
historically discriminated against22 and have little political power.2 9 It is
arguable whether gays, lesbians, or bisexuals have any choice in their sexual
orientation preference23"
It is no accident that this sounds like a suspect class analysis. The proper
analysis consists of a nexus between fundamental right and suspect class anal-
ysis, a nexus between the harm and the group. Perhaps a referendum or initia-
tive should be subjected to heightened scrutiny if it denies opportunities for
governmental participation to a singled out "group," but only if the prohibited
law, ordinance, or policy directs a harm at a group who has been historically
discriminated against and who are politically less powerful. In this sense, both
the majority and dissent in Evans were correct. The majority identified that a
fundamental right existed,23" ' and the dissent pointed to the distinguishing
characteristic of the Hunter, Washington, and Gordon cases as involving some-
thing more than just denying the participation."'
As the Court examines the right identified by Evans, rigid adherence to
Rights] Act was inadvisable because if we protect African-Americans and Jews against discrimina-
tion, the next thing you know ozone and earth-orbit believers, Democrats and Republicans, will
claim the same protection?" Id. at 433. Winer argues in reality, hate crimes are inflicted against
homosexuals, not earth-orbit believers. Id. at 432.
228. See KATZ, supra note 197; supra note 122 (listing only a few of the more current dis-
criminatory actions against homosexuals); see also Niblock, supra note 27, at 159 (describing the
isolation that society has inflicted on gays and lesbians).
One of the plaintiffs at the Evans trial gave a first hand accounts of the feeling of isolation
that discrimination produces:
I never was able to learn how to be spontaneous. I know that I strike many people, co-
workers, other people with whom I have contact as very stiff, very distant. And certainly
it isn't that I mean to.... When I went into seventh grade, we rode the school bus into
Castle Rock, and I would hear the senior high school boys at the back of the bus talking
about queers, and I'm not even sure how but somehow I came to understand that they
were talking about people like me. And obviously, I mean the way they spoke about
them it was clear that they were not people with whom it was safe to be identified.
Record vol. 4 at 83, Bayless I (No. 92-CV7223) (testimony of Paul Brown).
229. See Niblock, supra note 27, at 169. According to most courts, this does not entitle them
to any suspect class status. They have struggled, therefore, to pass local anti-discrimination mea-
sures protecting them when they search for jobs and housing.
230. See Terry S. Kogan, Legislative Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 1994 UTAH L.
REv. 209, 237 (studies show a majority of homosexuals knew they were interested in the same
sex at a very early age, before sexual development). One of the plaintiffs testified about his early
knowledge in the Evans trial:
I knew that I was somehow different even before I entered puberty before things take on
any sort of sexual connotations. I would say, I don't know, I would say probably I was
probably like six or seven when I first really started to become aware that somehow I
was different, but I didn't know why or what, you know.
Record vol. 4 at 79 (testimony of Paul Brown). Brown said he wanted to change:
And I was frustrated too because I would pray earnestly, you know, that I would
change, that I wouldn't be gay anymore, or I think possibly at the time I still even
thought of the word "queer," but I was very fervently hopeful that a change would hap-
pen, and it didn't.
Record vol. 4 at 84.
231. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282.
232. See id. at 1301 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
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the separate strands of equal protection analysis will only impede the effort to
give redress for the harm created by initiatives like Amendment 2. Admittedly,
scrutiny of the right to political participation may require the Court to forge
some aspects of the two strands together. This hybrid nature of analysis should
not deter the Court from focusing on the historical nature of the right. The
purpose of constitutional doctrines is to provide remedies for harms. When a
doctrine stands in the way of redress, then it becomes a tool that no longer
fits.
CONCLUSION
The founders of this country identified the problems inherent in a democ-
racy over 200 years ago: Pure devotion to the ballot box exalted only the
majority; minorities faced ,prospects of eternal damnation. By constructing a
representative government, the Framers attempted to ensure everyone received
absolution, by giving minorities protection against the majority.
Representation is built upon the principle that the elected official is an
agent for the citizen. Amendment 2 robs gays, lesbians, and bisexuals by
forever placing nearly every level of government out of reach. They may not
have any voice except by reamending the state constitution, an onerous burden
for a historically unpopular group. The Evans court correctly recognized that
this right to political participation had existed from the onset of the Republic.
At the same time, that old right blazes a new trail in analysis. Because of the
"group" nature of the right, aspects of suspect class are impossible to avoid.
No matter the label, the Justices of the Supreme Court have an opportuni-
ty to follow the road built by the Framers. Surely, even the most conservative
Justice will not sacrifice the principles upon which this country was founded
to surrender to factional prejudice.
Sue Chrisman
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SURVEY: TRANSPORTATION
INTRODUCTION
The creation of administrative agencies indicates a need for expertise in
various industries. Congress and the courts have shifted the responsibility of
governing certain sectors to agencies, which are equipped to regulate the de-
tails of those sectors and are qualified to pay particular attention to an
industry's operation.' Administrative power relieves the judicial and legisla-
tive processes of the details of regulation,2 leaving the judiciary to define and
interpret the limitations on agency power.'
While statutes and case law significantly restrict a court's ability to re-
verse agency determinations, the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
("APA")4 permits a court to overturn agency action if the reviewing court
finds the agency's conclusions to be "arbitrary and capricious,"5 or unsupport-
ed by "substantial evidence." 6 While the APA sets forth other circumstances
in which courts shall review agency action,7 "substantial evidence"' review
and "arbitrary and capricious'" review are the two standards most often used
to review agency fact-findings.' Both of these standards are highly deferen-
tial to agency decision-making," and regardless of whether the reviewing
court would have reached the same decision as the agency, the standards dic-
1. JAMES M. LANDIs, THE ADMINiSTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938).
2. Id. at 46.
3. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1986) (explaining that regulatory legislation "leav[es] an open field" for
courts to delineate the "contours of administrative power").
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
5. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994) (stating that a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
6. See id. § 706(2)(E) (stating that courts shall utilize the substantial evidence test whenever
they review formal agency action in accordance with §§ 556 and 557 of the APA).
7. Id. § 706(2)(B)-(D), (F).
8. The "substantial evidence" standard was well established before the APA was enacted in
1946. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (defining substan-
tial evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion").
9. Courts have struggled to define "arbitrary" and have relied on the Supreme Court's guid-
ance when employing this standard. CtiARL-Es H. KOCH JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 2.34-2.41 (1985).
10. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 597 (1984) (stating that since
1912 "the substantial evidence rule has been the touchstone for review of agency fact-findings");
Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20
UCLA L. REv. 899, 934 (1972-73) (stating that arbitrary and capricious review and substantial
evidence review are the two most frequently invoked statutory bases for setting aside agency
decisions).
11. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court has applied these standards, and how the
standards have evolved, see Matthew J. McGrath, Note, Convergence of the Substantial Evidence
and Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review During Informal Rulemaking, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REV, 541 (1986).
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tate that the reviewing court will uphold the agency's decision if the decision
is reasonable. 2
During the 1994 survey period, 3 the Tenth Circuit applied both the "sub-
stantial evidence" and "arbitrary and capricious" standards to review agency
decision-making. This Survey focuses on the Tenth Circuit's application of
these standards in two transportation law cases. In both cases, the Tenth Cir-
cuit deferred to agency expertise.
In Board of County Commissioners v. Isaac,4 the Tenth Circuit deter-
mined that it could not review the Federal Aviation Administration's ("FAA")
decision to withdraw approval of certain funding. 5 The court concluded that
the decision was committed to the FAA, and held that the FAA's decision was
not arbitrary and capricious. 6 This Survey will question the court's "arbitrary
and capricious" review, given its holding that allocation of funding is unre-
viewable as a matter of law.
7
In Committee to Preserve Boomer Lake Park v. Department of Transpor-
tation," the Tenth Circuit deferred to the Secretary of Transportation's deci-
sion to provide federal funds for the construction of a highway. 9 Judge
Brorby, writing for the court, held that the Secretary acted within the scope of
his authority in reaching his decision, 0 and concluded that the Federal High-
way Administration's findings were not arbitrary and capricious.2'
In both Issac and Boomer Lake, the Tenth Circuit chose to defer to agen-
cy decision-making. It appears clear from these and other cases, that the Tenth
Circuit will rarely upset or overturn agency decisions.
I. WHEN A COURT CANNOT DECIDE:
JUDICIAL REVIEW VS. COMMITTED TO AGENCY ACTION:
BOARD OF CouNTY COMMISSIONERS V. IsAAc 2
A. Background
1. Judicial Review of Agency Decision-Making
Agencies are created by the legislature and are governed by the terms of
12. See generally, Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990) (illustrating
that the arbitrary and capricious standard gives substantial deference to agency fact-finding); Cit-
izens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (explaining that the scope
of judicial review is narrow and that a court may not "substitute its judgment for that of the agen-
cy").
13. The Tenth Circuit Survey period includes cases decided from September 1993 to Decem-
ber 1994.
14. 18 F.3d 1492 (10th Cir. 1994).
15. Id. at 1498.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 4 F.3d 1543 (10th Cir. 1993).
19. Id. at 1550.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1553.
22. 18 F.3d 1492 (10th Cir. 1994).
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the agency's enabling act. The agency structure differs, depending on the size
and form of the particular administration.23 An agency's functions also vary
depending on the ends that the agency pursues.24 Such functions may include:
producing public goods," transferring wealth to individuals,26 subsidizing
particular activities, 7 regulating a sector of the economy," administering a
public resource,29 establishing rules for other decision processes,30 promoting
health, safety, and social values,3 and providing internal oversight.32 Most
agencies perform a number of these tasks and it is often difficult to identify
the core function of an agency.33
While it is the legislature's prerogative to grant agencies authority to
effectuate and interpret their enabling statutes, it is the responsibility of the
judiciary to review agency decision-making.34 In reality, however, only a
small number of agency decisions are actually subject to judicial review, 3
and even fewer are in fact overturned.36
The APA's provisions concerning judicial review of agency actions37
state that any person "adversely affected" by agency action38 is entitled to
judicial review as long as the agency action is final.39 The reviewing court
"shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law .... '0 A court, however, may not review agency ac-
tion that is committed to the agency's discretion by law.' Even in cases
where Congress has not explicitly rejected judicial review, "review is not to be
23. James v. DeLong, New Wine for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regulatory State,
72 VA. L. REv. 399, 401 (1986).
24. Id.
25. Examples of goods and services include defense, highways, weather reports, air traffic
control, and criminal justice. Id. at 402.
26. These functions include programs such as welfare and social security. Id.
27. For example, farm and housing subsidies aid individuals in transferring wealth. Id.
28. This includes regulating modes of transportation, banking, energy, securities and commu-
nications. Id.
29. Agencies manage resources such as forests, oil fields, and grazing land. Id.
30. An example of government regulation in this arena is anti-fraud laws. Id. at 402-03.
31. Agencies "further important social goals that the free market may undervalue." Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 403-04.
34. WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW 21 (2d ed. 1992).
35. Id. at 241.
36. Id. For statistics on the number of agency decisions that are overturned by courts, see
Carl McGowan, A Reply to Judicialization, 1986 DUKE L.J. 217, 220 (1986).
37. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
38. See id. § 702 (1994). This section of the APA, however, is limited by section 701(a). In
order for there to be judicial review of agency action, "a party must clear the hurdle of §701(a)."
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bank of Coushatta, 930 F.2d 1122, 1127 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing
Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985)).
39. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
41. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994). For a general discussion of section 701(a)(2)'s excep-
tions to judicial review of agency action, see Lawrence G. Baxter, Administrative and Judicial
Review of Prompt Corrective Action Decisions by the Federal Banking Regulators, 7 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 505, 555-60 (1994); Charles H. Koch, Jr., An Issue-Driven Strategy for Review of Agency
Decisions, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 548-58 (1991); Ronald M. Levin, Understanding
Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990).
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had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion." '42
In Heckler v. Chaney,43 the Supreme Court concluded that an agency's
refusal to pursue an enforcement action was "presumed immune from judicial
review under [5 U.S.C.] § 701(a)(2)."" In other words, the Court included
agency refusals to institute investigative or enforcement proceedings within the
"committed to agency discretion" exception of the APA.4'
Lower courts have struggled in applying the presumption of
unreviewability announced in Chaney.' It has been argued that Chaney has
threatened the continued reviewability of agency action and has left the lower
courts with some unanswered issues.47
Several years later, in Franklin v. Massachusetts,' the Court addressed
the issue of final agency action under section 704 of the APA 9 Franklin
involved an action against the President of the United States, the Secretary of
Commerce, Census Bureau officials, and the Clerk of the House of Represen-
tatives." The appellees claimed that the manner in which federal employees
serving overseas were counted for census purposes was erroneous.5 The Su-
preme Court, however, held that the agency's determination was unreviewable
42. Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985); see also Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct.
2024, 2030-32 (1993) (explaining that there are circumstances when the agency can best deter-
mine its spending priorities); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-600 (1988) (holding that the
court may not review the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency's decision to discharge em-
ployees under section 701(a)(2) of the APA); United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 820
(1984) (holding that judicial intervention into the FAA's decision-making "would require the
courts to 'second-guess' the ... judgments of an agency exercising its regulatory function"); Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (demonstrating that gov-
ernmental action is reviewable except where there is a statutory prohibition on review or where
agency action is committed by law to the agency's discretion). Section 701(a)(1) and 701(a)(2)
differ in that "[slubsection (a)(1) is concerned with whether Congress expressed an intent to pro-
hibit judicial review; subsection (a)(2) applies 'in those rare instances where statutes are drawn in
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply."' Webster, 486 U.S. at 599 (quot-
ing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410).
43. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Chaney involved prison inmates sentenced to die by lethal injec-
tion. The inmates petitioned the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), arguing that the injec-
tions had not been approved for use in human executions. Id. at 823. The inmates challenged the
FDA in court when the FDA refused to act on the inmates complaint. Id. at 825. The FDA argued
that its refusal to take enforcement action was unreviewable, and the Court agreed that it could not
review the FDA's determination under section 701(a)(2) of the APA. Id. at 832.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 838.
46. See Levin, supra note 41, at 753 (noting that "lower courts reviewing agency inaction
have had to struggle with [Chaney's] manifest ambivalence"); Donald M. Levy, Jr. & Debra J.
Duncan, Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking and Enforcement Discretion: The
Effect of a Presumption of Unreviewability, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 596, 612 (1987) (noting that
appellate courts have reached inconsistent results in reviewing administrative decisions).
47. Abner J. Mikva, The Changing Role of Judicial Review, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 115, 134-40
(1986).
48. 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992).
49. Id. at 2773. 5 U.S.C. § 704 states that "[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable
is subject to review on the review of final agency action ..... Id.




because there was no "final agency action.""
Franklin established a two-pronged test to help determine whether agency
action is final and thus subject to judicial review. The Court stated that lower
courts must determine "whether the agency has completed its decision[-]mak-
ing process, and whether the result of that process is one that will directly
affect the parties." 3 Judicial review is only appropriate when both of these
questions are answered in the affirmative. 4 Lower courts have generally
agreed with the holding and reasoning of Franklin,55 and have avoided ad-
dressing substantive claims when the two-pronged Franklin test is not satis-
fied.56
2. The Federal Aviation Act
The Federal Aviation Act was enacted in 1958."7 Under this Act, the
Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) was given authority to promulgate and
enforce regulations on all matters relating to the use of "navigable air-
space."5" The Secretary, in turn, delegated this authority to the Administrator
of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 9 The FAA is thus responsible
for the "promotion, regulation, and safety of civil aviation," as well as for
securing the use of airspace. 6' Among other things, the FAA maintains air
traffic control, creates and enforces standards that govern the certification of
civilian aviators, prepares the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems
which identifies airports eligible to receive grant-in-aid planning and develop-
ment funds, and develops airport facilities in accordance with standards it
establishes.
62
Throughout the 1960s, the number of aircraft in the United States rapidly
accelerated, motivating the federal government to increase funding for air-
52. Id. at 2773.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2774.
55. Cohen v. Rice, 992 F.2d 376, 381 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Public Citizen v. United
States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing the "core question" of
agency action requirement from Franklin); Charles E. Smith Management, Inc. v. Aspin, 855 F.
Supp 852, 857 (E.D. Va. 1994) (employing Franklin's two-pronged analysis of agency action).
56. Cohen, 992 F.2d at 377. For a discussion of Franklin and the consequences of its
holding, see Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1992, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 261,
266-68 (1993).
57. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
58. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1348(a). 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(29) defines "navigable airspace" as
"airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations... includ[ing] airspace
needed to insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft."
59. 49 C.F.R. § 1.47 (1994). The FAA superseded the Federal Aviation Agency under the
Department of Transportation Act of 1966. JOHN R. WILEY, AIRPORT ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT 11 (1986). When the Department of Transportation Act was enacted, "[a] major
reshuffling of aviation agencies took place." ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, AIRPORT REGULATION, LAW
AND PUBLIC POLICY 19 (1991). In addition to the Federal Aviation Agency becoming the Federal
Aviation Administration, certain responsibilities of the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") were
transferred first to the Department of Transportation and then to the National Transportation Safety
Board ("NTSB"). Id. For more information on the CAB and the NTSB see id. at 13-16, 19, 21.
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ports.63 The FAA was charged with administering the Airport and Airways
Trust Fund. ' The Trust Fund derives its proceeds from domestic air passen-
ger ticket taxes, air cargo, and aviation fuel taxes.65 Monies are allocated
from the Fund for airport development and improvement, helping to reduce
general congressional appropriation.'
In the past few decades, building new airports has become less of an
option than developing and enhancing existing ones.6 7 The lack of accessible
land, and Congress's hesitation to distribute capital from the Airport Trust
Fund, are just a few of the reasons why only one major airport is presently
planned in the United States for the rest of the century.' Environmental con-
siderations such as aircraft noise, traffic flow to and from airports, and the
smell of aircraft fuel, have also been an issue in airport projects.' When the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") passed,7 environmental issues
were given primary attention in airport planning.71 These reasons, taken to-
gether, may account for the fact that Dia has been the only major airport built
in the United States since 1974.72
63. See HARDAWAY, supra note 59, at 19.
64. 26 U.S.C. § 9502 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
65. See id. § 9502(b).
66. See id. § 9502(d) (stating that "[a]mounts in the Airport and Airway Trust Fund shall be
available ... for making expenditures... to meet those obligations of the United States...
which are attributable to planning, research and development, construction, or operation and main-
tenance of---(i) air traffic control, (ii) air navigation, (iii) communications, or (iv) supporting ser-
vices, for the airway system"); see also HARDAWAY, supra note 59, at 19-20. While the Fund was
established to finance airport development projects, at least one critic has argued that "the fund is
used as an accounting gimmick to artificially balance the [federal] budget." Pat Schroeder,
Colorado's New Airport Beginning to Take Wing, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 29, 1989, at 65.
67. Robert Hardaway, Economics of Airport.Regulation, 20 TRANsP. L.J. 47, 52 (1991).
68. Id. That airport, the Denver International Airport, was scheduled to open back in 1993.
Ann Carnahan, 3,000 Gather to Celebrate Start of Work on Airport, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Nov. 23,
1989, at 8. However, since 1993, DIA was forced to postpone the opening four times. Business
Aviation Briefs; Denver International Airport, WKLY. BUS. AVIATION (McGraw-Hill, Inc., New
York, N.Y.), Sept. 26, 1994, Vol. 59, No. 13. DIA did not open until February 28, beginning
operations 16 months late and $3 billion over budget. Stephen J. Hedges et al., A Taj Mahal in the
Rockies, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 13, 1995, at 48.
69. See HARDAWAY, supra note 59, at 63; Wiley, supra note 59, at 125; see also MICHAEL
J. MESHENBERG, PLANNING THE AIRPORT ENViRONMENT 5, 7 (1968) (explaining that "noise is the
most pervasive of the environmental effects of airports" and that jet emissions may cause con-
cern).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In NEPA, Congress declared:
[Ilt is the continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use all practicable means
and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to
foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and to fulfill the social, economic, and
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.
Id. § 4331(a) (1988).
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare a detailed statement on the environmental im-
pact ("EIS") of all major federal actions that will significantly affect the quality of the human
environment. Id. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). Thus, airport planners must prepare an environmental as-
sessment ("EA") in order to determine whether an EIS is necessary. C.A.R.E. NOW, Inc. v. FAA,
844 F.2d 1569, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1988).
For an account of how NEPA has affected administrative law, see Robert L. Rabin, Federal
Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1284-88 (1986).
71. See generally HARDAWAY, supra note 59, at 74-75 (explaining that environmental issues
were of paramount influence in the 1970s).
72. Denver International Airport was the first major airport built since Dallas/Ft. Worth
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B. Tenth Circuit Opinion: Board of County Commissioners v. Isaac
1. Facts
In February of 1995, the city of Denver replaced Stapleton International
Airport with a new airport ten miles northeast of Stapleton.73 As a result, car-
go carriers operating out of Stapleton were forced to relocate in order to con-
tinue their businesses.74 Several carriers disapproved of and rejected the new
site, Denver International Airport, because it did not provide the carriers with
acceptable access to interstate highways.75
In 1991, Adams County, the Front Range Airport Authority ("FRAA"),
and Centerport International, Inc., presented an offer to the FAA to expand a
nearby aviation facility, Front Range Airport ("Front Range"), into an air
cargo hub as an alternative to DIA."6 Early in 1992, the FAA authorized the
proposal,77 and allocated $15 million under the Airport Improvement Pro-
gram78 to expand the facilities to serve mass air cargo traffic anticipated in
the Denver metropolitan area.79 Subject to certain revisions and bids from
cargo carriers, the FAA informed the parties that it would allocate funds for
fiscal year 1992. However, the FAA made no commitment to provide funds
beyond 1992.80
Following FAA approval of FRAA's proposal and prospective granting of
financial support, FRAA began soliciting cargo carriers to sign long-term lease
options." FRAA was successful in obtaining a small number of lease agree-
ments while several companies expressed interest in the Front Range alter-
native providing the FAA committed to continual funding for the expansion.82
FRAA then submitted applications for funding to the FAA.83
International Airport, which opened in 1974. Paul Stephen Dempsey, The State of the Airline,
Airport & Aviation Industries, 21 TRANsp. L.J. 129, 168 (1992).
73. In late September of 1989, then Transportation Secretary Samuel Skinner furnished the
city of Denver with a check for $60 million to begin construction on a new Denver regional air-
port project. Leslie Cowling & Suzanne Weiss, Denver Gets 60 Million Check Federal Grant
Goes for Airport; Some Construction Begins Today, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 28, 1989, at 6.
74. Board of County Comm'rs v. Isaac, 18 F.3d 1492, 1494 (10th Cir. 1994).
75. DIA's prospective cargo facilities were located at the airport's northern end, which carri-
ers felt was inadequate. Id. at 1494.
76. Given DIA's inadequate facilities and Front Range's relatively close proximity to DIA,
the parties thought this would provide a good alternative to the DIA site. Id.
77. The proposal was approved in the FAA's Record of Decision ("ROD"). Id.
78. Congress passed the Airport Improvement Program in 1982 to expand and improve the
already existing Airport Development Aid Program ("ADAP"). WILEY, supra, note 59, at 123. See
generally HARDAWAY, supra note 59, at 19-21 (giving an overview of airport and airway Acts).
The Development Aid Program afforded support in terms of financial aid, hardware acquisition,
and research and development. WILEY, supra, note 59, at 11.
79. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1495.
80. The funding was allocated to Adams County and the FRAA, subject to revision after
bids had been opened. Id.
81. Id.
82. In April of 1992, United Parcel Service and Federal Express were two major carriers
who signed lease agreements with Front Range rather than DIA. At that time, a small number of
secondary carriers also signed letters of intent to commit to Front Range. Steve Caulk, Fedex
Delivers Front Range Lease: Small Airport Becoming A Cargo Hub with Second Major Signing,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 9, 1992, at 52.
83. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1495.
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In August 1992, DIA requested FAA approval of cargo facilities on the
southern end of the airport designed to give carriers ready access to interstate
highways. 4 The FAA approved of DIA's decision to change the location of
its cargo site, and as a result, carriers which had signed with Front Range
abandoned their leases and entered into lease agreements with DIA.85 The
FAA withdrew their approval of the Front Range expansion," concluding the
changed circumstances had diminished "the previously perceived need for the
Front Range expansion."87 Shortly thereafter, the FAA endorsed DIA's south-
ern end cargo facilities. 8 The Adams County Board of Commissioners and
other interested parties appealed the FAA's decision to the Tenth Circuit.89
They sought nullification of the FAA's reversal order and reinstatement of the
funding for the Front Range expansion project."
2. Opinion of the Court
In Board of County Commissioners v. Isaac,"' the petitioners argued that
the FAA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously because the reversal order was
not supported by substantial evidence as required by 49 U.S.C. app. §
1486(e),92 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).93 In support of
this argument, the petitioners noted that the FAA failed to consider such attrib-
utes as Front Range's convenient transportation routes, prudent and competi-
tive expansion/operating costs, investment opportunities, and long-term leases
and assurances from cargo carriers that they would establish themselves at
Front Range pending FAA funding.94 Because the FAA declined to take these
and other factors into account,95 the petitioners claimed that the FAA had
84. Id.
85. One such carrier was Federal Express. United Parcel Service was the only carrier who
ended up signing with the FRAA. Id.
86. There was no longer a "purpose and need" for the Front Range project given "the via-
bility of DIA as an alternative for air cargo operations." Id.
87. Id.
88. The FAA regional administrator concluded that the FAA's commitment to FRAA had
been "contingent upon relocation... [at] DIA... for cargo operations from the north to the
south side of the airport." Id.
89. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating that "[a]ny order...
issued by the Board or Secretary of Transportation... shall be subject to review by the courts of
appeals of the United States").
90. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1495. Petitioners also brought a conflict claim "to justify the reinstate-
ment of the original ROD and contend[ed] the FAA should be estopped from denying the money
it initially promised." Id. Petitioner's charged that the FAA was aware of a conflict of interest
stemming from FAA staff members' personal involvement in the Front Range and DIA projects.
Id. at 1499. The petitioners claimed that this conflict of interest was left unresolved. Id.
91. 18 F.3d 1492 (10th Cir. 1994).
92. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(e) (stating that "[tihe findings of facts by the Board or Secre-
tary of Transportation, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive").
93. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), 706(2)(E) (stating that a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; ... [or] unsupported by substantial
evidence").
94. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1495-96.
95. Petitioners also argued that the FAA played favorites instead of remaining neutral (the




acted arbitrarily and capriciously, resulting in a clear error of judgment."
The Tenth Circuit exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 49 U.S.C. app. §
1486(a),97 and affirmed the FAA's decision." Upon review, the court con-
sidered whether the FAA, in making their final determination, had given cre-
dence to all of the pertinent factors. 99 Concluding that there was no apparent
error of judgment, the court determined that the FAA's decision was not arbi-
trary and capricious."° Judge Moore emphasized that the FAA's initial sup-
port for the Front Range project was based on the presumption that "DIA was
not a viable alternative to the expansion of Front Range . ".. " 'Since there
were substantial changes in DIA's economic viability after it switched its
cargo location,"° the Tenth Circuit ruled that the FAA was justified in later
disapproving of FRAA's expansion. 3
The Isaac court went on to determine that it could not review the FAA's
decision to withdraw its tentative funding for the Front Range expansion."°
The court read the language of 49 U.S.C. app. § 1349 to provide the court
with no "justiciable standard of review,"'' 5 as "[tihe allocation of funds from
a lump-sum appropriation is ... traditionally regarded as committed to agency
discretion."" Because an agency can best determine its spending
priorities, 7 agencies have the flexibility to manage appropriations." s As
long as the agency's allocation "meets permissible statutory objections," a
court may not review the-agency's expenditure." 9
The Federal Aviation Act forbids judicial review "where objections were
not first presented to the 'Board or Secretary of Transportation' unless 'rea-
sonable grounds' excuse the failure to appeal to the agency.""'  Petitioners
96. Id.
97. For the text of section 1486(a), see supra note 90.
98. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1494.
99. Id. at 1497-98. The court considered the entire agency record in accordance with the
"substantial evidence" standard of section 706(2)(E). Judge Moore explained that this standard
required the FAA to have a "rational basis for drawing its conclusions from the facts." Id. at 1496
(citing City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 744 F.2d 1529, 1540 (1 1th Cir. 1985)).
100. Id. at 1498.
101. Id. at 1497. In the FAA's original Record of Decision, the FAA determined that DIA
was "'not as economical, efficient, and air cargo-oriented as Front Range Airport .... ' Id. This
was due to such considerations as DIA's potentially high costs and inadequate ground
transportation connections, long taxi distances and absence of low-priced land for private develop-
ment. Id.
102. Id. at 1498.
103. Id. The court explained that various cargo carriers did attempt to persuade DIA to relo-
cate its cargo site, despite their support for the Front Range project. It was therefore appropriate
for the FAA to consider DIA's response to these efforts in determining the location of the Denver
air cargo hub. Id. at 1497.
104. Id. at 1498.
105. Id. The court determined that the allocation of funds from a government appropriation is
a determination better suited to an administrative agency. Id.
106. Id. (citing Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (1993)).
107. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
108. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. at 2031-32.
109. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1498 (citing Vigil, 113 S. Ct. at 2032); see also International Union v.
Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining that the court has no jurisdiction to
review lump sum allocation of funds).
110. Id. at 1499 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(e)). Section 1486(e) states:
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failed to bring their conflict claim before the FAA and therefore it was within
the court's discretion to exercise review regarding the issue." The court
concluded "[m]eaningful review is not possible... " and did not consider the
matter."
2
In response to the petitioners' claim asserting equitable estoppel, Judge
Moore found no intentional misrepresentation or concealment by the FAA."3
The Tenth Circuit based its finding on the fact that the FAA had conditioned
funding for the Front Range expansion upon "factors ultimately left unsatis-
fied.""' 4 The court determined that this did not constitute affirmative miscon-
duct." 5 Moreover, claiming "equitable estoppel against the government is an
extraordinary remedy.""' 6 Judge Moore noted that an assertion of equitable
estoppel against the government has yet to be upheld by the Supreme
Court.' ',
3. Analysis
Much of the Isaac opinion focused on the two standards most often used
to review agency action."' The court first discussed the "substantial evi-
dence" standard."9 After stating that substantial evidence meant "more than
a mere scintilla but less than the weight of the evidence,"'"2 the court exam-
ined the record, in its entirety, under that standard.' 2' Next, the court exam-
ined the "arbitrary and capricious" standard and applied it to the facts.
2
Judge Moore noted that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously when "it
relie[s] on factors deemed irrelevant by Congress, fail[s] to consider important
aspects of the problem, [or] present[s] an implausible explanation or one con-
trary to the evidence.' 23
In Part H of the opinion, however, the court determined that the FAA's
decision to withdraw its tentative funding was not reviewable. 24 This deter-
mination should have precluded any discussion of the merits of the case.'2 5
The findings of facts by the Board or Secretary of Transportation, if supported by sub-
stantial evidence, shall be conclusive. No objection to an order of the Board or Secretary
of Transportation shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been
urged before the Board or Secretary of Transportation or, if it was not so urged, unless
there were reasonable grounds for failure to do so.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
111. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1498 (citing Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Dep't
of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 619 (10th Cir. 1987)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1499.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1498 (citing Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 421-22
(1990)).
117. Id. at 1498-99.
118. Id. at 1496-98.
119. Id. at 1496.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 744 F.2d 1529, 1539 (11th Cir. 1985)).
122. Id. at 1496-98.
123. Id. at 1497 (citing Quivira Mining Co. v. United States Regulatory Comm'n, 866 F.2d
1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 1989)).
124. Id. at 1498.
125. Id. at 1496. It has been said that no review means no review, for the APA cannot effect
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Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that section 701(a)(2) of the APA gives
the court no leave to intrude when an agency is allocating funds.'26 More-
over, the Supreme Court has held that it is error for a court to review the
merits of a claim when governmental action is not reviewable under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.' Logically, the same reasoning should have ap-
plied in Issac.2 s
The doctrine of unreviewability has been controversial since the Supreme
Court's decision in Heckler v. Chaney,'29 and the Tenth Circuit may have
been motivated to discuss Issac on its merits in order to dissipate the apparent
conflict between sections 701, 702 and 706 of the Administrative Procedure
Act. Given the presumption of reviewability under section 702, and section
706's judicial review provision for an agency's abuse of discretion, the Issac
court's examination of the FAA's determination acts to assuage petitioner's
concerns of the validity of the FAA's order.30
The Tenth Circuit's holding reinforces the conclusion that courts may not
exercise jurisdiction to review the allocation of agency funds.'3' While it was
probably unnecessary for the court to examine the record to determine whether
the FAA's decision was arbitrary and capricious, 3 2 the examination may
well have been warranted given the Supreme Court's conviction that the
"committed to agency discretion" exception remain a very narrow one.'33
"something to which it does not apply." Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness Is Not
Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REv. 643, 644 (1967).
126. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. at 2032.
127. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2776 (1992) (holding the District Court
erred in determining the merits of an APA claim when the governmental actions at issue were
unreviewable under the APA).
128. Access to the courts is not permitted where there is no means for the court to review an
action. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153 (1967). While the rationale underlying
Franklin stems from agency finality and § 704 of the APA, the same result can be extended to
reach § 702; if the APA does not permit review of an agency's actions, those actions are not re-
viewable for abuse of discretion. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
129. See Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L.
REv. 653 (1985); see also Sharon Werner, Note, The Impact of Heckler v. Chancy on Judicial Re-
view of Agency Decisions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1247, 1248-49 (explaining that section 701(a)(2)
has been the subject of confusion and controversy).
130. Some say judicial review should be guaranteed to test whether the agency has abused its
discretion. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACnON 359 (1965). For a
discussion on the conflict between §§ 701(a)(2) and 706(2)(a) of the APA, see Daniel B. Rodri-
guez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and its Consequenc-
es, 45 VAND. L. REv. 743, 756 (1992).
131. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1498.
132. Id. at 1496-97.
133. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. The Court noted that section 701 had been the sub-
ject of extensive commentary. Id. at 410 n.23.
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II. HIGHWAY DECISION-MAKING AND DEFERENCE TO AGENCY ACTION:
COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE BOOMER LAKE PARK V. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION'3 4
A. Background
There is a national policy to safeguard the unaffected beauty of public
park and recreation lands.'35 Section 138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1968 ("FHA"),36 and section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act
of 1966 ("DTA"),'37 forbid the use of parkland for highway purposes unless
there is no feasible and prudent alternative. 38 Thus, the Secretary of Trans-
134. 4 F.3d 1543 (10th Cir. 1993).
135. See 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). That section states in pertinent part:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to pre-
serve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife
and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites. The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate
and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and
Agriculture, and with the States in developing transportation plans and programs that
include measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed....
[T]he Secretary shall not approve any program or project.., which requires the use of
any publicly owned land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl
refuge of national, State, or local significance ... unless (1) there is no feasible and
prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible
planning to minimize harm to such park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge,
or historic site resulting from such use....
Id.
136. Id.
137. 49 U.S.C. § 303 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a discussion on the implications section
4(f) has had on case law and on judicial interpretations of that section, see Barbara Miller, Com-
ment, Department of Transportation's Section 4(f): Paving the Way Toward Preservation, 36 AM.
U. L. REv. 633 (1987).
138. Section 4(f) states in relevant part:
(a) It is the policy of the United States Government that special effort should be made to
preserve the natural beauty of the country-side and public park and recreation lands,
wildlife, waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.
(c) The Secretary may approve a transportation program or project (other than any pro-
ject for a park road or parkway under section 204 of title 23) requiring the use of pub-
licly owned land of a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of
national, State, or local significance, or land of an historic site of national, State, or local
significance (as determined by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction
over the park, area, refuge, or site) only if-
(1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to using that land; and
(2) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to
the park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site re-
sulting from the use.
49 U.S.C. § 303.
Section 138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act adds:
[iln carrying out the national policy ... the Secretary [of Transportation] ... is autho-
rized to conduct studies as to the most feasible Federal-aid routes for the movement of
motor vehicular traffic trough or around national parks so as to best serve the needs of
the traveling public while preserving the natural beauty of these areas.
23 U.S.C. § 138.
Section 138 of the Federal Highway Act and section 4(f) of the Department of Transporta-
tion Act are so similar that courts often simply refer to section 4(f). See, e.g., Overton Park, 401
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portation may approve the use of federal funds'39 to finance construction of
highways'4 through public parks only when "alternative routes reach ex-
traordinary magnitudes or... present 'unique problems." ' 4' If no alternative
route is reasonable, the Secretary may approve and finance construction only
in the event that highway construction considers "all possible planning to
minimize harm to the park."'42
In making this determination, the Secretary must take into account options
that do not also effect the parkland. 43 If the alternative route uses even a
small amount of protected area, section 4(f) is triggered.'"
In 1971, the Supreme Court handed down the seminal Overton Park45
decision. The decision is prominent for a number of reasons," and clarified
U.S. at 411 (explaining that the two sections are "clear and specific directives"); Eagle Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798, 800 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that section 138 does not "add
anything to § 4(f)").
139. Federal funds for highway expenditures have declined since the 1980s. The Federal share
of capital outlay was at its peak in the early 1980s, accounting for approximately 56 percent of the
funds that finance highways across the United States. Since then, federal funding has accounted
for 40 to 56 percent of highway financing. Report of the Secretary of Transportation to the United
States Congress, The Status of the Nations Highways, Bridges, & Transit: Conditions & Perfor-
mance, 68, 69 (1993).
140. For a discussion of the planning of federally funded highways and the basic federal-aid
highway process, see Edward V.A. Kussy, Environmental Considerations in Highway Planning,
C933 ALI-ABA 257 (1994).
141. Druid Hills Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 700, 715 (lth Cir.
1985) (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 819 (1988); see also Mon-
roe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 700 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that a
"feasible alternative route is one that is compatible with sound engineering") (citing Overton Park,
401 U.S. at 411). The Monroe County court then stated, "a prudent alternative route is one that
does not present unique problems, that is, an alternative without truly unusual factors so that the
cost or community disruption would reach extraordinary magnitudes .... " Id. (citing Overton
Park, 401 U.S. at 412-13).
Prior to construction of a federal highway, the Federal Highway Administration is responsi-
ble for making sure the project complies with NEPA, which entails preparing an environmental
impact statement ("EIS"). The EIS must "balance the environmental impacts and the benefits of
the alternatives and select a preferred alternative." UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, HIGHWAY PLANNING 2 (1994).
142. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411 (citing 23 U.S.C. § 138 and 49 U.S.C. § 303); see also
Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Lewis, 538 F. Supp. 149, 183 (1982) (explaining that the record must show
that "all possible measures have been taken to minimize harm") (emphasis added); Monroe Coun-
ty, 472 F.2d at 700 (stating that a "road must not take parkland, unless a prudent person, con-
cerned with the quality of the human environment is convinced that there is no way to avoid
doing so").
143. Druid Hills, 772 F.2d at 715.
144. See Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y, Inc. v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 83-85 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating
that section 4(f) "is applicable whenever parkland will be 'used for a highway project"') (emphasis
added).
145. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
146. Overton Park is often cited for its contribution to our understanding of section 706 of
the APA and the Court's determination that a reviewing court is required to make a thorough
examination of the agency's entire record. This has become known as the "hard-look" doctrine. As
the Overton Park Court explained, the reviewing court's inquiry has to be "thorough [and] prob-
ing ..... Id. at 415. In other words, courts must take a "searching and careful" look at the agen-
cy record. Id. at 416; see also Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political & Judicial
Controls over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1261
(1992) (noting that Overton Park is the most frequently cited case in Administrative Law);
Suzannah T. French, Comment, Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA Litigation,
81 CAL. L. REv. 929, 940-41 (1993) (stating that Overton Park is known for establishing the
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the requirements of highway planners and courts reviewing the Secretary of
Transportation's actions. 47 The language of the FHA and the DTA was in-
terpreted loosely until Overton Park was decided." Prior to 1971, the law
did not require rigorous scrutiny of possible alternatives, nor did it require less
damaging alternatives be chosen. 49 Overton Park made clear that Congress
enacted section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act,'50 and section
18(a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 5' to protect the "quality of our natu-
ral environment" and to "curb the accelerating destruction of our country's
natural beauty."''
The Overton Park Court set forth a test that required courts to take a
"hard look"'53 at the Department of Transportation's determination.'54 This
test consists of a three-tiered analysis that now provides courts with a stringent
evaluation in section 4(f) challenges. 5 In the aftermath of Overton Park,
federal highway decision-making has no longer been fashioned "on a least-
cost, political, and unreviewable basis."'5 6 Rather, the 4(f) standard has be-
come a hard edged tool for preserving our nation's rustic surroundings."'
"hard-look" doctrine).
147. See, e.g., Eagle Foundation, Inc. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798, 800 (1987) (stating that the
court and highway planners are guided by Overton Park); Druid Hills, 772 F.2d at 714 (conduct-
ing review under Overton Park analysis); Stop H-3, 538 F. Supp. at 159 (following the standard
set forth in Overton Park).
148. See generally Oliver A. Houck, The Secret Opinions of the United States Supreme Court
on Leading Cases in Environmental Law, Never Before Published!, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 459,
477-85 (1994) (noting that prior to Overton Park section 4(f) "did not require that urban parks be
spared" and apparently only required that "the Secretary of Transportation decide whether saving
park land really merited alternative routes"). For insight into Justice Marshall's Overton Park
opinion, see Jonathan Weinberg, Thurgood Marshall and the Administrative State, 38 WAYNE L.
REV. 115 (1991).
149. Houck, supra note 148, at 479.
150. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
152. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 404.
153. See supra note 146.
154. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415-17.
155. Id. The first prong of the test explains:
The court is first required to decide whether the Secretary acted within the scope of his
authority [under section 4(f)].... The reviewing court must consider whether the Secre-
tary properly construed his authority to approve the use of parkland as limited to situa-
tions where there are no feasible alternative routes or where feasible alternative routes
involve uniquely difficult problems. And the reviewing court must be able to find that
the Secretary could have reasonably believed that in this case there are no feasible alter-
natives of that alternatives do not involve unique problems.
Id. at 415-16.
The second and third Overton Park inquiries involve determining whether
[T]he actual choice made [by the Secretary] was not 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.' To make this finding the court must
consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment .... The final inquiry is whether the
Secretary's action followed the necessary procedural requirements.
Id. at 416-17 (citations omitted).
156. Houck, supra note 148, at 482.
157. See id. at 483 (stating that "[t]he effects of the Overton Park decision transcend highway
decision-making and transportation law"); Melissa A. MacGill, Comment, Old Stuff is Good Stuff.
Federal Agency Responsibilities Under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 7
ADM N. L.J. AM. U. 697, 722 (1994) (noting that "[i]nstead of raising mere procedural hurdles,
[Vol. 72:3
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: TRANSPORTATION
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. Committee to Preserve Boomer Lake Park v. Department of
Transportation"'
a. Facts
One of the main issues in Boomer Lake was whether the Federal Highway
Administration's decision to fund a four-lane highway through Boomer Lake
Park in Stillwater, Oklahoma violated section 4(f) of the Department of Trans-
portation Act.'59 After making a preliminary determination that the Secretary
of Transportation had acted within the scope of his authority,"w the Boomer
court had to decide whether the Secretary's decision to fund the highway was
founded on a "'consideration of the relevant factors,"""' and whether the
Secretary had abused his discretion in making his decision.'62
In 1988, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation ("ODOT") sought
federal assistance from the Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") to
reconstruct a two-lane road (Lakeview Road) that had previously cut through
the southern portion of Boomer Lake Dam,'63 which was located on Boomer
Lake." When the dam was reconstructed in the late 1970s,'65 the segment
of Lakeview Road which had run on top of the dam was destroyed and not
replaced.' t
The City of Stillwater decided to erect a new Lakeview Road across
Boomer Lake. 6 7 The City Commission planned to expand Lakeview into
four-lanes, supplanting that section of the road which had been obliterated
with the old dam.t' A cost analysis was administered and the City voted in
favor of a straight alignment across Boomer Lake."e The City's project was
regarded as "a vital part" of the city's transportation efforts. 70
Initially, the FHWA rejected ODOT's request for federal funds, 7' con-
section 4(f) imposes a clear and affirmative duty upon the DOT to minimize harm to historic
sites").
158. 4 F.3d 1543 (10th Cir. 1993).
159. Id. at 1547.
160. To determine this, the court followed the first inquiry of the three-pronged Overton Park
analysis. See supra note 156.
161. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1547 (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416).
162. Id.
163. id. at 1548.
164. Boomer Lake made up approximately 220 acres of Stillwater, Oklahoma's 347-acre
Boomer Lake Park. Id. at 1547.
165. The dam had been inspected in 1978, and at that time it was discovered that it was
compositionally flawed and needed to be rebuilt. Id.
166. The road was not replaced "due to concerns that traffic would cause structural stress to
the new dam ..... Id.
167. Id. The road was to be built on a raised causeway and bridge and would "eliminate
congestion and accommodate present and projected traffic needs by providing a major east-west
arterial route through the city." Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1547-48.
170. Id. Other factors such as traffic safety and fire department response times were taken into
consideration in the City's proposal. Id. at 1547.
171. Id. at 1548.
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cluding that the ODOT had failed to consider whether the new Lakeview Road
could have been built around Boomer Lake (instead of straight across it).'72
Additionally, ODOT failed to consider the idea of simply not building the
road.13 ODOT responded by submitting a second draft to the FHWA. This
draft included three alternative projects: "(1) a no-build alternative; (2) a four-
lane road with a straight alignment across Boomer Lake built upon a causeway
and bridge (the causeway alternative); and (3) a four-lane road with an align-
ment around the southern end of Boomer Lake and the park (the avoidance al-
ternative)."'' Finding ODOT's causeway alternative most "feasible," the
FHWA approved the second draft and granted ODOT federal funds for the
proposed road project.'75 Following the FHWA's approval, the Committee to
Preserve Boomer Lake Park ("Committee") was formed, and the proposed
road project became the subject of the Committee's efforts.'76
The construction was controversial because the City Commission elected
to cross the lake and park with the new road.'77 The project appropriated
roughly 3.3 acres of park-land and approximately 2.4 acres of Boomer Lake to
construct the causeway and bridge.'78 The Committee filed suit challenging
the project's funding.' The district court granted the Department of
Transportation's motion for summary judgment, s0 and the Committee ap-
pealed to the Tenth Circuit.
On appeal, the Committee claimed section 4(f) of the Transportation Act
was violated by the Federal Highway Administration. 8' The Committee
maintained that permitting federal monies to fund a highway project that en-
tailed destroying parkland violated the Act, and that there were alternatives
which could have been used without affecting the Park.8 2
b. Opinion of the Court
In affirming the district court's opinion, the Tenth Circuit applied the
three-pronged analysis promulgated by the Supreme Court in Overton
Park.'83 The Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary of Transportation acted
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. The FHWA also issued a finding of no significant impact in accordance with NEPA.
For a discussion of NEPA, see supra note 70.
175. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1548.
176. Id. The Committee was made up of six residents of Stillwater living near Boomer Lake
Park. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1547. The court did note that the City of Stillwater furnished 3.3 acres of commen-
surate land on another lake for public recreational use to make up for the 3.3 acres of Boomer
Lake the construction project would relinquish. Id. at 1548 n.l.
179. The Committee's action challenged the federal funding of the road project in addition to
the FHWA's failure to prepare an environmental impact statement. Id. at 1548.
180. Id. The court held that under section 4(f) of the Transportation Act, alternatives to the
Lakeview Road highway decision conferred "uniquely difficult problems" such that the Federal
Highway Administration did not err in rejecting them. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1549, 1551.
183. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415-17.
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within the scope of his authority under 4(f),' finding it reasonable for the
Secretary to conclude that alternatives to the highway project involved "unique
problems which rendered them imprudent."'83 While the Secretary failed to
consider an alternative such as a two-lane road that would have avoided taking
park-land,'86 and also failed to consider the potential use of existing roads
when he rejected the "no-build alternative,"'' 7 the court determined that both
options were incapable of "accommodating projected traffic volumes" and
therefore were inadequate.'88
Since the Department of Transportation failed to allege that the alternative
routes were not feasible, the court restricted its review to whether the alterna-
tives were imprudent.8 9 The court found that there were several reasons why
the suggested alternative routes were imprudent." Moreover, the causeway
alternative had several benefits that the other alternatives did not possess.'
It enhanced fishing access," it improved the quality of the water "by reduc-
ing the wind action on the lake"'93 and joined the east and west sides of the
park.
94
184. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1550.
185. The court explained that "Ithe inability of an alternative to accommodate future traffic
volumes is justification for rejecting [an] alternative." Id.; see also Hickory Neighborhood Defense
League v. Skinner, 910 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cit. 1990) (explaining that alternatives which do not
solve or fulfill the "transportation needs of the project" may properly be rejected by the Secretary
as not prudent"); Eagle Foundation, 813 F.2d at 805 (indicating that an aggregate of modest
problems "may add up to a sufficient reason to use § 4(f) lands"). But see Overton Park, 401 U.S.
at 411-13, in which the Supreme Court stated:
[C]onsiderations of cost, directness of route, and community disruption ... [are not] on
an equal footing with preservation of parkland .... Congress clearly did not intend that
cost and disruption of the community were to be ignored by the Secretary, but the very
existence of the statutes.., indicates that protection of parkland was to be given para-
mount importance.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
186. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1551.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1552.
189. Id. at 1550.
190. Id. For example, if an alternative could not "accommodate future traffic volumes," that is
sufficient for rejecting it as an alternative. Id. (citing Lake Hefner Open Space Alliance v. Dole,
871 F.2d 943, 947 (10th Cir. 1989)). Additionally, when an alternative route does not "satisfacto-
rily fulfill the purposes of the project... [it] may be rejected." Id. (citing Arizona Past & Future
Found., Inc. v. Lewis, 722 F.2d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983)). The court also cited Eagle Founda-
tion, 813 F.2d at 804, 810, for the proposition that safety and costs are valid aims to keep in mind
in rejecting alternative routes. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1550.
It was clear that the court accepted respondents several explanations as to why the alterna-
tives were not prudent. The Environmental Assessmentl/4(f) statement declared the avoidance route
problematic because it was found to have:
(1) higher road user costs; (2) more traffic congestion; (3) substandard curves which in
turn raised safety concerns; (4) failure to accommodate east-west traveling opportunities
as well as a direct route across the lake; (5) more intersection modifications on existing
roads; (6) more commercial and residential relocations; and (7) higher construction cost.
Id. The 4(f) statement also explained that "the no-build alternative, by failing to connect Lakeview
Road, was considered worst with respect to problems 1-4, and was thought to eliminate a vital
section line road that links the east and west sides of Stillwater." Id.
191. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1550.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1550 n.5.
194. Id. at 1550.
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As to the first Overton Park inquiry,'95 the court held that it was rea-
sonable for the Secretary to believe that the alternative routes were impru-
dent.'96 Thus, it was within the scope of his authority to fund the highway
project through Boomer Lake Park.'97 The court reasoned that an alternative
may be forsaken if it does not effectuate the highway's original intentions.'
The second prong of the Overton Park test'"9 required the court to deter-
mine whether all relevant factors were considered in the Secretary's deci-
sion.' Rejecting the Committee's suggestion that the Secretary should have
considered a two-lane parkland avoidance alternative, the court held that "the
decision concerning which alternatives to consider is necessarily bounded by a
rule of reason and practicality." '' The court also noted that the Committee
did not explain why the two-lane alternative would have been better suited
than the four-lane alternative that was previously rejected.2 2 While reducing
harm to the park, the two-lane alternative would not serve projected traffic
volumes.2 3 This fact, alone, was a sufficient a reason to reject the
Committee's proposal.
The Committee made several other arguments against the 4(f) state-
ment."0 First, it argued that the Secretary did not consider existing roads as
an alternative no-build option.0" The court was convinced, however, that the
Secretary did consider some of the roads already in existence, °" and had
concluded that they were inadequate.0 7 The Committee did not submit evi-
dence to suggest otherwise.2 "0 Although the Secretary did not consider "all"
of the existing roads, the court, nevertheless, did not find the oversight arbi-
trary and capricious.2 "0
The Committee also alleged that bad faith was involved in the final 4(f)
statement.2 ' It argued that the Secretary increased the estimated cost of the
avoidance alternative in the final EA/4(f) statement.2" Judge Brorby agreed
with the district court, however, finding no evidence to support a bad faith
195. See supra note 156.
196. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1550.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See supra note 156.
200. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1551. The second prong essentially requires the court to consider
whether the Secretary made a clear error of judgment. Id. (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416).
201. Id.; see also Hickory, 910 F.2d at 164 (explaining that the record does not have to be
utterly complete, but instead the government must apply the "rule of reason and practicality").
202. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1551.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1551-55.
205. Id. at 1551.
206. The court found the submitted environmental documents evidence of the Secretary's
consideration. Id. at 1551-52.
207. The record indicated that it was either unlikely existing roads could be widened into four
lanes or could not accommodate projected traffic volumes. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1552. While the failure to make such a consideration was relevant, it was not






Finally, the Committee alleged that: (1) the Secretary's decision was not
supported by the record;" 3 (2) the Secretary's decision was in violation of
the National Environmental Protection Act;2 4 and (3) the Secretary erred by
not filling out an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") and not issuing a
finding of no significant impact ("FONSI"). 2 5 The Tenth Circuit did not
give credence to any of the Committee's allegations, and in affirming the
district court, held that the Committee's claims were unsupported by the re-
cord.21 6
c. Analysis
In reviewing 4(f) determinations, courts are not entitled to substitute their
own judgment for the judgement of the Federal Highway Administration.2 7
The standard of review is very narrow.28 The court must consider the
FHWA's record the "focal point for judicial review.,
219
The legislative history of section 4(f) suggests that Congress intended to
preserve the nation's natural beauty through careful highway planning.22° Al-
though the Supreme Court in Overton Park construed 4(f) to mean that the
land must be preserved in all but the "most unusual situations, 221 courts
have found that several considerations can defeat the preservation of 4(f)
lands.222
Since Overton Park, courts have unconditionally questioned the possibility
of alternative routes in highway decision-making, ensuring highways are not
built through protected lands unless there are no other feasible and prudent
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1553. The Committee made this allegation to overrule the district court's granting
of summary judgment in favor of the respondents. The Tenth Circuit determined that no reason-
able juror could find the Secretary's determination arbitrary and capricious, and thus rejected the
Committee's claim. Id.
214. Id. at 1554 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The court explained
that NEPA obligates the agency to contemplate all environmental impacts of a proposed action
and guarantees that the agency will "inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental
concerns in its decision-making process." Id. (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462
U.S. 87, 97 (1983)). The Boomer Lake court then held that the Secretary did not violate NEPA
and was only required to consider possible environmental impacts in the decision process. Id.
215. The court held that the decision not to conduct an EIS and to issue a FONSI was best
left to the agency's expertise, and therefore, found that the Committee's final arguments failed. Id.
at 1555-56. The court concluded that the Committee's claims of adverse environmental effects
were at best speculative. Id. at 1556.
216. Id. at 1553-56.
217. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416; see also Citizens to Preserve Foster Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
466 F.2d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 1972) (explaining that the court is not "empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the Secretary").
218. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
219. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).
220. S. REP. No. 1340, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3482,
3500.
221. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411.
222. See supra note 185; see also Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190,
197-98 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that boosting a local economy is a reasonable consideration in
eliminating alternatives that would not accomplish that goal).
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alternatives.223  While the Tenth Circuit upheld the Federal Highway
Administration's decision to build a highway through Boomer Lake Park,224
the court made it clear that there were no reasonable alternatives to the pro-
posed highway. 5 While courts have vacillated in their approval of highway
construction through protected areas, 2 6 the common thread throughout the
circuits has been judicial deference to agency authority.227
Another commonality found in post-Overton Park 4(f) decisions is the
application of the Overton Park three-pronged analysis.228 While lower
courts are continually guided by this three-tiered inquiry, they have neverthe-
less taken liberty to expand their interpretations of 4(f).229 For example, it
has been held that land can be protected and highway projects may be rejected
if the land is "constructively" used in a transportation endeavor.230 Courts
identifying a constructive use of land have reduced Overton Park's three-
pronged inquiry to a two-step analysis. 3' This two-step standard considers:
"(1) the proximity of the harm to the property, and (2) the nature of the ef-
fects of the harm on the property's historic value or significance. 232 Other
lower courts have broadened 4(f) to include even minor uses of park land,233
or have applied 4(f) to protect archaeological sites.3
Section 4(f) has been very successful "in preserving numerous ... sites
and thousands of acres of public parkland. 3  While there is an undeniable
duty on the Secretary of Transportation to minimize harm to 4(f) land, the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Boomer Lake is suitable given its unique circum-
stances.236
223. Houck, supra note 148, at 482-83.
224. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1550.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Eagle Foundation, 813 F.2d at 810 (affirming decision to build highway
through 4(f) land); Coalition for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774, 784 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that the Secretary had failed to contemplate all reasonable alternatives in making
his 4(f) determination, and therefore, the parkland would be spared); Stop H-3, 538 F. Supp. at
181 (holding that the Secretary's determination must be set aside because the Secretary failed to
consider alternatives which would minimize harm to the park).
227. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1549 (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415) (stating that "the
Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity"); see also Eagle Foundation, 813
F.2d at 803 (stating that "deferential review ensures that once the court is satisfied that the Secre-
tary took a close look at the things that matter and made the hard decisions, those decisions
stick").
228. See supra note 155.
229. Roger Nober, Note, Federal Highways and Environmental Litigation: Toward a Theory
of Public Choice & Administrative Reaction, 27 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 229, 249-50 (1990).
230. See, e.g., Allison v. Department of Transp., 908 F.2d 1024, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stat-
ing that an escalation in noise levels is sufficient to create constructive use); Adler v. Lewis, 675
F.2d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that physical taking is not required to constitute use).
231. Miller, supra note 137, at 646.
232. Id.
233. Township of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 1983) (explaining that
"[any park use, regardless of its degree invokes section 4(f)") (citing Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y v.
Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 84 (5th Cir. 1976)).
234. See Stanley D. Olesh, Note, The Roads Through Our Ruins: Archaeology and Section
4(J) of the Department of Transportation Act, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 155, 163 (1986).
235. See Miller, supra note 137, at 636 n.13.
236. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411 (stating that unique circumstances may include "con-




During the Tenth Circuit's survey period, the court handed down only a
handful of transportation law decisions. Both Issac and Boomer Lake illustrate
the considerable judicial deference given to agency decision-making, and the
Tenth Circuit's regard for the FAA's and Department of Transportation's
expertise. The court's use of the "substantial evidence" and "arbitrary and
capricious" standards illustrate its willingness to uphold agency action.
Cases involving airport and highway development have historically been
brought before courts to protest agency determinations. As with other transpor-
tation activities, the responsibility for airport improvement and development,
as well as highway decision-making, has been delegated to administrative
agencies, which are thought to be better equipped to deal with the details of
aviation and road construction. Various agencies are created by the legislature
to regulate transportation, and courts simply act as a check on the agencies
power. The common law has stretched to provide solutions for principles
previously not considered in the agencies' enabling acts, but for the most part,







During the 1993-94 survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided several cases impacting important arbitration issues. Part I of this
Survey focuses on two decisions that addressed traditional labor law matters:
unionization and collective bargaining. These cases did not establish new law,
but rather reaffirmed existing precedent regarding the limited judicial review
of an arbitrator's decision. In Champion Boxed Beef Co. v. Local No. 7 United
Food & Commercial Workers International Union,' the court reinforced the
principle that judicial review of an arbitrator's award is extremely narrow and
may come into play only if the arbitrator ignores the plain language of the
collective bargaining agreement.2 In Ryan v. City of Shawnee,' the court af-
firmed the limited judicial review of arbitration awards, and concluded that
prior judicial review of an arbitration award could not preclude a subsequent
civil rights action.'
In Part II, this Survey addresses two decisions that brought Tenth Circuit
law into greater conformity with other appellate courts. In Bowles Financial
Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co.,' the Tenth Circuit decided to follow
those circuits exercising de novo review of a district court's determination re-
garding an arbitrator's compliance with statutory requirements.' Additionally,
in Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp.,7 the Tenth Circuit followed the
majority of other circuits in adopting the view that a district court order to
arbitrate can only be final within the meaning of § 16(a)(3) of the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"),' if arbitrability was the sole issue before the district
court.
9
Together, the cases discussed in Parts I and II illustrate the Tenth
Circuit's adherence to precedent with regard to collective bargaining agree-
ments. The court continues, however, to establish new procedures for areas
where arbitration provides a less traditional arbitral forum for resolving dis-
putes.
1. 24 F.3d 86 (10th Cir. 1994).
2. Id. at 87.
3. 13 F.3d 345 (10th Cir. 1993).
4. Id. at 348.
5. 22 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1994).
6. Id. at 1012.
7. 25 F.3d 953 (10th Cit. 1994).
8. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (Supp. 1994). See generally Gerald Aksen, Some Legal and Practical
Problems of Labor Arbitrators, in ARBITRATING LABOR CASES 163, 167 (Noel A. Levin et al.
eds., 1974) (Corp. L. & Prac. Sourcebook Series No. 6) (providing background information on the
history and application of the FAA). For a further explanation of the FAA, see infra part II.A.
9. Adair, 25 F.3d at 955.
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I. ARBITRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS
A. Background
1. Evolution of Labor Arbitration
Labor arbitration can be defined as "the referral of a grievance by the
parties, union and management, through a voluntary arbitration clause in the
collective bargaining agreement, to an impartial third person for a final and
binding resolution."'0 The process is uniquely American and does not have a
deeply rooted tradition."
In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or
"Wagner Act"), 2 giving workers the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively, and providing safeguards from management interference. 3 The use of
arbitration to settle disputes became widespread in the 1940's as unionization
and collective bargaining began to form the basis of industrial labor organiza-
tions.'
4
In 1947, with the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA" or "Taft-Hartley Act"), 5 statutorily based grievance arbitration
provided guidance for lawsuits by and against labor organizations. 6 Section
185 of the LMRA gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims in-
volving breach of collective bargaining agreements." In addition, this statute
favored arbitration as the means for resolving disagreements associated with
collective bargaining agreements because it presumed the dispute arbitrable. 8
On June 20, 1960, the Supreme Court decided three cases that fashioned
the present-day laws of arbitration. These cases, commonly referred to as "The
10. Gerald Aksen, History and Development, in ARBITRATING LABOR CASES 9, 9 (Noel A.
Levin et al. eds., 1974) (Corp. L. & Prac. Sourcebook Series No. 6).
11. Id.
12. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449-57 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
13. Aksen, supra note. 10, at 10.
14. LEONARD L. RISKiN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DIsPurE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 301
(1987); Aksen, supra note 10, at 9.
15. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (cod-
ified at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988)).
16. See RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 3.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988) (original version at ch. 120, title III, § 301, 61 Star. 156
(1947)). Section 185(a) provides in relevant part that "(sluits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization... may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties." In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
the Supreme Court held that § 301 embodies a substantive component that authorizes federal
courts to develop a uniform national law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
Id. at 451. The court also held that collective bargaining agreements that include arbitration claus-
es are enforceable under § 301 of the LMRA. Id. See also Douglas E. Ray, Court Review of La-
bor Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 32 VILL. L. REV. 57, 63-64 (1987)
(pointing out that the issue had been hotly debated before Lincoln Mills). Prior to the decision in
Lincoln Mills, there was debate over whether § 301 was considered procedural or substantive.
Aksen, supra note 10, at 15.
18. Jerome Lefkowitz, The Legal Framework of Labor Arbitration in the Public Sector, in




Steelworkers Trilogy," 9  established guidelines for determining the
arbitrability of labor disputes and the extent to which arbitration awards would
be reviewed and enforced." In United Steelworkers of America v. American
Manufacturing, the Court, relying in part on the LMRA, held that when a
collective bargaining agreement called for arbitration of all grievances, no ex-
ception should be read into the grievance clause.2 In United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., the Court established that the
federal policy was to promote industry stabilization through collective bargain-
ing agreements.22 According to the Court in United Steelworkers of America
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., therefore, courts must refrain from review-
ing the merits of an arbitration award handed down as part of a collective
bargaining agreement. 3
The Steelworkers Trilogy led to continued reliance on arbitration as the
preferred method for settling labor disputes under a collective bargaining
agreement, replacing the traditional lockout or strike.2" Arbitration of labor
disputes was seen as a substitute for industrial turmoil and a way to increase
security and peace in industry.' By the 1980s, over ninety percent of collec-
tive bargaining agreements between labor and management provided for some
form of grievance procedure resulting in arbitration.26
2. Role of the Arbitrator
Labor arbitrators function much differently than a traditional judge. 7
Arbitrators for labor disputes are generally chosen for their knowledge and
19. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Legal Framework of Labor Arbitration in the Private Sec-
tor, in LABOR ARBITRATION: A PRACICAL GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 18, 21 (Max Zimny et al.
eds., 1990).
20. The Steelworkers Trilogy included United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 568 (1960) (prohibiting federal courts from weighing the merits of a grievance when the
parties have agreed by collective bargaining to resolve all questions of contract interpretation
through arbitration). The role of the courts is to determine whether the particular claim is gov-
erned by the contract. Id. at 568. The second case was United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (holding that arbitration of labor disputes is different
than arbitration of a commercial agreement). Under the collective bargaining agreement, arbitration
is an integral part of the bargaining process distinct from the actual dispute. Id. at 578. Although
the collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the parties, it is much more than
just a contract: it is a complete agreement covering the entire employment relationship, including
ways to address unanticipated issues. Id. The final case of the Trilogy was United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (defining the scope of the arbitration
award as legitimate so long as it "draws its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement).
The essence test states that "an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the col-
lective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice." Id.
at 597. See also St. Antoine, supra note 19, at 21 (explaining that a court is to resolve all doubts
in favor of arbitration, even frivolous claims).
21. American Manufacturing, 363 U.S. at 567; see also 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988) (provid-
ing that conciliation and mediation services should be used only as a last resort).
22. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578.
23. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 596.
24. AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).
25. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578.
26. Mark E. Zelek, Labor Grievance Arbitration in the United States, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REv. 197, 197 (1989).
27. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 581.
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expertise in a specialized field.2" As described below, arbitrators may rely not
only upon their own experience, but upon what has been termed "industrial
common law"-practices common to the particular working environment or
industry that are not expressly contained within the agreement."
Although the arbitrator has substantial authority, many labor practices
remain "strictly a function of management."3 ° Management generally hires,
fires, pays, promotes and supervises employees,3' so the arbitrator's role is
limited to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agree-
ment." Although the arbitrator may consult outside sources for guidance, the
award must derive from the substance of the bargaining agreement.33
3. Judicial Review of an Arbitration Award
The Eleventh Circuit has held that the judicial review of an arbitration
award is extremely limited and that the district court should defer to the deci-
sion of the arbitrator whenever possible.34 Recently, the Tenth Circuit ap-
proved of this philosophy by stating that judicial review of an arbitration
award "is among the narrowest known to the law."35 In fact, the vast majority
of arbitration cases do not require judicial intervention.36 The proper approach
under a collective bargaining agreement, as set forth in the Steelworkers Trilo-
gy, is for a court to refrain from reviewing the merits of an arbitration
award.37 The federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes would ap-
pear meaningless if the courts could indiscriminately set aside awards.38
4. Common Law of the Shop
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.," the Supreme
Court held, for the first time, that a collective bargaining agreement creates a
new common law-the common law of a particular industry or of a particular
plant.l Except where explicitly limited by contract, an arbitrator is not con-
28. Id. at 582. The American Arbitration Association maintains a National Panel of Arbitra-
tors who are nominated and selected based on their experience, competence, and impartiality. Don
A. Banta, Arbitrator Selection: A Management View, in LABOR ARBITRATION: A PRACICAL
GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 93, 94 (Max Zimny et al. eds., 1990).
29. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 581.
30. Id. at 584 (defining "strictly management function" as any practice in the agreement
during which management is permitted to retain complete control and discretion).
31. Id. at 583.
32. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 597.
33. Id.
34. Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 682 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992).
35. Champion Boxed Beef Co. v. Local No. 7 United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l
Union, 24 F.3d 86, 87 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Litvak Packing Co. v. United Food & Commer-
cial Workers, Local No. 7, 886 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir. 1989)).
36. St. Antoine, supra note 19, at 18. Out of the approximately 50,000 arbitration cases that
are decided annually, traditionally only a few hundred are litigated in court. Id.
37. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 596; L. Robert Griffin, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
Awards, in ARBITRATING LABOR CASES 193, 194-95 (Noel A. Levin et al. eds., 1974) (Corp. L. &
Prac. Sourcebook Series No. 6).
38. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 596.
39. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
40. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 579; see also NCR Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists &
[Vol. 72:3
ARBITRATION
fined to the express provisions of the contract." The nature of the agreement
encourages the arbitrator to consider and rely upon extrinsic evidence as an
equal part of the collective bargaining agreement.42 Prior negotiations be-
tween the parties, evidence of past labor practices and the daily routine of the
plant all make up the common law of the shop and may factor into the
arbitrator's ultimate decision.43 Labor arbitrators are not selected to further
the law, but rather to serve the parties in the collective bargaining agree-
ment."M Recent Tenth Circuit opinions have upheld the importance of the
common law of the shop in interpreting labor contracts.45
5. Arbitrability of a Dispute
Parties cannot be forced to arbitrate a dispute that does not fall within the
intended scope of the arbitration clause in their agreement.' In AT & T Tech-
nologies Inc. v. Communications Workers, 7 the Court affirmed the well-es-
tablished test from the Steelworker's Trilogy for determining the arbitrability
of a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement.' Four rules govern a
court's evaluation of an arbitration agreement and have led to continued reli-
ance on arbitration as the preferred method of resolving labor disputes.49
First, since arbitration is a matter of contract, a party cannot be required to
submit to arbitration any issue the parties have not previously agreed to arbi-
trate.5" Second, the question of arbitrability under the agreement is a matter
for the court to decide.5' Third, when deciding whether the parties have
agreed to arbitrate on a particular issue, the court may not assess the merits of
Aerospace Workers, Dist. Lodge No. 70, 906 F.2d 1499, 1501 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that
the role of the common law of the shop had been "forcefully restated" by the Tenth Circuit).
41. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 581.
42. Id. at 581-82.
43. Eva Robins, The Law of the Shop, in LABOR ARBITRATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
ADVOCATES 229, 232 (Max Zimny et al. eds., 1990).
44. Id. at 230-31.
45. See NCR, 906 F.2d at 1501 n.3.
46. Alison B. Overby, Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71
IOWA L. REv. 1137, 1143 (1986).
47. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
48. 475 U.S. 643, 648-51 (1986). In addition to the cases already discussed, the Tenth Cir-
cuit decided the arbitrability of a dispute involving an employee grievance system. In
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Local Union No. 998, United Rubber Workers, 4 F.3d 913 (10th
Cir. 1993), Firestone instituted an Employee Suggestion System in the 1920s to give employees
incentives to come up with ways to improve safety and efficiency at the plant. Id. at 920. One
employee, a union member, made a suggestion through the system which the company ultimately
adopted. Id. The employee was paid $2,250 for his suggestion, but claimed he was owed more. Id.
When the employee filed a grievance with the union pursuant to the collective bargaining agree-
ment requesting arbitration of the dispute, Firestone refused and brought an action in district court
to prevent further processing of the grievance and to obtain a declaration that the grievance did
not fall within the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Firestone. Id. The Tenth Circuit,
relying on the AT & T four-part test for arbitrability affirmed the district court decision. Id. at 921.
The court found that the Employee Suggestion System had never been the subject of collective
bargaining, and since it provided its own internal procedures for review of grievances related to
the Suggestion System, the System was complete in and of itself. Id. at 922.
49. AT & T, 475 U.S. at 648-49; St. Antoine, supra note 19, at 24-25.
50. AT & T, 475 U.S. at 648.
51. Id. at649.
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the claims." Fourth, where the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is
a presumption in favor of arbitrability unless the clause cannot clearly be
interpreted in a way that covers the dispute.53
Doubts regarding the arbitrability of an issue should be resolved in favor
of coverage by the agreement.54 This presumption "recognizes the greater
institutional competence of arbitrators in interpreting collective-bargaining
agreements" and advances the federal labor policy of peacefully resolving
labor disputes.55
B. Champion Boxed Beef Co. v. Local No. 7 Union Food & Commercial
Workers International Union56
1. Facts
The Champion Boxed Beef Co. ("Champion") sought judicial review of a
labor arbitrator's decision. 7 The arbitrator found that Champion lacked suffi-
cient cause to discharge a union employee and ordered his reinstatement.58
The Champion employee was asked by his supervisor to take time off his
usual job, catching and sorting the product as it came off the line, and to take
a temporary assignment at the unloading dock.59 When the employee did not
perform the temporary assignment, Champion discharged him for insubordina-
tion and refusal to perform reasonable work. 6
The employee filed a grievance that was referred to arbitration pursuant to
the collective bargaining agreement.6 The arbitrator held that Champion did
not have sufficient cause to discharge the employee because the employee's
actions did not constitute insubordination or refusal to perform work within
the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement.62
In federal district court, Champion sought to vacate the arbitrator's award
and the union filed a counterclaim to enforce the award.63 The district court
granted Champion's motion for summary judgment and vacated the award,
holding that the arbitrator "stray[ed] beyond the four corners of the [collective
bargaining] agreement" and, therefore, exceeded his authority.'
52. Id.
53. Id. at 650.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 24 F.3d 86 (10th Cir. 1994).
57. Id. at 87.
58. Id. at 87-88.
59. Id. at 87.
60. Id.
61. Id. The relevant portion of the agreement stated "[no employee covered by this Agree-
ment shall be ... dismissed without just and sufficient cause. Sufficient cause of discharge shall
include ... insubordination ... [and] refusal to perform any reasonable work, service or labor
when required to do so by the Company." Id. at 88.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 87.
64. Id. at 88.
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2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit applied de novo review as it has in other cases where
the district court granted summary judgement.65 The court first looked at the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement and the basis of the arbitrator's
decision.' In making the decision, the arbitrator had examined the language
of the agreement and listened to testimony concerning Champion's current
practice, the "common law of the shop," regarding times when other employ-
ees had declined to accept work assignments.67 The arbitrator determined that
the employee never said he would not perform the requested work.' In addi-
tion, the arbitrator found that the employee had a physical reason for declining
the assignment, of which the company was aware.'
The Tenth Circuit explained that an arbitrator may consider and rely on
extrinsic evidence, except where expressly limited by agreement.7" When in-
terpreting provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, an arbitrator may
look to past practices in the industry and to the common law of the shop.7'
The court then held that the phrase "reasonable work", as stated in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, was ambiguous, but it refused to confirm or reject
the arbitrator's interpretation of the term.72 The court recognized that it may
not overrule an arbitrator's factual finding or contract interpretation simply be-
cause it disagrees with it.7" The court concluded that the award drew its "es-
sence"74 from the collective bargaining agreement and that the arbitrator was
entitled to consider the common law of the shop in his decision.75 According-
ly, the court reversed the district court order vacating the arbitration award and
remanded the case with instructions to enter an order of enforcement.76
3. Analysis
In Champion, the court did not create new legal principles, but instead
followed established precedent. Due to the diminished power of labor organi-
zations today, arbitration in this area often relies on precedent, which contrasts
with the approach of other contemporary arbitration fields.77 The court in
65. Id. at 87.
66. Id. at 88.
67. Id.; see supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text for an explanation of the common law
of the shop.
68. Id. at 88.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 88-89. Examples of extrinsic evidence may also include the negotiating and con-
tractual history of the parties. Id.
72. Id. at 89.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 20 for an explanation of the essence test.
75. Champion, 24 F.3d at 89.
76. Id.
77. See R. Bales, A New Direction for American Labor Law: Individual Autonomy and the
Compulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30 HouS. L. REv. 1863, 1866 (1994)
(indicating that while unions are becoming less visible in the American workplace, arbitration will
continue to play a role in maintaining individual rights). For examples of other areas where ar-
bitration is used, see Frederick N. Donegan, Examining the Role of Arbitration in Professional
Baseball, I SPORTs LAW J. 183 (1994); Donna Bialik et al., Higher Education: Fertile Ground for
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Champion recognized and relied upon three essential principles of arbitration
in its opinion. First, the court reviewed a well-known standard established over
thirty years ago by the Supreme Court that "[tihe refusal of courts to review
the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under
collective bargaining agreements.""8 The importance of this principle cannot
be understated, for absent such a standard, the federal policy of settling labor
disputes by arbitration would be undermined. The arbitration process is built
on a premise of arbitral authority. If courts are allowed to make the final
determination on arbitration awards, the entire mechanism becomes frustrated.
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the essence test for judicial review. The
essence test requires a court to examine the parties' mutual intent and recog-
nize their contract to arbitrate disputes.79 By entering into an agreement that
includes an arbitration clause, the parties bind themselves to the arbitrator's
decision and, unless a court is convinced the arbitrator committed a serious
error, the court should not overturn the arbitral decision."0 An arbitration
award must be enforced if it "draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement."'" Although arbitrators must adhere to the interpretation and ap-
plication of the collective bargaining agreement, they may also look to some
outside sources for guidance as long as the award remains principally based on
the agreement itself 2
In addition to the narrow scope of judicial review and the essence test, the
Tenth Circuit's opinion in Champion emphasized the importance of the com-
mon law of the shop when rendering an arbitral decision. 3 As previously
discussed, arbitrators are usually chosen because of their knowledge about a
particular industry's practice and custom. 4 The parties assume the arbitrator
will take into account any impact his decision might have on productivity and
morale. 5 In fact, the industrial common law is "equally part of the collective
bargaining agreement although not expressed in it."'8 6 If arbitrators did not
possess the implied authority to reach beyond the four comers of the docu-
ment, the character of labor arbitration would be severely limited. 7
Judicial deference to arbitration decisions is extremely beneficial to the
process because it allows the arbitrator to maintain governing authority over
the dispute. Challenging the arbitral decision involves dragging the controversy
into time-consuming and expensive litigation, effectively undermining exactly
ADR, [49-Mar.] DIsP. RESOL. J. 61 (1994).
78. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 596.
79. See Litvak Packing Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7,
886 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir. 1989).
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 597).
82. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 597.
83. Champion, 24 F.3d at 88-89.
84. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
85. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 582.
86. Id. at 581-82.
87. Id. at 582. The uniqueness of labor arbitration must be emphasized. The entire collective
bargaining effort is a type of industrial self-government. Id. at 580. The arbitrator becomes part of
the process of "self-government" the parties have created and furthers the common goals of unin-
terrupted production and specialized solutions. Id. at 582.
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what the arbitration process seeks to avoid.
C. Arbitration and Civil Rights
Although judicial deference is preferred in most instances, the Supreme
Court held in three cases that an adverse decision under a collective bargain-
ing agreement does not prevent an employee from instituting an action under a
statute creating individual rights."s The mid-1980s and early 1990s witnessed
a resurgence of Supreme Court confidence in the suitability for arbitration of
statutorily based claims.8 9 Lower courts, however, remain divided on whether
private agreements to arbitrate statutory rights are enforceable.' Although
arbitration is appropriate for resolving many contractual disputes, it is not an
adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting federal statutory and
constitutional civil rights.9'
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,92 the Court rejected the rule of de-
ferral and held that an employee's claim under Title VII9 was not precluded
by a prior arbitral decision against him.94 The Court stated arbitration was "a
88. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (holding that
prior submission of a grievance to dispute resolution procedures under a contract would not bar a
subsequent claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466
U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (holding that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where a police officer had received an
adverse ruling in arbitration, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply to
bar a civil rights action); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974) (holding that
an adverse award in arbitration would not bar a subsequent action under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964). See generally Robert G. Howlett, Why Arbitrators Apply External Law, in
LABOR ARBrrRATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 257, 264-68 (Max Zimny et al. eds.,
1990) (noting, however, that nothing in the three opinions "supports a conclusion that arbitrators
should not apply applicable law").
89. Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving and Deferring Title VII Claims, 58 BROOK. L.
REV. 779, 789 (1992). See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-
86 (1989) (holding that an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the Securities Act is en-
forceable, overruling Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). The Court noted that, beginning with
the lower courts, judicial hostility to arbitration had decreased over the years. Rodriguez, 490 U.S.
at 480. This was confirmed when the Supreme Court endorsed arbitration of federal statutory
rights in Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at
480. See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that an
agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is enforce-
able). The Court's decision in Gilmer indicates a shift from restraint to deference with regard to
agreements to arbitrate disputes arising under Title VII. See Plass, supra, at 779-80. Additionally,
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, which amended Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, contains language that encourages arbitration.
90. Plass, supra note 89, at 789.
91. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290; Howlett, supra note 88, at 264-69. As an example of a con-
stitutional right not appropriate for arbitration, McDonald pointed to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 466 U.S.
at 285 n.l. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United Sates or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
92. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
94. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49, 56-59. The Court held that "Title VII's purpose and proce-
dures strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit his private cause of action if he first
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comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by
Title VII."9' In Alexander, the Court concluded that the federal policies fa-
voring arbitration of labor disputes and prohibiting discriminatory practices in
the workplace should complement one another.96 Therefore, an employee
should be allowed to pursue a remedy through arbitration as provided by the
collective bargaining agreement, as well as in court, pursuant to Title VII.97
The informality of the arbitration process often contributes to the efficient,
inexpensive and expeditious nature of the procedure. 98 These same character-
istics, however, make arbitration a less desirable forum for the resolution of
individual civil rights claims.99
D. Ryan v. City of Shawnee"'
1. Facts
In Ryan, a black firefighter, sued the City of Shawnee, Oklahoma, in
federal district court under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,'0 ' 1983, °2 and Title
VII,' °3 alleging illegal race discrimination." Plaintiff, Nathaniel Ryan, was
the city's first and only black firefighter. 5 Mr. Ryan asserted that during his
employment "he was subjected to racial slurs and jokes, disciplined more
harshly than white employees, subjected to discriminatory promotion practices,
and eventually discharged because of his race.""'" Upon termination, Mr.
Ryan filed a grievance with the firefighters union, who addressed the matter in
arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the union
and the city. 7
During the arbitration proceeding, the union did not pursue the issues of
harassment, discipline, and promotions." The arbitrator determined that the
pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement." Id. at 49. The employee in Gardner-Denver, unlike the employee in Gilmer,
did not choose to limit his rights by agreeing to arbitrate his title VII claims. See Gilmer, 500 U.S.
at 35; Plass, supra note 89, at 790-91.
95. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56. The Court expressed its concern that the factf'mding process
in arbitration is usually not equivalent to judicial factfinding and stated that an arbitrator's experi-
ence encompasses "the law of the shop and not the law of the land." Id. at 57. This idea, that the
judicial process was superior to arbitration for resolving disputes involving statutory claims, was
overturned in Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34 n.5, noted in Sacks v. Richardson Greenshield Sec. Inc., 781
F.Supp. 1475, 1481 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
96. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60.
97. Id. The cases following Gilmer, however, appear to place the burden of showing that
Congress did not intend to preclude the statutorily based claim on the individual opposing arbitra-
tion. See Plass, supra note 89, at 790 n.57.
98. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58.
99. Id.
100. 13 F.3d 345 (10th Cir. 1993).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).







city violated the collective bargaining agreement because it failed to afford
Mr. Ryan dismissal procedures which were required under the agreement."l
The arbitrator expressly declined to rule on the merits of the claim and or-
dered that Mr. Ryan be reinstated with backpay."'
Two subsequent lawsuits followed. Mr. Ryan filed a race discrimination
claim in federal district court and the city challenged the arbitration award in
state court."' After the state court affirmed the arbitrator's award, the federal
district court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on Ryan's civil
rights claims."' The court declared that any consequential damages should
be resolved under the collective bargaining agreement and that the process was
over. 1'3
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
In Ryan, the Tenth Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's decisions in
Alexander" and McDonald', acknowledging that arbitration is not an
adequate substitute for a court proceeding when adjudicating claims under
Title VII and § 1983."6 In addition, the Tenth Circuit looked to these cases
in holding that an arbitration award does not bar a subsequent cause of action
under § 1981."'
The Tenth Circuit declared that because the purpose of arbitration is to
avoid court intervention, a court may only intervene to examine whether the
arbitrator's decision drew its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment.' 18 In explaining the concept of issue preclusion, the court said it does
not apply "when the party against whom the earlier decision is interposed did
not have a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate the critical issue in the earlier
case."' 9
In Ryan, the state proceeding was limited to the city's challenge of the
arbitration award and did not address Mr. Ryan's civil rights claims. 2 ° The
Tenth Circuit reasoned that because the state judicial proceeding did not afford
Mr. Ryan an opportunity to present his civil rights claims, it could not pre-
clude further litigation of his federal claims. 2' Accordingly, the court re-





113. Id. at 347.
114. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
115. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
116. Ryan, 13 F.3d at 347.
117. Id. at 347 n.l. In Alexander, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff does not waive the
right to a trial de novo by first pursuing arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. Alex-
ander, 415 U.S. at 49.
118. Ryan, 13 F.3d at 348.
119. Id. (quoting Underside v. Lathrop, 645 P.2d 514, 516 n.6 (Okla. 1982) (quoting Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980))).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 346, 350.
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3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit in Ryan focused on the limitations of arbitration, main-
taining that "arbitration could not provide an adequate substitute for judicial
proceedings in adjudicating [civil rights] claims."'23 Although arbitrators are
often familiar with the procedures of the workplace, they may not have "the
expertise required to solve the complex legal issues presented by the civil
rights statutes.' 2 4 In addition, as the court correctly pointed out, the arbitra-
tor is only authorized to interpret the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.'25 A civil rights claim may conflict with this agreement, therefore,
making the courtroom the proper forum in which to decide civil rights cases.
However broad the arbitrator's authority, it is by no means exclusive and
cannot preclude certain substantive claims by union employees. 26 An arbitra-
tor has no authority to enforce civil rights laws in conflict with rights protect-
ed under the collective bargaining agreement. 27 The arbitration process has
the potential to deprive an employee of their constitutional rights because it
might not be in the union's interest to vigorously pursue such a claim.
2
1
An employee's statutory rights exist independent from constitutional
rights, even if the same occurrence violates both categories of rights. 29 The
federal government has enacted statutory protection for individuals that may
not be waived through a collective bargaining agreement. 3 The Ryan court
properly adhered to well-established precedent in holding that Mr. Ryan may
pursue his civil rights claims in a court of law.
II. ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
A. Background
1. Introduction
Although arbitration enjoys widespread use in labor relations, it is recog-
nized in commercial areas as well. 3' In 1925, Congress enacted the United
States Arbitration Act, now known as the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"),132 to alleviate judicial hostility towards arbitration and provide ju-
dicial enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate. 3  The FAA established
a federal policy favoring arbitration by giving courts the power to compel
123. Id. at 347 (quoting McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984)).





129. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49-50.
130. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29 n.3 (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Barrentine,
450 U.S. at 740 (Fair Labor Standards Act); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 37 (Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
131. See generally Overby, supra note 46 (discussing the substantive arbitrability of disputes
under the FAA).
132. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1-9 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
133. Overby, supra note 46, at 1141-42.
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arbitration, stay proceedings pending arbitration, and affirm arbitral
awards. 34 Judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements allowed the courts
to achieve the Act's other goal-to provide fast and efficient dispute resolu-
tion and lighten the case loads of federal courts.'35
2. Second Arbitration Trilogy
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided a group of consolidated cases known
as the "Second Arbitration Trilogy."'36 In this new trilogy, the Supreme
Court approved the federalization of arbitration, established that the FAA
applies in state courts, and declared that issues of arbitrability should be de-
cided in accordance with the federal policy favoring arbitration.'37 The cases
comprising the Second Arbitration Trilogy sought to strengthen, and even
broaden, the scope of the FAA and the federal policy of enforcing agreements
to arbitrate absent a ground for revocation.'38
3. Fundamentally Fair Hearing
The courts have created a basic requirement that both parties to an arbitra-
tion be afforded a "fundamentally fair hearing.' ' 39 Arbitration proceedings
are not bound by the formal rules of evidence or procedure, unless expressly
agreed to by the parties."4 Although the requirements vary by state, most
courts agree that a fundamentally fair hearing requires only notice, the oppor-
tunity to be heard and to present evidence, the opportunity to make an argu-
ment before the decision makers, and decision makers free from bias.' 4' In
fact, the FAA allows arbitration to go forward "with only a summary hearing
134. Id. at 1137.
135. Id. at 1141.
136. The first case of the Second Arbitration Trilogy was Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213 (1985) (holding that the FAA requires district courts to compel arbitration of pen-
dent arbitrable claims when one party files such a motion, even if it would mean inefficiency).
The Court explained that the Act gave district courts no discretion to decide the arbitrability of
issues about which an arbitration agreement has been signed. Id. at 218. The second case was
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 14-15 (1984) (pointing out that Congress mandated
the enforcement of arbitration agreements and ultimately holding that the scope of the FAA en-
compasses claims in state court). The Court recognized only two limitations on the enforceability
of provisions governed by the FAA. First, "they must be part of a written maritime contract or a
contract 'evidencing a transaction involving commerce."' Id. at 11. Second, "such clauses may be
revoked upon 'grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' Id. (quot-
ing 9 U.S.C. § 2). The final case of the Trilogy was Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (holding that § 2 of the FAA effectively creates substantial
federal law regarding arbitrability and that it overrides any contrary state policy). See generally
Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71
VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985) (tracing the origins and assessing the future application of the FAA).
137. See Hirshman, supra note 136, at 1306-07. Section 2 of the FAA is the primary sub-
stantive provision of the Act and provides that an arbitration agreement "in any maritime transac-
tion or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract." Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
138. See Hirshman, supra note 136, at 1352-53.
139. Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1012-13 (10th Cir.
1994).
140. Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 685 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992).
141. Bowles, 22 F.3d at 1013.
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and with restricted inquiry into factual issues."'42
Despite the fundamentally fair hearing requirements, courts continue to
afford the arbitrator wide latitude in making an award.'43 For instance, in
Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.,' the court held that errors in
the arbitrator's interpretation of the law or findiigs of fact did not warrant
reversal of the decision.' "A court can set aside an arbitration award only if
one of the statutory or judicial grounds for vacation has been proven."'4
4. Vacation and Review of Arbitrators Award Under FAA § 10
Under § 10 of the FAA, any party to the arbitration can apply to vacate
an arbitration award:
1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means. 2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrator or either of them. 3) where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct, in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced. 4) where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers .... 5) where an award is vacated and the time within which
the agreement required the award to be made has not expired the
court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators. 47
5. Stay of Proceedings Under FAA § 3
Section 3 of the FAA addresses lawsuits brought in federal court regard-
ing issues that the parties agreed to in writing prior to the dispute."' In Mo-
ses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,49 the Su-
preme Court recognized that although § 3 of the FAA refers to a suit "in any
of the courts of the United States," both state and federal courts are obligated
142. Robbins, 954 F.2d at 685.
143. Id.
144. 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988).
145. Id. at 635.
146. Bowles, 22 F.3d at 1014. See infra note 147 and accompanying text for further discus-
sion of the grounds for vacating an arbitration award.
147. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The plain language of § 10 suggests the provi-
sion is not applicable to an action to vacate brought in state court. The decisions of state courts,
however, are divided with regard to the applicability of § 10. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 676 (1994).
148. 9 U.S.C. § 3 provides:
[If] any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court
in which suit is pending ... shall on the application of one of the parties stay the trial
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, pro-
viding the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988)
The Supreme Court has not clarified whether or not a § 3 claim is applicable to actions in
state court. Lower courts have generally held that either § 3 applies to state courts or that the FAA
requires state courts to grant comparable stays. BORN, supra note 147, at 229.
149. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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to grant stays of litigation. 5 ' In most cases, a § 3 stay is enough to ade-
quately protect the right to arbitration, but in special cases a stay of litigation
is not enough and the courts must rely on other provisions of the FAA to
grant the parties relief."'
6. Ex Parte Communications
Reversal of an arbitral decision based solely on ex parte communication
with an arbitrator is rare. For example, in Creative Homes & Millwork, Inc. v.
Hinkle,' an arbitrator's ex parte contact with a party's witness, after testi-
mony, to discuss possible employment, was not "misconduct" warranting
vacation of the arbitration award.' Additionally, in Vincent Builders, Inc. v.
American Application Systems, Inc.,' the plaintiff failed to prove that one
of the arbitrators engaged in improper ex parte communications with the
defendant's attorney and representatives of the defendant corporation.' The
court in Vincent stated that ex parte communications must involve facts, issues
or evidence relevant to the subject of the arbitration.'56 Rule 29 of the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association's Rules and Code of Ethics, however, states that
"[tihere shall be no direct communication between the parties and a neutral
arbitrator other than at oral hearings.""' To prevent disputes regarding ex
parte communications with an arbitrator, the parties should put an express
clause in their contract about the nature of any such contact or prohibit it
entirely.
7. Section 16(a)(3) of the FAA
Section 16 of the FAA authorizes immediate appellate review of an order
"refusing a stay" of litigation pending arbitration or an order denying a motion
to compel arbitration. 58 On the other hand, § 16 of the FAA provides for
immediate review of a decision favoring arbitration under only two circum-
stances.'59 First, when the district court's order represents "'a final decision
with respect to arbitration""' and second, "when 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) pro-
vides the means for an interlocutory appeal."'
' 6'
Section 16(a)(3) focuses on the first of the two circumstances: when a
150. Id. at 27 n.34.
151. Id. at 27. A state may need to rely on § 4 of the FAA to compel arbitration, where in a
case similar to Moses the party opposing arbitration is not the one from whom payment or perfor-
mance is sought. Id.
152. 426 S.E.2d 480 (N.C. 1993).
153. Id. at 482-83.
154. 547 A.2d 1381 (Conn. 1988).
155. Id. at 1386-87.
156. Id.
157. Creative Homes, 426 S.E.2d at 482 (quoting the American Arbitration Association, Con-
struction Industry Arbitration Rules § 29 (1991)).
158. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (a)(1)(A-C) (Supp. 1993). Section 16 was originally codified at 9 U.S.C. §
51. It was renumbered by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title III,
§ 325 (a)(1), 104 Stat. 5089, 5120 (1990).
159. Humphrey v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 4 F.3d 313, 317 (4th Cir. 1993).
160. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3)).
161. Id.
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final decision is made regarding arbitration.'62 A decision is final and appeal-
able if it ends the litigation on its merits and leaves nothing for the district
court to preside over other than execution of judgement.'63 An order compel-
ling arbitration is final when it results from a proceeding in which the only
issue is the arbitrability of the dispute."M The court in Humphrey held that
absent a "final decision" incapable of review at any other point, the court of
appeals was precluded from reviewing the district court's decision favoring
arbitration.65
8. "Embedded" Proceeding and Independent Action
The question of whether a dispute is arbitrable can arise incident to the
pending action or as an entirely independent action." If the arbitrable issue
is "embedded," a proceeding whereby the issue has been raised pendent to a
larger action, then the statute generally allows an immediate appeal only from
decisions against arbitration. 67 The statute "bars an immediate appeal when
the decision is in favor of arbitration."'" On the other hand, if the case pres-
ents arbitrability as the sole issue, the order is considered final and appellate
review is immediately available. 69
Although the rules governing arbitration proceedings open the door to
various areas of litigation, the FAA focuses on ensuring parties a fair hearing
and on limiting court intervention in arbitration agreements. These aspects of
the FAA are the subject of the following Tenth Circuit opinions on attorney
conduct and appellate review.
B. Bowles Financial Group Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. 70
1. Facts
In Bowles, a dispute arose concerning the amount of compensation owed
Bowles Financial Company ("Bowles") by Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. ("Stifel") for
the nonperformance of financial services. 7' The parties submitted the matter
to arbitration in accordance with the terms of an agreement granting the arbi-
trator sole authority to govern the procedural rules of the dispute.' At vari-
ous times during the proceedings, counsel for Bowles intentionally, affirma-
tively, and repeatedly communicated to the arbitrators a previous settlement
offer made by Stiefel."3 The district court expressed shock as to the
162. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (a)(3).
163. American Casualty Co. v. L-J, Inc., 35 F.3d 133, 136 (4th Cir. 1994); Humphrey, 4 F.3d
at 317.
164. Humphrey, 4 F.3d at 317.
165. Id. at 319.
166. Id. at 316.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 317.
170. 22 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1994).





counsel's actions, but held that the arbitration hearing was not "fundamentally
unfair"' and allowed the arbitration award to stand.'75
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision
that the counsel's actions did not warrant vacation of the arbitral award.'76
First, the court discussed several features of arbitration and declared that "by
agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the opportunity for review by the court-
room for the [perceived] simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitra-
tion."" 77 The court noted that the only requirement an arbitrator must grant
the parties is a fundamentally fair hearing,' and that no evidence was pre-
sented to suggest the hearing was not fundamentally fair.'79
The court then considered the appropriate level of review for evaluating a
district court's decision to confirm or vacate an arbitration award. Past Tenth
Circuit decisions had reviewed a district court's decision to confirm, vacate or
deny a motion to vacate an arbitration award without reference to the standard
of review. 8 ' The court realized, however, that the standard plays an impor-
tant role in ensuring that arbitrators comply with statutory requirements.
Therefore, the court followed the decisions of other circuits' and applied de
novo review in Bowles.1
8 2
The court went on to emphasize the narrowness of its review,"8 3 stating
that error in the arbitrator's interpretation of law or findings of fact do not
merit reversal.' 8' Statutory and other legal requirements imposed upon arbi-
tration contracts, proceedings, and awards are the only tools employed when
vacating a decision.'85 Although the court expressed dismay at the counsel's
conduct, nothing in the arbitration agreement explicitly condemned the com-
munication of settlement offers to the arbitrators.' 86 The court does not have
174. Id. at 1013. Courts tend to agree that a fundamentally fair hearing only requires notice,
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence before the decision makers, and that the decision
makers be free from bias, while the FAA allows arbitration to proceed with only a summary hear-
ing and with restricted inquiry into the factual issues. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1014.
177. Id. at 1012 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29-33
(1991)).
178. Id. at 1013 ("[A] fundamentally fair hearing requires only notice, opportunity to be
heard, and to present relevant and material evidence and argument before the decisionmakers, and
that the decisionmakers are not infected with bias.").
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1012.
181. Id. (citing Atlantic Aviation Inc. v. EBM Group, Inc., 11 F.3d 1276, 1282 (5th Cir.
1994); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 1993);
Employers Ins. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1481, 1485 (9th Cir. 1991)).
182. Id.
183. Id. The FAA allows a reviewing court to vacate an arbitration award in limited circum-
stances including when the award was procured by fraud, corruption, or undue means; when there
is evidence of partiality or corruption by the arbitrators; where there was misconduct by the arbi-
trators; or where the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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the power to impose its rules of evidence on the arbitration proceedings. After
reviewing the district court decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed that none of
the statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award existed.'87
3. Analysis
It is important to limit federal court intervention in arbitration agreements.
It would undermine the arbitration process to arbitrate and litigate a dispute.
The federal court's hands should, therefore, be tied in such cases so as not to
frustrate the process.
a. De novo Review
On a hearing de novo, the court reviews the matter as a court of original
jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction.'88 The court of appeals must,
therefore, adhere to the same standards of review that bound the district court.
Although de novo review is typically seen as giving the court broad discretion,
the limited review available to the district court in arbitration cases carries
over to the appellate court. This results in the Tenth Circuit being equally as
constrained as the district court in its ability to reverse an arbitral decision.
Federal policy favors judicial deference towards arbitration decisions and
mandates that courts do not intrude unnecessarily on contractually imposed
arbitration. 89 The Tenth Circuit's decision in Bowles follows the precedent
of other circuit courts and lends support to the arbitral process by demonstrat-
ing judicial respect towards arbitrators. In an arbitration decision, a federal
judge cannot make a broad decision which conflicts with the federal policy fa-
voring judicial deference.
b. Ex parte Communications
The behavior of Bowles's counsel is generally discouraged in arbitration,
although it was within the broad procedural rules agreed to by the parties. In a
courtroom, such conduct could result in serious sanctions. Courts, however, do
not have the authority to re-draft an arbitration agreement between the parties
and must enforce it as written.
The kind of behavior exhibited by Bowles's counsel was not expressly
prohibited by the agreement. The integrity of arbitration in the long run, how-
ever, depends upon the court's strict interpretation of arbitration agreements in
the short run. With their limited authority, courts must control the arbitration
process on a daily basis in order to prevent significant obstacles in the future.
Due to their freedom of contract, parties have only themselves to blame
for not incorporating an express prohibition against ex parte communications
into an arbitration agreement. Parties often choose arbitration because of the
broad contractual control over the process, and can avoid unwanted ex parte
187. Id.
188. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 721 (6th ed. 1990).
189. Robbins, 954 F.2d at 682.
[Vol. 72:3
ARBITRATION
communication by contracting to limit such behavior in advance, By expressly
contracting about acceptable ex parte communications, if any, the parties serve
the federal policy of keeping arbitration disputes out of court. The ability to
settle disputes through good faith and fair dealing is thwarted if the controver-
sy is complicated by excessive delay and costs caused by unwarranted judicial
interference.
C. Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp.' 9
1. Facts
In Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp., a distributor of school buses
("Adair") brought an action against the manufacturer of the buses ("Blue
Bird") for breach of contract. 9' The dispute arose when a Texas school dis-
trict canceled a substantial order with Adair because it questioned its authority
to sell Blue Bird buses in Texas. 9 Adair brought an action against Blue
Bird alleging breach of contract and requesting damages. 93 Adair also
sought a declaration that the arbitration clause in the arbitration agreement was
not applicable to the particular dispute.'94 The district court, finding that the
dispute was within the scope of the arbitration clause, ordered the parties to
proceed with arbitration pursuant to their prior agreement and dismissed the
complaint.'95 However, under § 3 of the FAA, the district court should have
granted defendant's motion to stay the action pending arbitration."9 Section
3 states that on application of either party, the court shall stay the trial until
arbitration has been held in accordance with the terms of the agreement."'
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
Due to the procedural error, the Tenth Circuit had appellate jurisdiction.
The court corrected the mistake by vacating the district court's order of dis-
missal and remanding the case for a stay pending arbitration. 99 The opinion
began with a discussion of Congress's intent in its 1988 amendment of the
FAA to "'promote appeals from orders barring arbitration and limit appeals
from orders directing arbitration.... ' 9 This fundamental principle locks the
parties into the prior arbitration agreement and emphasizes the importance of
allowing a hearing on the issue before any court intervention. Although this
Congressional policy was not fully implemented,2" the court reviewed the
190. 25 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 1994).
191. Id. at 953.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 954.
195. Id. at 954-55.
196. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
197. Id.
198. Adair, 25 F.3d at 955.
199. Id. (quoting Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 984 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
200. Id. ("Section 16(b)(1) and (2) prohibits appeals from interlocutory orders staying an
action pending arbitration pursuant to § 3 and from orders compelling arbitration to proceed under
§ 4.").
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general policy of § 16 of the FAA2°0 which allows an appeal to be taken
from a final arbitration decision."2
A majority of the circuits have adopted the view that, within the meaning
of § 16(a)(3), an order is final and immediately appealable only if arbitrability
is the sole issue before the district court .20  A minority of courts, on the oth-
er hand, hold that dismissal of a complaint raising issues other than
arbitrability are final and appealable under § 16(a)(3). 4 Without much dis-
cussion behind its holding, the Tenth Circuit agreed with and adopted the
majority approach, explaining only that a stay pending arbitration under § 3
will rarely be a final decision within § 16(a)(3).
The court concluded by declining to reach the merits of Adair's breach of
contract appeal, since it adopted the majority approach which discouraging
immediate appellate review in a proceeding where the arbitrability of the issue
is not the only relief sought. 5 In accordance with 9 U.S.C. § 3, the court
vacated the district court's order of dismissal and remanded the case for entry
of a stay pending arbitration.2°
3. Analysis
Although recently decided, Adair has become a leading case in the area of
arbitration appeals. Adair stands for the proposition that § 10 of the FAA
forecloses appellate review of district court arbitration decisions, unless the
201. 9 U.S.C. § 16 outlines when an appeal may be taken from a district court ruling involv-
ing arbitration:
(a) An appeal may be taken from-
(1) an order-
(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title,
(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to pro-
ceed,
(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title of compel arbitration,
(D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or
(E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award;
(2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against an
arbitration that is subject to this title; or
(3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may not be
taken from an interlocutory order-
(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or
(4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title.
9 U.S.C. § 16 (Supp. V 1993).
202. Adair, 25 F.3d at 955.
203. Id. (citing Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 15 F.3d 93, 95 (8th Cir. 1994);
Humphrey v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 4 F.3d 313, 317-18 (4th Cir. 1993); S L H S.P.A. v. Miller-St.
Nazianz, Inc., 988 F.2d 1518, 1522 (7th Cir. 1993); Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 984
F.2d 58, 61 n.3 (2d Cir. 1993); Thompson McKinnon Sec., Inc. v. Salter, 873 F.2d 1397, 1399
(11 th Cir. 1989); Delta Computer Corp. v. Samsung Semiconductor & Telecommunications Co.,
879 F.2d 662, 664-65 (9th Cir. 1989).
204. Id. See Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 920 F.2d 1269, 1274-76 (6th Cir. 1990).
205. Adair, 25 F.3d at 954-55. Plaintiff also sought a declaratory judgement that the arbitra-





order can be characterized as a final decision, or falls within limited excep-
tions found in the subsections. In Adair, the district court dismissed the re-
maining claims in an embedded proceeding, but the order to arbitrate was not
appealable. Adair follows the rule adopted in Humphrey, "that an embedded
proceeding may not give rise to a final decision subject to section 16(a)(3)
review, even when all the claims in which the arbitration issue is embedded
are resolved.""2 7
Regarding the trial court's incorrect procedural ruling, the Tenth Circuit
followed correct FAA procedure by refusing to hear the case until arbitration
proceedings had been held. By adopting the majority view, which discourages
immediate appellate review other than where a determination of arbitrability is
the sole issue, the court ensured district court maintenance over the case. This
measure furthers the federal policy discouraging court intervention. Under the
majority view, only questions as to the arbitrability of the underlying dispute
itself are referred to the appellate level, thereby reducing the number of arbi-
tration appeals.
Consistent with the majority decision, an order does not constitute a final
decision if issues other than arbitrability are raised. Stays pending arbitration
entered pursuant to § 16(a)(3), however, will be few because of the interlocu-
tory effect of § 3."2 Section 3 encompasses disputes brought on "any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing," and, therefore, the
likelihood of issues other than the dispute's arbitrability is inherent."z9 Due to
the wide coverage of § 3, a stay pending arbitration will almost always be
naturally embedded in the dispute and will be characterized as interlocutory,
not as a final decision under § 16(a)(2).
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the declining state of labor organizations, labor arbitra-
tion remains distinct with "its own traditions and with a common bond of
precedent and practice."12 0 Relying on the principle of judicial deference, the
Tenth Circuit reemphasized the narrow scope of review applied to arbitration
awards in Champion. However, the court noted that civil rights are one excep-
tion to the federal policy favoring arbitration, as illustrated in the Ryan de-
cision.
In addition to labor organizations, arbitration is also commonly used in
commercial contexts. The cases surveyed reveal the Tenth Circuit's reliance
on the FAA to guide its decisions. The court has followed the latest trends by
establishing de novo review of district court orders in Bowles and by its inter-
pretation of FAA § 16 in Adair. In its recent arbitration cases, the Tenth Cir-
207. Humphrey v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 4 F.3d 313, 318 (1993); Adair, 25 F.3d at 955. See
also American Casualty Co. v. L-J Inc., 35 F.3d 133, 136-37 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that the result
in Humphrey is consistent with a majority of other circuits).
208. Adair, 25 F.3d at 955.
209. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3).
210. David E. Feller, End of the Trilogy: The Declining State of Labor Arbitration, [48-Sep.]
ARB. J. 18, 24 (1993).
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cuit has exhibited an overall willingness to defer to the arbitration process,




Statutes of limitations are a balance between the interests in protecting
valid claims and the interest in prohibiting the prosecution of stale claims.'
Congress, however, has frequently failed to provide a statute of limitations for
federal causes of action. Allowing such actions to be brought after any length
of time was not Congress's intent.2 Therefore, the federal courts must find a
statute of limitations to apply to such actions. Unwilling to fashion a period of
limitations on their own,3 the federal courts have resorted to borrowing one
from a state or federal statute.4 In order to achieve a proper balance for feder-
al causes of action that do not have a statute of limitations, courts borrow a
period of limitations from an analogous state cause of action.' This task often
is very difficult.
From September 1993 through December 1994, the Tenth Circuit con-
fronted the issue of borrowing a statute of limitations for two different federal
civil rights causes of action. In Arnold v. Duchesne County,6 the Tenth Circuit
determined the appropriate statute of limitations to borrow for a civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.' Although the Utah state legislature had
passed a statute of limitations specifically for § 1983 actions, the court applied
Utah's residual statute of limitations instead.8 In Jones v. Runyon,9 the Tenth
Circuit decided which statute of limitations applied to a civil rights action
1. Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal "Fallback" Statute of Limitations: Limitations by
Default, 72 NEB. L. REv. 454, 462-63 (1993).
2. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336,
342 (1805)).
3. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 (1966) (fashioning a period of lim-
itations would be a "drastic sort of judicial legislation" by federal courts).
4. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1987).
5. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271.
6. 26 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 721 (1995).
7. Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
Three main objectives of § 1983 were: (1) to override certain state legislation infringing
upon the rights or privileges of United States citizens; (2) to provide a remedy where state law
was inadequate; and (3) to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy was theoretically but
not practically available. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961). The primary purpose of §
1983 is to enable an individual whose federal constitutional or statutory rights are abridged by a
person acting under color of law to recover damages or secure injunctive relief. See Burnett v.
Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 55 (1984).
8. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 985-89.
9. 32 F.3d 1454 (10th Cir. 1994).
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brought by a federal employee under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act after a final administrative decision denied his promotion.'" The court
borrowed the limitations period from a similar action brought by a federal
employee under Title VII."
I. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ACrIONS
A. Background
Civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not have express
statutes of limitations. 2 Moreover, Congress has not enacted a general limita-
tions period for all civil rights actions, and until recently, no fallback statute of
limitations existed. 3 Traditionally, federal courts have borrowed a period of
limitations from state law in order to fill the gap left by Congress. 4 The Su-
preme Court, in Burnett v. Grattan,5 interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 198816 to re-
quire the federal courts to apply a three step procedure for selecting a state
limitations period:
First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States "so far
as such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights
statute] into effect." If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake
the second step by considering application of state "common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes" of the forum
State. A third step asserts the predominance of the federal interest:
courts are to apply state law only if it is not "inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States."' 7
The Court clarified the second step by reference to its previous decisions
that required the federal courts to apply the "most appropriate" or most "anal-
10. Id. at 1455.
11. Id. at 1458; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)-(c) (1988) (providing a 30-day limitations peri-
od for a federal employee after receipt of notice of final action taken by the EEOC on a complaint
of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); see also 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993) (increasing the limitations period to 90 days as required by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991).
12. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 262 (1985).
13. Congress recently passed a residual statute of limitations for federal statutory claims. 28
U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. V 1993). This will not affect the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions,
however, because § 1658 applies only to statutes passed after December 1, 1990. Id.
14. See, e.g., Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266-67, 267 n.12 (citations omitted).
15. 468 U.S. 42 (1984).
16. Section 1988 provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by
the provisions of [this title] ... shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the
laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect;
but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provi-
sions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the com-
mon law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein
the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to
and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a
criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
17. Burnett, 468 U.S. at 47-48 (citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
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ogous" state limitations period. 8 This attempted clarification, however, did
not end the confusion because "appropriate" and "analogous" are not synony-
mous, and the terms were supplied without much explanation or elabora-
tion.' The federal courts developed a number of different analytical methods
in trying to choose the most appropriate or analogous statute of limitations for
§ 1983 actions. 0
At least seven circuits used a factual analogy,2' in which they would se-
lect a statute of limitations for a state law claim that was factually similar to
the § 1983 claim alleged.22 The factual analogy led to time-consuming litiga-
tion, different limitation periods for allegations within the same § 1983 com-
plaint, and unpredictability.23
Four circuits adopted the statutory liability analogy method.24 Under this
method, the courts applied limitation periods created by the state statute gov-
erning similar actions, on the theory that such statutes were most appropriate
because § 1983 actions stemmed from a federal statute.25 Some courts using
this analogy applied state statutes of limitations the state legislature had made
applicable expressly to § 1983 actions.26 Although the statutory liability anal-
ogy achieved state-wide uniformity, commentators criticized the method for
adopting limitation periods motivated by state interests 27 and for the analyti-
18. Id. at 49.
19. Paul Rathburn, Note, Amending a Statute of Limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983: More
Than 'A Half Measure of Uniformity', 73 MINN. L. REv. 85, 91 (1988).
20. Id. at 92; see also Gregory L. Biehler, Limiting the Right to Sue: The Civil Rights Dilem-
ma, 33 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 16-27 (1983-84); Mark D. Jarmie, Selecting an Analogous State Limita-
tions Statute in Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts Claims: The Tenth Circuit's Resolution, 15 N.M.
L. REV. 11, 18-36 (1985); Brian Kibble-Smith, Statutes of Limitation and Section 1983: Implica-
tions for Illinois Civil Rights Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 415, 418-21 (1987); Michael J.
Brophy, Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
97, 98-101; Lee L. Cameron, Jr., Note, Civil Rights: Determining the Appropriate Statute of Limi-
tations for Section 1983 Claims, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 440, 442-43 (1986); Dirk J. Holkeboer,
Note, A Call for Uniformity: Statutes of Limitation in Federal Civil Rights Actions, 26 WAYNE L.
REv. 61, 65-67 (1979).
21. See Rathbum, supra note 19, at 92 n.38 (citing various circuits' decisions that utilized a
factual analogy).
22. See, e.g., McClamn v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (applying the one-
year limitations period for an analogous common law assault cause of action to a § 1983 claim
alleging deprivation of constitutional rights after police officer allegedly beat and threatened the
claimant).
23. Rathburn, supra note 19, at 92-93; see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985)
(stating that the factual analogy approach "inevitably breeds uncertainty and time-consuming liti-
gation that is foreign to the central purposes of § 1983"); Biehler, supra note 20, at 34 (conclud-
ing that confusion and prejudice result from the inconsistent application of factual analogies);
Brophy, supra note 20, at 99 (characterizing factual analogies as mechanical, fragmented, and
producing uncertainty); Cameron, supra note 20, at 443 (criticizing factual analogies for often
forcing courts to rely upon misleading allegations in the pleadings).
24. See Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1981); Pauk v.
Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 866 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Cole v.
Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1092 (4th Cit. 1980); Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 335-36 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
25. Rathbum, supra note 19, at 93.
26. See, e.g., Nored v. Blehm, 743 F.2d 1386, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (apply-
ing OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265(1) (1975) which specifically referred to § 1983 actions at that time).
But see Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (4th Cir. 1978) (rejecting VA. CODE ANN. § 8-
24 (Michie 1950) one-year limitation on all § 1983 claims).
27. See Rathbum, supra note 19, at q4 n.51 ("This criticism goes beyond the statutory liabil-
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cal flaws in the analogy.28
At least four other circuits adopted a catch-all analogy and applied the
limitations period for all state actions not otherwise limited.29 This method
was used mainly when courts applying the statutory liability analogy failed to
locate a statutory liability provision. ° Commentators criticized this approach
for being arbitrary3 and adopting limitation periods motivated by state inter-
ests.
32
In 1985, the Supreme Court adopted a general tort analogy approach in
Wilson v. Garcia.33 The Supreme Court held that: (1) federal law governs the
characterization of § 1983 for limitations purposes; 34 (2) a single character-
ization of all § 1983 claims best fits the statute's remedial purposes; 35 (3) the
most appropriate characterization was as a personal injury claim;36 and (4)
the state's personal injury statute of limitations should apply.37 The Court
found that the personal injury tort actions were most analogous because they
were similar to the nature of § 1983 actions.3' Although Wilson clarified
which analogy the federal courts should use, practical problems remained.
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, claimed that the majority's rule provided
no guidance for courts using state law that "defie[s] the newly minted rule by
supplying not one but two periods that govern various injuries to personal
rights.139 Because state law possibly will not "obligingly supply a limitations
period to match an abstract analogy that may have little relevance to the forum
State's limitations scheme,"'  Justice O'Connor advocated the continued use
of the factual analogy method.4 Thus, even after Wilson, federal courts re-
mained confused about which personal injury statute of limitations should be
applied when the state had more than one.42 When faced with this problem,
several federal courts applied the intentional personal injury statute of limita-
ity analogy to the heart of the 'borrowing' process. Some critics contend that only a federal limita-
tions period should govern § 1983 actions. They argue that state limitations periods, although
sufficient for state actions, cannot properly govern federal constitutional claims.").
28. See id. at 94 n.52 ("The gist of this 'analytical' criticism rests with the nature of § 1983.
Because § 1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather enforces other rights existing in the
Constitution and federal law, it makes little sense to analogize § 1983 to a statute that creates both
a substantive right and remedy.") (emphasis added).
29. See McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying Colorado's
"residuary" statute of limitations); Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400, 406 & n.11 (8th Cir.) (apply-
ing Iowa's general catch-all statute of limitations), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982); Baker v. F
& F Inv., 420 F.2d 1191, 1198 (7th Cir.) (applying Illinois catch-all statute), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 821 (1970); Greenfield v. District of Columbia, 623 F. Supp. 47, 50 (D.C. 1985) (applying
District of Columbia's catch-all statute).
30. Rathburn, supra note 19, at 95.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 96.
33. 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).
34. Id. at 270.
35. Id. at 271-75.
36. Id. at 276.
37. Id. at 275.
38. Id. at 276.
39. Id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 287.
41. Id.
42. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
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tions, theorizing that intentional torts are most closely analogous to the claims
Congress envisioned being brought under § 1983. 41 Other federal courts con-
sidered the analogy to the intentional tort action too narrow because § 1983
embraces a broad array of actions for personal injuries, and thus applied the
residuary personal injury statute of limitations.4
In 1989, the Supreme Court again considered which statute of limitations
should apply to § 1983 claims in order to settle the disagreement between the
federal courts.45 In Owens v. Okure, the Supreme Court held that when a
state had multiple limitation periods for personal injury actions, the state's
general or residual personal injury statute of limitations should be applied for
§ 1983 actions.' Finally, the issue appeared settled.
In 1987, however, the Utah state legislature muddied the waters again by
enacting section 78-12-28(3) of the Utah Code, which provided for a two-year
statute of limitations in actions "for injury to the personal rights of another as
a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983."' This is the only effective statute
in the country that provides an explicit limitations period for § 1983 ac-
tions.' Thus, in Utah, the federal courts were forced to decide whether to
apply Utah's four-year residual statute of limitations'9 or to apply the two-
43. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1985) (selecting Ohio statute
of limitations for libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and
malpractice, and rejecting statute of limitations for bodily injury or for injury to the rights of the
plaintiff not enumerated elsewhere), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986); Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d
916, 920 (5th Cir. 1985) (selecting Mississippi statute of limitations for most intentional torts, and
rejecting statute for causes of action not otherwise provided for), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065
(1986); Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250, 1254-56 (11 th Cir. 1985) (selecting Alabama
statute of limitations governing actions for "any trespass to person or liberty, such as false impris-
onment or assault and battery" and rejecting statute for "any injury to the person or rights of an-
other not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in this section") (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986).
44. See, e.g., Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1523-24 & n. 11 (1Oth Cir. 1988) (selecting
Oklahoma statute of limitations for "injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract and not
hereinafter enumerated", and rejecting statute for assault or battery) (citations omitted); Banks v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1416, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating in dicta that it
"might well" apply District of Columbia statue of limitations for claims not otherwise provided for
and rejecting statute for libel, slander, assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution,
false arrest, or false imprisonment); Small v. Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 546-49 (1st Cir. 1986) (select-
ing Maine's statute of limitations governing all tort actions except as otherwise provided and
rejecting statute for assault and battery, false imprisonment, slander, libel, and medical malprac-
tice); McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984) (selecting Colorado statute of
limitations for "all other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided
by law," and rejecting statutes for trespass and trespass on the case) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. §
13-80-108(1)(b) (1973)).
45. Owens, 488 U.S. at 243-48.
46. Id. at 249-50.
47. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28(3) (1992).
48. Arnold v. Duchesne County, 26 F.3d 982, 985 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 721 (1995). Virginia had a statute that specifically provided a one-year limitation for § 1983
actions, but it was held inapplicable in Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316, 1317 (4th Cir. 1978),
and repealed after four years. Id. Oregon also had such a statute which the Ninth Circuit applied
to § 1983 actions, but the specific reference to § 1983 has since been removed from the statute.
Id. (citing Nored v. Blehm, 743 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)).
49. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(3) (1992). Section 78-12-25(3) provides a four-year
statute of limitations for "an action for relief not otherwise provided for by law." Id.
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year statute of limitations applicable specifically to § 1983 actions." The fed-
eral district court judges in Utah were divided on the question.' The Tenth
Circuit addressed this issue in Arnold v. Duchesne County.2
B. Arnold v. Duchesne County
3 3
1. Facts
On April 21, 1988, officers of the Duchesne County Sheriff's Department
arrested Louis F. Arnold and charged him with selling a stolen firearm.54 The
Duchesne County Attomey dismissed the charges against Mr. Arnold on June
27, 1988."5 Mr. Arnold brought an action on April 17, 1992, against
Duchesne County, Sheriff Clair Poulson, and officers Merv Taylor and Jerry
Foote, asserting claims under state law and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986
and 1988.56 Mr. Arnold alleged that his arrest had been politically motivated
and "the police had actual knowledge at the time of his arrest that the firearm
in question was not stolen."57
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that section 78-12-28(3) of
the Utah Code, which imposed a two-year statute of limitations on § 1983
actions, barred Mr. Arnold's § 1983 claim." The district court held that sec-
tion 78-12-28(3) was the most appropriate and analogous statute of limitations
for § 1983 actions and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.59 In so
holding, the court noted that the Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Garcia,' had
directed the federal courts to use the most appropriate or analogous state stat-
ute of limitations.6' The district court dismissed the Supreme Court's decision
in Owens v. Okure 2 to apply the residual personal injury statute of limita-
tions because Utah had provided an express statute of limitations for § 1983
actions. The court instead concluded that the Supreme Court's directive was to
follow the Wilson mandate of choosing the most analogous or appropriate
50. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 983.
51. Compare Adamson v. City of Provo, 819 F. Supp. 934, 948 (D. Utah 1993) (applying
Utah's residual four-year statute of limitations rather than § 78-12-28(3) to § 1983 actions) and
Sheets v. Lindsey, 783 F. Supp. 577, 581 (D. Utah 1991), affd sub nom. Sheets v. Salt Lake
County, Nos. 93-4128, 93-4134, 1995 WL 8224 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 1995) (same) with Arnold v.
Duchesne County, 810 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (D. Utah 1993) (applying § 78-12-28(3) to bar § 1983
action), rev'd, 26 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 721 (1995) and Tarlip v. Van
Austin, No. 92-C-621-W, 1993 WL 723501, at *4-5 (D. Utah May 18, 1993) (adopting report and
recommendation following Arnold and applying § 78-12-28(3)), aff d sub nom. Tarlip v. Buckner,
17 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1994) and Thompson v. Rasmussen, No. 91-C-1039-S, 1993 WL 723845,
at *2 (D. Utah May 5, 1993) (same).
52. 26 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 721 (1995).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 983.
55. Arnold v. Duchesne County, 810 F. Supp. 1239, 1240 (D. Utah 1993), rev'd, 26 F.3d
982 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 721 (1995).
56. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 983.
57. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1240.
58. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 983.
59. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1247.
60. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
61. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1242.
62. 488 U.S. 235, 247-48 (1989).
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statute of limitations.63 Because section 78-12-28(3) was the most analogous
and appropriate, the district court concluded it should be applied unless it was
"inconsistent with federal laws and policy." In order to determine that sec-
tion 78-12-28(3) passed this test, the court examined both procedural due pro-
cess and equal protection attacks.
The district court found that the statute of limitations was procedural in
nature, because the limitations period was not part of the same act as the
cause of action.' Under procedural due process, a statute passes constitution-
al muster if it provides a reasonable time to bring suit.' The district court
held that two years was a reasonable time in light of a number of federal
circuit court decisions applying as little as one year to § 1983 actions.67
In holding that section 78-12-28(3) did not violate equal protection, the
district court found no evidence to support the contention that the Utah state
legislature improperly discriminated against a federal cause of action.' First,
the district court noted that section 78-12-28(3) could be interpreted as apply-
ing to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims in addition to § 1983 claims. 9 Second, even
if the limitations period did not apply to § 1985 claims, §§ 1983 and 1985 are
distinguishable and any difference in limitations periods would be rationally
based.7" Third, the court noted that the two-year period of limitations was the
same as that applied to state actions against state officers, which indicated that
the "legislature reasonably assessed the length of time required to bring a
cause of action against any individual acting under color of state law."'"
Fourth, the court dismissed the claim that the Utah state legislature acted with
improper motives. The court felt the legislature was only trying to set up a
limitations period within the parameters set by the Tenth Circuit in Mismash v.
Murray City72 because of the similarity in the language between Mismash and
the statute.73 Fifth, the court found that Utah had a legitimate interest in set-
ting the statute of limitations, because Utah courts had concurrent jurisdiction
over § 1983 actions.74 Sixth, the court refused to assume that the state
63. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1242 ("[It is logical to assume that the Supreme Court used the
terminology of most appropriate or analogous because there was no express statute of limitations
at issue in either Wilson or Owens.") (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 1243.
65. Id. at 1244 ("If not part of the same act, however, the 'limitations period is said to be
only a procedural limit on the remedy, and not a substantive limit on the right'.") (quoting Sarfati
v. Wood Holly Assocs., 874 F.2d 1523, 1526 (1 1th Cir. 1989)).
66. Id. (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 n.13 (1989)).
67. Id. at 1244-45.
68. Id. at 1245.
69. Id. at 1245 n.7 (stating that the language "for injury to the personal rights of another as a
civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983" does not rule out application of the limitations period to §
1985) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28(3) (1992)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1245.
72. 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1052 (1985).
73. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1246. The Tenth Circuit, in Mismash, applied the four-year
residual statute in Utah, because Utah had no statute of limitations "expressly applicable to actions
for injury to the rights of another." Mismash, 730 F.2d at 1367.
74. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1246-47 (stating that Utah's interests are legitimate and do not
amount to an invasion of the federal domain, because "as long as Congress chooses to defer to the
states in questions of time limitations, the court cannot see that a state is violating the principles
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legislature's motive in shortening the limitations period was to truncate the
cause of action, because attempting to guess the motives of the legislature was
too imprecise and difficult to be of value." Because the district court found
section 78-12-28(3) was the most analogous and appropriate statute of limita-
tions and both the due process and equal protection standards were met, it ap-
plied the two-year statute of limitations to § 1983 actions. 76
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the four-year
residual statute of limitations under section 78-12-25(3) should apply instead
of the two-year statute of limitations under section 78-12-28(3). 7' The court
initially went through the analyses set forth in Burnett v. Grattan," Wilson v.
Garcia,79 and Owens v. Okure ° and found that, prior to the enactment of
section 78-12-28(3), § 1983 actions were governed by the four-year residual
statute of limitations set forth in section 78-12-25(3) of the Utah Code."' The
court then discussed whether to apply the new statute of limitations enacted
specifically for § 1983 actions.
The Tenth Circuit went through the three step procedure, as mandated by
§ 1988,2 for determining which state statute of limitations to apply to decide
if section 78-12-28(3) should apply to § 1983 actions. First, the court noted
that § 1983 did not have a statute of limitations and therefore, no suitable
federal rule existed. 3 In the absence of a federal rule, the court moved to the
second step, which required the selection of the most analogous or appropriate
statute of limitations. The Tenth Circuit assumed that section 78-12-28(3) was
the most analogous statute because the Utah state legislature enacted the stat-
ute specifically to provide a limitations period for § 1983 actions. 4 The court
combined the remainder of the second step with the third step of the § 1988
analysis, and discussed whether section 78-12-28(3) was the most appropriate
limitations period and consistent with federal law and policy.85 The Tenth
Circuit court held that section 78-12-28(3) was not consistent with the purpose
and nature of § 1983.86 First, the court stressed that the characterization of
the essential nature of a § 1983 action was a question of federal law. Even
of federalism by setting an express statute of limitations for civil rights actions, particularly when
the state has concurrent jurisdiction.").
75. Id. at 1247.
76. Id. at 1243, 1247.
77. Arnold v. Duchesne County, 26 F.3d 982, 983 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
721 (1995).
78. 468 U.S. 42 (1984).
79. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
80. 488 U.S. 235 (1989).
81. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 984-85.
82. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
83. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 984.
84. Id. at 985 n.6.
85. Id. at 985-86.
86. Id. at 986 (stating that the primary objectives of the Civil Rights Acts are to ensure that
individuals may recover damages or secure injunctive relief when their federal constitutional or




though federal courts borrow the statute of limitations from state law, the
federal court decides how to characterize the 1983 action in order to borrow
the appropriate limitations period applicable to an analogous state cause of
action."8 This determination is crucial because it allows the federal court to
ensure an acceptable fit between the borrowed limitations period and the poli-
cies behind § 1983.9 The court held that section 78-12-28(3) merely reflects
the Utah legislature's judgment as to the appropriate statute of limitations for
§ 1983 actions and usurps the role of the federal courts in characterizing the
essence of those actions." Therefore, section 78-12-28(3) was inconsistent
with federal law and should not be applied to § 1983 actions. 9'
Second, the court found section 78-12-28(3) eliminated the assurances that
neutral rules of decision will apply to § 1983 actions. 92 Section 78-12-28(3)
applies exclusively to § 1983 actions.9 3 Its legislative history revealed that
while the initial proposal applied to the broader category of "personal injury,
or injury to the personal rights of another," it was changed before enactment
to apply specifically and exclusively to § 1983 actions and thus, was no longer
a neutral rule of decision applicable to all personal injury cases.94 The court
concluded that this change was intended to reduce the number of § 1983 ac-
tions and was therefore inconsistent with the broad remedial objectives of such
actions.9 Thus, the court held that the two-year statute of limitations was not
the appropriate period of limitations. 96 Instead, the four-year statute of limita-
tions for personal injury actions should be applied to § 1983 actions.97
C. Analysis
With one exception, Congress failed to establish express statutes of limita-
tions for civil rights actions.9" Obviously, Congress did not intend for civil
rights actions to have no statute of limitations.' Therefore, either the federal
courts have to fashion a statute of limitations themselves or they have to bor-
row one from the forum state. The federal courts could not fashion a period of
limitations because it would be a "drastic sort of judicial legislation.'"'" This




92. Id. at 987-88.
93. Id. at 986 (rejecting any arguments that § 78-12-28(3) was intended to apply to any
action other than § 1983 actions).
94. Id. at 988 (stating that had the original proposal been enacted, it would have supplied a
neutral rule of decision).
95. Id. at 988-89, 988 n.9 (noting that the Burnett court made it clear that such a purpose
was impermissible).
96. Id. at 989.
97. See id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1988) (providing a one-year-within-accrual limitation period for
claims against persons who negligently refuse to prevent the commission of wrongs conspired to
be done by others as prohibited in 42 U.S.C. § 1985).
99. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) ("A federal cause of action 'brought at any
distance of time' would be 'utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws'.") (quoting Adams v.
Woods, 6 U.S. 336, 342 (1805)).
100. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 (1966).
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left the option of borrowing a state statute of limitations, which is what Con-
gress mandated federal courts to do under § 1988.0' The question then aris-
es: which state statute of limitations should the federal court borrow for each
federal cause of action?
Statutes of limitations are a balance between the interest of having claims
prosecuted and the interest of not wasting time and resources litigating old
claims.'0° When a state legislature enacts a statute of limitations, it strikes
that balance for a particular type of state claim, not federal. The federal courts
try to find a statute of limitations for a state action that is analogous to the
federal action so the federal law will incorporate the state's judgment on the
proper balance for the statute of limitations. 3 When the federal claim differs
from the state cause of action, however, "the State's choice of a specific peri-
od of limitation is, at best, only a rough approximation of 'the point at which
the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests
in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones'."' °
In passing section 78-12-28(3), the Utah state legislature directly balanced
the interests of the federal cause of action under § 1983.1o5 However, in en-
acting the four-year residual statute of limitations the Utah state legislature
balanced the interests, if any balancing occurred at all, for all state actions
without a statute of limitations."° Thus, in Arnold, the court could pick ei-
ther (1) a statute of limitations where the state legislature had directly bal-
anced the interests in the federal cause of action or (2) a statute of limitations
where the state legislature may have balanced the interests inherent in all state
causes of action that did not have a statute of limitations. The purposes of
borrowing a state statute of limitations would have been better served had the
court chosen the former statute of limitations. The major purpose of choosing
an analogous state cause of action from which to borrow a statute of limitation
is to make sure that the interests of the federal cause of action are appropriate-
ly balanced."° Having the state legislature directly balance the interests of
the federal cause of action serves this purpose better than having the federal
court balance the interests and then choose an approximate state cause of
action in which the state may or may not have made the appropriate balancing
considerations.
Allowing the state to balance directly the interests in a federal cause of
action would also aid predictability and reduce litigation. First, borrowing state
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
102. Nelson, supra note 1, at 462-63.
103. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271 ("By adopting the statute governing an analogous cause of ac-
tion under state law, federal law incorporates the State's judgment on the proper balance between
the policies of repose and the substantive policies of enforcement embodied in the state cause of
action.").
104. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975)).
105. See Arnold v. Duchesne County, 810 F. Supp. 1239, 1245-46 (1993), rev'd, 26 F.3d 982
(10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 721 (1995).
106. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(3) (1992).
107. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271; Arnold, 26 F.3d at 987 (picking the appropriate limitations
period applicable to an analogous state cause of action is crucial because it better ensures an ac-
ceptable fit between the borrowed limitations period and the policies behind § 1983).
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statutes of limitations leads to uncertainty because litigants do not know which
statute the federal court will borrow. Although the Supreme Court's decision
in Owens v. Okure'" greatly reduced this problem, greater certainty would
result if the state statute expressed both the federal cause of action it applied
to and the statute of limitations for that action. A state statute expressly direct-
ed to § 1983 actions would best accomplish the goal set forth by the Supreme
Court, in Wilson v. Garcia,"° of eliminating uncertainty by providing one
simple broad characterization of all § 1983 actions.
Second, allowing the state legislature to enact specific statutes of limita-
tions for federal causes of action would reduce the amount of litigation on the
subject of borrowing the state statute of limitations. Instead of going through
the three step procedure mandated by § 1988, the federal court would only
need to look at the state statute that applied specifically to the federal cause of
action.
In Arnold v. Duchesne County, the court noted two arguments against
allowing the state legislature to enact a statute of limitations aimed directly at
a federal cause of action." ° The first is that a state legislature which enacts
such a limitations period usurps the role of federal law in characterizing the
essence of such actions."' "'Congress surely did not intend to assign to state
courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining
and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action.""'
' 2
Although Congress may not have intended to assign the state legislatures such
a role, it has allowed it by not passing a federal statute of limitations and
thereby endorsing the borrowing of state limitation periods. If a state legisla-
ture enacts a statute of limitations for general personal injury actions, the
federal courts are directed by Owens to apply it to § 1983 actions. Thus, a
state legislature is allowed to set a specific statute of limitations for § 1983 ac-
tions so long as it disguises it under a general personal injury limitations peri-
od and does not mention § 1983 in the statute.
The Wilson Court directed federal courts to apply the personal injury
statute of limitations partly to ensure the borrowed period of limitations would
108. 488 U.S. 235, 248 (1989) (holding that a state's general or residual statute of limitations
should be applied to § 1983 actions).
109. 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985).
110. See Arnold, 26 F.3d at 986-88.
111. Id. at 987; see also Sheets v. Lindsey, 783 F. Supp. 577, 581 (D. Utah 1991):
A state is within its sphere of power in our federal system of government, as a matter of
state policy, when it limits the time within which a state cause of action may be vindi-
cated in state court. In contrast, a federally recognized or federally created cause of
action cannot be foreshortened by specific state legislation.
The concept is simple. The issue before the court concerns the fundamental prin-
ciple of federalism; namely the geographic division of power. A state lacks the power to
truncate federally created or federally recognized rights. The principles of federalism is
[sic] the perennial message of both the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act. Whether
to diminish a federally created right is simply not a choice for a state to make .... De-
termining the statute of limitations for a federally created cause of action, the court
emphasizes, is exclusively a federal choice.
Id.
112. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 986 (quoting Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269).
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not discriminate against federal civil rights remedies." 3
General personal injury actions, sounding in tort, constitute a major
part of the total volume of civil litigation in the state courts today,
and probably did so in 1871 when § 1983 was enacted. It is most
unlikely that the period of limitations applicable to such claims ever
was, or ever would be, fixed in a way that would discriminate against
federal claims, or be inconsistent with federal law in any respect."4
Although this would be true if the state legislature did not know which person-
al injury statute of limitations would apply, it is not true when the state legis-
lature knows that the residual personal injury statute of limitations will apply.
A state legislature could provide a statute of limitations for every state person-
al injury cause of action and then the residual statute of limitations would only
apply to § 1983 actions. This seems to be what the Utah state legislature was
trying to do. Unfortunately, it made the mistake of mentioning that the statute
of limitations should apply to § 1983 actions."5
The federal courts are not willing to give state legislatures such power
explicitly because they are worried that the state legislature would provide a
period of limitations that was too short."6 This protection, however, could be
accomplished by making sure that the statute of limitations did not violate
procedural due process and equal protection."7 Under procedural due process
the statute of limitations must provide the claimant a reasonable time within
which to bring a claim."8 A number of cases have found that limitation peri-
ods as short as one year should be applied to § 1983 actions."9 Thus, Utah's
two-year statute of limitations is hardly unreasonable. 20
Under an equal protection claim, the federal court would not use the limi-
tation period if it was shown that the state legislature improperly discriminated
against the federal cause of action.'' Thus, the state legislature must have a
rational reason for choosing the limitations period.'22 Arguably, the Utah
state legislature's rational reason was to make the § 1983 period of limitations
consistent with the period of limitations for state actions against state officers
acting in their official capacity.'23 Thus, the Utah two-year statute of limita-
tions passed constitutional muster, 24 but was rejected because it expressly
applied to § 1983 actions.'25
The second argument against allowing a state legislature to enact a statute
of limitations aimed directly at a federal cause of action is that it would elimi-
113. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276.
114. Id. at 279.
115. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28(3) (1992).
116. See Sheets v. Lindsey, 783 F. Supp. 577, 581 & n.9 (D. Utah 1991).
117. See Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1247.
118. Id. at 1244 (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 n.13 (1989)).
119. See id. at 1245 (listing citations).
120. Id. at 1244-45.
121. Id. at 1245.
122. See id. at 1245 n.7.
123. Id. at 1245-46.
124. Id. at 1247.
125. See Arnold, 26 F.3d at 986.
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nate the assurance that neutral rules of decision would apply to § 1983 actions
in Utah.'26 This would only be the case, however, if the state passed a differ-
ent statute of limitations for each federal civil rights cause of action. In Ar-
nold, the court interpreted section 78-12-28(3) to apply exclusively to § 1983
actions; therefore, civil rights actions brought under other sections of the Civil
Rights Acts had a different limitations period.'27 Section 78-12-28(3), how-
ever, could have been interpreted just as easily to apply to other sections of
the Civil Rights Acts, because the statute of limitations was for any action "for
injury to the personal rights of another as a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983."2' In addition, an equal protection analysis could ensure that the state
legislature did not discriminate against a particular federal cause of action.
Allowing the state legislature to enact a statute of limitations that express-
ly applied to federal civil rights actions, instead of choosing the residual per-
sonal injury statute of limitations, would better serve the main purpose of
statutes of limitations. The state legislatures could directly balance the interests
of having claims prosecuted and the interest of not wasting time and resources
litigating old claims. This also would provide more certainty and reduce litiga-
tion. Furthermore, the federal courts could use the doctrines of due process
and equal protection to make sure that the limitations period was reasonable
and that neutral rules of decision would apply within the state.
II. THE STATUTE OF LIMrrATIONS FOR 29 U.S.C. § 633A ACTIONS
A. Background
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), enacted in 1967,
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees over the age of 40
on the basis of their age." Section 633a of Title 29, which was added to the
ADEA in 1974, prohibits age discrimination by federal government agen-
cies. 3° A federal employee has two alternative routes for pursuing a claim of
age discrimination.' 3' A federal employee may invoke the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) administrative process and then file
a civil action in federal court if not satisfied with the administrative reme-
dies.' In the alternative, the federal employee may choose to bring suit in
federal court in the first instance. 3 Although the ADEA provides time peri-
ods for notification of the EEOC for the latter route,'3 4 it does not set forth
126. Id. at 987.
127. Id. at 987-88 (stating it is arguable that other sections of the Civil Rights Acts would
still be covered by the residual four-year statute of limitations).
128. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1245 n.7 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28(3)) (emphasis
added).
129. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 633a provides in pertinent part: "All
personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of
age ... in executive agencies as defined in [5 U.S.C. § 105] ... shall be made free from any dis-
crimination based on age." 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a).
131. Stevens v. Department of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 5 (1991).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b), (c).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d).
134. Id. (providing that a claimant must give notice of intent to sue to the EEOC within 180
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limitation periods for either route to federal court."'
When Congress amended the ADEA in 1974 to make it applicable to the
federal government, it did not merely add the government to the definition of
employers subject to the Act. Instead, it added § 633a, which applied to the
federal government and expressly forbade incorporation of any other ADEA
provision into § 633a.'36 The original proposal of § 633a contained a thirty-
day statute of limitations for federal employees after a final administrative
decision. 37 This provision was virtually identical to the thirty-day statute of
limitations for federal employees under Title VI. 3 When the proposed bill
emerged from committee, however, it appeared without a limitations period
and with no explanation for its removal.' Because the ADEA is silent as to
how long after a final administrative decision an action may be filed in district
court, the Supreme Court has indicated that the proper analysis is to assume
"Congress intended to impose an appropriate period borrowed either from a
state statute or from an analogous federal one."'"
There are four possible sources of a statute of limitations for § 633a.
First, a court could adopt a state statute of limitations that covers an analogous
state action. 4' Second, a court could adopt the two-year (three years if will-
ful violation) statute of limitations applicable to private ADEA actions.'42
One district court so held, despite the command in § 633a(f) that the private
sector provisions of the statute do not apply to federal employees.'43 Third, a
days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred and then wait 30 days before filing the action,
but not providing a limitations period for filing a claim in the federal court).
135. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a. Because the Tenth Circuit, in Jones v. Runyon, 32 F.3d 1454
(10th Cir. 1994), determined only the appropriate statute of limitations for federal employees filing
a claim in federal court after an administrative decision, this survey will not address the statute of
limitations issue arising from claims filed first in federal court. See Stevens v. Department of
Treasury, 500 U.S. 1 (1991) and Edwards v. Shalala, 846 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ga. 1994) for deci-
sions on the statute of limitations for filing a claim in federal court in the first instance.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(f) provides: "Any personnel action of any department, agency, or other
entity referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall not be subject to, or affected by, any provi-
sion of this chapter, other than the provisions of section 631 (b) of this title and the provisions of
this section."
137. See S. 1861, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. 15895 (1972).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993)
(codifying the increased limitations period from 30 to 90 days mandated by the Civil Rights Act
of 1991).
139. Bornholdt v. Brady, 869 F.2d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 1989).
140. Stevens v. Department of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1991) (citing Agency Holding Corp.
v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1987)). The Supreme Court did not decide
which limitations period to apply because the defendants acknowledged that filing one year and
six days after the allegedly discriminatory event took place was well within whatever statute of
limitations that might apply. Id. at 8. The Court also noted that the plaintiff had received a no-
tification from the EEOC that indicated that he may have up to six years to file the action. Id. at 8
n.2.
141. Jones v. Runyon, 32 F.3d 1454, 1455-56 (10th Cir. 1994) (ruling out the applicability of
state statutes).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1988). The statute of limitations for private ADEA actions was
reduced to 90 days after the date of notice of termination or dismissal from the EEOC by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
143. Wiersema v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 648 F. Supp. 66, 68 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); see also
Coleman v. Nolan, 693 F. Supp. 1544, 1548 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (limitations period is either two
years under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or two years (three if willful violation) under 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)).
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court could follow the Ninth Circuit'" and apply the general six-year statute
of limitations that applies to all actions against the United States where no
statute of limitations is otherwise provided. 4 Fourth, a court could follow
the First and Second Circuits and apply the thirty-day limitations period for
federal employees filing suit under Title VII.'
B. Jones v. Runyon" 7
1. Facts
Julius J. Jones, an Afican-American male over the age of 40, alleged
that the United States Postal Service denied him the position of ad hoc EEO
counselor on November 7, 1986, due to his race, age, and past protests against
alleged unlawful employment practices at the postal service." Mr. Jones
filed an administrative complaint on December 8, 1986, and the EEOC issued
a final administrative decision on August 28, 1990, finding no discrimina-
tion.'49 Mr. Jones filed a pro se complaint in the District Court of Colorado
on September 28, 1990, but the complaint was dismissed for failure to proper-
ly serve the Postmaster General and the United States.'50 On September 16,
1991, Mr. Jones refiled his discrimination claims in federal district court. The
district court granted the Postmaster General's motion to dismiss on the
ground the action was time barred, holding that the thirty-day limitation period
then applicable to federal employees filing suit under Title VII applied to bar
all of Mr. Jones's claims. 5 ' Mr. Jones appealed the district court's ruling
only with respect to his age discrimination claims.'52
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that Mr. Jones's age
discrimination claim was time barred because the statute of limitations for
federal employees alleging age discrimination after a final administrative deci-
sion was thirty days.'53 In so holding, the court noted that because Congress
had not supplied a limitations period, the federal courts were to borrow an
appropriate statute of limitations from a state or federal statute. 54 After set-
144. Lubniewski v. Lehman, 891 F.2d 216, 221 (9th Cir. 1989). But see Miller v. Department
of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, 827 F. Supp. 636, 638 (D. Nev. 1993) (applying the 90-day
statute of limitations according to 1992 EEOC regulations).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1988).
146. Long v. Frank, 22 F.3d 54, 55 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995);
Lavery v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022, 1024-27 (1st Cir. 1990); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)
(Supp. V 1993) (the Title VII statute of limitations was increased from 30 days to 90 days by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991).
147. 32 F.3d 1454 (10th Cir. 1994).
148. Jones v. Frank, 819 F. Supp. 923, 924 (D. Colo. 1993), aff d sub nom., Jones v. Runyon,
32 F.3d 1454 (10th Cir. 1994).
149. Jones, 32 F.3d at 1454-55.
150. Id. at 1455.
151. Id. The refiling was "almost five years after the alleged discriminatory act and over one
year after the final decision of the EEOC." Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1458.
154. Id. at 1455-56 (quoting Stevens v. Department of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 7 (1991) (citing
1995]
608 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:3
ting forth the split of authority among the courts of appeals, the Tenth Circuit
discussed which statute would be appropriate.'
The court ruled out using a state statute, because "[t]o adopt varying state
rules would burden administrative efforts of the EEOC and prove an 'unsatis-
factory vehicle[ ] for the enforcement of federal law'.' 56 Instead, the court
chose to borrow a federal statute. In determining that the statute of limitations
under Title VII should apply, the court first noted that a reasonable source for
borrowing a statute of limitations is an analogous statute where the balancing
of interests Congress intended to protect was very similar.'57 The court found
that the statute of limitations under Title VII was the most analogous statute to
ADEA for three reasons.'58 First, the ADEA and Title VII share the common
purpose of eliminating discrimination in the workplace.'59 Second, the lan-
guage of § 633a(a) and (b) is "almost in haec verba" with § 2000e-16(a) and
(b) of Title VII. r° Third, the legislative history of § 633a indicates that Title
VII was its source.1
6
1
The court then addressed whether the legislative history of § 633a indicat-
ed Congress did not intend for the statute of limitations under Title VII to
apply because it left out the statute of limitations included in the proposal for
§ 633a that was almost identical to the one in Title VII. 62 Because Congress
omitted the limitation without explanation or evidence of debate, the court
determined it could not say Congress's purpose was to preclude the use of the
Title VII statute of limitations.6 3 Thus, the court did not believe the omis-
sion proved Congress intended to make the most appropriate statute of limita-
tions inapplicable to § 633a."6
Lastly, the court found that the change in EEOC regulations, adopting the
Title VII statute of limitations, was persuasive. 65 Prior to 1992, the EEOC
took no position as to the statute of limitations for filing a suit after a final ad-
ministrative decision."6 The notice the EEOC sent out to Mr. Jones, howev-
er, was misleading because it stated that he "MAY have up to six years after
the right of action first accrued."' 167 In 1992, the EEOC changed its position
to that of applying the Title VII limitations period to ADEA claims.' Al-
though the Tenth Circuit noted that there should be less judicial deference to
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1987))).
155. Id. at 1456-58.
156. Id. at 1456 (quoting DelCostello %'. International Bd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161
(1983)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1456-57.
159. Id. at 1456 (citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) and Smith v.
Oral Roberts Evangelistic Ass'n, 731 F.2d 684, 688 (10th Cir. 1984)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1457.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1457-58.
166. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.514 (1991) (excluding age discrimination complaints expressly from a
limitations period for filing civil actions after a final agency decision).
167. Jones, 32 F.3d at 1457 n.7 (emphasis in original).
168. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.408(c) (1994).
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an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous provision in a statute inconsistent
with a previously held position, the court still found the EEOC's position per-
suasive." For these reasons the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court and
held that the statute of limitations found in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c),
applied to bar Mr. Jones's ADEA claim under 29 U.S.C. § 633a.1
70
C. Analysis
The issue the Tenth Circuit faced in Jones is directly attributable to
Congress's failure to explain why it omitted a statute of limitations when it
enacted § 633a. That Congress chose to excise from § 633a a statute of limita-
tions identical to the Title VII statute of limitations for federal employees
creates a strong inference that Congress did not want that statute of limitations
to apply.' The Tenth Circuit followed the First and Second Circuits in de-
ciding the omission by Congress should not be determinative of legislative
intent.' The Tenth Circuit, however, did find that the legislative history in-
dicating the ADEA was patterned after, derived from, and similar to Title VII
strongly suggested that the Title VII statute of limitations was an analogous
statute of limitations. 7 1 Thus, the Tenth Circuit found that Congress's omis-
sion of a statute of limitations identical to the one in Title VII was a mistake
and should be ignored.'74
A few courts have refused to ignore the strong inference created by
Congress's omission and have instead ignored the literal reading of §
633a(f) 75 It has been argued that Congress intended broader protection of
federal employees against discriminatory employment practices than private
sector employees.'76 Thus, § 626(e)'s longer statute of limitations would be
more appropriate to achieve the broad remedial purposes of § 633a ac-
169. Jones, 32 F.3d at 1458.
170. Id.
171. Lubniewski v. Lehman, 891 F.2d 216, 220 (9th Cir. 1989); Bomholdt v. Brady, 869 F.2d
57, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1989).
172. Jones, 32 F.3d at 1457 (following Long v. Frank, 22 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1994) and
Lavery v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022, 1026 (1st Cir. 1990)).
173. Id. at 1456-57. One court has argued that there are some differences between the struc-
tures of Title VU and the ADEA:
Unlike Title VII, which requires an aggrieved federal employee to initiate admin-
istrative remedies, the ADEA allows a federal employee either to initiate administrative
remedies or to file suit in federal court after filing a notice of intent to sue. Moreover,
unlike [Title VII], which specifically provides that a plaintiff must exhaust administra-
tive remedies unless certain exceptions are applicable, [the ADEA] does not require a
plaintiff who initiates administrative remedies to exhaust those remedies before bringing
suit in federal court.
Coleman v. Nolan, 693 F. Supp. 1544, 1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citations omitted). But see Lavery
v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022, 1025 n.4 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting these differences but not finding them
to be of overriding significance).
174. See Jones, 32 F.3d at 1457.
175. See Wiersema v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 648 F. Supp. 66, 67-68 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)
(applying statute of limitations applicable to nongovernmental employees under the ADEA); cf
Coleman, 693 F. Supp. at 1548 (holding that either the two-year or three-year, in case of willful
violation, statute of limitations under 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) or the three-year statute of limitation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 should apply).
176. Valaris v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 577 F. Supp. 282, 287-88 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
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tions."' Every circuit court that has dealt with the issue has rejected this
argument by reading § 633a(f) literally or ignoring the argument altogeth-
er.1
78
If the court does not borrow the limitations period for private employees
alleging age discrimination or the Title VII limitations period, then only two
possible sources for a statute of limitations remain. First, the court could apply
a state statute of limitations. No circuit court has done so, because it would
lead to varying statutes of limitations across the country and severely burden
the administrative efforts of the EEOC.179 Second, the court could follow the
Ninth Circuit and apply the six-year statute of limitations for non-tort actions
against the federal government.' Other circuit courts have not applied the
six-year statute of limitations because they have noted the following anomaly:
federal employees alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin under Title VII would have thirty days to file a suit,
while federal employees alleging age discrimination under the ADEA would
have six years.'
Because all of the statute of limitations options that could be applied to §
633a have problems, the Tenth Circuit reached a pragmatic result by choosing
the most analogous and best alternative of the thirty-day statute of limitations
from Title VII, despite the countervailing legislative history.
The application of the thirty-day period of limitation to Mr. Jones, howev-
er, was unfair. Mr. Jones received a notice from the EEOC which stated, in
pertinent part: "As to any claim based on the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a), you MAY have up to six years after the
right of action first accrued."' 82 Although this notice does not unequivocally
state that Mr. Jones had six years in which to file an action, it is not even
close to thirty days. Thus, it is likely Mr. Jones was seriously misled by the
EEOC with information that denied him his day in court. The EEOC has
subsequently changed its position by approving the thirty-day period of limita-
tions for federal employees after a final administrative decision. 8 3 The Tenth
Circuit found the EEOC's change of position persuasive because it was consis-
tent with the court's interpretation of the analogy between Title VII and the
ADEA,'84 but the court also should have been persuaded by the misleading
notice sent to Mr. Jones. Fairness would mandate the choice of a six-year
statute of limitations for Mr. Jones, but the Tenth Circuit seemed more con-
cerned with the precedent it was setting.
177. See Coleman, 693 F. Supp. at 1547; Wiersema, 648 F. Supp. at 68.
178. Compare Long v. Frank, 22 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1994) (reading 633a(f) literally) and
Lavery v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022, 1024 (1st Cir. 1990) (same) and Lubniewski v. Lehman, 891
F.2d 216 221 (9th Cir. 1989) (same) and Bornholdt v. Brady, 869 F.2d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 1989)
(same) with Jones, 32 F.3d at 1455-58 (ignoring the argument altogether).
179. DelCostello v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1983).
180. Lubniewski, 891 F.2d at 221.
181. Long, 22 F.3d at 57-58; Lavery, 918 F.2d at 1027.
182. Jones, 32 F.3d at 1457 n.7 (emphasis in original).
183. Id. at 1457.




In Arnold v. Duchesne County and Jones v. Runyon, the Tenth Circuit had
to determine which statute of limitations to borrow for a federal cause of
action. Congress could have avoided the problems facing the Tenth Circuit by
enacting statutes of limitations for the federal causes of action. In Arnold, the
Tenth Circuit was instructed by § 1988 to borrow an analogous state statute of
limitations for § 1983 actions."5 Congress could just as easily have enacted
§ 1988 with the instruction that the federal courts should apply a certain limi-
tations period for all civil rights actions and avoided the time-consuming and
expensive litigation. In Jones, the Tenth Circuit had to determine which feder-
al statute of limitations to apply to 29 U.S.C. § 633a, because Congress omit-
ted, without explanation, the statute of limitations that was originally pro-
posed."s Had Congress not omitted the limitations period, time-consuming
and expensive litigation over the issue could have been avoided.
Recently, Congress had a chance to correct its mistakes and eliminate
wasteful litigation on the issue of which statute of limitations to apply to fed-
eral causes without a limitations period. Congress enacted a general fallback
statute of limitations for all federal causes of action without a period of limita-
tions. "'87 Instead of fixing the problems, however, Congress decided, in spite
of recommendations by litigants and federal judges, that the fallback statute of
limitations should not be applied to any cause of action created by a federal
statute passed before December 1, 1990.88 Thus, the federal courts must
continue the long, expensive, and uncertain process of borrowing statutes of
limitations that Congress failed to provide for federal claims.
Brent D. Warkentine
185. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 984.
186. See Jones, 32 F.3d at 1457.
187. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. V 1993) (providing a four-year statute of limitations for any
civil cause of action arising under a congressional statute enacted after December 1, 1990).
188. See Kimberly J. Norwood, 28 U.S.C. § 1658: A Limitation Period With Real Limitations,
69 IND. L.J. 477, 502-05 (1994).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SURVEY: COMMERCIAL SPEECH
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit, for the second consecutive survey period,' handed
down an important constitutional law decision regarding commercial speech.
In Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado,2 three issues-commercial speech, the
extent of private rights of access to public records, and attorney advertis-
ing-amassed to create an intriguing but questionable decision. Lanphere &
Urbaniak addressed whether a state legislature could bar access to public
records when those procuring the records were utilizing them solely for eco-
nomic gain. Attorneys Lanphere and Urbaniak contested the statute as an
impermissible restraint on their free speech rights, basing their challenge on
the limited protection afforded commercial speech.
In addressing the issues posed by Lanphere & Urbaniak, this Survey
discusses the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine, including recent
Supreme Court pronouncements on the topic. The Survey also examines the
existence and extent of private rights of access to public records and the hotly
debated decisions regarding the permissibility and propriety of attorney adver-
tising. The Survey criticizes the circuit's decision as inconsistent with recent
Supreme Court decisions and concludes that the Colorado statute is an imper-
missible restraint on free speech.
I. LANPHERE & URBANIAK V. STATE OF COLORADO: COMMERCIAL SPEECH,
PUBLIC RECORDS, AND DIRECT-MAIL SOLICITATION
A. Evolution and Protection of Commercial Speech Under the First
Amendment
In 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court held in a brief three page decision that
the Constitution imposes no restraints on government regulation of "purely
commercial advertising."3 Although this initial foray into the commercial
1. During the 1993 survey period the Tenth Circuit decided Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen,
2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995). For a discussion of Coors, see J. Bart-
lett Johnson, Constitutional Law Survey, 71 DENy. U. L. REv. 887, 887-93 (1994).
2. 21 F.3d 1508 (1994).
3. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). For an interesting discourse regarding
Valentine and the commercial speech doctrine in general, see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The
Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv. 747 (1993). The authors
discuss the pre-Valentine lack of distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, and
conclude that Valentine explicitly created, without explanation or reliance on prior precedent, the
commercial speech doctrine. Id. at 754-57.
Note that the commercial advertising at issue in Valentine is equivalent to commercial
speech. Although there are many proposed definitions of commercial speech, the Court itself has
traditionally relied on one of two formulations. The first and narrower of the two states that com-
mercial speech is speech that proposes a commercial transaction. Virginia State Board of Pharma-
cy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). A broader definition,
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speech spectrum was clear and unambiguous, the last fifty-two years of com-
mercial speech jurisprudence have lacked both simplicity and clarity. While
the Court has since concluded that commercial speech deserves some protec-
tion,4 there has been much disagreement over the scope and degree of shelter
such speech should be accorded under the First Amendment.
The definitive break with Valentine's absolutist approach came in 1976,
when the Court expressly abandoned Valentine in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.5 In striking down a
Virginia statute that restricted licensed pharmacists from advertising pre-
scription drug prices, the Court noted that "speech does not lose its First
Amendment protection because money is spent to project it." This protection,
however, is not absolute. False or misleading commercial speech may be regu-
lated," and time, place and manner restrictions imposed
The Court further defined the Virginia Citizens formulation in 1980 when
it handed down the seminal decision in the commercial speech arena: Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.9 The effects of
Central Hudson were two-fold. First, the Court returned to government some
of the regulatory power over commercial speech that presumably was lost after
Virginia Citizens. Second, the Court adopted a four-part test to be applied
when deciding commercial speech issues. Under this analysis, it is first neces-
sary to determine whether the First Amendment protects the speech in ques-
tion." This first prong of the Central Hudson test is met if the expression
found in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980), claims that commercial speech is "expression related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience." In a recent decision, however, the Court redefined commercial
speech in accordance with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. This definition focuses on the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of commercial speech, such as whether money is spent to project it,
whether the speech is carried in a publication sold for profit, whether the speech solicits money,
and whether the speech is on a commercial subject. Peter J. Tarsney, Regulation of Environmental
Marketing: Reassessing the Supreme Court's Protection of Commercial Speech, 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 533, 551-52 (1994) (citing Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1512
(1993)).
4. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
5. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Rumblings of the Court's changing stance on the issue, however,
could be heard three years earlier in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). In
Lehman, the majority concluded that a municipality's refusal to allow political advertising on city-
owned rapid transit vehicles did not constitute a violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 304. The
majority based its conclusion on a finding that legitimate state interests were at stake. Id. at 303-
05. The dissenters (Lehman was a 5-4 decision) argued, however, that the city was banning mes-
sage content, since only political advertising was restricted. Id. at 310.
6. Virginia Citizens, 425 U.S. at 761. Rather, the Court stated that restriction of entire cate-
gories of speech solely on the basis of inclusion in that category is forbidden. Id.
7. Id. at 771-72 ("The First Amendment... does not prohibit the State from insuring that
the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.").
. . 8. Id: at 771. These restrictions must "serve a significant governmental interest [and]...
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Id. In short, com-
mercial speech is entitled to protection only from "unwarranted governmental regulation." Id. at
761-62.
9. -447 U.S. 557 (1980).
10. Id. at 564-66. Virginia Citizens implied that commercial speech could only be restricted
if the speech .sought to be regulated is false or misleading. Central Hudson, however, permits
states to regulate even truthful advertising. In order to do so, the state carries the burden of dem-
onstrating that its regulation will further a substantial state interest. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
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concerns lawful activity and is not misleading." Next, the deciding court
must determine whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. 2 If
these initial tests are met, 3 the court must then decide, third, whether the
"regulation directly advances" the asserted governmental interest and, fourth,
whether it "is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.' ' 4
The Court has attempted, with mixed results, to recharacterize the final
two prongs of the analysis. Under Central Hudson, the third prong inquiry is
satisfied if the governmental body demonstrates that the restriction directly
furthers the asserted state interest." Hence, a regulation that "provides only
ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose" does not directly
advance the asserted interest and will not be upheld under the original frame-
work. 6 However, in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., the
Court held that the legislature's "reasonable" belief that the restrictions ad-
vanced the asserted state interest satisfied the third prong. 7
This decidedly deferential and "reasonableness" approach continued as the
predominant interpretation of Central Hudson's third prong until 1993, when
the Supreme Court decided Edenfield v. Fane.5 There, the Court struck down
a Florida law prohibiting certified public accountants from engaging in direct,
personal solicitation of clients.' 9 In doing so, the Court emphasized that under
Central Hudson's third prong "a governmental body seeking to sustain a re-
striction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are




13. A court will only proceed to the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson analysis
if the speech survives scrutiny under these initial inquiries. Id.
14. Id. Central Hudson describes the final two prongs of the analysis as criteria for deter-
mining whether the state interest asserted in prong two is substantial and if the regulatory tech-
nique adopted is proportionate to that interest. Id. at 564.
15. Id. ("[T]he Court has declined to uphold regulations that only indirectly advance the state
interest involved."). Under prong three, the court will "focus on the relationship between the
State's interests and the advertising ban." Id. at 569.
16. Id.
17. 478 U.S. 328, 341-42 (1986). The Posadas reasonableness test thus appears to favor less
scrutiny of governmental action and further judicial deference to government regulation. In fact,
many commentators interpret Posadas as representing little more than rational basis review. See,
e.g., Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in
Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1931 (1992). However, the Court itself has never
formally adopted such a standard. Note also that Posadas characterizes steps three and four in the
Central Hudson analysis as "involv[ing] a consideration of the 'fit' between the legislature's ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends." Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341.
Many commentators have suggested that the deferential approach adopted in Posadas is
applicable only when a "vice" activity is being regulated. See, e.g., Tarsney, supra note 3, at 546-
47. Commonly regulated vice activities include gambling, alcoholic beverages, tobacco and prosti-
tution. Id. at 547. In a recent decision, however, the Supreme Court refused to consider whether
vice activities were subject to a lower level of scrutiny. United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 113
S. Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993).
18. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
19. Id. at 1796.
20. Id. at 1800. The two asserted state interests in Edenfield were protection of consumers
from fraud (as well as protection of privacy) and furtherance of the accountant's independence, a
necessary component of the attestation function. id. at 1799. While the Court found these interests
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This expansion demonstrates a significant departure from the "reasonableness"
approach adopted in Posadas, and may indicate a return to the initial Central
Hudson framework.2 As it stands, however, Central Hudson's third prong
remains in flux, awaiting further clarification by the Court.
Central Hudson's fourth prong has also been the subject of much debate.
Whereas the framework as set forth in Central Hudson, if read literally, im-
poses a least-restrictive-means test,22 courts have not read the Central Hudson
language to create such a requirement. The Supreme Court adopted this devia-
tion in 1989 when it decided Board of Trustees v. Fox,23 which served as the
determinative break with the least-restrictive-means interpretation. Fox merely
requires the means to be "narrowly-tailored to achieve the desired objec-
tive." 4 Under this requirement, the legislature's regulatory technique must
merely be reasonable. 25 In contrast, a least-restrictive-means test would re-
quire the government to demonstrate that no other regulatory technique could
further its asserted interest to the same degree. Hence, Fox's narrowly tailored,
or "reasonable fit," requirement undoubtedly gives governmental
decisionmakers greater deference to determine which regulatory method best
suits the asserted interest.26
In 1993, the Court confirmed its adherence to the narrowly tailored stan-
dard with its decisions in United States v. Edge Broadcasting27 and City of
substantial, it concluded that the regulatory technique adopted by the Florida Board of Ac-
countancy did not advance "these interests in a direct and material way." Id. at 1798.
21. In addition to recharacterizing the third prong yet again, the Court in Edenfield alleviated
any notions that the Central Hudson framework represents rational basis review. It thus stated that
the Court will only examine those interests put forward by the state; under Central Hudson, the
Court will not speculate as to other possible state interests, as would be allowed under rational
basis review. Id. at 1798. Moreover, the Court will scrutinize the asserted state interest to ensure it
is the actual interest "served by the restriction." Id. at 1798-99 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Wom-
en v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)). The Court also placed some emphasis on the Board's
failure to demonstrate, through studies or other "anecdotal evidence," that the restrictions ad-
vanced the asserted state interests. Id. at 1800. Hence, a "reasonable belief," such as that in
Posadas, on the part of the legislature may now be insufficient to satisfy step three of the analy-
sis.
22. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 ("[I]f the governmental interest could be served as
well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot sur-
vive.").
23. 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) ("[Wle now .. conclude that the reason of the matter re-
quires something short of a least-restrictive-means standard.").
24. Id. While the Court alleged that its decisions could not be reconciled with a least-restric-
tive-means standard, id. at 479, the cases are clearly to the contrary. For example, in Central
Hudson the Court not only stated a least-restrictive-means test, but also applied one. See Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569-71. The Court even went so far as to suggest alternative, but less restric-
tive, means that the Commission could have employed. Id. The Court continued its application of
the least-restrictive-means standard in Posadas, where it stated that "the restrictions on commercial
speech [were] no more extensive than necessary to serve the government's interest." Posadas, 478
U.S. at 343. In furtherance of this point, the Court noted that the Puerto Rico Superior Court had
narrowed the statute considerably to ensure compliance with this requirement. Id. Thus, as the
dissent in Fox points out, the majority reaches its holding "only by recasting a good bit of con-
trary language in our past cases." Fox, 492 U.S. at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (citing In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). Hence, after Fox
"a regulation ... can ... be more extensive than is necessary to serve the government's interest
as long as it is not unreasonably so." City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505,
1519 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
26. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480-81.
27. 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2705 (1993) ("We made clear in [Fox] that our commercial speech
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Cincinnati v. Discovery Network." In doing so, however, the Court in Dis-
covery Network maintained that the standard was greater than rational basis re-
view.29 As such, courts will not require the regulation to be the least severe
method available, but will examine whether there are "numerous and obvious
less-burdensome alternatives."3 The existence or nonexistence of such alter-
natives serves as a factor in determining whether the fit is reasonable."
In Edge Broadcasting, the Court further held that challenges to a statute
as applied to the plaintiff, in an individual capacity, should be resolved under
Central Hudson's fourth prong.32 Previously, and in the court of appeal's de-
cision in Edge Broadcasting, challenges of this nature were based on the third
prong of the analysis.33 As a result, only when a statute's general application
is contested will the more stringent third step be the focal point of the analy-
sis.34 Note that at least one commentator has concluded, however, that special
circumstances may limit Edge Broadcasting to its facts.35 Even so, the
Court's intention, as demonstrated in Fox, Edge Broadcasting, and Discovery
Network, to discard the least-restrictive-means standard in favor of the narrow-
ly tailored approach cannot be questioned.
B. Regulation of Direct-Mail Solicitation by Attorneys
Armed with new-found commercial speech protection courtesy of Virginia
Citizens, in 1977, two Arizona lawyers placed an ad in a local newspaper
publicizing their fees for various routine legal services. This advertisement
contradicted every bar regulation in the country, as well as two hundred years
of traditional attorney restraint. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held in Bates
cases require a fit between the restriction and the government interest that is not necessarily per-
fect, but reasonable."). The Court in Edge Broadcasting characterized the fourth-prong inquiry as
a determination of "whether the regulation is more extensive than is necessary to serve the gov-
ernment[al] interest." Id. at 2704-05. Noticeably absent is the familiar "no" that traditionally pre-
ceded "more extensive." See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Posadas, 478 U.S. at 343.
Thus, Edge Broadcasting represents the Court's final recharacterization of Central Hudson's
fourth prong.
28. 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 n.13 (1993).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Court in Discovery Network also noted that the governmental body must assert
an interest that seeks to protect a commercial harm. Id. at 1515. Moreover, unless there exists
some demonstrable difference between the prohibited commercial speech and noncommercial
speech, courts will refuse to accept the. "low value" of commercial speech as a justification for a
categorical ban. Id. at 1516. The Court also warned against "plac[ing] too much importance on the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech." Id. at 1514. Rather, the distinction
must bear some relationship to the interests asserted. Id.
32. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2703-05.
33. See, e.g., id. at 2704.
34. Id. The statute must still directly advance the state interest as required by prong three of
the analysis. Also, all four prongs of the Central Hudson framework still must be satisfied.
35. Tarsney, supra note 3, at 561. Tarsney states two facts that may limit Edge
Broadcasting's precedential value. First, a vice activity was being regulated. id. Hence, the Court
may have afforded the statute greater deference, as vice activities are afforded special treatment.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Second, the Court may have been more willing to
manipulate the Central Hudson framework because Congress had few or no other methods to reg-
ulate state run lottery systems. Tarsney, supra note 3, at 561-62.
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v. State Bar of Arizona36 that states could not impose blanket bans on attor-
ney advertising. Nearly twenty years after this historic decision; however, the
propriety of attorney advertising continues to be intensely debated. Although
Bates purported to bestow upon attorneys the right to engage in so-called
"traditional" advertising in newspapers, periodicals and the like, the opinion
expressed specific reservations about the permissibility of in-person solicita-
tion.37
Just one year later, these reservations were addressed in Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n.3" Citing the overriding state interests in "protecting consum-
ers, regulating commercial transactions, and maintaining standards among
members of the licensed professions," the Court upheld a regulation restricting
in-person solicitation." In contrast to public advertising, in-person solicitation
exerts pressure upon and demands an immediate response from a specific
individual.' Hence, bar association restrictions prohibiting such action serve
the "legitimate and important state interest" of protecting the public from the
unwanted effects of solicitation.4
In 1985, the Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel2 again
expanded the sphere of protection accorded attorney advertising. The Court
held that a state may not impose a blanket ban on written, public advertise-
ments directed toward specific potential clients facing particular legal dilem-
mas.43 Zauderer, in conjunction with Bates and Ohralik, thus set the stage for
the debate over direct-mail solicitation, a novel and recent phenomenon having
characteristics of both public and in-person advertising."
36. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates held that states could not place blanket bans on reasonable
legal advertising which was not false or misleading. The Court based its decision on the limited
protection afforded commercial speech in Virginia Citizens. The Arizona State Bar, which im-
posed the ban, contended lawyer advertising either would or potentially could adversely effect
professionals, mislead the public, impede the administration of justice, produce undesirable eco-
nomic effects, and reduce the quality of legal services. Id. at 364, 368-79. The Court, however,
determined that the consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information outweighed all
of the Bar's proffered interests. Id. at 364.
37. Id. at 356.
38. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
39. Id. at 460, 468.
40. Id. at 457. This pressure could result in confronted individuals making hasty and unin-
formed decisions regarding an important and personal matter. Id. Moreover, there is no oppor-
tunity to police the propriety of the communication between the attorney and the potential client.
Id.
41. Id. at 462. These potential effects include "stirring up litigation, assertion of fraudulent
claims, debasing the legal profession, and potential harm to the solicited client in the form of
overreaching, overcharging, underrepresentation, and misrepresentation." Id. at 461. Despite the
Court's conclusion in Ohralik, attorneys occasionally still attempt to solicit clients directly. For an
example, see In re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265 (N.J. 1992).
42. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). The attorney in Zauderer placed a newspaper advertisement seek-
ing potential plaintiffs in suit against Dalkon Shield, the manufacturer of a birth control device
previously proven to be dangerously defective. Id. at 629-31.
43. Id. at 644-47.
44. Like in-person solicitation, direct-mail solicitation is personal (a direct contact addressed
and written to a specific individual), presumably for a specific purpose (representation of the solic-
ited client in a specific legal matter). However, a written contact is less personal and intrusive than
an in-person confrontation, and does not subject the solicited client to the pressures of making an




The Supreme Court ended all speculation regarding the permissibility of
direct-mail solicitation in 1988 when it handed down the still controversial
decision of Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n 5 Relying on the crucial distinc-
tion between in-person and written advertisements, the Court held that states
could not categorically ban attorneys from soliciting clients through the
mail.' The Court noted that written communications may be reflected upon
or even discarded, and involve significantly less privacy invasion than an in-
person confrontation. '7 Moreover, states have several available options in po-
licing such advertising. For example, states could require lawyers to file copies
of the proposed communication with a state agency so as to allow for review
and supervision, and, if appropriate, punishment.' The communication could
bear advertisement identification clauses and provide details of the process by
which concerned recipients could report suspected inaccuracies or abuses.49
Also, state agencies could require the attorney to authenticate the accuracy of
the information prior to mailing."
In short, the Court in Shapero held that the First Amendment prohibits
states from imposing plenary bans on direct-mail solicitation by attorneys."
Although opportunities for attorney abuse may increase without such a ban,
these "isolated abuses or mistakes [do] not justify a total ban" on protected
commercial speech-especially when viewed in light of the many possible re-
strictive arrows states hold in their commercial speech quivers. 2
C. Public Records and Criminal Proceedings
Although the common law historically provided a minimal, if not abso-
lute, right of access to some government records, statutory schemes across the
country have supplanted this common law framework. 3 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has held that the First Amendment bestows upon the general
45. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
46. Id. at 471, 473-74. In 1985, Shapero contacted the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising
Commission, seeking their approval of a form letter he intended to send to potential clients. Id. at
469. The letter invited and encouraged those persons facing foreclosure on their homes to contact
his office regarding legal representation. Id. Despite the Commission's conclusion that the letter
was not false or misleading, it was denied approval because of a Kentucky Supreme Court rule
prohibiting written advertisements to those facing specific legal problems. Id. The rule permitted
attorneys to mail written solicitations to the general public. Id. at 469-70. The Commission did,
however, express its opinion that the Kentucky rule violated the First Amendment, and suggested
the rules be amended. Id. at 470. Shapero then took his claim to the Kentucky Bar Association's
Ethics Committee, which upheld the rule. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court struck down the rule
but oddly replaced it with an American Bar Association rule that also prohibited targeted direct-
mail solicitation. Id. at 470-71.
47. Id. at 475-76.
48. Id. at 476.
49. Id. at 477-78.
50. Id. at 477.
51. Id. at 471.
52. Id. at 476.
53. See, e.g., Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1511. The underlying, and most important,
issue for commercial speech purposes, is whether the Constitution can be read to confer such a
right upon the general public. All appearances indicate, as does the current Court, that no such
right exists.
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public no constitutional right of access to government records.54
It may be possible, however, to circumvent this holding when the records
at issue involve criminal proceedings. For example, the Sixth Amendment
right to a fair and public trial may sometimes implicate First Amendment
protection of a right of access. 5 All indications are, however, that this right
only attaches where the public records sought actually relate to and involve an
initiated, ongoing, or completed criminal proceeding.56 Moreover, this right is
triggered only when a tradition of accessibility to the desired records or pro-
ceedings is demonstrated and when public access to the records plays a valu-
able role in "the actual functioning of the process. 5 7 "Experience and logic"
will therefore dictate whether a constitutional right of access attaches.5"
D. Curtailment of Commercial Speech: Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado 9
1. Majority Opinion
The controversy in Lanphere & Urbaniak arose out of a Colorado statute
prohibiting access to public criminal-justice records where the information
contained in the records is to be used to "solicit business for pecuniary
gain. '" The three plaintiffs were Lanphere and Urbaniak, partners in a Colo-
rado Springs law firm, and Frank Mutchler, director of a substance abuse cen-
ter, also located in Colorado Springs.6 Prior to enactment of the challenged
statute, plaintiffs obtained the names and addresses of individuals involved in
alcohol-related traffic incidents.62 Mutchler used the information to solicit
clients for his treatment center, and Lanphere and Urbaniak solicited those
individuals facing prosecution for DUIs and various misdemeanor traffic viola-
tions.63 Both solicitations came in the form of targeted, direct-mail advertise-
ments. 64
Once denied access to the records, plaintiffs sought declaratory and in-
54. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) ("this Court has never intimated a
First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within government
control").
55. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). Note that even this right,
should it inhere, is not absolute. Id. at 9.
56. See id. at 6-10. For example, the public records sought in Press-Enterprise involved at-
tempts by the media to obtain transcripts of a preliminary hearing in a criminal prosecution. Id. at
4-5.
57. Id. at 8-10, 12.
58. Id. at 9.
59. 21 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1994).
60. Id. at 1510. The Colorado statute in relevant part provides:
Records of official actions and criminal justice records and the names, addresses, tele-
phone numbers, and other information in such records shall not be used by any person
for the purpose of soliciting business for pecuniary gain. The official custodian shall
deny any person access to records of official actions and criminal justice records unless
such person signs a statement which affirms that such records shall not be used for the
direct solicitation of business for pecuniary gain.
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-305.5 (1994).






junctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of their First and
Fourteenth Amendment free speech rights.' The state of Colorado contended
that the issue was merely one of public records access, not free speech.' Ap-
parently in agreement, the District Court granted summary judgment for Colo-
rado and plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit.67
The Tenth Circuit initially focused on the scope and degree of the tradi-
tional common-law right of access to government records." Although the
common law historically recognized such a right, Colorado statutes effectively
preempted the field and were thus controlling.69 Accordingly, any right of
access to the records not granted by statute required a constitutional source.
The court concluded, based on a strong line of Supreme Court precedent, that
the First Amendment bestowed no such right.7 °
Although Colorado argued that determination of the access question was
dispositive, the court disagreed, noting that the First Amendment was implicat-
ed by the Coiorado legislature's "content-based restriction on protected
speech."'" Because the legislation disfavored commercial speech, the court
applied the four-part test formulated in Central Hudson.72 First, the court
found that the First Amendment protected the speech in question because the
proposed advertising was neither false nor misleading, and the statute denied
all commercial access to the records.73 Second, the court concluded that Col-
orado had a substantial governmental interest in preventing privacy inva-
sions.74 Further, the court held that Colorado's interest in protecting privacy
was directly furthered by denying access to the names and addresses of those
charged with alcohol related traffic violations and preventing solicitors from
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1511.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id; see COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-301 to 24-72-308 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
70. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1512. The plaintiffs, however, argued that a separate
line of cases granted the necessary First Amendment right. Plaintiffs maintained that the Sixth
Amendment right to a fair and public trial implicated a First Amendment right of access to the
records in question. Id. The Court, however, disagreed, stating no tradition for this type of access
existed, and that such access would not positively further any particular process. Id. The dissent
relied heavily upon this reasoning. See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
71. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1512-13. The regulation was content based because
the Colorado legislature permitted and denied access to the records based on whether the records
were to be used for commercial purposes, i.e., soliciting pecuniary gain. While the records them-
selves were not "speech," access to the records was determined "based on the speech use" of the
records (if the speech was commercial then access was denied, and vice versa).
72. See supra notes 9-35 and accompanying text.
73. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1514. The Colorado legislature made no attempt to
deny commercial access only to those solicitations found to be misleading, but rather imposed a
plenary commercial access ban. Id. Nor did Colorado claim that any of the plaintiff's particular
advertisements were misleading. Id.
74. Id. The court noted that discovery of a person's legal affairs constitutes a greater privacy
invasion when the information is used to elicit pecuniary gain than when the same information is
used for a non-economic purpose. Id. Plaintiffs, however, alleged Colorado's stated purpose was
illusory, because the information could be obtained through other sources, including the local
newspapers. Id. The court found, however, that the state had a legitimate, substantial interest in
"not aiding in the dissemination of the information for commercial speech purposes," as well as
reducing the potential for solicitor abuse and "maintaining public confidence in our system of
justice." Id.
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overreaching towards vulnerable solicitation recipients.75
Central Hudson's fourth prong, which requires the regulation to be no
more extensive than necessary to further the siate's interest, caused the most
debate. The court interpreted this prong to require no more than a reasonable
fit between the regulation and the state's asserted interest."6 Both Colorado
and the court's primary task was overcoming and distinguishing Shapero."
The court offered several reasons why Shapero was not controlling. First, the
statute was designed to protect privacy, not to prevent solicitation.78 More-
over, Colorado did not ban direct mail solicitation by attorneys; it merely
established an indirect barrier by not making certain records available for that
purpose.79 Finally, the court considered it relevant that Colorado possessed
the greater power to deny all access to criminal justice records." With the
case distinguished from Shapero, the court held that the Colorado statute con-
stituted a reasonable fit in furtherance of the state's asserted interest, and
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Colorado.
8'
2. Dissent
Judge Aldisert dissented, claiming that the First Amendment right of
access to criminal proceedings rendered the Colorado statute unconstitution-
al. 2 In particular, Judge Aldisert believed that the Press-Enterprise three-part
inquiry controlled and determined the issue. 3 Applying Press-Enterprise,
Judge Aldisert concluded that the Colorado statute denied access to records
that were clearly a part of criminal proceedings.84 Moreover, a historical right
of access to such records existed-a right which added significantly to the
judicial process in question. 5 Accordingly, Judge Aldisert insisted that Colo-
rado have a compelling state interest to justify denial of the records. 6
Judge Aldisert found none of Colorado's asserted interests sufficiently
compelling. 7 These interests included protecting privacy, restricting use of
the records to their intended purpose, and preventing state assistance in un-
75. Id. at 1515.
76. Id. (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-81 (1989)). In determining
whether such a fit existed, the court balanced the state's interests against the effect of the statute
on commercial speech. Id.
77. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
78. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1515.
79. Id. Rather, Colorado erected an indirect "barrier to commercial speech." Id.
80. Id. at 1516.
81. Id.
82. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (Judge Aldisert, a Senior Circuit Judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, was sitting by designation).
83. Id; see Press Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986).
84. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1517.
85. Id. at 1517-18. Solicitation adds value to the judicial process by informing individuals of
their legal rights in judicial proceedings. Id. at 1518. Such information is particularly important
where, as here, potential liberty and property interests may be at stake. Id. Finally, allowing sub-
stance abuse centers access to the records for solicitation purposes served the judicial process by





wanted solicitation by those seeking economic gain."8 The state's arguments
furthering these interests overlooked that a right of access to such records has
always played a role in preserving the credibility of the criminal justice sys-
tem. 9 Moreover, Supreme Court precedent establishes that restriction of
speech connected to allegedly offensive conduct is an insufficient basis upon
which to deny access to public records."° In addition, the dissent believed that
the statute was underinclusive, and failed to effectively accomplish its stated
objective of protecting privacy.9 Judge Aldisert concluded by noting that the
activity in question, access to criminal proceeding records, enjoyed constitu-
tional protection without regard to the lawful use of that information.92 As
such, the state lacked the power to deny access to the records based solely on
an intent to utilize them to procure pecuniary gain.93
3. Analysis
The court's opinion in Lanphere & Urbaniak is an unfortunate defeat for
commercial speech protection-a defeat based on an unconvincing attempt to
distinguish precedent, as well as the acceptance of an asserted state interest
that was likely illusory. Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions should
have altered the court's analysis. As a result, the Tenth Circuit appears to be
retreating from the strong commercial speech protection it provided last year
in Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen.94
The Colorado statute at issue fails to satisfy the commercial speech frame-
work as delineated in Central Hudson and its progeny. As the Supreme Court
has made clear, speech that is not false or misleading may be regulated only
when a substantial interest is asserted and directly advanced by the regulatory
technique employed, and when a reasonable fit exists between the asserted
interest and the regulation.95
Colorado enacted the legislation96 in question to inhibit privacy inva-
sions.97 Undoubtedly, protecting privacy constitutes a substantial state inter-
est.9 However, courts should be loathe to accept a governmental body's as-
serted interest without further inquiry. Indeed, the Supreme Court has mandat-
ed that courts not "turn away if it appears that the stated interests are not the
actual interests served by the restriction." Moreover, the Court has, in prac-
tice, examined the circumstances to determine what purpose the challenged
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1519.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1518-19.
92. Id. at 1519.
93. Id. at 1519-20.
94. See supra note 1.
95. See supra notes 9-35 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
97. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1514. Specifically, the interest was protecting "the
privacy of those charged with misdemeanor traffic offenses and DUI." Id.
98. The Supreme Court has held that protection of potential clients' privacy constitutes a
substantial interest. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1799.
99. Id. at 1798 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)).
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statute actually serves in a given case.' °
Ignoring the Supreme Court's directive, and despite evidence to the con-
trary, the court in Lanphere & Urbaniak accepted Colorado's asserted privacy
interest. Evidence offered by the plaintiffs indicated that the legislation actual-
ly was passed to prevent the information provided in the records to be used
for direct-mail solicitation purposes. While little legislative history is available,
remarks by one state senator denote no indication of privacy concerns.'
Confronted by this reality, the court noted the presence of additional state
interests. These interests were "lessening the danger of solicitor abuse and
maintaining public confidence in our system of justice."'0 2 To support this
assertion, the court cited several solicitation cases, including Shapero.'°3
However, none of the cases cited suggests that a state has the power to prohib-
it direct-mail solicitation when the proposed communication is not false or
misleading and no substantial state interest exists."° Yet Colorado never con-
tended that plaintiffs solicitations were in any manner deceptive or untruthful,
and "merely because targeted, direct-mail solicitation presents lawyers with
opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a total ban on
that mode of protected commercial speech."'05 In light of this pronounce-
ment, "lessening the danger for solicitor abuse" should not constitute a sub-
stantial state interest unless the state can bring forward empirical evidence
establishing that such abuses exist. Similarly, the court never explained how
denying access to these records to persons seeking to utilize them for pecuni-
ary gain maintains public confidence in the justice system.
The Colorado statute also fails to survive a proper application of step
three of the analysis. Even assuming arguendo, that Colorado's legitimate state
interest was protecting privacy, permitting and denying access to the records
based on further use for commercial purposes does not materially alleviate any
purported harm as required by Edenfield. In Lanphere & Urbaniak, the court
interpreted step three as merely requiring the statute to "advance the State's
interests in a reasonably direct way."'" As stated above, however, Edenfield
altered this prong of the Central Hudson framework by requiring the state to
demonstrate that "the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in
100. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 (1993).
101. When introducing the amendment, Senator Wells made these remarks: "We were not
[providing access to records] to ... provide a client base ... for people to go out and solicit new
business and... so what this does is it... says that those records are still open but are not to be
used in direct solicitation for pecuniary gain .... Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1514. The
court concluded that this statement merely summarized what the amendment does, but that it was
"not a definitive statement on the state's interest ... and is not inconsistent with the state's assert-
ed interest in protecting privacy." Id. However, the statement itself is conclusive-the state acted
to prevent those in similar positions as plaintiffs from obtaining and using the information to
engage in direct-mail solicitation. While the remarks may not be inconsistent with the state's as-
serted privacy interest, no mention is even made of such an interest, as would be expected if, as
Colorado claimed at trial, privacy was the overriding interest involved.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1799.
105. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476.
106. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1515.
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fact alleviate them to a material degree."'0 7 The statute, however, fails miser-
ably to accomplish its stated objective. Nowhere in the court's opinion does it
justify its conclusion that privacy invasions are greater and more offensive
when the obtained information is gathered for an economic purpose.' Cer-
tainly, line-drawing based on the intended use of the information in no way
alleviates the fact that such invasions will continue to occur. The only distinc-
tion is that those responsible for the privacy invasion will not be utilizing the
information for pecuniary gain. The statute is thus far too underinclusive to
accomplish effectively its stated purpose."° As such, privacy invasions are
not a significant concern. " 0 Considering the distinct possibility that there are
no real harms in Lanphere & Urbaniak, and the Colorado statute's inability to
alleviate to a material degree the occurrence of privacy invasions, the third
step in the Central Hudson analysis, as delineated under Edenfield, is not
satisfied.
The reasonable fit, or narrowly tailored, requirement of step four also
presents difficulties. In determining whether such a fit existed, the court in
Lanphere & Urbaniak turned to Shapero, and made what it deemed three
important distinctions."' The first of these distinctions was "the added inter-
est in protecting privacy."" 2 While there was no assertion of a privacy inva-
sion in Shapero, the court in Lanphere & Urbaniak never explained the signif-
icance of this distinction. In failing to do so it overlooked that the invasions
are identical, regardless of the source from which the information is derived.
The second and third putative distinctions, respectively, were Colorado's refus-
al to grant access to all groups seeking to utilize the records for pecuniary
gain, and Colorado's ability to ban all access to the records, regardless of
107. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
108. Rather, the court allows Colorado to engage in "mere speculation or conjecture" as to the
effect of the statute on privacy invasions, a practice specifically forbidden by the Supreme Court.
Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800.
109. If privacy interests truly constituted a substantial state interest, Colorado would have
banned all access to the records. Under the current statute, however, a pro-bono attorney or non-
profit substance abuse center legitimately could obtain the information and solicit in precisely the
same manner as plaintiffs. Hence, the absence or presence of a pecuniary objective in no way
effects any privacy invasion.
Also, while the Court in Posadas suggested underinclusiveness was no bar to satisfying the
third prong, Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342-43, two distinctions separate Lanphere & Urbaniak. First,
Posadas was a vice case, and hence arguably receives special treatment by the Court. Second, as
support for its conclusion that "[aippellant's [underinclusivel argument is misplaced," the Court in
Posadas noted that the history of legalized gambling in Puerto Rico supported its conclusion. Id.
at 342-43. Here, however, Colorado historically had provided access to the records. Lanphere &
Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1517 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
110. The present situation is analogous to that in Edenfield. There the Court noted that if the
solicited individual was "unreceptive to his initial telephone solicitation, they need only terminate
the call. Invasion of privacy is not a significant concern." Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1803. Here,
unresponsive individuals need only dispose of or ignore the solicitation.
111. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. Note also that an argument can be made
that the entire line of cases regarding attorney solicitation should be ignored. In each case in-
volving attorney solicitation, a regulatory board or legislature had enacted an ordinance or law
specifically addressing solicitation only. Here, however, the Colorado statute restricts all commer-
cial speech, without regard to whether the soliciting individual is an attorney, by denying access to
the records.
112. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1515.
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use." 3 Again, however, the court bases its conclusion on these distinguishing
factors with no meaningful discussion of why these differences render the fit
in Lanphere & Urbaniak reasonable.
In contrast, a strong argument can be made that the fit is unreasonable.
The prohibited privacy invasions, those undertaken with a pecuniary goal, are
no more harmful than the permitted privacy invasions, those undertaken with-
out a pecuniary goal." 4 Hence, the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech "bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular inter-
ests" asserted."5 Therefore, Colorado may not restrict access to the records
based on whether the information will serve a commercial purpose, even as-
suming its privacy interest is legitimate." 6
As demonstrated, the Colorado statute fails to withstand scrutiny under the
Central Hudson analysis. Specifically, the state's asserted interest is likely
illusory and, even if legitimate, fails to alleviate privacy invasions to a materi-
al degree. Moreover, Colorado has failed to establish a reasonable fit between
its statute and privacy invasions. Rather than demonstrating genuine concern
for protecting privacy interests, the Colorado legislature appears to be making
normative judgments regarding the relative worth of solicitation as a form of
speech. Such a resolution directly contradicts the "general rule that the speaker
and the audience, not the government, [should] assess the value of the infor-
mation presented."" 7 Properly scrutinized, the statute is an impermissible re-
striction on commercial speech.
113. Id. at 1515-16. Furthermore, the court's assumption that Colorado's ability to prohibit
any access to the records grants it the power to regulate use of the records is suspect. While the
Supreme Court historically has accepted this "greater power includes the lesser power" argument
in the commercial speech context, see, e.g., Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-346, the Court in Edge
Broadcasting refused to address this assertion. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. CL at 2703 ("The Gov-
ernment argues... that the greater power to prohibit gambling necessarily includes the lesser
power to ban its advertisement .... The Court of Appeals did not address this issue and neither
do we .... ).
114. This situation is analogous to Discovery Network, where the Court stated the city's prop-
osition-that every decrease in commercial newsracks increased safety-was "an insufficient jus-
tification for the discrimination against respondents' use of newsracks that are no more harmful
than the permitted newsracks." Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511.
115. Id. at 1514.
116. See id. The situation is again analogous to Discovery Network, where the Court stated:
[niot only does Cincinnati's categorical ban... place too much importance on the dis-
tinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, but in this case, the distinction
bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted. It is
therefore an impermissible means of responding to the city's admittedly legitimate inter-
ests."
Id.
Discovery Network also cited another relevant decision, Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980). Carey struck down a statute concerning picketing because "nothing in the content-based
labor/nonlabor distinction has any bearing whatsoever on privacy." Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct
at 1514 (citing Carey, 447 U.S. at 465). Similarly, nothing in Colorado's pecuniary/nonpecuniary
purpose distinction has any bearing on privacy.
117. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1798.
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CONCLUSION
Since 1976 and Virginia Citizens, courts have struggled with the proper
scope and degree of First Amendment protection to afford commercial speech.
As a result, the commercial speech doctrine developed into a puzzling array of
contradictory decisions in which deference to legislative judgments was the
only norm. However, in recent years, the Supreme Court has provided much
guidance in the commercial speech arena and generally afforded commercial
speech greater constitutional protection. As such, the Tenth Circuit's decision






During the 1994 survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided two notable
contract cases regarding the extent of governmental liability. In United World
Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Ass'n,' the Tenth Circuit per-
mitted a foreign state to evade liability for its nonperformance of contractual
obligations by invoking foreign sovereign immunity. On the domestic front,
however, the Tenth Circuit required U.S. government agencies to honor their
contractual obligations owed to private investors in RTC v. FSLIC,2 despite
the agencies' attempt to invoke the sovereign acts doctrine.
Part I examines the Tenth Circuit's application of foreign sovereign im-
munity to a contract dispute between a Denver corporation and the Republic
of Kazakhstan. Part II explains the events occurring in the United States' thrift
industry during the past decade which led to litigation against the Federal
Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and related agencies. The
Survey concludes by reviewing how the Tenth Circuit was able to hold those
federal agencies liable for their breach of contract.
I. INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. The Development of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States
Foreign sovereign immunity is an international law doctrine whereby
domestic courts relinquish their jurisdiction over a foreign state.3 Thus, grant-
ing immunity to foreign states is not constitutionally mandated; rather, it is a
"matter of grace and comity" exercised by the United States.4
In the early nineteenth century, in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,5
Chief Justice Marshall laid the foundation for the absolute theory of foreign
sovereign immunity, which lower courts generally followed until 1952.6 At
that time, the U.S. State Department announced its adoption of the restrictive
theory of foreign sovereign immunity in the "Tate Letter".7 This theory re-
1. 33 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 904 (1995).
2. 25 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1994).
3. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6606.
4. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
5. 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
6. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486. The absolute theory grants a state complete immunity from
the adjudicatory jurisdiction of foreign states. See Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" Out
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity
Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489, 497 (1992).
7. Donoghue, supra note 6, at 497. Jack B. Tate, the Acting Legal Advisor to the De-
partment of State, wrote a letter to the Attorney General on May 19, 1952 explaining why the
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stricted immunity to cases involving the public acts of foreign governments
and denied it for suits stemming from the commercial acts of foreign govern-
ments.8
In 1976, Congress codified the American version of the restrictive theory
in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the Act).9 The stated purpose for
such action was "to provide when and how parties can maintain a lawsuit
against a foreign state ... in the courts of the United States."'" The Act pro-
vides the only basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign government in
American courts," and must be applied in every action against a foreign sov-
ereign. 2
A foreign state is presumed immune from the jurisdiction of American
courts unless the case falls under one of the exceptions provided for by the
Act. 3 The most significant of these is the commercial exception found at §
1605(a)(2).' 4 Under § 1605(a)(2), courts will exercise jurisdiction if the suit
is based upon: (1) an act committed outside of U.S. territory; (2) which is con-
nected to a foreign state's commercial activity elsewhere; and (3) causes a
direct effect within the United States. 5 In such cases, the critical determina-
tion is whether the activity constitutes commercial activity causing direct ef-
fects within the United States.
The Act defines "commercial activity" as "either a regular course of com-
mercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to
State Department would no longer grant foreign governments immunity in certain types of cases.
26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952). The change in policy was necessitated in part by the increasing
amount of commercial activity governments were conducting. The change was also necessary
because the restrictive theory, under which "the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with
regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure
gestionis)," was gaining widespread acceptance outside of the Soviet bloc. Id. at 984-85.
8. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.
9. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 3, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605. For a
more detailed discussion of the reasons for codification, see id. at 6606-08; Verlinden, 461 U.S. at
487-88. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 3, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6604.
11. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989).
12. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493.
13. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1476 (1993). The exceptions are found at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2164 (1992). The Act states in
relevant part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
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its purpose."'6 In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,7 the Supreme
Court recognized the vagueness of this definition and attempted to clarify it.
The Court concluded that when a foreign state acts as a private player rather
than as a market regulator, its actions are commercial for purposes of the
Act.'8 The central issue in Weltover focused on whether the foreign state's
actions were of the type a private party would perform while conducting trade
or commerce, and did not focus on the reasons behind such action. 9 The
Court also rejected the interpretation of "direct effect," followed by some
circuits, which required the effect to be both substantial and foreseeable.20
Instead, the Court defined a direct effect under the Act as one which follows
as an "immediate consequence" of the foreign state's activity.2'
Although the Supreme Court has attempted to provide guidelines for inter-
preting the commercial exception, the critical terms involved still remain ill-
defined. The effect is that a plaintiff attempting to file suit against a foreign
state is forced to accept the commercial label placed on the foreign state's
activity by a district court. A court's characterization of the foreign state's act,
therefore, determines whether the suit is barred by immunity. United World
Trade v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Ass'n22 provides an example as to
how costly sovereign immunity can be for companies contracting with foreign
states.
B. Tenth Circuit Decision:
United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Ass'n"
The plaintiff, United World Trade, Inc. (UWT), was a Colorado corpora-
tion operating out of Denver, Colorado.2" One defendant, Mangyshlakneft Oil
Production Ass'n (MOP), was authorized to conduct oil production and expor-
tation on behalf of the Republic of Kazakhstan,2" and another defendant,
Kazakhstan Commerce Foreign Economic Association (Kazcom), served as
MOP's agent for its transactions with UWT.26
In December of 1991, representatives from UWT, MOP and Kazcom
entered into a preliminary agreement in Moscow. Under the terms of the
agreement, UWT was required to locate potential oil buyers for the first quar-
ter of 1992. MOP agreed to negotiate with UWT for prospective buyers, sup-
ply 200,000 metric tons of oil during the first quarter if a qualified buyer was
found by UWT, and provide 800,000 metric tons of oil during the rest of
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
17. 112 S. Ct. at 2165-66.
18. Id. at 2166.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2168.
21. Id. (quoting Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991),
aff d, 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992)).
22. 33 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 904 (1995).
23. 33 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 904 (1995).
24. Id. at 1234.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1234-35.
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1992.27 On January 23, 1992, UWT, MOP and Kazcom signed a contract for
the sale of crude oil in Moscow. The contract required MOP to supply
200,000 metric tons of oil to an Italian customer (ISAB), and required UWT
to pay MOP 97% of the price paid by ISAB.28 The contract terms specified
the method of payment: in U.S. dollars via irrevocable credit opened by a
"first class European/USA bank."'2 9
The oil was to be transported to ISAB in four tanker shipments. UWT
selected the London branch of the San Paolo Bank to issue a credit letter
covering payment to MOP and to send Kazakhstan notice of the letter prior to
each delivery. Once notified, MOP was to ship the oil to ISAB and, upon
delivery, send the shipping documents to the bank in London. The London
bank would then send payment to MOP's account with the Credit Commercial
de France bank in Paris.3"
The dispute between the parties arose when the bill of lading for the third
oil shipment was allegedly stolen from a Kazcom representative.3 This event
led to UWT's six-year indemnification of ISAB in order to secure its payment
from ISAB. UWT then claimed that the defendants refused to supply it with
more oil and instead sold directly to ISAB. As a result, UWT filed suit for
breach of the preliminary agreement.32 MOP and Kazcom claimed foreign
sovereign immunity and UWT countered that the defendants were subject to
the jurisdiction of American courts under the commercial exception to the
Act.33 The resultant issue therefore, was whether the defendants' actions qual-
ified as a direct effect under the Act.34
The district court declined to interpret Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
Inc.3" as requiring only a slight effect in the United States.36 Rather, the
court held that an effect qualifies as direct only if it flows as an immediate
consequence of the foreign state's activity.37 Moreover, the court concluded
that a financial loss alone incurred by a plaintiff in the United States is in-
sufficient to satisfy the direct effect requirement.3" After finding that both the




31. United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 821 F. Supp. 1405, 1407
(D. Colo. 1993), affd, 33 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 904 (1995).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1408.
34. For a discussion of previous judicial interpretations of the meaning of "direct effect," see
supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
35. 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
36. United World Trade, 821 F. Supp. at 1408. Note that in doing so, the district court re-
fused to follow the rationale of Ampac Group Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973
(S.D. Fla. 1992), aff d, 40 F.3d 389 (11th Cir. 1994). Ampac involved a breach of contract claim
by a Florida corporation against the government of Honduras for a dispute arising from the sale of
a cement business as part of the government's privatization plan. Id. at 975-76. In holding that the
nature of the transaction qualified for the commercial exception, the court stated, "Weltover there-
fore teaches that the effect in the United States need only be slight." Id. at 977.
37. United World Trade, 821 F. Supp. at 1408.
38. Id. at 1409 (citing Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 891 (1989)).
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preliminary agreement and the sales contract had virtually no connection with
the United States, the court held that the losses suffered by UWT were not
legally significant39 and did not constitute a direct effect in the United
States.' It consequently granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.4
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of immunity. 2 The court itself rec-
ognized the direct effect clause as "hopelessly ambiguous when applied to any
particular transaction." 3 In reaching its decision, therefore, the court attempt-
ed to apply the Weltover guidelines to the particularities of the specific case
before it." It noted that UWT's case differed significantly from the situation
in Weltover because no part of MOP's performance occurred in the United
States: the oil was transferred from Kazakhstan to Italy. While performing
their contractual obligations, the defendants had absolutely no connection with
the United States.45 UWT's place of performance for its contract obligation
was specified as Paris.' The court, therefore, concluded that converting funds
into American dollars was not a direct effect following as an immediate conse-
quence from the defendants' acts.47
Likewise, the court found that Kazcom's failure to provide a bill of lading
for the third shipment did not have a direct effect within the United States.4
UWT's loss caused by indemnifying ISAB stemmed from its contractual obli-
gations with ISAB and not from those it had with MOP and Kazcom. Thus,
the contract with ISAB functioned as an intervening factor which prevented
the indemnification from being an immediate consequence of the defendants'
acts.49
39. Id. at 1408 (citing Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1515 (D.C. Cir.
1988)). The "legally significant" standard seems to require that the losses arise from acts that
created legal obligations or invoked the sanction of the law. The Zedan court listed a bank's refus-
al to pay on a letter of credit, a transfer of money, and incurring a debt, as legally significant
events. Zedan, 849 F.2d at 1515. But see Antares Aircraft, Ltd. Partnership v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that drawing a check on an American bank was
not a legally significant act), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
40. United World Trade, Inc., 821 F. Supp. at 1409.
41. Id. at 1410.
42. United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d 1232, 1234 (10th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 904 (1995).




47. Id. at 1238. "The requirement that an effect be 'direct' indicates that Congress did not
intend to provide jurisdiction whenever the ripples caused by an overseas transaction manage
eventually to reach the shores of the United States. Such is the case here." Id. House Report No.
1487 explains the meaning of "commercial activity":
This definition includes cases based on commercial transactions performed in whole or
in part in the United States, import-export transactions involving sales to, or purchases
from, concerns in the United States, business torts occurring in the United States ...
and an indebtedness incurred by a foreign state which negotiates or executes a public
lending institution located in the United States .... It will be for the courts to determine
whether a particular commercial activity has been performed in whole or in part in the
United States. This definition, however, is intended to reflect a degree of contact beyond
that occasioned simply by U.S. citizenship or U.S. residence of the plaintiff.
H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 3, at 17-18, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615-16.
48. United World Trade, 33 F.3d at 1238.
49. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit concluded its opinion by holding that UWT's claim of
lost profits was not covered by the commercial exception because such losses
did not occur in the United States.50 The acts giving rise to the suit occurred
entirely in Europe: the contract was signed in Moscow, the oil was shipped
from Kazakhstan to Italy, UWT was paid in London, and MOP received its
payment in Paris. After examining the particularities of the situation, the court
held that the defendants' acts, as well as the resultant direct effects, occurred
in Europe rather than the United States.5 The effect of UWT transferring its
proceeds from London to the United States was insufficient for invoking the
commercial exception. To rule otherwise would be to interpret the commercial
exception in such a way as to grant district courts jurisdiction over any suit
arising out of an overseas transaction in which an American claims losses that
resulted from the acts of foreign states.52
C. Analysis
In United World Trade, the Tenth Circuit sought to impose parameters on
foreign governments' amenability to suit in American courts. In upholding the
defendants' claim of sovereign immunity, the Tenth Circuit followed other
circuits' interpretation of the scope of the commercial exception.53 American
companies should take notice. A corporation cannot satisfy the direct effects
requirement for jurisdiction against a foreign state simply by showing it is
incorporated under U.S. law and has its principal place of business within the
United States. Furthermore, those companies functioning as middlemen for
international transactions with no contractual performance obligations in the
U.S. should be particularly cautious. Under United World Trade, requiring
payment in American dollars and transferring those funds to the U.S. after
their initial deposit in a foreign bank will not allow a plaintiff to defeat the
presumption of immunity granted to foreign states. Such acts simply do not
rise to the level of direct effects.
This is a fair and reasonable decision. If a sophisticated business chooses
to deal outside of the United States in search of new business opportunities, it
should be prepared to bear the risks of operating within different legal re-
gimes. United World Trade went to Kazakhstan searching for new opportuni-
ties. Such opportunities do not come without risks. United World Trade could
50. Id. at 1238-39.
51. Id. at 1239.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(upholding sovereign immunity because of the absence of direct effects in the United States), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 728 (1995); Antares Aircraft, Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33,
36 (2d. Cir. 1993) (finding no direct effects when there is "no connection with the United States
other than the citizenship or place of incorporation of the plaintiff'), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878
(1994); Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1527 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that "mere financial
loss suffered by a plaintiff in the United States as a result of the action abroad of a foreign state"
is an insufficient basis by itself for subject matter jurisdiction against a foreign state), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 891 (1989); Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(finding no direct effects in the United States from financial hardships incidental to a contract
formed in Saudi Arabia).
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not expect the benefits of recourse in United States courts after it chose to do
business elsewhere. To hold otherwise would allow corporations the benefits
of overseas ventures, while insulating them from the consequences of such
ventures. American courts are not a residual insurance policy for American
corporations seeking overseas opportunities. Such corporations should not look
to American courts to minimize their risks when they have made deliberate
choices to do business elsewhere. 4
United World Trade exemplifies a situation in which a plaintiff may not
sue a foreign sovereign under the commercial exception. What United World
Trade does not demonstrate, however, is what type of contract with a foreign
state would satisfy the minimum threshold required to meet the direct effect
clause. Apparently, without some product or service crossing a U.S. border, or
at least one party utilizing a U.S. bank, there is no direct effect within the
United States for purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The
peculiar irony is that foreign parties with sufficient savvy to contract with
foreign states for payment or partial performance within U.S. territory will
likely obtain recourse from U.S. courts in cases of breach. On the other hand,
American companies that contract with foreign states outside of U.S. territory
and transfer the proceeds home, will have no recourse from the U.S. judicial
system.55
II. THE FSLIC, FIRREA & THE DENIAL OF THE SOVEREIGN ACTS DEFENSE
A. Brief History of the Modern Thrift Industry
With its 1,700 failed thrift organizations, the Great Depression prompted
the congressional reform that provided the structure of the nation's savings
and loan industry for roughly fifty years.56 To regulate the thrift industry and
provide a deposit insurance fund, Congress created the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board ("Bank Board") and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC).57 These agencies were responsible for promulgating
regulations governing all federal savings and loan associations, including those
setting minimum capital requirements.
The 1980s, however, proved to be a devastating decade for the nation's
savings and loan industry. High interest rates and deregulation were a fatal
54. See Tubular Inspectors, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 977 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1992)
(granting sovereign immunity and noting that doing so prevents a company from "jurisdictionally
having its cake and eating it").
55. Compare the result in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992)
(denying immunity to Argentine government when sued by two Panamanian corporations and a
Swiss bank in U.S. federal court) with that in United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil
Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.2d 1232 (1994) (granting immunity to Kazakhstan government when sued by an
American corporation in U.S. federal court), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 904 (1995).
56. H.R. REP. No. 54(1), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
86, 88.
57. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797, 800 (D.C. Cir.), vacated and withdrawn,
(August 18, 1993); see also Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725
(1932); Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (1933); National Hous-
ing Act, tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934).
58. Winstar, 994 F.2d at 800-01.
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combination for many thrifts.59 As an incentive to induce profitable financial
institutions to acquire the failing thrifts, the Bank Board and FSLIC allowed
them to deviate from generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in
order to satisfy capital requirements.' The Bank Board thereby encouraged
acquisitions that would have otherwise failed due to regulatory capital require-
ments. The Bank Board's purpose was to prevent the closure of all the insol-
vent thrifts that the FSLIC's resources could not cover.6' The use of super-
visory goodwill and regulatory accounting practice (RAP) goodwill comprised
two of the major deviations from GAAP.6'
This practice continued until Congress enacted the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).63 The "precari-
ous financial condition" of the thrift industry, the "waning" consumer confi-
dence in it, and the "bankruptcy of FSLIC" necessitated the legislation.'M
FIRREA abolished both the FSLIC and the Bank Board.65 The FSLIC's in-
surance function was assigned to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and the Bank Board's regulatory function was transferred to the new-
ly created Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). 6 Additionally, the previous
accounting standards allowed by the Bank Board were denounced as "regula-
tory and statutory accounting gimmicks."'67
FIRREA phased out the use of supervisory goodwill and stiffened capital
requirements. It required OTS to implement "uniformly applicable capital
standards for savings associations," including a leverage limit that maintained
core capital at not less than three percent of the savings association's total
assets, a tangible capital requirement of not less than 1.5 percent of total as-
sets, and a risk-based capital requirement.'
Consequently, FIRREA's stricter capital requirements thrust some of the
thrifts acquired by private investors prior to its enactment into noncompliance
with the new federal regulations. Litigation arose across the country as the
OTS informed reorganized thrifts and their investors that they were now insol-
vent. Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Albuquerque was one
such thrift caught in FIRREA's web after signing a deal with the FSLIC.'
59. H.R. REP. No. 54(l), supra note 56, at 294, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 90.
60. Winstar, 994 F.2d at 801-02.
61. Id. at 801.
62. Id. at 801-802. Supervisory goodwill allows any excess in an acquisition's cost beyond
the fair market value of the acquired assets to be separately recorded as goodwill: capital deficits
are thus treated as an asset. RAP goodwill resulted when the FSLIC provided cash aid to the
acquiror. Rather than treating the cash amount as an asset which would have increased net worth
and decreased the amount of goodwill, the cash assistance was recorded as a credit to the net
worth without reducing the goodwill. Hence, the monetary contribution was counted twice: once
as tangible capital and once as RAP goodwill capital. Id. at 802.
63. Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA].
64. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), supra note 56, at 302, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 98. As of
December 31, 1988, the FSLIC was $56 billion in the red, $37 billion of which stemmed from
1988 alone. Id. at 100.
65. See FIRREA, supra note 63.
66. Winstar, 994 F.2d at 804.
67. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), supra note 56, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 94.
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(1)(A), (t)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 1993).
69. Security Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 796 F. Supp. 1435, 1437 (D.N.M. 1991),
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B. Tenth Circuit Decision: RTC v. FSLIC
70
After the failing Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Albu-
querque (Old Security) fell under federal regulatory control, FSLIC determined
that it would be more cost-effective to solicit new capital sources rather than
to liquidate Old Security.7" Plaintiffs, First Southwest Financial Services,
Clarence Ashcraft, and Allen White (the Investors), invested in and formed
Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Albuquerque (New Securi-
ty) in 1985 by merging with Old Security. Although the Investors contributed
$6 million in cash to New Security, the amount was insufficient to bring the
merged institutions into solvency. As part of an Assistance Agreement with
the Investors, FSLIC agreed to include a $7 million debenture as regulatory
capital and $12 million as supervisory goodwill to be amortized over a period
of thirty-five years.72 New Security then proceeded to operate profitably un-
der the terms of the Assistance Agreement.
After the passage of FIRREA, however, OTS notified Security Federal of
its tangible insolvency and imposed lending restrictions on it. The Investors
tendered ownership of Security Federal via letter back to the OTS and request-
ed restitution which OTS refused.73 Plaintiffs then filed suit claiming, among
other things, breach of contract and frustration of purpose.74 OTS placed Se-
curity Federal into receivership with the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
shortly thereafter.75
The district court held that there were no genuine issues of material fact
regarding the documents and events of the case. 6 Within the three documents
forming the contract 77 between the Investors and the defendants, the court
found that "treatment of goodwill as regulatory capital [was] an express term
of the overall contractual agreement. '78 It held that the defendants had also
explicitly waived the application of contrary regulation disallowing the use of
goodwill as regulatory capital by not expressly or implicitly reserving any
statutory rights to do SO° 71 The court noted that the treatment of goodwill was
fundamental to the contract, since "the merger would have made no sense
without this special treatment of goodwill, as the new institution would have
been insolvent at its inception and no rational investor would have participated
under those conditions."80
affd sub nom. RTC v. FSLIC, 25 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1994).
70. 25 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1994).
71. Security Federal, 796 F. Supp. at 1437.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1438.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1438. FIRREA established Resolution Trust Corporation as the successor to FSLIC
as conservator or receiver to manage and resolve cases involving thrifts insured by FSLIC prior to
enactment of FIRREA. FIRREA, supra note 64, at 369-70.
76. Security Federal, 796 F. Supp. at 1442.
77. Three writings, the Assistance Agreement, the Resolution, and the Letter, formed the
contract between the Investors and the defendants. See id. at 1443-44.
78. Id. at 1444.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1445.
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As a last resort, the defendants attempted to bar any liability by invoking
the sovereign acts doctrine. The district court found that the doctrine's purpose
was to ensure that the government, when acting as a contractor, was treated as
any private contractor would be regarding contractual liability. Indeed, its
goal was not simply to immunize the government whenever it legislates for
the general welfare.8 The court held that the sovereign acts doctrine did not
bar the Investors' breach of contract claim, because the FSLIC specifically
promised the Investors the use of goodwill as regulatory capital for a 35-year
period, and, thereby, waived the application of contrary regulations. 2 The
district court found the defendants in breach of the contract and held them
liable just as it would any private contractor.83 The Investors were therefore
awarded rescission and restitution on their motion for summary judgment.84
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on appeal.85 The
court recognized that supervisory and regulatory goodwill played "crucial"
roles in the acquisition of Old Security, and that without them, New Security's
capitalization would have been $6.5 million short of the regulatory compliance
amount. 6 The defendants asserted that the Assistance Agreement, exclusive
of the Resolution and the Letter, formed the contract and did not concern su-
pervisory goodwill. 7 The court disagreed with the defendants' interpretation
of the contract. It found that the Assistance Agreement relied upon both the
Resolution and the Letter due to the three writings' contemporaneous issuance
for the purpose of acquisition and the explicit cross-references to the other
writings contained within each of them.8 Furthermore, the contractual lan-
guage clearly stated that the supervisory goodwill was to apply to continuing
regulations and not just the acquisition.89 The Tenth Circuit held that the lan-
guage of the contract was completely unambiguous: the government could
have easily restricted the supervisory goodwill to the transaction had it so
desired.'
The defendants also asserted that OTS's enforcement of FIRREA's capital
regulations could not constitute breach of contract due to the sovereign acts
doctrine.9 The court explained the doctrine as follows:
81. Id. at 1446. For further explanation regarding the doctrine's origins, evolution, and ap-
plication, see Ronald G. Morgan, Identifying Protected Government Acts Under the Sovereign Acts
Doctrine: A Question of Acts and Actors, 22 PUB. CONT. L.J. 223 (1993).
82. Security Federal, 796 F. Supp. at 1447.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. RTC v. FSLIC, 25 F.3d 1493, 1497 (10th Cir. 1994).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1499.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1500. The Resolution stated, "for purposes of reporting to the Bank Board or the
FSLIC, the value of any intangible assets on the books of New Security resulting from accounting
for the Merger in accordance with the purchase method may be amortized by New Security over a
period not to exceed 35 years .... I "d. The Letter also stated that "for purposes of reporting the
value of any intangible assets resulting from accounting for the acquisition in accordance with the
purchase method, may be amortized by Security of Albuquerque over a period not to exceed 35
years .... "Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1501.
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The sovereign acts doctrine operates to insulate the government
from liability for certain inabilities to perform contractual obligations.
More specifically, when the government enacts legislation of general
applicability for the benefit of the general welfare and such legislation
inadvertently affects the government's performance of a contract to
which it is a party, the government cannot be held liable for damages
resulting from its failure to perform any more than it would if it were
an individual private party.
The bounds of the immunity afforded the government by the
sovereign acts doctrine, however, are not limitless. The limits of this
immunity are defined by the extent to which the government's failure
to perform is the result of legislation targeting a class of contracts to
which it is a party. If Congress enacts legislation targeted to abro-
gate preexisting contract obligations the government owes to private
citizens, the government may be properly sued for breach.92
In the case of congressional legislation involving agencies, discretion
becomes the crucial element. If Congress provides an agency with discretion
in the enforcement of a mandate because it is aware that an abrupt change in
law would abrogate prior agreements, the agency may be held in breach of
any agreement that the agency could have honored by exercising such discre-
tion.93 The court found that FIRREA's structure reflected Congress's aware-
ness of, and desire to mitigate, the paralyzing effects that the heightened capi-
tal requirements would have on mergers.94 FIRREA provided OTS with the
ability to allow for both the limited use of supervisory goodwill and the ex-
emption of thrifts from the revised capital standards.95 Because the Director
of the OTS had the discretion to allow for continued use of regulatory ac-
counting measures but opted instead to ignore the contract's goodwill terms,
the court found OTS to be in breach of contract.%
Furthermore, because no rational investor would have entered into the
contract without the special accounting arrangements, the court agreed that
they constituted material terms of the contract.97 "[W]ithout supervisory and
regulatory goodwill, New Security would have debuted as an insolvent institu-
tion."'98 The court held, therefore, that OTS's actions constituted breach of a
material term of the contract and discharged the plaintiffs from further perfor-
mance. 9 In addition to the breach of contract, the Tenth Circuit also found
frustration of purpose. It held that the application of FIRREA's capital require-
ments made it impossible for the Investors to fulfill their contractual obligation
92. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
93. Id.





99. Id. at 1503.
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to operate the thrift in compliance with regulations." ° This completely frus-
trated the investors' purpose and warranted discharge of their agreement to ac-
quire the thrift."'
Finally, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling granting the
Investors $6 million and postjudgment interest as restitution.'0 2 The purpose
of rescission and restitution is to restore the plaintiff to the position he or she
enjoyed before entering into the contract by requiring the defendant to return
the value of plaintiff's consideration." 3 The measure of restitution falls with-
in the discretion of the trial court and depends on the circumstances of the
case." 4 Because the court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court, the
amount of the award was upheld.
C. Analysis
The court's opinion is a refreshing dose of common sense. OTS must
wish that it would have exhibited just that when it considered how to handle
the application of FIRREA to Security Federal. Congress passed FIRREA in
an effort to lead the way out of the thrift industry fiasco of the last decade. Its
intent was to restructure the system in order to remedy the volatile situation
and limit losses. If anything, OTS's actions in RTC v. FSLIC would have
exacerbated the situation. The FSLIC elected to find capital investors for a
failing thrift because it was a cheaper solution than liquidation. After passage
of FIRREA, OTS attempted to renege on its end of the deal by denying the
special accounting promised to the investors. This would have returned New
Security to the insolvent state it was in 1985 and bilked the Investors of their
$6 million.
What Congress surely did not intend by enacting FIRREA was to abandon
any and all contracts that the FSLIC entered into with investors and declare
profitable, restructured thrifts insolvent. The Tenth Circuit recognized the folly
in this. To rule otherwise would establish a dangerous precedent of allowing
the government to breach its express obligations every time it changed its
mind. Because the Tenth Circuit wanted to send such a broad message, it
ruled that the government's breach was grounds for awarding rescission and
restitution. The court could have avoided the issue of breach, sidestepped the
government's sovereign acts defense, and still awarded the restitution sought
by the investors by rescinding the agreement on the grounds of frustration of
purpose. Instead, it chose to meet the government's sovereign acts defense
head-on, and effectively sent a broader message to federal agencies generally
to keep their promises whenever they have the discretion to do so. Perhaps in
the future OTS will pay more attention to the discretion granted to it and heed
the old adage: "if it ain't broke, don't fix it".
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1504-1507.
103. Id. at 1504 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 370 (1981)).





The 1994 survey period presented two unusual contract cases that required
the Tenth Circuit to apply federal law rather than state law via the Erie doc-
trine. Both of the scenarios presented by these cases are ripe for repeat occur-
rence in the future. International commerce will only expand as more players
opt to enter the global market, and thrift investors will continue to fight the
application of FIRREA's capital requirements. In United World Trade, the
Tenth Circuit realized the limits to its own power. The foreign state's connec-
tions to the U.S. were insufficient for asserting jurisdiction under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. In RTC v. FSLIC, however, the Tenth Circuit real-
ized the limits of the OTS's power and accordingly forced it to act as a pri-
vate player would under the law.
Lisa Zeiler Joiner"





During the 1994 term, the Tenth Circuit frequently addressed the Fourth
Amendment implications of the stop and detention of suspects and their
luggage by law enforcement officers. In United States v. Little,' the court
clarified the legal standard for evaluating whether police-citizen encounters
aboard public transportation constitute a seizure of the citizen. The Tenth
Circuit held that the proper Constitutional test, as set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Florida v. Bostick2 , must consider the "totality of the
circumstances," not merely the location of the encounter.' In doing so, the
Tenth Circuit overruled any contrary opinions that would lead lower courts to
apply a per se rule classifying police-citizen encounters aboard public trans-
portation as seizures.' The court addressed additional personal detention ques-
tions pertaining to border patrol operations in United States v. Lopez-
Martinez,' and the proper scope of a detention in United States v.
Fernandez.6
In a related trend, the Tenth Circuit confronted the issue of force or show
of force in conducting a "Terry stop"7 of a suspect in United States v.
Melendez-Garcia' The court recognized that force may be required as a pre-
caution in conducting a Terry stop of a dangerous suspect. However, it empha-
sized that the government must demonstrate that the facts available to the
officer conducting the stop would warrant an officer of reasonable caution to
believe that the use of force was appropriate under the circumstances.9 Failing
this justification, the use of force transforms a Terry stop into a full custodial
arrest requiring probable cause.'0
In United States v. Moore," the Tenth Circuit addressed the seizure and
detention of a suspect's luggage. The court held that two factors articulated by
the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officers established reasonable suspicion
justifying the detention of the defendant's bag:' 2 1) the suspects paid extra to
purchase their tickets at the last minute; and 2) they lied about their place of
embarkation."
1. 18 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994).
2. 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
3. Little, 18 F.3d at 1503-04.
4. Id. at 1504.
5. 25 F.3d 1481 (10th Cir. 1994).
6. 18 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1994).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 15-18.
8. 28 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1994).
9. Id. at 1052.
10. Id. at 1053.
11. 22 F.3d 241 (10th Cir. 1994).
12. Id. at 243-44.
13. Id.
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I. SEIZURE OF INDIVIDUALS
A. Background
1. Terry Stops and Reasonable Suspicion
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures not supported by probable cause. 4 In
Terry v. Ohio,5 the U.S. Supreme Court established the constitutionality of
investigatory detentions by classifying such stops as narrow exceptions to the
probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Terry Court held
that an officer may stop an individual reasonably suspected of criminal activi-
ty, question him briefly, and perform a limited external pat-down frisk for
weapons. 6 The Court determined that short, investigatory detentions resulted
in less of a personal invasion than an arrest, 7 and that they serve an impor-
tant governmental interest that outweighs their minimal intrusion.'"
Terry stops may be conducted only if the detaining officer has a reason-
able and articulable suspicion that a crime is about to be committed. 9 In or-
der to prove reasonable suspicion, the government must point to specific and
articulable facts, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, that
reasonably suggest that criminal activity has occurred or is imminent." Usu-
ally, the basis for reasonable suspicion stems from an officer's personal obser-
vations or the collective knowledge of several law enforcement personnel.2'
Normally, courts afford considerable deference in this area to experienced
officers who often infer criminal activity from conduct that appears innocuous
to a lay observer.22 The Supreme Court has held that when considered
through the eyes of a trained and experienced officer, several seemingly inno-
cent activities may add up to reasonable suspicion.23
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,24 the Supreme Court applied the
standard of reasonable suspicion to border patrol operations. Reflecting the
underlying principles of Terry, the Court found that the government's impor-
14. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
16. Id. at 27.
17. Id. at 26.
18. Id. at 26-27.
19. Id. at 21-22.
20. Id. at 21.
21. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 232-35 (1985); Evelyn M. Aswad et
al., Project: Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court
and Courts of Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEO. L.J. 622, 624-25 n. 112 (1994).
22. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418-22 (1981); Aswad, supra note 21, at 625-
26 nn.113-14.
23. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
24. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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tant interest in protecting and maintaining its borders, along with the absence
of practical alternatives for policing its borders, outweighed the minimal intru-
sion of a brief stop. 5 The Court established a non-exhaustive, multi-factor
test26 as a guide for courts evaluating the reasonableness of a border patrol
stop. 7 The experience of border patrol officers, in light of the unique charac-
teristics of their mission, is given noticeable deference when weighing the test
factors."
2. Reasonableness of Terry Stops
A valid investigatory detention must be reasonable in scope, conducted for
a legitimate investigatory purpose, and reasonably related to the circumstances
that initially justified the detention.29 This standard applies to brief stops to
ask questions and ascertain the identity of a person, as well as stopping a
vehicle and ordering the exit of its occupants.3 ° To ensure personal safety, an
officer initiating a Terry stop may conduct an external pat-down frisk of the
detainee to locate weapons.3 However, when an officer's actions in a Terry
stop exceed those necessary for a minimally-intrusive investigatory detention,
the seizure of an individual becomes an arrest, which must be supported by
probable cause.32
Police can take further precautionary measures beyond a frisk to ensure
their safety, provided that such measures are reasonably necessary under the
circumstances.33 If an officer's actions exceed what is necessary under the
totality of the circumstances, the stop may only be justified by probable cause
or consent.3 4 Although the Supreme Court has readily allowed minimal intru-
sions on a person's liberty, such as frisks or the request to exit a vehicle,35 it
has also recognized that the use or threat of force, such as handcuffs and
firearms, results in a heightened level of intrusion, thereby requiring a more
25. Id. at 881.
26. The Court listed several factors that officers may consider: 1) characteristics of the area
in which the vehicle is encountered; 2) proximity of the area to the border; 3) "usual patterns of
traffic on the particular road"; 4) the agent's "previous experience with alien traffic"; 5) "informa-
tion about recent illegal crossings in the area"; 6) driver's behavior, including any obvious at-
tempts at evasion; 7) vehicle characteristics, such as cargo space; and 8) appearance that vehicle is
heavily loaded. Id. at 884-85.
27. The test has been applied, for example, in United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d
1481, 1483-84 (10th Cir. 1994) and in United States v. Monsisvais, 907 F.2d 987, 990 (10th Cir.
1990).
28. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d at 1483-84; Monsisvais, 907 F.2d at 990.
29. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
30. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 146 (1972); Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7, 22-23.
31. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-26.
32. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1983).
33. "Since police officers should not be required to take unnecessary risks in performing
their duties, they are 'authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their
personal safety and maintain the status quo during the course of [a Terry) stop."' United States v.
Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235
(1985) (alteration in original)).
34. Id.
35. Pennsylvania v. Minms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977); Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
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careful evaluation of its justification.36 The government must demonstrate that
the facts available to an officer using force would warrant a person of reason-
able caution to believe that such action was appropriate under the circum-
stances.37
3. Determining Seizure of an Individual
In recent years, the Supreme Court has frequently tried to determine when
seizure of an individual occurs incident to a Terry stop. The Terry Court itself
maintained that not all police-citizen encounters result in a seizure of the citi-
zen.3 ' A seizure only occurs when an officer restrains an individual's liberty
by show of authority or physical force.39
In cases following Terry, the Court clarified that a seizure requiring
Fourth Amendment analysis does not occur unless a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave.' In making this determination,
the Court stated that the totality of the circumstances should be considered."
A seizure occurs when a person's belief that his freedom is restricted
results from direct police action and cannot be attributed to other causes.42
The conduct of the police must be intimidating or coercive enough to convince
a reasonable person that he could not disregard the police and go about his
business.43
The Court tightened its seizure determination criteria in California v.
Hodari D." The Court held that Hodari, while being chased by a police offi-
cer, was not seized until the officer tackled him.45 Rejecting Hodari's argu-
ment that a reasonable person being chased by a police officer would not feel
free to leave, the Court maintained that although a reasonable feeling of
36. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
37. Id. See also Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1463 (use of firearms justified because officers had infor-
mation suspects may be armed); United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1563 (10th Cir. 1993) (of-
ficer acted unreasonably when she drew firearm and handcuffed defendant after noticing defendant
lawfully had firearm in his car); United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 1993)
(use of firearms and handcuffs warranted when police were informed suspect had threatened to kill
someone and displayed violent behavior when stopped); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263,
1273-74 (10th Cir. 1982) (police acted reasonably in pointing weapons at a suspected murderer
whom they believed to be heavily armed).
38. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
39. Id.
40. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218-19 (1984) (stationing INS agents at exits raised
possibility of questioning on attempt to exit, but did not amount to seizure); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (asking drug suspect in airport to accompany federal agents
for questioning was not a seizure).
41. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (facts that agents did not exhibit weapons, merely re-
quested cooperation, and encounter took place in a public area, supported finding of no seizure).
42. See, e.g., Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218-19 (employees were restricted not by police, but by
voluntary employment obligations).
43. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (holding that a defendant who ran
from a cruising marked police car and discarded evidence while the police car followed him at a
normal speed was not seized). The Court found that the police actions did not communicate "to
the reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon the [defendant's) freedom
of movement." Id. at 575.
44. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
45. Id. at 629.
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restricted freedom is a prerequisite of a seizure, it does not, without more, de-
fine a seizure.' A seizure requires either compliance with a show of
authority or actual physical restraint.'
The Supreme Court addressed police-citizen encounters aboard public
transportation in Florida v. Bostick.' Bostick was aboard a bus during a
scheduled layover when he was approached by officers who asked to search
his luggage.4 9 Bostick reluctantly complied and the officers discovered that
the luggage contained cocaine.5" The Supreme Court rejected the state su-
preme court's finding that a reasonable person would not have felt free to
leave, and that a police-citizen encounter aboard a bus constituted a seizure
per se.5 The Court reasoned that Bostick's restricted mobility resulted from
his voluntary decision to travel by bus, rather than from any direct police
action.52 In situations where a restriction of mobility does not result from
police conduct, the applicable seizure test is whether a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.53 Echoing prior cases, the Court maintained that the totality of the
circumstances must be considered in applying this modified test.54
B. Stops Aboard Public Transportation: United States v. Little
1. Facts
After noticing a large blue suitcase in the public baggage area of a train
and detecting a suspicious chemical odor, a DEA agent approached the sus-
pected owner (Little) in a roomette aboard the train.5 Noticing that Little had
paid cash for her one-way ticket, the agent asked her if she possessed
drugs.56 Following Little's denial, the agent asked for her consent to a search
a blue nylon bag in the roomette." The agent advised Little that she was not
under arrest and did not have to consent, so she refused.5" After Little admit-
ted that the large blue suitcase belonged to her, the agent asked to search the
suitcase and again informed her that she did not have to consent. 9 Little
replied that she did not own the suitcase and did not know of its contents.'
The agent subjected the suitcase to a canine sniff.6 When the dog alerted the
46. Id. at 628.
47. Id. at 626.
48. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
49. Id. at 431.
50. Id. at 432.
51. Id. at 435-36.
52. The Court found that any confinement was "the natural result of [Bostick's] decision to
take the bus." Id. at 436.
53. id. at 439. The Court found this test appropriate because a refusal to cooperate, without
additional suspicious factors, does not justify lawful detention by the police. Id. at 437.
54. Id. at 439-40.
55. United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1501 (10th Cir. 1994).
56. Id. at 1501-02.
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agent to the presence of drugs in the suitcase, the agent arrested Little and
searched both bags after obtaining warrants.' The search yielded a total of
thirty kilograms of cocaine.63
Little was indicted for possession with intent to distribute more than five
kilograms of cocaine.' She pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress the
evidence on the grounds that it was obtained from her luggage through an
illegal seizure without a warrant and search without probable cause. The
district court granted the motion, reasoning that a person has a higher expecta-
tion of privacy in a small room aboard a train.'
The district court also concluded that the agent's detection of a chemical
odor was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that Little's luggage
contained illegal drugs; therefore detaining the luggage for the purpose of a
canine sniff was unjustified.6' The government appealed, arguing that the en-
counter between the agent and Little was consensual, and that the agent had
reasonable suspicion to detain the luggage.'
2. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district court and
remanded the case.' Citing Florida v. Bostick's "totality of the
circumstances" test, the court held that the district court employed the wrong
legal standard.70 Just as the Supreme Court rejected the application of a per
se rule that any police-citizen encounter aboard a bus constituted a seizure, the
Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the location of the encounter was
determinative as to seizure.7 The court conceded that application of the total-
ity of the circumstances test was "necessarily imprecise," but maintained that
the focus of the test--"'the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a
whole,' on a reasonable person"-would be "defeated by rules which give
determinative weight to the location of a police-citizen encounter. '7
The Tenth Circuit went even further regarding the expectation of privacy
issue. Holding that train roomettes do not confer an expectation of privacy to





66. Id. The trial court explained that the private, confined space of the roomette produced a
situation where Little felt that she was not permitted to decline answering questions. Id. The court
also believed that the pointed, incriminating questions and the agent's failure to advise Little that
she was free to terminate the encounter at-will, contributed to the coercive nature of the encounter.
Id.
67. Id. at 1503.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1506.
70. Id. at 1503-04. Because the case was remanded, the court did not decide whether the
agent had reasonable suspicion to detain the luggage and subject it to a canine sniff. Id. at 1506. It
did find, however, that the agent's detection of an unidentified chemical odor did not amount to a
reasonable suspicion prior to his encounter with Little. Id.
71. Id. at 1504.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1504-05 (quoting United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 853 (4th Cir. 1988),
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ruled any contrary statements in previous cases, particularly United States v.
Dimick.
74
The court criticized the district court's emphasis on the agent's failure to
advise Little of her right to refuse to answer questions, noting that there is no
per se rule requiring such an advisement.75 Rejecting the district court's
reliance on the fact that the agent asked very pointed and incriminating ques-
tions, the court found no support that such conduct was relevant to the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the encounter. 6
3. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Judge Kelly concurred with the majority's opinion, except the portion
overruling his statement in Dimick that private rooms "on passenger trains can
be comparable to hotel rooms where an occupant enjoys a heightened expecta-
tion of privacy." 7 While Judge Kelly agreed that location is not determina-
tive of a seizure, he believed it inappropriate to categorically reject the notion
that a person cannot expect a comparable level of privacy in a train compart-
ment as in a hotel or motel room.7 ' According to Judge Kelly, the majority
erred in its decision to reject the issue of privacy without considering its
implications on other aspects of Fourth Amendment protection.79
In a detailed dissent, Judge Logan, joined by Chief Judge Seymour and
Judge McKay, maintained that the district court did not apply a per se test
with regard to location, nor did it apply an erroneous test in determining that
the encounter between the agent and Little constituted a non-consensual
seizure."0 He believed that the district court simply applied a balancing test,
in which it weighed as coercive the failure of the agent to advise Little that
she could refuse to answer questions, the confines of a the small, private
roomette with only one exit, and the agent's persistent, accusatory question-
ing."' Because he believed that Bostick represented the extreme limit of con-
stitutional behavior, Judge Logan believed that the district court permissibly
found the additional factors coercive enough to tip the balance toward non-
consensual seizure. 2
Judge Logan agreed that Bostick was the guiding decision in Little, but he
cautioned that Bostick should be read narrowly. 3 He pointed out that the
Supreme Court did not decide that a seizure had not occurred under the facts
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983 (1988)).
74. Id. at 1504. In Dimick, 990 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit held that
private sleeper cars on passenger trains are comparable to hotel rooms, thereby enjoying a height-
ened expectation of privacy and requiring probable cause for intrusive police searches.
75. Little, 18 F.3d at 1505.
76. Id. at 1505-06.
77. Id. at 1506 (Kelly, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra note 74.
78. Little, 18 F.3d at 1507.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1513-14 (Logan, J., dissenting).
81. 'Id. at 1514.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1508-09.
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of Bostick.84 Rather, the Court merely required the state court to apply a to-
tality of the circumstances evaluation instead of a per se rule.85 Judge Logan
asserted that a broad reading of Bostick led lower courts to balance conduct
that looked more like coercion against conduct that could be considered non-
intimidating.86 To him, any conduct that is no more coercive than that in
Bostick is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
4. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Little is noteworthy for two reasons. First,
it broadly interpreted Bostick as holding that non-forceful police-citizen con-
frontations aboard confined public transportation are not seizures solely by
virtue of their location." In order to become seizures, law enforcement per-
sonnel in these situations must exhibit a much more intimidating, forceful, and
custodial posture to invoke a situation where the individual feels compelled to
cooperate.
A serious problem with Bostick's premise, as applied in Little, lies with
the court's perception of how a reasonable person views encounters with
police." The court gave too much credit to the average person's knowledge
of her rights in these situations and her ability to feel secure enough to disre-
gard law enforcement officers.89 In reality, few people are fully aware of
their Fourth Amendment rights, most are fearful of the police, and the police
know how to exploit this to their advantage.' It has also been shown that a
person's refusal to cooperate often increases police suspicion and intensifies
their investigations.91 In light of these observations, it is difficult to under-
stand how a reasonable person in Little's situation could know that she was
free to ignore the agent without fear of further harassment.
The Tenth Circuit has fallen in line with other circuits, but has notably
modified prior opinions, such as United States v. Ward"z and United States v.
Bloom.93 In those cases, decided after Bostick, the Tenth- Circuit gave
significant weight to location in evaluating police-citizen encounters aboard
84. Id. at 1508.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1508-09.
87. Id. at 1504; see also United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1497 (10th Cir. 1994); Unit-
ed States v. Girolamo, 23 F.3d 320, 326 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying Little), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
640 (1994).
88. Michael J. Reed, Jr., Comment, Florida v. Bostick: The Fourth Amendment Takes a Back
Seat to the Drug War, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv. 825, 846 (1993).
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amend-
ment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1301 (1990)).
91. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. 961 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir. 1992).
93. 975 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992). In United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947 (3d Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995), the Third Circuit specifically cited the Tenth Circuit's depar-
ture from Ward and Bloom, both of which Kim relied upon as controlling in his case regarding an
encounter with police on-board a train. Id. at 951 n.1. The court pointed to the Little decision in
holding that the fact that Kim's encounter took place in a train roomette was but one factor in
considering the totality of the circumstances, and was not determinative as to whether a seizure
had occurred. Id. at 952.
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trains, finding that each encounter resulted in a seizure of the individual with-
out reasonable suspicion. 94
As pointed out in both dissents, the Tenth Circuit has categorically
refused to extend the same expectation and protection of privacy to rooms
aboard trains that it extends to hotel/motel rooms. 95 By overruling previous
holdings and dicta recognizing a heightened expectation of privacy in private
train compartments, the Tenth Circuit has reduced the degree of police justifi-
cation required for future intrusions into such compartments. The standard of
justification that the court will employ regarding searches and arrests remains
unclear. As Judge Kelly pointed out, it seems wholly inappropriate to reject
out of hand a heightened expectation of privacy in train compartments merely
to emphasize that location is not determinative in evaluating police-citizen en-
counters. The refusal of the court to recognize a heightened expectation of
privacy aboard train roomettes illustrates the diminished significance of loca-
tion as a factor in the totality-of-circumstances test, a factor which held notice-
able significance for the Tenth Circuit only two years ago.
C. Border Patrol Stops: United States v. Lopez-Martinez
1. Facts
A U.S. Border Patrol agent observed a van and sedan travelling in tandem
on the highway.96 The agent noticed four Hispanic passengers in the sedan,
but could not see well inside the van.9 7 The agent became more suspicious
when he noted that both vehicles were driving twenty-five miles an hour be-
low the speed limit.9" The agent also saw an individual peer out the rear win-
dow of the van and then disappear from view.' A check of the van's license
plates revealed "nothing extraordinary."'" Nevertheless, the agent stopped
the van, driven by Roberto Lopez-Martinez, and verified the driver's U.S.
citizenship."' Upon searching the van, the agent promptly discovered four
undocumented aliens.1
0 2
Charged with transporting illegal aliens and aiding and abetting, Lopez-
Martinez filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered at the stop.0 3 He
94. "The setting of the encounter... inside and within the immediate vicinity of a small
private roomette on a train, although not dispositive by itself, supports a determination that a
reasonable person ... would have felt unable to decline the officers' requests or terminate the
encounter." Ward, 961 F.2d at 1531. "In Ward, the location of the encounter in the confines of a
small private train compartment weighed heavily in our analysis." Bloom, 975 F.2d at 1453.
95. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
96. United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 1481, 1482 (10th Cir. 1994). This particular
stretch of highway is frequently used to circumvent an important U.S.-Mexico border checkpoint.
Id.
97. Id. at 1482, 1486-87.
98. Id. at 1482.
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contended that the agent did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the van."°




On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding
that the agent had made a reasonable inference of suspicion in light of the
circumstances and his observations." The court relied on the Brignoni-
Ponce test to evaluate the factors that determine reasonable suspicion. 7 In
examining the totality of the circumstances, the Tenth Circuit noted that a
border patrol agent is "entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience in
detecting illegal entry and smuggling,"'" and that an officer's articulable
facts when viewed individually, "will often comport with general notions of
innocent travel."'" Taken together, however, these facts can amount to
reasonable suspicion in the eyes of a trained and experienced officer."0
Accordingly, in evaluating the facts with respect to each of the Brignoni-
Ponce factors, the court determined that the agent's observations established
that a reasonable officer would suspect that the van driven by Lopez-Martinez
contained illegal aliens."'
3. Dissent
In his dissent, Judge McKay criticized the majority for its imprecise anal-
ysis of the justification for a Terry stop. "When the layers of gloss are
removed and the facts are analyzed accordingly, it is clear to me that [the
agent] acted on a mere hunch rather than on such articulable facts sufficient to
vest him with objective, reasonable suspicion.""' Judge McKay identified
what he perceived to be three doctrinal errors in the majority opinion. First, he
believed the majority placed undue reliance on the Brignoni-Ponce factors." 3
According to Judge McKay, seemingly suspicious facts, when properly viewed
against the backdrop of the circumstances as a whole, tend to lose significance
unless they are given the status of a factor in a test."4 Second, he criticized
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1487.
107. Id. at 1483-84. See also supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
108. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d at 1484 (quoting Brignoni-Ponce, 242 U.S. 873 (1975)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1485-87.
112. Id. at 1487 (McKay, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Judge McKay wrote:
When viewed in relation to the totality, arguably suspicious facts can take on more
significance when viewed together with other related facts-thus, the whole can equal
more than the sum of its parts. Other seemingly suspicious facts, however, can lose
significance when properly viewed against the backdrop of the circumstances as a





the majority's failure to perform a "rational inference" test of each factor
before considering it in the context of the holistic picture."' Third, he
believed that the majority excessively deferred to the agent's experience when
that experience could not be a decisive factor in making a rational inference of
suspicion. "6 "[T]o allow [the agent] to make inferences of suspicion froin
the wide-lens totality viewpoint ... comes close to granting [him] powers of
extrasensory perception.""'
4. Analysis
The Lopez-Martinez decision gives border patrol officers great latitude to
stop vehicles reasonably suspected of transporting illegal aliens. In recognizing
the unique mission of border patrol agents, the court deferred to the judgment
of these agents by allowing the piecing together of seemingly innocuous facts
and observations to create an inference of suspected criminal activity.
Although the agent's justification was evaluated by the totality of circum-
stances, the "totality," pointed out by the dissent, was viewed through a very
wide lens."'
If courts were not somewhat deferential to the judgment of border patrol
agents, it would be difficult for agents to justify most highway stops. Vehicles
travelling particular routes, the manner in which they travel, and the race of
the driver and passengers do not immediately conjure impressions of suspi-
cious behavior. Indeed, in situations not involving suspected illegal immigra-
tion, these factors would hardly serve to establish reasonable suspicion. Basing
reasonable suspicion on certain "profiles" has not found favor with courts,
which insist on the articulation of specific facts and how they point to suspi-
cious activity." 9 The Tenth Circuit, realizing the difficulty faced by border
patrol agents in executing their duties without violating the Constitution, al-
lowed the training, experience, and judgment of these agents to be the crucial
link between innocent facts and the formulation of reasonable suspicion.
D. Exceeding the Scope of Detention: United States v. Fernandez
1. Facts
A Utah state trooper pulled over a vehicle driven by Edimiro Fernandez
after observing that it had difficulty staying in its lane, and was in probable
violation of state window-tint standards. 2  The trooper, when asking for
Fernandez's license and registration, noticed the driver's nervousness and felt
115. Id. at 1488.
116. Id. at 1489.
117. Id.
118. id.; see also United States v. Martin, 15 F.3d 943, 951 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[Rjeasonable
suspicion cannot be reduced to a 'neat set of legal rules,' and ... law enforcement officers, like
jurors, are permitted to formulate 'certain common sense conclusions about human behavior....'
(citation omitted)).
119. See, e.g., Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (factors in drug courier profile did not
articulate reasonable suspicion).
120. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 875 (10th Cir. 1994).
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a "tension in the air."' 2 ' After completing an NCIC computer check of the
driver, passenger and vehicle, the trooper radioed for back-up and again
approached the vehicle on the driver's side. 122 Still holding Fernandez's li-
cense and registration, as well as the passenger's identification, the trooper
asked if there were any weapons, drugs, or other contraband in the
vehicle.'23 Fernandez and the passenger replied that there were not.'24 No-
ticing escalated nervousness in the two men, the trooper asked to search the
vehicle.'25 The two men exited the vehicle and Fernandez consented to a
search of the interior, which yielded 123 kilograms of cocaine.'26
Fernandez was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute. 21 The district court denied his motion to suppress the evidence




On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the ruling of the district court and
remanded the case.'29 The court held that Fernandez had been unlawfully
seized when the trooper detained him without reasonable suspicion beyond that
necessary to issue a citation. 30 Citing its previous decision in United States
v. Guzman, 3' the court reiterated the rule that a reasonable detention must
be related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified the stop. 32 Al-
though a police officer may request a license and registration during the
course of a routine traffic stop, he must allow the driver to proceed on his
way without further questioning once the documents have been satisfactorily
produced. 133 Because the trooper retained Fernandez's license and registra-
tion while he continued to question him about weapons or drugs, the court
held that Fernandez unquestionably had been seized.'34 According to the
court, in order for the seizure to be lawful, there had to be "'specific and
articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts [giving] rise to
reasonable suspicion' of additional criminal activity."'35 The court found that
the reasons given by the trooper to justify further detention of
Fernandez-irregular lane travel, nervousness of the men, and the startled
nature of the passenger upon awakening to the trooper's presence-were insuf-
121. Id. The trooper was also struck by how startled the sleeping passenger appeared upon
awakening and finding a trooper near the car. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 875-76.
124. Id. at 876.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 875.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 883.
130. Id. at 880.
131. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988).
132. Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 876-77.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 878.
135. Id. (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990)).
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ficient to establish reasonable suspicion.'36 The court maintained that these
reasons, along with the trooper's testimony regarding his "sixth sense,"
"tension in the air," and his belief that something was "afoot," suggested that




In his dissent, Judge Brown argued that the court did not adequately
consider the totality of the circumstances with deference to the unique view-
point of the law enforcement officer. 3  He thought that the district court
relied upon the appropriate test and properly determined that the series of facts
pointed out by the trooper, when considered together, warranted further
investigation.13 1 Judge Brown noted that the district court found that the
defendant's nervousness went beyond that which most people demonstrate
during a routine traffic stop, and that only a law enforcement officer could
make such an evaluation at the time it occurred."4 By viewing the totality of
the circumstances through the eyes of the trooper with deference to the
trooper's judgment and experience, the district court, in Judge Brown's
opinion, came to a more accurate conclusion about the situation. 4 '
4. Analysis
In Fernandez, the Tenth Circuit made it clear that in traffic stops, any
detention of an individual beyond the scope of the traffic violation requires
objective, reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity. 42 In viewing
the totality of the circumstances offered by the police officer, the court
focused on the rational connection of those circumstances to the formulation
of reasonable suspicion. While the court still gives considerable deference to
an officer's training and experience, an officer is still required to offer
substantive facts that point to suspicion of criminal conduct beyond the facts
which served as the basis for the initial stop. Otherwise, the detention will
constitute an unconstitutional seizure. When the substance of the holistic
picture is weak, the court is likely to find that reasonable suspicion was
lacking.
43
The degree of deference given to police by the Tenth Circuit in this situa-
tion appears to be more limited than that given in border patrol stops. Unlike
border patrol stops, the court refused to allow the experience and judgment of
136. Id. at 880.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 883-87 (Brown, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 886-88.
140. Id. at 886.
141. Id. at 886-88.
142. Id. at 877-78; see also United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561-62 (10th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1994).
143. The Tenth Circuit was not the only circuit last year to address this issue. In United
States v. Ramos, 20 F.3d 348, 352 (8th Cir. 1994), the Eighth Circuit held that detaining a driver
beyond the period necessary to issue a traffic citation constituted a seizure which required
reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity beyond that of the traffic offense. Id.
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an officer to bridge the gap between facts of questionable substance and
criminal suspicion. While it appears that the experience and judgment of an
officer is the key to determining reasonable suspicion in border patrol
encounters, the substance of the facts articulated by an officer is the key to
Fernandez-type encounters. Although Fernandez addressed the reasonable
suspicion necessary to prolong an investigatory stop, it illustrated that
deference to police judgment is limited.
E. Use or Threat of Force in a Terry Stop:
United States v. Melendez-Garcia
1. Facts
Melendez-Garcia ("Melendez") and two other men suspected of
transporting marijuana, were under surveillance by the DEA and the Las
Cruces, New Mexico police.'" The officers had also been informed of the
suspects' location and travel arrangements. 5 When the suspects left a motel
and proceeded on the highway in two cars, the officers followed and stopped
them." When the officers pulled over the two vehicles, they conducted what
they termed a "felony stop."' 47 The officers handcuffed each suspect, frisked
them and strapped them with seatbelts into separate police cars." A DEA
agent asked one of the suspects for consent to search the car belonging to
Melendez, but in which Melendez had not been riding.'" The suspect
answered that the agent could search the vehicle but would find nothing.50
Although a visual search revealed nothing, a canine sniff resulted in the dog
alerting the officers to the presence of drugs in the car. 5' The officers read
all three suspects their rights, and in a second search of the car, found twenty-
one pounds of marijuana in the gas tank.'52
Melendez was indicted for conspiracy, possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, and aiding and abetting.'53 He filed a motion to suppress the
evidence, arguing that he had been arrested without probable cause and that
the consent to search the car had been tainted by the illegal arrest.'54 The
district court ruled that reasonable suspicion justified the stop of the three men
and, despite the potentially coercive nature of the stop, Melendez voluntarily
144. United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1049-50 (10th Cir. 1994).
145. Id. at 1049.
146. Id. at 1050.
147. Id. The officers drew their weapons, pointed them at the vehicles, ordered that the igni-
tion keys be thrown from the windows, and ordered the suspects to put their hands outside, exit






153. Id. at 1049.
154. Id. at 1050.
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consented to a search of the vehicle."' Melendez conditionally pled guilty
and appealed.'56
2. Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case.' 57
The Tenth Circuit held that conducting a "felony stop" exceeded the scope of
reasonable suspicion that justified the stop, and therefore the men had been
arrested without probable cause.5 The court agreed with the district court
that the information the officers obtained and corroborated with their observa-
tions was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to conduct an investi-
gatory stop of the two vehicles. 59 However, the court held that the govern-
ment did not demonstrate that the circumstances justified the use of weapons
or confinement."6
The court noted that no bright-line rule exists to determine whether police
conduct exceeds the scope of an investigatory stop, and that the evaluation is
"guided by 'common sense and ordinary human experience."'6 The court
also pointed out that the use of firearms, handcuffs, or other forceful
techniques does not automatically transform a Terry stop into a full custodial
arrest requiring proof of probable cause. 62 The use or threat of force,
however, must be warranted under a "reasonable person" evaluation of the
circumstances.'63 The court found that drugs, guns, and violence often go
together and may be a factor in considering the actions of the officers;
however, there was no evidence or testimony that would reasonably lead the
officers to believe that the suspects were armed or dangerous, or that the
circumstances warranted such inordinate intrusiveness.'" The court found no
satisfactory explanation for the officers' "felony stop" when the officers out-
numbered the suspects, the officers executed the stop on an open highway in
daylight, the officers had no information or observations that the suspects were
armed or dangerous, and the suspects fully complied with police orders.' 5
3. Analysis
The decision in Melendez-Garcia clearly illustrates the Tenth Circuit's
position on the use of force during an investigatory stop. The court permits
greater latitude to police to ensure their personal safety when arresting sus-
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1051.
157. Id. at 1056. With regard to the question of the voluntariness of the consent to search the
vehicle, the court remanded the issue to the district court with guidance as to the proper constitu-
tional standard, based on the Tenth Circuit's determination that the defendant had been subjected
to an illegal arrest.
158. Id. at 1053.
159. Id. at 1051.
160. Id. at 1052-53.
161. Id. at 1052 (quoting United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1562 (10th Cir. 1993)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1052-53. The court pointed out that "the naked fact that drugs are suspected will
not support a per se justification for use of guns and handcuffs in a Terry stop." Id. at 1053.
165. Id.
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pected felons. Drawn guns, handcuffs, and confinement in vehicles are not
considered by the court to be over-intrusive, provided that the officers can
establish a reasonable basis for their actions." The most important factors in
justifying forceful actions appear to be the officers' knowledge of the defen-
dant and his criminal background (armed, dangerous, or propensity for
violence), the environment at the scene of the seizure (rural or residential), and
the actions of the defendant (combative or cooperative). 6 However, some
articulable support for an officer's belief that the situation warrants the use of
force must exist."6 Otherwise, absent probable cause, such an intrusion on
personal liberty constitutes an illegal custodial arrest.'
II. SEIZURE OF LUGGAGE
A. Background
Under the Fourth Amendment, the seizure of personal property requires
probable cause. 7 ' In United States v. Place,' the Supreme Court held that
police may briefly detain a traveler's luggage if reasonable suspicion exists
that the bag contains contraband or other criminal evidence.' Citing Place,
the Tenth Circuit held in United States v. Hall'73 that "[liaw enforcement
officers may seize and briefly detain.., luggage provided that the officers
have reasonable articulable suspicion that [it] contains narcotics."'74 Because
seizure of personal baggage from an individual's immediate possession is
particularly intrusive on both the individual's possessory interest in property
and liberty interest in proceeding with his "travel plans, brief seizures of
personal property must be reasonable.'75 The reasonableness of the seizure
depends upon the diligence of the police in conducting the investigation quick-
ly, the duration of the seizure, and whether the police transported the luggage
to a different location from where it was originally seized.'76 As with indi-
viduals, personal property may not be subjected to an intrusive search without
probable cause.'77
166. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
167. See Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1052-53.
168. Id.
169. See United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 18 F.3d 845, (10th Cir. 1994) (officers did not
have probable cause to arrest vehicle occupants prior to discovery of evidence in the vehicle).
170. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 14.
171. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
172. Id. at 706. The holding reflects that the same standards governing investigatory
detentions of persons also apply to detentions of personal effects. Id. at 708-09.
173. 978 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1992).
174. Id. at 620 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 706).
175. See Place, 462 U.S. at 708-10.
176. Id.
177. Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 542 (1990).
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B. United States v. Moore
1. Facts
DEA agents conducting routine surveillance of a train station were in-
formed that three people who boarded the train in San Bernardino, California,
made a cash purchase of tickets from the conductor.' An agent approached
two of the men, one of whom was Michael Moore, and asked to speak with
them.'79 Moore immediately left for the rest room. 8° In Moore's absence,
the other passenger claimed that the two had boarded the train in Los Angeles
and were returning to Chicago.'' The agent noted that the ticket indicated
that the men boarded the train in San Bernardino and had paid a penalty in the
purchase price because the ticket was purchased on board while the ticket
office was open.8 2 The agent received permission to search the passenger's
bag, which contained no contraband. 3 The passenger told the agent that the
other bags in the compartment belonged to Moore.'84
The agent located Moore, who told the agent he was traveling from Los
Angeles to Chicago.' They returned to Moore's seat, and Moore consented
to a search of his garment bag but refused consent to search the duffle bag
under his seat.'86 The agent seized the bag and told Moore that the bag
would be sent to Chicago before Moore arrived if it contained nothing incrimi-
nating. 7 The agent then removed the bag from the train and subjected it to
a canine sniff.88 After the dog alerted the agent to the presence of drugs in
the bag, the agent obtained a search warrant and discovered two kilograms of
cocaine in the bag.'89
Moore was indicted on charges of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine and aiding and abetting."9 He filed a motion to suppress the
evidence obtained from the bag on the grounds that the bag was seized with-
out reasonable suspicion.' The district court denied the motion and Moore
conditionally pled guilty.'92











188. Id. at 242-43. The train departed a few minutes after the bag was removed by the agent.
Id. at 247.
189. Id. at 243.
190. Id. at 242.
191. Id. at 243.
192. Id. at 242.
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2. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the
facts enumerated by the district court adequately supported the conclusion that
the agent had reasonable suspicion to detain Moore's luggage and subject it to
a canine sniff.'93 In considering the totality of the circumstances, the court
held that the defendant's lie regarding his boarding location, coupled with his
cash ticket purchase in the face of a penalty, were sufficient for the agent to
formulate reasonable suspicion.'94
3. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Logan detailed two bases for reversal. First, he
believed that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure of
Moore's bag after he denied consent to its search. 9 Second, "probable cause
was required to hold [the] bag for a period extending beyond the train's
departure, and no such probable cause existed."'9 6 Judge Logan disagreed
with the majority's finding that the defendant's lie about where he boarded the
train and the penalty factor in purchasing the ticket on board provided an
objective basis for establishing reasonable suspicion.'97 He also argued that
the lie about the defendant's point of origin could be "reasonably interpreted
as merely a reference to the general area from which [Moore] and his
companions were coming", and in any event, did not give rise to reasonable
suspicion. 9
Judge Logan referred to three Tenth Circuit cases-Hall, Ward, and
Bloom-where "more egregious" facts than those in Moore were found not to
constitute reasonable suspicion."l Judge Logan's skepticism of the majority's
deference to the judgment of law enforcement officers was evident:
The government asks that we rely upon the expertise of experienced
lawmen and the alleged infallibility of unidentified train personnel.
But such reliance gives unreviewable discretion to law officers; the
only cases that get to the courts are those in which the officers find
contraband.... As I read the majority opinion any three ordinary-
looking retirees who board a train in a suburb but identify their
origination as the city and who pay cash for their tickets on board,
can have their luggage seized against their will .... I am unwilling to
rely upon the tacit assumption that such a thing will not happen to
193. Id. at 243-44.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 244 (Logan, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Id. Judge Logan maintained that there could be many reasons why the ticket was pur-
chased with cash, and that a person arriving late to the train station may consider the penalty for
an on-board ticket purchase trivial in comparison to the inconvenience of waiting in line at the
ticket office. Id.
198. Id. Judge Logan pointed out that an admission that Moore boarded the train in Los An-
geles should have "generate[d] more suspicion than a reference to San Bernardino." Id.




you or me, our innocent children, or people like us-that only the
guilty are accused."l
Finally, Judge Logan contended that because the agent did not have
probable cause at the time he seized the bag or when the train departed, he
exceeded the scope of a permissible detention authorized by Place."'
4. Analysis
Like the border stop in Lopez-Martinez, and unlike the prolonged
detention in Fernandez, the Moore decision gives police great latitude in
establishing the existence of reasonable suspicion. As Judge Logan's dissent
points out, however, the decision conflicts with Hall, Ward, and Bloom, where
the court rejected factors that appeared to be nothing more than drug-courier
profiles. 2 The court expressed no concern that police officers in these
situations cannot convincingly distinguish unusual legitimate conduct and
unusual suspicious conduct. Instead the court accepted the police premise that
unusual conduct is by definition suspicious.
The court's decision not to address the issue of detaining Moore's luggage
until after the train's departure ignores Moore's most compelling defense.
Requiring a traveler to abandon his luggage in order to continue with his
itinerary, exceeds the brief and minimally-intrusive detention authorized in
Place. 3 While the fact that Moore was not personally detained may mitigate
the intrusive effect of seizing his luggage, the intrusive effect on his possesso-
ry interest was greatly enhanced. 4 Arguably, the government's interest in
controlling drug trafficking does not outweigh the substantial inconvenience of
depriving an individual of his possessory interest in his personal property for
several hours or days.
Other courts, however, support the Tenth Circuit's position. The Third
Circuit in United States v. Frost 5 held that an eighty-minute delay of the
defendant's luggage to subject it to a canine sniff was not unreasonable be-
cause the police were diligent in their efforts to procure a canine unit.2"6 The
court placed primary emphasis on the diligence of the police and discounted as
200. Moore, 22 F.3d at 246 (Logan, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 248. Judge Logan also argued that the court should have addressed the issue of the
excessive time of detention of the luggage, despite the fact that it was not sufficiently raised by
defense counsel at trial. Id. at 246. He reminded that the court could consider such an issue if
"consideration is necessary to prevent manifest injustice." Id. Judge Logan maintained that Moore,
although a criminal engaged in drug trafficking, was a "victim of unconstitutional police
behavior." Id.
202. Id. at 244-45. The Tenth Circuit had found no reasonable suspicion in these cases; all
three defendants had purchased a one-way ticket in cash. Id.
203. Id. at 246-48. See United States v. Scales, 903 F.2d 765, 769 (10th Cir. 1990) (seven-
hour luggage detention exceeds Place's briefness requirement); United States v. Cagle, 849 F.2d
924, 927 (5th Cir. 1988) (ninety-minute detention unreasonable); Moya v. United States, 761 F.2d
322, 327 (7th Cir. 1984) (three-hour detention of bag unreasonable); United States v. Puglisi, 723
F.2d 779, 790 (11 th Cir. 1984) (140-minute detention unreasonable).
204. Moore, 22 F.3d at 248.
205. 999 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 573 (1993).
206. Id. at 742.
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minimal the inconvenience caused to the defendant by having to depart on his
flight without his luggage.
20 7
CONCLUSION
The 1994 Tenth Circuit decisions pertaining to seizure of individuals and
their property in the course of investigatory detentions provide police with
wide latitude in formulating reasonable suspicion. In situations where seizure
has occurred, the court still requires articulable facts, not suppositions, that
rationally point to a conclusion of reasonable suspicion. It appears, however,
that these facts are usually viewed in a light more favorable to the police.
The totality of circumstances surrounding a police-citizen encounter deter-
mines whether a seizure has occurred. Emphasis on any single factor, such as
location, conflicts with the court's current "totality of circumstances" analysis.
Specifically, the court diminished the significance of location as a factor in
evaluating police-citizen encounters, and limited the areas in which an individ-
ual enjoys a heightened expectation of privacy from government intrusion.
Anthony J. Fabian
207. Id. at 741-42. But see United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051,
1060 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Even if government agents were perfectly diligent.., a seizure without
probable cause could still last too long to pass muster under the Fourth Amendment.").
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Prejudice, like the spider, makes everywhere its home. It has neither
taste nor choice of place, and all that it requires is room. If the one
prepares her food by poisoning it to her palate and her use, the other
does the same. Prejudice may be denominated the spider of the mind.
Thomas Paine'
INTRODUCTION
Congress designed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)
2
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)3 to combat
the more overt forms of discrimination in the workplace. Case law interpreta-
tions employing similar analyses have strengthened this common bond over
time." Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA),5 however, seriously
disrupted the purpose behind Title VII and the ADEA.6 The CRA amended
Title VII to counteract four inherently anti-plaintiff Supreme Court decisions
from 1989.2 However, the CRA left the ADEA, Title VII's "statutory cous-
in,"' unchanged in regard to these decisions. Thus, much of the analysis em-
ployed under Title VII may no longer be applicable in the ADEA context.
This Survey examines how the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has decided Title VII and ADEA cases during the past year, noting
1. FORTY THOUSAND QUOTATIONS 1374 (compiled by Charles N. Douglas, 1917).
2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
3. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)).
4. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VI, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1093, 1093
(1993); see also Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1205 (1983); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979).
5. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
6. See Eglit, supra note 4, at 1101-02.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. 1993). The four decisions are: Lorance v. AT&T Technol-
ogies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 900 (1989) (holding that the limitations for filing an ADEA claim run
from the date when the seniority system was adopted rather than the date plaintiffs suffered inju-
ry); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762-65 (1989) (refusing to bar an action by persons who did
not intervene in a pending lawsuit that might have affected their interests); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (holding that in a Title VII case, an employer had the
burden of producing evidence of a "business justification" for the employment practice challenged
as discriminatory); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (holding that employ-
ers may not be found liable under Title VII if they can prove that they would have made the same
hiring decision if they had not taken gender into account). Of these cases, however, Wards Cove is
the only one specifically mentioned in the CRA. Congress noted that, "(2) the decision of the
Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio ... has weakened the scope and effective-
ness of Federal civil rights protections; and (3) legislation is necessary to provide additional pro-
tection against unlawful discrimination in employment." Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. V 1993)).
8. Howard Eglit noted that Title VII and the ADEA are "statutory cousins." Eglit, supra
note 4, at 1103.
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differences as well as similarities.9
First, in Hurd v. Pittsburg State University,"° the court held that Con-
gress intended the ADEA" to abrogate state immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. 2 This decision, which allows claims against state agencies to be
brought in federal court, differs from previous decisions where courts declined
to rule directly on this question. 3
Second, in O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc.,4 the court determined that "seri-
ous and pervasive misconduct" is not a threshold requirement for application
of the "after-acquired evidence doctrine."' 5 This expansion of Summers v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.'6 would have solidified the
indubitable nature of this defense within the Tenth Circuit. 7 However, the
United States Supreme Court limited the impact of both Summers and
O'Driscoll via its recent decision in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co.'
8
Finally, in Griffith v. Colorado Division of Youth Services,9 the Tenth
Circuit called into question previous decisions allowing nominal damages in
Title VII actions where monetary loss had not been proven.2" Because nomi-
nal damage awards entitle plaintiffs to "prevailing party"'" status, Griffith
would have severely limited the number of claims litigated. The discrimination
9. The Survey period includes Tenth Circuit opinions decided between Sept. 1, 1993 and
Dec. 31, 1994.
10. 29 F.3d 564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 321 (1994).
11. Section 4(a) of the ADEA provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's age.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988).
12. Hurd, 29 F.3d at 565. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states
that, "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign State," U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
13. See EEOC v. Wyoming Retirement Sys., 771 F.2d 1425, 1428 (10th Cir. 1985) (declin-
ing to determine whether Congress enacted the ADEA pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it found that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar an action against the state
of Wyoming); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983) (declining to decide wheth-
er Congress enacted the ADEA pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment after finding that
the ADEA was a valid exercise of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause).
14. 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994).
15. Id. at 179.
16. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
17. O'Driscoll, 12 F.3d at 179-80. Other circuits have held that the after-acquired evidence
doctrine does not preclude a finding of liability but only affects the available remedies. See, e.g.,
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1228 (3d Cir. 1994).
18. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
19. 17 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1994).
20. See e.g., Baker v. Weyerhauser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1990) (awarding $1 in
nominal damages to a papermill employee who claimed sexual harassment based upon a hostile
work environment).
21. "Prevailing party" status allows a litigant to recover attorneys fees. This provides an
incentive to many attorneys who might not normally take valid civil rights cases due to the enor-
mous cost of litigation.
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alleged in Griffith, however, occurred prior to enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.22 Nominal damages are mostly a moot issue after the 1991 Act.
Yet, attorney's fees are potentially affected in cases currently in dispute in-
volving discrimination that occurred prior to 1991.
I. A HISTORY OF THE CHANGES IN TITLE VII AND THE ADEA
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment "against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national ori-
gin."23 Although Title VII does not expressly refer to sexual harassment, it
has long been recognized that Title VII's protection against employment dis-
crimination includes the right to be free from gender-related harassment.24
A major advancement in sexual harassment claims occurred when the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgated guidelines
which expressly defined sexual harassment as a violation of § 703 of Title
VII.25 In 1986, the Supreme Court followed suit stating, "[w]ithout question,
when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's
sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex. 26
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, offered only limited remedies to
those who had suffered discrimination." In November of 1991, President
Bush ushered in a new era of active civil rights enforcement with the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.2" The Act amended five statutes, including Title VII and
the ADEA.2 9 It expanded the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by allowing compen-
satory damages, punitive damages, and jury trials in cases of intentional dis-
crimination under Title VII.3' As a caveat, however, Congress placed limits
upon compensatory and punitive damage awards by limiting recovery accord-
ing to the size of the violating employer's company.3'
Furthermore, punitive damages are only available in cases of intentional
discrimination where the plaintiff succeeds in proving that the defendant dis-
22. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 changed many characteristics of Title VII. See infra text
accompanying notes 23-44.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
24. See Garber v. Saxon Business Prod., 552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(holding that compelling female employees to submit to the sexual advances of male supervisors
constitutes a violation of Title VII); see also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)
(declaring that Title VII should be interpreted liberally to prohibit a racially discriminatory envi-
ronment), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1994).
26. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
27. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, compensatory and punitive damages were not
allowed in Title VII cases. See Eglit, supra note 4, at 1203-08.
28. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
29. The Act also amended three other statutes: The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
of 1990, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, and The Civil Rights Attorney's Awards Act of 1976.
30. Note, however, that punitive damages may not be awarded against governmental entities.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3). A plaintiff may recover a maximum of $300,000 from employ-
ers who have more than 500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks and a maximum of
$50,000 from employers with between 14 and 101 employees.
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criminated "with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected
rights of an aggrieved individual. ' 32 The legislative history and structure of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 indicate that punitive damages are recoverable
only in particularly egregious instances of intentional discrimination."
Title VII did not provide for jury trials prior to the 1991 Act. After the
1991 Act, however, either party may insist upon a jury trial where the plaintiff
requests compensatory or punitive damages. 34 The 1991 Act also specifies
that juries should not be informed of the damage caps" to ensure that juries.
do not return lower verdicts than they might otherwise have rendered. 6
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also amended some provisions of the
ADEA. Specifically, it amended section 7(e) of the ADEA by eliminating the
two/three year statute of limitations and mandating the 180-360 day filing
requirements in Title VII. 37 Further, it requires the EEOC to provide notice to
the parties upon termination of its investigation, and to provide claimants
ninety days after receipt of such notice in which to file a civil action.38
For the most part, Title VII and ADEA decisions have been consistent.39
The 1991 Act, however, brought several changes. Unlike Title VII, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 does not amend the ADEA to allow punitive and compen-
satory damages in intentional discrimination cases.' Congress's failure to
provide such damages under the ADEA implies its acquiescence in the ADEA
arena to Supreme Court decisions found intolerable in the Title VII context.4
Apparently, age discrimination is not as important as race or sex discrimina-
tion.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is also silent as to whether the "substantial
factor" requirement set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins42 applies to the
32. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(l).
33. 137 CONG. REc. S15,483-84 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth that
punitive damages may only be awarded in egregious cases).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. V 1993).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2).
36. 'The bill specifically provides that the jury shall not be informed of the existence or
amount of the caps on damage awards. Thus, no pressure, upward or downward, will be exerted
on the amount of jury awards by the existence of the statutory limitations." 137 CONG. REC.
S15,484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)-(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e).
39. The text of the ADEA is largely identical to that of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The only major difference is that the term "age" has been substituted in the ADEA for the
Title VII phrase "race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972). Because the prohibitions in both acts are similar, the
Supreme Court has found interpretations under Title VII equally applicable to the ADEA. See
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120 (1978). Note that Title VII decisions
are not applicable to the ADEA where the issue is one of specific statutory construction and the
statutory language differs. Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC En-
forcement, 23 STETsON L. REV. 53, 88 (1993).
40. See, e.g., Lee v. Sullivan, 787 F. Supp. 921, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
41. See Eglit, supra note 4, at 1206 n.365 (citing Catherine Ventrell-Monsees, Ageism: The
Segregation of a Civil Right, EXCHANGE ON AGEING, LAW & ETmcs, BULLETIN No. 8, Spring
1992, at 1 (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Gerontological Society of America, Nov.
24, 1991)).
42. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In a claim of sex discrimination, a plaintiff must prove that gender
was a substantial or "motivating" factor in the employer's decision. Id. at 244.
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ADEA. There is also no clear answer as to whether the Civil Rights Act of
1991 overturned Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,43 which held that the
statute of limitations runs from the date of the discriminatory act as opposed
to the date of the injury." Against this backdrop, this Survey now examines
how the Tenth Circuit has decided cases involving both Title VII and the
ADEA.
II. A REJECTION OF FEDERALISM AND THE "PLAIN STATEMENT" RULE?:
HURD V. PITTSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY4
A. Background
The cornerstone of federalism is the unbending concept that both the
Union, and the States which comprise it, have certain powers in which the
other should not interfere.' The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
was intentionally designed to limit the powers of the federal government.47
All powers not specifically granted to the federal government are retained by
the states.'
The Eleventh Amendment's immunity provision49 further solidifies this
fortress of federalism by forbidding private parties from bringing suit against
states in federal court absent congressional intent to abrogate the amendment.
Therefore, the main question is, when does legislation enacted by Congress
evince a desire to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment? Results differ depending
on whether the statute was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause or sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Courts are very hesitant to infer congressional intent to override Eleventh
Amendment immunity when statutes are enacted merely in accordance with
43. 490 U.S. 900 (1989)
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) overrides Lorance in that
[f]or purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to a
seniority system that has been adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose...
when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniori-
ty system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority
system or a provision of the system.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
45. 29 F.3d 564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 321 (1994).
46. As James Madison noted in THE FEDERALIST NO. 10:
[I]t clearly appears, that the same advantage which a Republic has over a Democracy, in
controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small Republic, - is
enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it .... The influence of factitious lead-
ers may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a
general conflagration through the other States.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 64 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982).
47. The Tenth Amendment states that "[tlhe powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
48. For the unconventional view that the Tenth Amendment refers to state powers created by
the Constitution rather than residual powers, see 3 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY & WILLIAM JEFFREY,
JR., POLITICS AND THE CONSTrrTUrION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 36-37 (1980).
49. Supra note 12.
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the Commerce Clause.50 In National League of Cities v. Usery,51 the Su-
preme Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act, which required state and
local governments to comply with minimum wage and overtime pay require-
ments, was unconstitutional.52 The Court acknowledged the plenary powers of
Congress to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause.53 According to the
Court, however, the states also have plenary powers in matters of state sover-
eignty that are implicit in the Tenth Amendment's guarantee of federalism.54
State sovereignty, in and of itself, therefore imposes external limits on
Congress's ability to regulate under the Commerce Clause with regard to
issues affecting a state's separate and independent existence.55 Importantly,
National League's holding was limited to statutes enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.56
Conversely, when Congress legislates under the enforcement clause of the
Civil War Amendments (section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment),57 the Su-
preme Court has rejected the assertion that state functions which relate to
sovereignty are inviolate.58 Section 5 states that, "[tihe Congress shall have
the power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this arti-
cle."59 According to the Court, "principles of federalism that might otherwise
be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the
power to enforce the Civil War Amendments [prohibiting racial inequality] 'by
appropriate legislation."' "Those amendments were specifically designed as
an expansion of federal power and a limit of state sovereignty. '
50. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976). The Court is not hesitant,
however, when Congress legislates pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and expresses its intent
to override state immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99
(1984). Note that Congress does not need to explicitly state its legislative intent. The Court liber-
ally construes congressional intent when it considers legislation passed pursuant to § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-78 (1980).
51. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
52. Id. at 856. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), as originally promulgated,
excluded the states and their political subdivisions from its definition of "employer." See ch. 676,
§ 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (1938). This was changed via later amendments. See Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a), 88 Stat. 58 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(d) (1988)).
53. National League, 426 U.S. at 840.
54. Id. at 842. The federal government's power is "supreme within its sphere of action," but
it is, nevertheless, a government of limited powers. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 405-06 (1819).
55. National League, 426 U.S. at 845. The Court noted that applying the FLSA requirements
to the states would indeed interfere with state autonomy. Id. at 851-52. For example, the court
noted that FLSA requirements would impose substantial costs on state employers. Id. at 846.
Increased costs would force states to either raise taxes or cancel programs. Id. at 848.
56. Id. at 852 n.17.
57. The Civil War Amendments refer to Amendments 13-15 of the United States Constitu-
tion. These amendments primarily abolish slavery and guarantee equal protection of the law to all
races in the United States.
58. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (holding that Con-
gress acted permissibly- under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted § 1 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, which prohibited states from making electoral changes that had a discrimina-
tory effect).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.




Although Congress originally passed Title VII pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which extend the definition of
employers to include states, were enacted pursuant to section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 62 In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,63 the Supreme Court held that
a state government employer could be held liable for money damages despite
the Eleventh Amendment, if it violated the prohibitions against discrimination
under Title VII.' In this way, the Court extended Fourteenth Amendment
rights to state government employees who are the victims of Title VII discrim-
ination. The Court declared that Congress could take steps to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even if such action
would ordinarily violate the Eleventh Amendment.65
Although federal legislation affecting race and gender discrimination has
found refuge in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the ADEA has not
found a similar safe haven. Some courts contend that the ADEA was enacted
pursuant to section 5,' while others insist that it was enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.67 The Supreme Court added to the confusion by refusing
to answer the question definitively. In EEOC v. Wyoming,68 the EEOC argued
that Wyoming's mandatory retirement policy, which required game wardens to
retire at age fifty-five, violated the ADEA.6 The Court upheld the ADEA as
a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power regardless of the Tenth
Amendment, but declined to decide whether the ADEA was also enacted pur-
suant to section 5.70 However, the Court reaffirmed that Congress is not lim-
ited by Tenth Amendment constraints when legislating under section 5, but is
so constrained when legislating under the Commerce Clause.7
Prior to its decision in Hurd v. Pittsburg State University,72 the Tenth
Circuit had not clearly addressed this important issue. In EEOC v. Wyoming
Retirement System,73 the court did not decide whether the ADEA was enacted
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
EEOC-instead of a private individual-was suing the state, rendering Elev-
enth Amendment immunity inapplicable.74 Hurd forced the Tenth Circuit to
take a stance on this issue.
62. Fitzpatrick v. Britzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 n.9 (1976).
63. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
64. Id. at 456-57.
65. Id. at 456. One of the most unusual aspects of this case was the absence of dissenting
opinions. In fact, Justice Rehnquist, who later dissented in City of Rome, wrote the opinion.
66. See, e.g., EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 603 (7th Cir. 1982) (concluding that the ADEA
is a valid extension of Congress's power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
67. See, e.g., McCroan v. Bailey, 543 F. Supp. 1201, 1205-07 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (concluding
that the ADEA is a valid extension of Congress's Commerce Clause power).
68. 460 U.S. 226 (1993).
69. Id. at 234.
70. Id. at 243.
71. Id. at 243 n. 18. Since the Supreme Court's decision, at least two other jurisdictions have
held the ADEA to be enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Heiar v.
Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1984); Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715
F.2d 694, 700 (1st Cir. 1983).
72. 29 F.3d 564 (loth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 321 (1994).
73. 771 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1985).
74. Id. at 1428.
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B. Facts
The plaintiff, a state employee, brought a claim against Pittsburg State
University (PSU) alleging discriminatory discharge in violation of the ADEA.
In the district court, PSU sought to dismiss the plaintiff's claim by arguing
that the Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to the state against a private
action in federal court.7' Both parties agreed that PSU was an agency of the
state of Kansas,76 and that the state law claim for breach of an implied em-
ployment contract was barred from federal jurisdiction by the Eleventh
Amendment.
71
Noting that Eleventh Amendment immunity may be abrogated where: (1)
Congress evinces an "'unequivocal expression of congressional intent' to do
so;" and (2) Congress "authorizes such suits pursuant to section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment,""8 the district court held that the ADEA indeed was
enacted pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.79 The district
court then relied heavily on the holdings of other jurisdictions to support its
contention that the legislative history of the ADEA evinced "'a congressional
purpose to prevent arbitrary age discrimination within the protected age group
by extending the coverage of the Act to state and local governments.', 0
The district court rejected the defense's assertion that Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity was required by the Supreme Court's holding in Employees v.
Missouri Department of Public Health and Welfare."' There, the Court con-
cluded that Congress did not mean to abrogate state immunity under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a statute with language virtually identical to the
ADEA."2 The district court distinguished Employees by noting that the FLSA
was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, while the ADEA was enacted
75. Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 821 F. Supp. 1410, 1411 (D. Kan. 1993).
76. Id.
77. Id. The day prior to the Hurd decision, the Tenth Circuit specifically noted that "pendent
jurisdiction ... may [not] override the Eleventh Amendment." Mascheroni v. Board of Regents,
28 F.3d 1554, 1559 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121). If Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity is not raised as a defense, a federal court may or may not examine the issue.
Some jurisdictions adhere to a "mandatory" rule which requires a court to consider Eleventh
Amendment immunity sua sponte as a jurisdictional matter, whereas other jurisdictions adhere to a
"permissive" rule which merely authorizes a court to raise the issue when not raised by the de-
fendant. See Mascheroni, 28 F.3d at 1558-59.
78. Hurd, 821 F. Supp. at 1412 (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99).
79. Id. at 1412. According to the court, the 1974 amendments to the ADEA extended its
protection to federal, state, and local government employees. Id. The legislative history indicated
"a congressional purpose to prevent arbitrary age discrimination." Id. (quoting EEOC v. Elrod,
674 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982)). The discrimination prohibited by the ADEA goes to the very es-
sence of the 14th Amendment. Id. Even though the ADEA does not expressly state that it was
enacted pursuant to § 5, the Supreme Court has previously held that "Congress does not have to
recite the words 'Section 5' or 'Fourteenth Amendment' or 'Equal Protection' in order for a stat-
ute to be based on it." Id. (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244 (1983)).
80. Id. (quoting Elrod, 674 F.2d at 605); see also Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d
441, 443 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that Congress made its intention to abrogate l1th Amendment
immunity crystal clear by including states in the ADEA definition of "employers" who may be
liable for legal and equitable relief).
81. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
82. Hurd, 821 F. Supp. at 1413. The FLSA, like the ADEA, authorizes suits "in any Federal
or State court of competent jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988).
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pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."3
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
In a one paragraph opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision in Hurd.4 Finding that the district
court's opinion was "thorough and well-reasoned," Judge McCay merely noted
two additional decisions supporting the district court's holding that Eleventh
Amendment immunity does not bar actions against a state under the ADEA.s5
D. Analysis
According to the Supreme Court, when a federal statute alters the balance
of power between the states and the federal government, Congress must clear-
ly state its intent to extend the statute to the states. 6 This holding is known
as the "plain statement rule."" The plain statement rule was adopted by the
courts, mainly out of concern over Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause.8 In Gregory v. Ashcroft,89 however, a majority of the Supreme
Court altered the rule's analysis by refusing to extend the ADEA to state
appointed judges.9' According to the Court, the exception to the ADEA for
"appointee[s] at the policymaking level" could include judges, and since Con-
gress did not specifically exempt them from this exception, judges were obvi-
ously meant to be included in the exception.9 The reasoning is flawed, how-
ever, because the language of the exception seems an odd way of including
"judges" within its parameters. The most accurate interpretation of the plain
statement rule is that since judges are not specifically mentioneL' in the excep-
tion, they are covered by the ADEA. In this opinion, the Court essentially
expands an extreme state's rights notion at the expense of many victims of
discrimination.
83. Hurd, 821 F. Supp. at 1413.
84. Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 29 F.3d 564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 321
(1994).
85. Id. at 564 (citing Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985), and Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 700 (lst Cir.
1983)).
86. Atascadero v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985); see generally, Deanna L. Ruddock,
Note, Gregory v. Ashcroft: The Plain Statement Rule and Judicial Supervision of Federal-State
Relations, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1563 (1992).
87. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
88. Id.
89. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
90. Id. at 467.
91. Id.; see also Ruddock, supra note 86, at 1566. Note that the dissent believed that the
alteration of Garcia's plain statement rule would simply result in confusion. Gregory, 501 U.S. at
477 (White, J., dissenting). According to Justice White:
[Tihe majority's approach is also unsound because it will serve only to confuse the
law.... The majority does not explain its requirement that Congress's intent to regulate
a particular state activity be "plain to anyone reading [the federal statute]." Does that
mean that it is now improper to look to the purpose or history of a federal statute in
determining the scope of the statute's limitations on state activities?
Id. at 478.
19951
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Some scholars have argued that since federalism barriers are beginning to
creep into the Commerce Clause analysis, Congress's power under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment should be expanded as much as possible.92 The
Tenth Circuit's analysis in Hurd apparently adopted this view by side-stepping
the plain statement analysis outlined by the Rehnquist Court in Gregory. It
should follow that if Congress had the power to prohibit gender discrimination
under section 5, that power should extend to prohibit age discrimination. In
fact, the Tenth Circuit has only brought the ADEA on par with Title VII-its
statutory cousin-in this respect. This is a step in the right direction, however,
and other circuits should adopt the same view.
III. EMPLOYEE MISREPRESENTATION AND THE "ABSOLUTION" '9 3 DEFENSE
UNDER TITLE VII: O'DRSCOLL V. HERCULES, INC.94
A. Background
While employers should be allowed to introduce evidence that an employ-
ee was dismissed because of misconduct in defense to Title VII claims of
discrimination, the waters are murkier when the employer seeks to introduce
evidence of misconduct unknown at the time of the alleged discrimination.95
Both the courts and Congress have addressed this issue in some form.96
The origins of the after-acquired evidence doctrine are found in Mount
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle.97 In Mt. Healthy, a
teacher claimed that the school board had taken adverse actions against him
for exercising his First Amendment rights.9" The school board acknowledged
that the plaintiff's speech was one of the reasons for the plaintiff's dis-
charge." The school board also contended, however, that the plaintiff was
dismissed for using obscene gestures toward students." The Supreme Court
92. E.g., Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights,
Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA.
L. REv. 1029, 1083 (1993).
93. The strict form of the after-acquired evidence doctrine has been described by some
commentators as a form of "absolution." Rebecca H. White & Robert D. Brussack, The Proper
Role of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 35 B.C. L. REv. 49, 52
(1993).
94. 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1086 (1995).
95. James G. Babb, Comment, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence as a Defense in Title VII
Employment Discrimination Cases, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1945, 1946 (1994).
96. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the plurality opinion, authored by
Justice Brennan, rejected the use of after-acquired evidence in mixed-motive cases. Id. at 252. Yet,
many courts have ignored the holding of Price Waterhouse. One court has even used Price Water-
house to support the use of after-acquired evidence in mixed-motive cases. See Deshaw v. Lord &
Taylor, No. 90 Civ. 0490 (JFK), 1991 WL 107271, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 13, 1991) (citing Price
Waterhouse to permit the use of after-acquired evidence in an ADEA suit). Congress responded to
the uncertainties by amending Title VII to read, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchap-
ter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993).
97. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
98. Id. at 276.




held that the school board could escape a finding that discrimination was a
"substantial factor" in their refusal to rehire the plaintiff by establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the decision to discharge the plaintiff
would have been reached based solely on the use of obscene gestures.' °'
This defense has come to be known as the "would have terminated anyway"
standard.'o2
The seminal case regarding after-acquired evidence in the Tenth Circuit is
Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 3 The plaintiff in
Summers was satisfactorily employed as a field claim representative for seven-
teen years, when State Farm discovered that he had forged a signature on one
of the claims."° State Farm immediately warned the plaintiff that subsequent
falsifications would result in termination. 5 Years later, State Farm dis-
missed the plaintiff, who subsequently filed suit alleging a violation of the
ADEA." During discovery, nearly four years after the plaintiff had been
terminated, State Farm discovered evidence that the plaintiff had falsified over
150 additional claims. 7
Relying on Mt. Healthy, State Farm argued that the evidence was relevant
and should absolutely bar the plaintiff's claim.' 8  The Tenth Circuit
agreed." According to the court:
[t]o argue ... that this after-acquired evidence should be ignored is
utterly unrealistic. The present case is akin to the hypothetical where-
in a company doctor is fired because of his age ... and the company,
in defending a civil rights action, . . . discovers that the ... employee
was not a "doctor." In our view .... Summers is in no better posi-
tion.'"'
Many courts have followed Summers by adopting some form of the doc-
trine."I
There are some serious doubts, however, about the proper legal applica-
tion of Mt. Healthy in Summers. Mt. Healthy was a mixed-motive case in
which a valid reason did exist for firing the plaintiff at the time of dis-
101. Id. at 287.
102. See Babb, supra note 95, at 1951.
103. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
104. Id. at 702.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 701-02.
107. Id. at 703.
108. Id. at 705.
109. Id. at 708.
110. Id.
111. See Dotson v. United States Postal Serv., 977 F.2d 976, 978 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 263 (1992) (following the Summers doctrine that after-acquired evidence may be used
where a plaintiff omitted current use of prescription drugs on an employment application);
Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting commitment
to the Summers doctrine in denying relief to the plaintiff in a sex discrimination case where she
omitted to mention a prior conviction for drunk driving on her employment application), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993). Cf. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir.
1994) (rejecting the Summers rule by limiting the use of after-acquired evidence), vacated, 115 S.
Ct. 1397 (1995).
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charge." 2 In Summers, the employer acted solely with the intent to discrimi-
nate.' 1
3
In Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.," 4 the Eleventh Circuit rejected
the Summers rule that after-acquired evidence was an absolute bar to any
claim of discrimination." 5 According to the court, "[tihe Summers rule is an-
tithetical to the principal purpose of Title VII-'to achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunity' by giving employees incentives 'to self-examine ... em-
ployment practices and to endeavor to eliminate' ... employment discrimina-
tion."' 16
Wallace, a case of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, involved
claims of hostile work environment and sexual harassment, as well as retalia-
tory discharge under the Equal Pay Act (EPA).' During a deposition, the
defendant discovered that the plaintiff had lied about a previous narcotics
conviction on her employment application."8 It was undisputed that the em-
ployer would not have hired the plaintiff had it been aware of the narcotics
conviction."'9
The court agreed that Mt. Healthy provided "persuasive guidance concern-
ing after-acquired evidence," but chided the Tenth Circuit for misapplying the
doctrine. 2 ' According to the Eleventh Circuit, Summers represented "an un-
warranted extension of Mt. Healthy" since it effectively
ignore[d] the lapse of time between the employment decision and the
discovery of a legitimate motive. Whereas the Mt. Healthy rule ex-
cuses all liability based on what actually would have happened absent
the unlawful motive, the Summers rule goes one step further: it ex-
cuses all liability based on what hypothetically would have occurred
absent the alleged discriminatory motive assuming the employer had
knowledge that it would not acquire until sometime during the litiga-
tion arising from the discharge.'
Mt. Healthy refused to allow membership in a protected class to place plain-
tiffs in a worse position, yet Summers achieved precisely this result.'22
The Summers rule does not encourage employers to eliminate dis-
crimination. Rather, it invites employers to establish ludicrously low
thresholds for "legitimate" termination and to devote fewer resources
to preventing discrimination because Summers gives them the option
to escape all liability by rummaging through an unlawfully-discharged
112. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285.
113. Summers, 864 F.2d at 702.
114. 968 F.2d 1174 (1 lth Cir. 1992), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
115. Id. at 1178.
116. Id. at 1180 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).
117. Id. at 1176.
118. Id. at 1176-77.
119. Id. at 1185 (Godbold, J., dissenting).





employee's background for flaws.'23
While the Eleventh Circuit refused to allow after-acquired evidence to bar
claims of discrimination, it did allow this evidence to go to the issue of avail-
able remedies, including attorney fees. 24 The court "agree[d] with the ab-
stract proposition ... that after-acquired evidence is relevant to the relief due"
to the plaintiff.2 Wallace is best viewed as a direct limit on the doctrine as
announced in Summers.
During the Survey term, the Tenth Circuit was given an opportunity to




Dorthea O'Driscoll, a Quality Control Inspector, was terminated by Her-
cules, Inc. after six years of employment. 27 She brought suit alleging that
her termination violated the ADEA.'12
While preparing for trial, the defendant discovered that O'Driscoll had
misrepresented information on her employment application, 29 her health in-
surance application, and her security clearance application. 3 Hercules main-
tained that it would have fired the plaintiff had it known about the false state-
ments. 3' In her defense, plaintiff presented evidence that misrepresentations
by other employees had not resulted in their termination.
3 2
The district court, however, relying on Summers, found that the plaintiff
had no right to relief in the face of unrefuted evidence that the defendant
would have dismissed the plaintiff had it known of her misconduct.'33 Ac-
cordingly, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.'34
123. Id. at 1180.
124. Id. at 1181, 1183.
125. Id. at 1181.
126. 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1086 (1995).
127. Id. at 177.
128. Id. The plaintiff also asserted state law claims of wrongful termination and breach of
employment contract. Id.
129. The specific evidence was that she misrepresented her age, her childrens' ages, her date
of high school graduation and the amount of education she had received. Id. at 177-78.
130. Id. at 178.
131. Id. In support of its contention, Hercules offered the following language from the em-
ployment application: "I understand that any misrepresentation made by me herein may result in
the cancellation of this employment application ... without any obligation or liability to me other
than payment of the rate agreed upon for services actually rendered." Id. Hercules also presented
affidavits by company management stating that the managers would have fired the plaintiff had
they known about her misrepresentations. Id.
132. Id. The plaintiff's evidence regarding other employees included falsification of time
cards and false statements concerning employee's whereabouts while on duty. The plaintiff also
noted that Hercules' Management Manual Procedure handbook specified that violations which
occurred more than twelve months prior were not to be taken into account by the supervisor in
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C. Tenth Circuit Decision
Initially, the Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs assertion that Summers
only applies in the face of serious and pervasive employee misconduct.
35
Rather, the court clarified Summers by announcing a more lenient three-prong
burden of proof that defendants must satisfy to benefit from the doctrine's
application: the employer must prove that (1) it was unaware of the miscon-
duct when the employee was discharged; (2) the misconduct would have justi-
fied the discharge; and (3) it would indeed have discharged the employee, had
the employer known of the misconduct.'36
While deeming serious misconduct as not dispositive, the court did note
that the plaintiff's actions represented a pattern of dishonest behavior.'37 Fur-
thermore, O'Driscoll's evidence of other employees who were not fired for
dishonesty was irrelevant. According to the court, the plaintiff had not provid-
ed any evidence that Hercules had retained other employees who had commit-
ted similar infractions equivalent to her numerous misrepresentations. 3 '
D. Analysis
By giving examples of irrelevant evidence, while failing to define what is
relevant, Summers and O'Driscoll encourage employers to "comb 'an
employee's file ... [for] minor, trivial, or technical infractions.""' 39 If, under
O'Driscoll, serious or pervasive conduct is unnecessary, what then is required?
The Summers standard requires the employer to show that it would have fired
the plaintiff for the act at issue. Yet, the idea that an employer would actually
admit that it would not have fired the employee had it known of the miscon-
duct is dubious. Responding to such obvious pitfalls of the doctrine's applica-
tion, the Supreme Court recently rejected the Tenth Circuit's harsh interpreta-
tion of the after-acquired evidence doctrine in McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co. "
Ms. McKennon, age 62, claimed that Nashville Banner violated the
ADEA by discharging her because of her age. 4' She further asserted that the
district court misapplied the after-acquired evidence doctrine by admitting
evidence, discovered during a deposition, that she had photocopied sensitive
materials-in contravention of handbook policy-for her "protection."' 42 Ar-
guing that the after-acquired evidence doctrine should not apply to her case,
McKennon attempted to distinguish her case from the employment application
135. Id. at 179. According to the court, "there is no threshold requirement of serious and
pervasive misconduct" under the Summers doctrine. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 179-80.
138. Id. at 180.
139. See Babb, supra note 95, at 1958-59 (quoting O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp.
656, 659 (D. Utah 1990)).
140. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
141. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 540 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
142. Id. at 540-41. Ms. McKennon allegedly copied the materials in anticipation of being
terminated because of her age. Id.
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fraud precedents by pointing to the clear nexus between her alleged miscon-
duct and the discrimination claim.43 Noting that the Sixth Circuit had al-
ready adopted Summers,'" the court of appeals rejected the nexus argument
and affirmed the lower court's decision. 45
The Supreme Court granted certiorari'" to resolve the conflicting circuit
opinions regarding the complete denial of relief in after-acquired evidence
situations. 47 According to the Court, ADEA violations are not so trivial as to
preclude enforcement on a showing of misconduct." The Court held that
allowing after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing to bar all relief undermines
the purpose of the ADEA--"elimination of discrimination in the
workplace."' 49
Importantly, the Supreme Court limited the application of Mt. Healthy to
mixed-motive firings, 5 ° thereby rejecting the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in
Summers. The Court, however, also emphasized the importance of the
employee's wrongdoing by eliminating the remedies of front pay and reinstate-
ment in this and similar cases.'5' The appropriate remedy in such cases, is an
award of backpay calculated from the date of the unlawful discharge to the
date of the acquisition of the evidence.'52 After considering any extraordinary
circumstances relating to either party, the resulting figure is the employee's
remedy. 5 ' Perhaps realizing the vagueness of the "would have terminated
anyway" standard, the Court explained that the employer must establish that
the misconduct was so severe that the employee in fact would have been fired
on that ground alone had the employer known of it at the time of dis-
charge.'54 Although the court failed to define "in fact," this mandate is stron-
ger than the Tenth Circuit's third prong in O'Driscoll. Although the Court
declined to expressly overrule O'Driscoll,'55 McKennon requires employers
143. Id. at 541.
144. Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
145. McKennon, 9 F.3d at 542, 543 n.8. The court stated that "if Mrs. McKennon's nexus
theory were adopted, it would apply where an employee takes money from her employer for sup-
port of herself in anticipation of an unlawful discharge." Id.
146. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
147. In addition to the Tenth Circuit's Summers doctrine and the Eleventh Circuit's Wallace
decision, the Seventh Circuit, in Smith v. General Scanning Inc., 876 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1989),
provided yet another analysis. Combining Summers and Wallace, Smith allowed after-acquired
evidence to prohibit back pay after the discovery of the misconduct. Id. at 1320 n.2. The EEOC
has expressly adopted this position. Revised General Counsel's Memorandum on Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 718, at 405:7105, 7108 (March, 1993). The Supreme Court,
in McKennon, ultimately adopted a similar compromise between the employer's concern about
misconduct and the employee's rights against discrimination. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886; see
also infra text accompanying notes 148-53.
148. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883-84.
149. Id. at 884 (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979)).
150. Id. at 885. A mixed-motive firing occurs when an employer fires an employee for both
lawful and unlawful reasons. Mt. Healthy involved a mixed-motive firing; Summers did not. Id.;
see also supra text accompanying notes 103-13.
151. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 886-87.
155. Id. at 885. Subsequently, the Court vacated O'Driscoll for reconsideration in light of
McKennon. O'Driscoll, 115 S. Ct. 1086 (1995).
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to present more evidence than a mere statement that they would have fired the
plaintiff. Thus, employers should protect themselves by explicitly outlining
reasons for discharge either in a procedural handbook or through longstanding
company policies.
IV. THE DEATH KNELL FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES: GRIFFITH V. COLORADO
DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES 6
A. Background
At common law, courts vindicated the deprivation of "inalienable" rights,
which did cause actual injury, by awarding nominal sums of money."7
Awarding nominal damages without proof of actual injury signified the impor-
tance accorded certain rights in society.'58 Prior to the 1991 amendments to
the Civil Rights Act, six jurisdictions addressed the question of nominal dam-
ages in Title VII actions. Five, including the Tenth Circuit, awarded nominal
damages under Title VII. 5 9 For example, in Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., the
Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court's award to the plaintiff of one dollar in
her "hostile work environment" sexual harassment claim, in addition to
$90,000 in actual and punitive damages on a state claim of outrageous con-
duct."s°
An award of nominal damages is critical in many cases because courts
have held such damages to be a prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees
under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that a court may, in its dis-
cretion, allow a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney's fees in Title VII ac-
tions. '6 In order to be deemed prevailing, however, the party must have at
156. 17 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1994).
157. Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and Rem-
edy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 403, 441
(1993) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (alteration in original)).
158. Id..
159. See Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming a $1 nominal
damage award in a "hostile work environment" sexual harassment case); Huddleston v. Roger
Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 905 (11th Cir. 1988); Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340,
344 (10th Cir. 1986) (affirming a nominal damage award in a sex discrimination case); Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 253 n.l (4th Cir. 1983); Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir. 1982);
Joshi v. Florida State Univ., 646 F.2d 981, 991 n.33 (5th Cir. Unit B June), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
972 (1981).
160. The court of appeals affirmed based upon the following findings:
(1) sexual harassment of an employee which creates a hostile or offensive work environ-
ment is actionable under Title VII; (2) for such conduct to be actionable it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of employment [as Baker had
demonstrated through the remarks and actions of her co-workers]; (3) damages for emo-
tional distress, however, are not actionable under Title VII; and [since this was the only
damage Baker suffered] (4) accordingly, the issues are found in favor of Baker and her
nominal damages are assessed at $1.00.
Baker, 903 F.2d at 1343. Note that this case came to trial before the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Thus, there were few Title VII remedies available to plaintiffs in "hostile work environment"
cases.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that:
In any action or proceeding under [Title VII] the court, in its discretion, may allow the
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least been awarded nominal damages.62
The only circuit which has consistently denounced awarding nominal
damages in Title VII cases is the Seventh Circuit.163 In Bohen v. City of East
Chicago,' Judge Easterbrook, acknowledging that a number of courts have
found nominal damages to be viable under Title VII, held that "[nominal]
damages are not 'equitable relief' within the meaning of Title VII. 6 1 Be-
cause Title VII's language mandates equitable relief but not damages, the
court rejected the plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees." Similarly, in
Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,67 the Seventh Circuit over-
turned a lower court's decision to provide nominal damages in a sexual ha-
rassment claim where a plaintiff could not prove economic harm. 6 The
court found that where reinstatement, backpay, and any other sources of com-
pensatory damages are not available, the defendant must prevail on the mer-
its.1
69
The Supreme Court has not addressed the role of nominal damages in
defining a "prevailing party" under Title VII. The Court, however, has re-
solved a similar issue in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In Farrar v. Hob-
by, '7 the Court declined to allow an attorney's fees award where the plain-
tiff was awarded only nominal damages. 7' According to the Court, the
threshold requirement for being considered a prevailing party is met "when
actual relief on the merits of [plaintiff's] claim materially alters the legal rela-
tionship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way
that directly benefits the plaintiff." "' While the moral satisfaction of win-
ning a lawsuit does not bestow "prevailing party" status,'73 a judgment for
damages--compensatory, punitive, or nominal-changes the legal relationship
prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee ... as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for
costs the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988).
162. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1147-48 (7th Cir. 1990); Dockter v.
Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1990); Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).




167. 882 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).
168. Id. at 1239-40. Here, the economic harm required was a showing that the harassment
resulted in discharge. Id.
169. Id. at 1240.
170. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
171. Id. at 570.
172. Id. This definition is a culmination of three previous decisions. See Texas State Teachers
Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989) (noting that to be considered a pre-
vailing party within the meaning of § 1988, the plaintiff must be able to point to a change in the
legal relationship between itself and the defendant); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per
curiam) (reaffirming that a judgment will constitute relief for purposes of § 1988 only if it affects
the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760-61 (1987)
(observing that respect for the ordinary language of § 1988 requires that a plaintiff obtain some
relief on the merits before he can be said to prevail).
173. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 573-74.
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between the parties, as the defendant is thereby required to pay money not
previously due.'74
Despite the plaintiff's prevailing party status in Farrar, the Court denied
attorney's fees by subjecting the nominal damage award to a reasonableness
test.'75 The Court recognized two classes of prevailing parties-those with
actual, compensable injuries, and those without such injuries.'76 Those plain-
tiffs unable to demonstrate actual injuries receive only nominal damages.'77
Both classes of plaintiffs are "prevailing" only for the purpose of guaranteeing
enforcement against the defendant. 7 ' The prevailing party status, however,
will not allow a "nominal damages prevailing party" to circumvent case law
requiring a reasonably proportionate relationship between a nominal damage
award and an attorney's fee award.'79 The Court emphasized that one of the
most essential factors in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee
award is the degree of success obtained." Indeed, the Court determined that
when an essential element of the plaintiff's claim for monetary relief is not
proven-as is the case for plaintiffs granted nominal damages solely to ensure
enforcement against the defendant--"the only reasonable fee is usually no fee
at all."'' Thus, the presence or absence of neither the prevailing party status
nor nominal damages were determinative to attorney's fees. The weakness of
plaintiff's showing-the absence of actual injury, and the unsuccessful mone-
tary claim-caused the Court's rejection of the claim for attorney's fees."2
B. Facts
In Griffith v. Colorado Division of Youth Services, a female employee
accused her male supervisor at the Division of Youth Services ("DYS") in
Adams County, Colorado, of racial discrimination and sexual harassment.8 3
The defendant supervisor referred to the plaintiff as a "stupid white woman"
and forcefully reprimanded her in the presence of others at the division. 4
Following an investigation, the defendant supervisor was discharged.8 5
174. Id. at 574.





180. Id.; see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983).
181. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 575.
182. The dissent noted that the case should have been remanded for a consideration of the
reasonableness of the award as the majority did not find that nominal damages could never sup-
port the awarding of attorney's fees. Id. at 579 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The dissent agreed that awarding $280,000 in attorney's fees where the plaintiff had only recov-
ered one dollar in a $17,000,000 suit was excessive as a matter of law. However, the dissent re-
fused to agree that the appropriate award was no fee at all. Id.
183. 17 F.3d 1323, 1324 (10th Cir. 1994). Griffith further alleged that she was subjected to
retaliation (i.e. denials of promotion) even after Grier, the supervisor, was terminated. Id. This
case is unusual in that the plaintiff was a white female and the supervisor was a black male. Id.
184. Id. at 1325. The incidents of sexual and racial discrimination also included: Grier's curs-





The district court granted summary judgment to DYS based on uncontro-
verted facts that the plaintiff received full pay during her administrative leave,
suffered no loss in wages or tenure, and was compensated by DYS for therapy
sessions due to job-related stress. s6 Since the plaintiff had not suffered any
actual damages, the court refused to grant nominal damages under Title
VII.'8 The court recognized a split among the circuits regarding the issue of
nominal damages, 8' but ruled that because Title VII only provides equitable
relief, and since nominal damages are compensatory rather than equitable in
nature, the plaintiff was not entitled to nominal damages. 8 9
In addition, the plaintiff's contention that her lack of promotion constitut-
ed retaliatory discrimination was dismissed."9 The court found that, in light
of a state-wide hiring freeze, Griffith could not demonstrate a specific position
denied to her.'9'
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo 92 Griffith's contention that the trial
court erred in refusing to award nominal damages, 93 and affirmed the judg-
ment for DYS.' 9'
Griffith argued that she was subjected to a "hostile work environment,"
noting that she had complained to various superiors long before the situation
erupted in the spring of 1990.'9' While Griffith acknowledged that "Congress
186. Id.
187. Id. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, remedies available for Title VII discrimination
claims were purely equitable incorporating injunctive relief (i.e. reinstatement) or backpay, and in
some cases front pay and lost benefits. Attorney's fees and costs for the prevailing party were also
available. Maureen E. McClain & Kevin G. Chapman, Updates in Employment Discrimination,
491 PRACTICING L. INST. LITIG. ADMIN. PRAC. 7 (1994). Section 102 of the 1991 Act expanded
recovery to include compensatory and punitive damages in the limited cases of intentional dis-
crimination. Id.
188. See Maney v. Brinkley Mun. Waterworks & Sewer Dep't, 802 F.2d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir.
1986) (award of nominal damages will support award of reasonable attorney's fees); Katz v. Dole,
709 F.2d 251, 253 n.1 (4th Cir. 1983) (even if the plaintiff does not regain her position, she might
be entitled to nominal damages and attorney's fees); T & S Serv. Assocs. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d
722, 728 n.8 (1st Cir. 1981) (where compensatory damages are not available, courts should con-
sider award of nominal damages). But see Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 431 (5th
Cir. 1992) (nominal damages are legal, not equitable relief and therefore outside the scope of Title
VII remedies), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994); King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898
F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (nominal damages are not available under Title VII); Swanson v.
Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1989) (nominal damages are not
available as equitable relief), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).
189. Griffith, 17 F.3d at 1325.
190. Id.
191. Griffith's EEOC claim was filed on April 4, 1990. The district court found that no pro-
motions were available to DYS counselors after that date. Id. at 1325-26.
192. Id. at 1326. The court applied the standard previously set forth by the Tenth Circuit that
"[s]ummary [j]udgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute over a material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Russillo v. Scarborough,
935 F.2d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1991)).
193. Id. Griffith asserted that nominal damages are not only an appropriate relief under Title
VII, but are necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Act. Id.
194. Id. at 1329.
195. Id. at 1325.
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did limit the scope of remedies under Title VII," she still maintained that hers
was a valid cause of action.' 96
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that employers may be liable under an
agency theory'97 as previously set forth in Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Correc-
tions Department.'98 According to the Hirschfeld test, however, the employer
may only be liable if "(1) the harasser acted within the scope of his employ-
ment, (2) the employer failed to remedy a hostile work environment brought
about by the sexual harassment of which the employer knew or should have
known, or (3) the harasser acted under apparent authority from the employ-
er.' 9 Noting that there was no evidence presented that DYS had a history
of condoning sexual harassment, and there were undisputed facts that DYS
had remedied the situation, the court held that "the matters related by Griffith
are so isolated, infrequent in terms of total employment service, or so ques-
tionable in relation to sexual harassment of Griffith that we agree with the dis-
trict court that the record contains only conclusory and speculative allegations,
none of which meet the Hirschfeld test."'2°
The court then addressed the issue of nominal damages. Nominal damag-
es are a "token" recognizing an invasion of the plaintiff's rights despite the
absence of actual damages.2"' In an abrupt departure from precedent, the
Tenth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, holding that nominal
damages were compensatory in nature. Since Title VII provides equitable
rather than legal relief, nominal damages were withheld entirely. 2
The court distinguished their previous decisions in Baker 3 and Derr v.
Gulf Oil Corp.204 by arguing that those cases awarded Title VII plaintiffs
nominal damages due to their prevailing party status.205 The Griffith court
insisted that Baker and Derr did not characterize nominal damages as equita-
ble or legal, leaving the court free to decide this issue in Griffith. 6
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1330.
198. 916 F.2d 572, 576-79 (10th Cir. 1990).
199. Griffith, 17 F.3d at 1330 (citing Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 576-79); see also Sauers v. Salt
Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cit. 1993) (harasser's employer could be liable as agent);
Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1170 (10th Cit. 1991) (employer may be liable for employee
indifference to citizens' rights); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417-18 (10th Cir.
1987) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) position that employer is
liable for employees acting in the scope of employment).
200. Griffith, 17 F.3d at 1330.
201. Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cit. 1973) (citing Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co. v. Clay, 194 F.2d 888 (1952)).
202. Griffith, 17 F.3d at 1327.
203. Baker, 903 F.2d at 1342 (affirming the district court's award of $1.00 in nominal damag-
es where other damages (i.e. actual and punitive) had also been recovered).
204. 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)
(finding plaintiff was the "prevailing party" because she had succeeded in proving significant
issues in the litigation)).





The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is not retroactive. 7 Because Griffith's
cause of action accrued in 1990,2' the Civil Rights Act of 1964 governed
the case despite the 1994 date of decision. Although the Tenth Circuit did not
speculate as to a result under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, its analysis of the
nature between equitable and legal remedies alone has created a dramatic legal
shift.
By rejecting its previous decisions in favor of a Seventh Circuit analy-
sis,2" the court adopted the position that "nominal damages are compensato-
ry in nature and since Title VII provides for equitable, not legal relief, nomi-
nal damages must not be awarded under Title VI. '210 The court also adopt-
ed2" ' the Fifth Circuit's decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,2'
which defined nominal damages as compensatory and excluded such recovery
from Title VII. 213 Since the Fifth Circuit had previously upheld awarding
nominal damages in the Title VII context, perhaps the Tenth Circuit was sim-
ply adopting the better argument. Despite the approval of nominal damages by
most circuits, 24 all agree that Title VII only provides equitable relief.
2 5
Thus, an award of any damages would seemingly contradict their holdings.1 6
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides for compensatory as well as puni-
tive damages; as such, the nature of Title VII changed from equitable to le-
gal. 17 Such a shift brings to the forefront the question of whether nominal
damages should be available in Title VII cases. The answer must be affirma-
tive.
As "hostile work environment" cases have previously illustrated, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 left many victims of sexual harassment "a right without a
remedy. '2t5 While the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides for compensatory
and punitive damages, a case could conceivably arise where neither economic
nor serious mental damages can be proven. The victim should not remain
uncompensated while the perpetrator remains unpunished. "Congress has stated
that eradicating discrimination in employment is a national priority of the
highest order. Thus, an award of nominal damages would be appropriate [un-
207. See, e.g., Steinle v. Boeing Co., 24 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994)).
208. Griffith, 17 F.3d at 1325.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 163-69.
210. Griffith, 17 F.3d at 1327.
211. Id.
212. 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), aff d, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
213. Id. at 431.
214. See supra note 159.
215. See, e.g., Swanson, 882 F.2d at 1240.
216. See Anne C. Levy, Righting the "Unrightable Wrong": A Renewed Call for Adequate
Remedies Under Title VII, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 567, 567-68 (1990).
217. Compensatory and punitive damages are legal and not equitable in nature. See Judith A.
Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and
Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV. 775, 793 (1991).
218. Sharon T. Bradford, Note, Relief for Hostile Work Environment Discrimination: Restor-
ing Title VII's Remedial Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 1611, 1630 (1990).
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der] Title VII." 9
Although Farrar held that the appropriate attorney's fee award might be
none at all where only nominal damages are awarded, perhaps attorney's fees
should be viewed as another source of punishing the perpetrators of discrimi-
nation and as a message that such behavior will no longer be tolerated.220
After all, awarding nominal damages while forbidding attorney's fees "vindi-
cates the plaintiff's rights but does not force the defendant employer to...
alter its relationship with the plaintiff' or consider future improvements in the
work environment.22 Further, denying attorney's fees might discourage attor-
neys from taking these meritorious cases. The Tenth Circuit will most likely
affirm the right to nominal damages in future Title VII cases. However, given
Farrar and the Tenth Circuit's conservative nature, attorney's fees will not
likely be procured where only nominal damages are awarded.
CONCLUSION
During its most recent term, the Tenth Circuit evinced a decidedly conser-
vative view of the status quo. O'Driscoll reaffirmed the after-acquired evi-
dence doctrine and would have extended its coverage but for the Supreme
Court's recent decision in McKennon.
In Griffith, the court adopted the more conservative view that nominal
damages should not be allowed in Title VII cases. Although the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 renders the issue mostly moot, current decisions best indicate the
court's future rulings.
The most surprising decision of this Survey period was the Tenth Circuit's
holding in Hurd. The court's post-Civil Rights Act of 1991 rationale was
analogous to its pre-Civil Rights Act of 1991 rationale. Hurd, a case where a
previous decision decided under Title VII was later adopted in the ADEA con-
text, reflects that the ties between Title VII and the ADEA remain intact.
Stephanie Van Auken
219. Yelonsky, supra note 157, at 441 (footnote omitted).
220. Note that punitive damages are currently available under Title VII only where "the com-
plaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discrimina-
tory practices with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l) (Supp. V. 1993).




Modem environmental law enforcement relies on cooperative efforts of
states and federal agencies. This approach is referred to as a cooperative feder-
alism process. Under this process, the federal government sets national statuto-
ry or regulatory environmental standards but allows states the flexibility to
determine how to meet those standards. Under most environmental regulations,
the federal government delegates enforcement authority to the states, yet
stands ready to step in if a state either fails to devise a method to meet the
standards, takes inadequate action, or simply fails to take required enforcement
actions against violators. The cooperative federalism approach raises the ques-
tion of whether the federal government can seek enforcement of the national
standards after a state initiates enforcement action. Thus far, courts have not
held the doctrine of claim preclusion to defeat the federal government's in-
dependent jurisdiction following state enforcement actions.'
The federal government's paternalistic role serves as an enforcement
safety net to the state's primary responsibility for environmental compliance.2
The popular support for this federal safety net, however, has diminished in
recent years. The emergence and popularity of the phrase "unfunded federal
mandates," as a substitute term for "cooperative federalism," provides evi-
dence of this decline. This Survey discusses two Tenth Circuit decisions from
the survey year that involve conflicts resulting from the dual federal/state
approach to environmental law.3
In Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc.,4 the Tenth Circuit limited New
Mexico's authority to invoke federal jurisdiction to seek penalties under the
Clean Air Act. This Survey analyzes the Tenth Circuit's approach, which
recognizes the supervisory and enforcement role that court's traditionally at-
tribute to the federal agencies. The Survey also discusses dicta from the opin-
ion that reflects the Tenth Circuit's willingness to depart from the traditional
1. See United States v. Ford Motor Co., 736 F. Supp. 1539, 1549-51 (W.D. Mo. 1990)
(holding that the Clean Air Act provides for independent federal enforcement, even if state con-
cludes manufacturer is in compliance); United States v. SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp. 411, 418-20 (D.
Md. 1985) (refusing to dismiss or stay a federal enforcement action because of administrative
consent order entered into after federal notice of violation issued). But cf Alabama ex rel.
Graddick v. Veterans Admin., 648 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (holding that a state
cannot enforce state regulations without also enforcing federal regulations).
2. Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., 32 F.3d 491, 493 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Train v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975).
3. The survey year covers decisions issued by the Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1993
and December 31, 1994. In the preceding year, the Tenth Circuit considered the federal/state inter-
action in United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 922
(1994); see also Shane J. Harvey, Environmental Law Survey, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 961, 978
(1994) (discussing the Tenth Circuit's recognition of state authority to regulate federal facilities).
4. 32 F.3d 491 (10th Cir. 1994).
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claim preclusion doctrine.
In Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners,5 the court
considered the issue of whether the federal Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act ("RCRA") preempted state and local hazardous waste regulations.6
After identifying the consistent guidance the Tenth Circuit provided for the
lower court to follow on remand, the Survey discusses the distinction between
the application of the preemption test in the Eighth Circuit and various state
Supreme Courts,7 and the factual application proposed by the Tenth Circuit in
Blue Circle Cement.8
I. STATES' AUTHORITY TO INVOKE FEDERAL JURISDICTION AFTER
PREVAILING IN STATE ACTION: ESPINOSA V. ROSWELL TOWER, INC. 9
A. Background
Whether referred to as cooperative federalism or unfunded federal man-
dates, the dual federal/state process constitutes a common thread in the en-
forcement of most modem environmental laws."° Under the Clean Air Act
("CAA")," for example, the federal Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") identifies criteria pollutants 2 and sets air quality standards 3 for
such pollutants to provide, with an adequate margin of safety, for human
health. 4 The standards established for the criteria pollutants constitute the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"). The states have the
responsibility of meeting these standards. The Act requires each state to sub-
mit a State Implementation Plan ("SIP") demonstrating its proposed method(s)
of meeting the NAAQS.5 If the EPA determines that the SIP is sufficient to
meet the CAA standards, it must approve the SIP. 6 If, on the other hand, the
EPA determines that a SIP proposed by a state is insufficient to meet the
Clean Air Act standards, the EPA has the authority to implement a Federal
Implementation Plan ("FIP") in lieu of a SIP. 7
Both state and federal agencies can enforce a SIP. Section 7411(c) of the
CAA authorizes state enforcement of a SIP 8 and § 7413(a) and (b) authorize
5. 27 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994).
6. Id. at 1504.
7. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
8. See Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1508-09.
9. 32 F.3d 491 (10th Cir. 1994).
10. Another commonly employed method is to attach conformity conditions on the receipt of
federal funds. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2423-24 (1992).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
12. Criteria pollutants refer to the substances for which EPA has established National Ambi-
ent Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"). Criteria pollutants include carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur
dioxide (SO 2), ozone (03), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), lead (Pb), and particulates. 40 C.F.R. § 50.1-
.12 (1994).
13. Standards are established based on a per unit volume basis. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (Supp. V 1993).
18. Section 7411 (c) states:
(c) State implementation and enforcement of standards of performance
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federal enforcement of a SIP in federal district courts.'9 Once approved by
the EPA, a SIP becomes enforceable federal law.2 ° To enforce a SIP, the
EPA can issue a Notice of Violation ("NOV"). 1 If the violation continues 30
days after the issuance of the NOV, and the EPA cannot reach an agreement
with the polluting source through negotiations, the EPA may enforce the SIP
either by issuing an administrative order or by instituting an enforcement
(1) Each State may develop and submit to the Administrator a procedure for
implementing and enforcing standards of performance for new sources located
in such State. If the Administrator finds the State procedure is adequate, he
shall delegate to such State any authority he has under this chapter to imple-
ment and enforce such standards.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the Administrator from enforcing
any applicable standard of performance under this section.
42 U.S.C. § 7411 (c) (1988).
19. Section 7413(a) & (b) provides:
(a) In general
(1) Order to comply with SIP
Whenever, on the basis of any information available to the Administrator, the
Administrator finds that any person has violated or is in violation of any re-
quirement or prohibition of an applicable implementation plan or permit, the
Administrator shall notify the person and the State in which the plan applies of
such finding. At any time after the expiration of 30 days following the date on
which such notice of a violation is issued, the Administrator may, without re-
gard to the period of violation (subject to section 2462 of Title 28)--
(A) issue an order requiring such person to comply with the requirements or
prohibitions of such plan or permit,
(B) issue an administrative penalty order in accordance with subsection (d) of
this section, or
(C) bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
(2) State failure to enforce SIP or permit program
Whenever, on the basis of information available to the Administrator, the
Administrator finds that violations of an applicable implementation plan or an
approved permit program under subchapter V of this chapter are so widespread
that such violations appear to result from a failure of the State in which the
plan or permit program applies to enforce the plan or permit program effec-
tively, the Administrator shall so notify the State. In the case of a permit pro-
gram, the notice shall be made in accordance with subchapter V of this chap-
ter. If the Administrator finds such failure extends beyond the 30th day after
such notice (90 days in the case of such permit program), the Administrator
shall give public notice of such finding. During the period beginning with such
public notice and ending when such State satisfies the Administrator that it
will enforce such plan or permit program (hereafter referred to in this section
as "period of federally assumed enforcement"), the Administrator may enforce
any requirement or prohibition of such plan or permit program with respect to
any person by-
(C) bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Civil judicial enforcement
The Administrator shall, as appropriate, in the case of any person that is the
owner or operator of an affected source, a major emitting facility, or a major
stationary source, and may, in the case of any other person, commence a civil
action for a permanent or temporary injunction, or to assess and recover a civil
penalty of not more than $25,000 per day for each violation, or both, in any of
the following instances:
42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(b) (Supp. V 1993).
20. United States v. Ford Motor Co., 736 F. Supp. 1539, 1546 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
21. Id.
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action under section 113 of 42 U.S.C. § 7413.22 Section 113 provides for in-
junctive relief, civil penalties,23 and criminal penalties.24
The statute authorizes the Administrator "to enforce a SIP in federal court,
acting as a supervisor to insure [sic] that the federal [air quality] standards are
met. '25 Temporal restrictions limit the supervisory role to the "period of fed-
erally assumed enforcement. '26 This period of federally assumed enforcement
begins when the Administrator notifies a state that violations of the applicable
enforcement plan are so widespread that they appear to have resulted from a
state's failure to effectively enforce the plan. Federally assumed enforcement
ends when the state demonstrates to the Administrator that it will enforce the
SIP.
27
Section 7411(c)(1) delegates the authority to states to implement and
enforce the SIP. The New Mexico Environmental Department ("NMED") in
Espinosa claimed that this delegation of authority was broad enough to allow
NMED to file an additional action in federal court against the defendants
following a successful state action.28
Any effort to bring a second, separate action that "arises out of the same
nucleus of operative facts as the prior claim" potentially implicates the claim
preclusion doctrine.29 Under that doctrine, "a final judgment on the merits
bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of
action."3 The doctrine precludes relitigation of a claim on grounds that were
raised or could have been raised in the prior action.3' The binding status of
the prior action bars subsequent admission of a matter that could have been
raised in the prior action.3"
In Espinosa, neither party contended that the issue in the federal action
did not arise from the same nucleus of operative facts as the state action. Also,
neither party claimed that the state action was not decided on the merits.33
Whether claim preclusion barred the issue in the federal action, therefore,
turned on whether the state could have initially brought a federal enforcement
action.
B. Facts
Roswell Tower, Inc.,34 Ray Bell, and Leonard Talbert (collectively
22. Id.
23. Violators may be assessed up to $25,000 per day. Id.
24. Polluters who knowingly violate an SIP may face criminal penalties. Id.
25. Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., 32 F.3d 491, 492 (10th Cir. 1994).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2).
27. Id.
28. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 492.
29. Lane v. Peterson, 889 F.2d 737, 742 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 823 (1990).
30. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
31. Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1467 (10th Cir. 1993).
32. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1974).
33. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 492 (seeking damages for the same conduct under the Clean Air
Act and requesting that the district court recognize the state court judgment).
34. Roswell Tower, Inc. is a property management corporation. See Plaintiff's Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1, Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., (No. CV-91-268)
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"RTI") owned and operated a commercial office building in New Mexico.3"
During an eight year period (1982-1990), RTI conducted numerous abatement
jobs to'remove and dispose friable asbestos from the ceilings of the occupied
office building.36 The New Mexico Environmental Department and its secre-
tary, Judith M. Espinosa (collectively "NMED"), brought suit in state court
against RTI for alleged violations of environmental regulations and nuisance
laws. 37 The state court awarded the plaintiff penalties of $76,837.3 RTI's
appeal is pending in state court. Subsequent to the state action, NMED initiat-
ed suit in the New Mexico federal district court on the same facts, requesting
that the district court recognize the state court judgment.39 The federal suit
sought to recover money damages of $25,000 per day as available under fed-
eral law,' instead of the maximum $1,000 per day per violation available
under New Mexico state law." The district court granted summary judgment
for RTI holding that: 1) even though NMED could file a federal action under
42 U.S.C. § 7412 to enforce the state emission standards, it could not seek the
federal penalties provided by § 7413; and 2) claim preclusion prevented
NMED from bringing suit in federal court.42 In Espinosa, NMED appealed
the lower court's decision that prevented NMED from invoking federal juris-
diction to seek federal penalties pursuant to the Clean Air Act after having
prevailed on the same issue in the state enforcement action.43
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding
that NMED, having prevailed in a state enforcement action, could not invoke
federal jurisdiction to seek federal penalties under the Clean Air Act.' The
Tenth Circuit found that states' authority, as delegated to the states by the
Clean Air Act, is limited to enforcement of the federally approved SIP through
the state administrative and judicial process. 5 The Tenth Circuit interpreted
the language in § 7413' as the procedural prerequisite to the federal enforce-
(N.M. Complaint filed July 29, 1991).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 2-4.
37. Id. at 6.
38. Appellee's Answer Brief at 2, Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., 32 F.3d 491 (10th Cir.
1994) (No. 93-2238).
39. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 492.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b).
41. Appellee's Answer Brief at 3, Espinosa (No. 93-2238) (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-
12(E) (Michie 1978)).
42. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 492.
43. Id. Neither party contended that a successful state action enforcing the $1,000 per day
state penalty precluded the EPA from bringing a federal action in federal court to enforce the
$25,000 per day penalty. The Tenth Circuit declined to address the issue of whether "a state ac-
tion, regardless of the outcome, could be followed by a federal action for the same violation." Id.
at 493 n.2.
44. Id. at 494.
45. Id. at 492. The Court of Appeals included in the states' authority the possibility to en-
force citizens' suits pursuant to § 7604. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1988).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
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ment of the states implementation plan. 47 The court found no language in the
Clean Air Act to allow states to pursue federal enforcement actions.' The
provisions authorizing the Administrator to enforce the SIP when the state
fails to do so "underscore the dual enforcement approach with the state gov-
ernment having primary control and federal action serving as an enforcement
safety net."
In concluding its opinion, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that its interpreta-
tion of §§ 7412 & 7413 was consistent with § 7416.0 Section 7416 states
that federal authority preempts state enforcement only when the state regula-
tion is less stringent than the SIP." Although the Tenth Circuit noted that
some cases have acknowledged the availability of jurisdictionally independent
enforcement actions," it rejected the line of reasoning that concludes that the
Clean Air Act allows states to bring federal enforcement actions under §
7412.13 The court rejected Alabama ex rel. Graddick v. Veterans Administra-
tion5 4 on the grounds that, under claim preclusion, an unsuccessful federal
action brought by a state would result in foreclosing the EPA from filing suit




This case illustrates the respective federal and state roles under the doc-
trine of cooperative federalism. While the limitations of the federal govern-
ment over the states trace back to the framing of the Constitution,56 the limi-
tations on the state role under the doctrine of cooperative federalism are a
relatively recent articulation of the law.
One reason for the resurgence in the doctrine of cooperative federalism
since the 1970s is the proliferation of environmental laws that require the state
and local implementation of federally imposed standards. The Constitution,
however, provides federal legislative authority over individuals as opposed to
states.57 Consequently, the federal authority over states to enforce the federal
mandates imposed by modem environmental law, is restricted to economic
reward or punishment, depending on the state's behavior.58 If a state behaves
as the federal government desires, economic reward in the form of continued
47. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 493.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
51. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 494.
52. Id.; see supra note 1.
53. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 494 (rejecting the reasoning of Alabama ex rel Graddick v. Vet-
erans Admin., 648 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Ala. 1986)).
54. 648 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
55. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 494.
56. See THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairchild ed., 1966)
("[Wle must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens,-the only proper ob-
jects of government.").




federal funding of projects, such as federal highway programs, continues.5 9
When a state "misbehaves," and does not comply with the federal mandate,
the withdrawal of federal funding for such projects constitutes the
punishment.' As long as states have the real choice to deny the federal man-
date and accept the consequence, the cooperative federalism approach is not in
danger of constitutional challenge." The Supreme Court explicitly supported
Congress's ability to "hold out incentives" provided they fall "short of outright
coercion. ' 2
The political ramifications of this type of system allow for the account-
ability of local interests to vest in the local electorate.63 For example, in a
state faced with a choice of implementing an unpopular federal mandate, the
political system is empowered to elect representation reflecting the local pref-
erence to suffer the economic consequences rather than comply with the feder-
al mandate. If the will of the people changes, the political system will reflect
that change and elect new representation consistent with the local goals.
The divided responsibilities of state and federal agencies in promulgating
and enforcing environmental laws create other advantages and disadvantages.
Participation at the federal level provides for the establishment of a consistent
set of national standards creating a minimum, or "floor," level of values that
serve as an environmental safety net.64 Federal involvement helps reduce the
temptation at the local level to attract new business to the area at the expense
of the environment by imposing a relaxed set of standards.65 Federal involve-
ment also helps prevent control of the state or local agency by the industries
supplying jobs and economic health to a region when these industries are not
in compliance with the law.
On the other hand, state involvement allows states to respond to state and
local goals and set standards that are more restrictive than those established by
the federal government. State action is not without cost however. Unfunded
federal mandates placed on the states can be a significant financial burden and
a source of political friction.' Also, a divided responsibility system creates
problems relating to the division of responsibility, and the resolution of incon-
sistencies in the system. The ruling in Roswell Tower, Inc. indicates that the
Tenth Circuit values the safety net provided by a consistent set of national
environmental standards over the burdens resulting from the unfunded federal






64. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 98 (1975); see also United
States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that states have rights to
impose limitations and standards more stringent than federal regulations promulgated under the
Clean Water Act).
65. United States v. Ford Motor Co., 736 F. Supp. 1539, 1550 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
66. See Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1507, 1518 (D. Mont. 1994) (questioning
the proper relationship between the federal government and the several states, and in particular,
the constitutionality of federally imposed unfunded mandates to the states).
19951
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
bility system.
2. State Enforcement in Federal Court
Contrary to the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Alabama ex rel.
Graddick, the federal district court in that case did not condone state enforce-
ment of federal law in federal court.6 7 In Graddick, the Alabama federal dis-
trict held that a state can enforce state law in either state or federal court.'
The federal court exercised pendent jurisdiction because, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(d)(1), the EPA adopted the state air pollution law.69
Standing alone, the language used by the Graddick court, stating that the
"[state agency] cannot be said to be attempting to enforce state regulations
without also being found to be enforcing federal regulations,"7 ° appears am-
biguous. In context, however, this statement becomes clear. The federal district
court made this statement in response to the defendant's contention that the
State of Alabama could not enforce state regulations for civil penalties in
federal court.7 ' The issue of whether a state could enforce federal law in fed-
eral court did not arise in Graddick.2
This contextual interpretation, (determining where state law may be en-
forced) is further supported in the federal district court's subsequent discussion
of the House of Representatives Report No. 294, which addressed the state's
"power to enforce state sanctions against federal facilities. ' 73 This discussion
centered on whether federal parties may be defendants, not on whether the
state may enforce federal law in federal court.
The real issue in Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., therefore, was not
whether a state could bring a state enforcement action in federal court after
having brought the same action in state court, but rather, could a state enforce
a federal law (the $25,000 per day civil penalty) in federal court after success-
fully bringing a state enforcement action ($1000 per day civil penalty) in state
court? In this case, the Tenth Circuit held that the state has no authority to en-
force the federal civil penalty.74 Left unanswered, however, is why the state
has no such authority. Two possibilities exist. First, the Tenth Circuit may be
judicially limiting the "full authority to ... implement and enforce ... Na-
tional Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP)" that the
EPA granted to New Mexico.7" The second possibility is that NMED's first
action to enforce the $1000 per day state penalty precluded them from en-
forcing the $25,000 per day federal penalty under the doctrine of claim preclu-
sion. This second possibility leaves unanswered the question of whether
67. See Graddick, 648 F. Supp. at 1211.
68. Id.
69. The state law adopted was Chapter 13 of the Alabama Department of Environmental




73. Id. at 1212 (emphasis added).
74. See supra text accompanying note 48.
75. 55 Fed. Reg. 5990 (1990).
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NMED could have enforced the $25,000 per day federal penalty if they had
not previously enforced the $1000 per day state penalty.
In rejecting the Graddick analysis because "it would... permit an unsuc-
cessful federal action brought by a state to foreclose the Administrator from
filing suit under the [federal] Clean Air Act," the Tenth Circuit made an un-
necessary statement.76 It is unnecessary because it addressed a moot point.
Graddick neither supported nor refuted the central issue in Espinosa77 of
whether a state agency may enforce a federal penalty in federal court. Reject-
ing the Graddick analysis, therefore, was unnecessary to the Espinosa deci-
sion.
3. Claim Preclusion
The lower court's ruling, affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, also held that
claim preclusion prevents NMED from bringing a federal action. 78 Most of
the Tenth Circuit's opinion addressed the state's authority to bring an enforce-
ment action in federal court; the claim preclusion issue elicited no direct re-
sponse. Since the court unanimously affirmed the lower court's decision, with
no reversal in part concerning the claim preclusion holding, it appears that the
Tenth Circuit concurred in toto with the decision below. In rejecting the rea-
soning in Graddick,79 however, the Tenth Circuit concluded the opinion with
dicta that seems to leave the door open for a federal suit brought by the EPA
on the same claim unsuccessfully brought by a state in federal court.8 0 Such a
suggestion implies that if the state had the authority to, and did bring the
action in federal court, the EPA could still bring a separate action despite its
failure to join the state's federal enforcement proceedings. This contradicts the
court's apparent affirmation that claim preclusion barred the present action.
Throughout its opinion, the court referred to the dual enforcement ap-
proach in a context of either state or federal action, rather than one of both
state and federal action. For example, the court stated that the Administrator
may assess the penalty if a state fails to do so; 8" and referred to "federal ac-
tion serving as a federal safety net."82 To allow federal action following un-
successful state action in federal court goes beyond the intended purpose of
providing a federal safety net.83
76. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 494.
77. Id. at 492.
78. Id.
79. 648 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
80. See Espinosa 32 F.3d at 494 (rejecting the analysis because "it would seem to permit an
unsuccessful federal action brought by a state to foreclose the Administrator from filing suit under
the Clean Air Act").
81. Id. at 493.
82. Id.
83. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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II. STATE AND LOCAL PREEMPTION OF RCRA: BLUE CIRCLE CEMENT, INC. V.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
4
A. Background
Unlike the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"),85 which addresses the cleanup of existing pollu-
tion, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") s6 regulates new
and active contamination sources. RCRA's goal is to minimize pollution by
tracing wastes8 7 and by conserving resources.8 To achieve at least a mini-
84. 27 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
87. RCRA established a "cradle to grave" tracking system for both solid and hazardous
wastes to prevent the unauthorized storage, treatment and disposal of wastes that are harmful to
health and the environment. This system requires that a manifest accompany all solid or hazardous
wastes from the time of their "generation" to their ultimate disposal. One of the keys to under-
standing RCRA is the complex relationship between "solid waste" and "hazardous waste" and the
differing statutory and regulatory definitions of each. Section 6903(27) of the statute defines solid
waste as any "garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant,
or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or
contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural opera-
tions, and from community activities." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1988). The same section exempts
from the definition of solid waste all solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or
dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges that are point sources subject
to permits under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. § 7342 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), or
special nuclear, or byproduct materials as defined by the Atomic Energy Act ("AEA"), 42 U.S.C.
2011 (1988). Id. In other words, just about everything that is discarded constitutes a solid waste
unless it is already regulated by the CWA or AEA or constitutes domestic sewage or irrigation
runoff. Although the statute does not define the term discarded, the regulatory definition is any
material which is abandoned [in certain ways], or recycled [in certain ways], or considered inher-
ently waste-like. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2. (1994). Both the statute and the regulations contain definitions
of hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5); 40 C.F.R. § 261.3. (1994). Common to both the statuto-
ry and regulatory definition is the requirement that a hazardous waste must also be a solid waste.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). A substance, therefore, that meets the statutory definition of being a "sub-
stantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, or disposed of" is not subject to RCRA unless it is also a solid waste. Id.
Practically, this means that even very dangerous substances are not regulated by RCRA until they
are disposed. Thus, the regulatory definition determining when a substance is disposed of becomes
a critical element in any RCRA action.
88. Section 6902 of RCRA states:
(a) Objectives
The objectives of this chapter are to promote the protection of health and the
environment and to conserve valuable material and energy resources by-
(6) minimizing the generation of hazardous waste and the land disposal of
hazardous waste by encouraging process substitution, materials recovery, prop-
erly conducted recycling and reuse, and treatment;
(7) establishing a viable Federal-State partnership to carry out the purposes of
this chapter and insuring that the Administrator will, in carrying out the provi-
sions of subchapter III of this chapter give a high priority to assisting and co-
operating with States in obtaining full authorization of State programs under
subchapter III of this chapter,
(11) establishing a cooperative effort among the Federal, State, and local gov-
ernments and private enterprise in order to recover valuable materials and
energy from solid waste.
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mum national environmental standard, Congress bars states and municipalities
from imposing less stringent requirements than the federal RCRA provi-
sions.8 9 In keeping with the theme of a state/federal cooperative effort, states
have the authority to adopt more stringent provisions than those set forth by
the federal EPA." The federal RCRA provisions, therefore, establish a
"floor," as opposed to a "ceiling," limit on pollution standards.9
The policy objectives behind RCRA's promotion of recovering materials
and properly conducting recycling and reuse92 include: 1) recovering energy
and other valuable items from discarded materials; 2) avoiding environmental
dangers; 3) protecting a scarce land supply; 4) reducing the trade balance; and
5) reducing the nation's reliance on foreign energy and materials.93 A state's
ability to impose additional restrictions to address their local preferences re-
garding these goals, however, creates a potential for conflict between state and
federal law. When, as in Blue Circle Cement, the state's RCRA provisions
conflict with the federal provisions, preemption becomes an issue.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution states that "the
laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 9 4 In the absence of explicit
preemptive language in a federal statute, the United States Supreme Court
recognizes two types of implied preemption.95 First, "field preemption" refers
to situations where the scheme of federal regulation is "so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for States to supple-
ment it." The second type of implied preemption is "conflict preemp-
(b) National policy
The Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United States
that, wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or
eliminated as expeditiously as possible. Waste that is nevertheless generated
should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present and
future threat to human health and the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1988).
89. Section 6929 states:
Upon the effective date of regulations under this subchapter no State or political subdi-
vision may impose any requirements less stringent than those authorized under this
subchapter respecting the same matter as governed by such regulations, except that if
application of a regulation with respect to any matter under this subchapter is postponed
or enjoined by the action of any court, no State or political subdivision shall be prohib-
ited from acting with respect to the same aspect of such matter until such time as such
regulation takes effect. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any State or
political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirements, including those for site
selection, which are more stringent than those imposed by such regulations.
42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988).
90. Id.
91. See Old Bridge Chemicals, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 965 F.2d 1287,
1292 (3d Cir. 1992).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(6).
93. Blue Circle Cement, Inc., v. Board of County Comm'rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir.
1994).
94. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
95. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1504.
96. Id. (quoting Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982)).
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tion. ' Conflict preemption occurs where "compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility" or where state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.""
Because Congress set only a floor and not a ceiling in RCRA,"u express
or implied preemption does not exist where the state or local regulations are
more restrictive than RCRA."'0 Congress explicitly provides in § 6929 that
state and local governments may adopt solid and hazardous waste regulations
more stringent than those imposed by federal EPA. 2 This explicit provision
precludes an implication of federal supremacy via field preemption. Therefore,
only if state or local ordinances regulating the treatment, storage, and disposal
of hazardous waste frustrate the "full accomplishment of congressional purpos-
es embodied in [RCRA]" (an example of conflict preemption), would the
federal provisions preempt state or local provisions. 3
B. Facts
In the early 1980s, Blue Circle Cement, Inc. ("Blue Circle") planned to
convert its coal and natural gas fired cement kilns to use Hazardous Waste
Fuels ("HWFs").' ° The zoning ordinance in effect at the time made no ref-
erence to recycling operations but required industrial operators to obtain a
conditional use permit to establish an "industrial waste disposal site."'05 Blue
Circle considered burning HWFs to constitute "recycling" or "burning for
energy recovery""'° rather than disposal.'0" Consequently, Blue Circle did
not believe that the ordinance required a conditional use permit for their pro-
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)).
99. Id. (quoting Hines V. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
100. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
101. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1504.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 6929.
103. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1505.
104. HWFs are a less expensive type of fuel that contain industrial wastes with a high British
Thermal Unit ("BTU") value. Id. at 1501-02.
105. Id. at 1502; see CLAREMORE-ROGERS COUNTY, OKLA., METROPOLITAN PLANNING
COMM'N ZONING ORDINANCE § 3.13.2.
106. The EPA recognized that "burning of hazardous wastes as fuels can be a type of recy-
cling activity exempted from regulation." 48 Fed. Reg. 11,157-58 (1983). The burning must con-
stitute legitimate, as opposed to sham, recycling to fall within the exemption. 48 Fed. Reg. 11,158
(1983). The "energy value of the hazardous waste being ... burned "is the primary factor in dis-
tinguishing sham from legitimate burning for energy recovery. A limit of 5000 BTU/lb. is general-
ly considered the minimum for a legitimate hazardous waste fuel. 56 Fed. Reg. 7183 (1991). "If
the wastes being burned have only de minimis energy value, the burning cannot recover sufficient
energy to characterize the practice as legitimate recycling .... [Tihe wastes, for practical purposes
are being burned to be destroyed." 48 Fed. Reg. 11,158 (1983). The nature of the device used to
burn the hazardous waste can be relevant to whether the material is being recycled by being
burned for energy recovery or abandoned by being burned or incinerated. United States v. Self, 2
F.3d 1071, 1080 n.8 (10th Cir. 1993). High BTU materials burned in an incinerator that is unable
to retrieve the energy from the material is considered to be burned for destruction. Id. Likewise,
low BTU materials burned in a boiler or industrial furnace are also considered to be burned for
the purpose of destruction because of their limited energy value. Id.
107. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1502.
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posed conversion."a The board of County Commissioners of Rogers County,
Oklahoma ("Board") disagreed and informed Blue Circle that the ordinance re-
quired the permit." Rather than apply for the permit, Blue Circle filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma,
seeking a declaratory judgment that burning HWFs did not constitute industrial
disposal."' While Blue Circle's suit was pending, the Board amended the
ordinance to require a conditional use permit for "recycling" and "treatment"
of HWFs. " Blue Circle amended its complaint to allege that the amended
ordinance: 1) was preempted by RCRA; 2) constituted a violation of the Com-
merce Clause; and 3) could not equitably be enforced retroactively."' 2 The
District Court denied both Blue Circle's summary judgment motion and the
Board's motion to dismiss.' Immediately before trial, however, the district
court sua sponte issued a summary judgment in favor of the Board. The court
held that: 1) RCRA did not preempt the Ordinance; 2) the Ordinance did not
violate the Commerce Clause; and 3) Blue Circle had not acquired a vested
right to use HWFs and, therefore, the amended Ordinance was constitutional
as applied." 4 Blue Circle appealed the summary judgment.
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit swiftly reversed the district court's sua sponte grant of
summary judgment, citing procedural grounds and prejudice to the non-moving
party.' Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) authorizes courts to
treat motions to dismiss as requests for summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit
found that Blue Circle had not received the requisite "reasonable opportunity
to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."' 16 The
court reasoned that because Blue Circle had been denied the opportunity to
present its own factual materials in defense of the summary judgment motion,
the district court's actions were prejudicial. The finding of prejudice prevented
the Tenth Circuit from holding that the lower court's ruling constituted harm-
less error." 7 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit remanded for further proceed-
108. See id. at 1502.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The Rogers County Ordinance, § 3.13.2, "Industrial Waste
Disposal/Recycling/Treatment" as amended states:
An Industrial Waste Disposal/Recycling/Treatment Site shall not be less than one
hundred sixty (160) acres in size and no other industrial waste dispos-
al/recycling/treatment site shall be nearer than one (1) mile (5,280 feet) in any direction
from the proposed industrial waste/recycling/treatment site. The site will be as nearly
square as possible.
All industrial waste disposal/recycling/treatment sites shall be located at least one
(1) mile from any platted residential subdivision.
Id. at 1509.
112. Id. at 1502.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1502-03.
115. Id. at 1503-04.
116. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
117. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1503-04.
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ings on the summary judgment issue." '
The Tenth Circuit also reversed and remanded on the dormant Commerce
Clause issue."9 The court stated that because the ordinance operates
evenhandedly, in that it does not distinguish between hazardous waste generat-
ed within and outside Rogers County, the less stringent Pike test applied rather
than the stricter test reserved for statutes that explicitly discriminate based on
the origin of the article of commerce. 20 Because the district court failed to
apply the Pike test, the court of appeals held that the record was inadequate to
support a summary judgment for the Board on the commerce clause chal-
lenge. 2 '
On the retroactivity issue, the court affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Board. 2 In the district court proceeding,
Blue Circle contended that it would be inequitable to apply the amended ordi-
nance after they had incurred engineering and planning costs in reliance on the
conditions imposed by the original ordinance.'23 The district court ruled that
Blue Circle had no vested rights in burning HWFs at its cement plant prior to
the Board's amendment to section 3.13.2. '12 Blue Circle reformulated its ar-
gument on appeal.'" Blue Circle alleged that the Board acted inequitably by
amending the ordinance to specifically thwart their HWF project.'26 The
Court of Appeals refused to follow In re Julius Bankoff,'21 the only authority
supporting Blue Circle's claim, because the original opinion, "Bankoff I," had
been withdrawn and superseded. Its successor, "Bankoff II,'"' had not yet
been released for publication and, therefore, the opinion lacked precedential
value. 29
On the issue of whether RCRA preempted the Board's ordinance, the
Tenth Circuit held that a genuine issue of material fact existed and remanded
for a factual determination.10 The court's holding focused on the inappropri-
ateness of the summary judgment.13' The record reflected Blue Circle's con-
tention that no 160-acre plot existed in the county meeting that could meet the
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1512.
120. Id. at 1511-12. The Pike test requires the court to scrutinize: 1) the nature of the local
putative benefits advanced by the ordinance; 2) the burden the Ordinance imposes on interstate
commerce; 3) whether the burden is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits; and 4)
whether the local interests can be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate commerce.
Id. at 1512; see Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
121. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1512.
122. Id. at 1514.
123. See id. at 1502.
124. Id. at 1503.
125. Id. at 1513.
126. Id.
127. No. 69586 & No. 78146, 1992 WL 131940 (Okla. June 16, 1992) ("Bankoff I").
128. In re Julius Bankoff, 875 P.2d 1138 (Okla. 1994) ("Bankoff II").
129. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1513. Under Rule 1.200(B)(E) of the Oklahoma Rules of
Appellate Procedure an unpublished opinion "shall not be considered as precedent by any court or
in any brief or other material presented to any court, except to support a claim of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or law of the case." Id.




criteria listed in Rogers County Ordinance § 3.13.2.32 The record also re-
flected, however, that the Board had identified three sites that, if rezoned from
floodplain to industrial, would qualify under the ordinance.' 33 Because Blue
Circle could apply for a variance from the zoning requirements, the Board
argued that the ordinance did not constitute an absolute ban on hazardous
waste.' 34 Blue Circle, in turn, argued that the alternative sites did not meet
requirements for storing and burning hazardous wastes because of their flood-
plain status and, therefore, it was inconceivable the sites would be rezoned to
permit such activity.' 5 The court considered this exchange on the record to
constitute "a serious [factual] dispute over whether this ordinance imposes a
de facto ban on the burning of HWFs in Rogers County."'
' 36
In addition to reversing and remanding the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the Board on the preemption issue, the Tenth Circuit pro-
vided explicit guidance to the lower court on remand. In so doing, the Tenth
Circuit drew upon a somewhat limited, albeit consistent, body of case law to
direct the preemption analysis. 37 Where state or local ordinances constitute
an explicit or de facto total ban of an activity otherwise encouraged by RCRA,
the federal RCRA provisions preempt those state or local provisions.
38
When the ordinance does not operate as a complete ban on the encouraged
activity, no preemption results, provided that the ordinance is supported by a
record establishing it as a reasonable response to a legitimate local concern for
safety or welfare.139 If the state or local ordinance does not address, or is not
reasonably related to, a legitimate concern, then it "may be regarded as a sham
and nothing more than a naked attempt to sabotage federal RCRA policy of
encouraging the safe and efficient disposition of hazardous waste materi-
als."'1
40
The Tenth Circuit instructed the lower court on remand to follow the lead
of the Eighth Circuit 4 ' and the Supreme Courts of Louisiana,42
Arkansas,4 3 and Wyoming'" in concluding that a total ban on encouraged
132. See supra note 116.




137. Id. at 1508.
138. Id.; ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1986); Ogden Envtl. Servs. v.
City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 1446-47 (S.D. Cal. 1988); Jacksonville v. Arkansas Dep't
of Pollution Control and Ecology, 824 S.W.2d. 840, 842 (Ark. 1992); Rollins Envtl. Servs. v.
Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So.2d 1127, 1132 (La. 1979).
139. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1508; Lafarge Corp. v. Campbell, 813 F. Supp. 501,
508-12 (W.D. Tex. 1993); Old Bridge Chemicals, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
965 F.2d 1287, 1296-97 (3d Cir. 1992); North Haven Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Upjohn Co.,
753 F. Supp. 423, 431 (D. Conn.), aff d, 921 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1990).
140. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1508.
141. See ENSCO, 807 F.2d at 745 (finding that RCRA preempted county ordinance that im-
posed an outright ban on storage, treatment, or disposal of hazardous waste).
142. Rollins, 371 So.2d at 1132 (holding that RCRA preempted a parish ordinance's flat ban
on hazardous waste disposal).
143. City of Jacksonville, 824 S.W.2d at 842 (holding that RCRA preempted a city ordinance
that barred the incineration of hazardous waste because the local measure frustrated RCRA's
"preference for treatment rather than land disposal of hazardous waste").
144. Hermes Consol., Inc. v. People, 849 P.2d 1302, 1311 (Wyo. 1993) ("[Allthough [§ 6929]
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activity will result in preemption by RCRA 45 If, on the other hand, the low-
er court should find that the ordinance falls short of a total ban, a finding of
preemption is only compelled if the record fails to support a legitimate con-
cern. " Such a finding is likely since the Board conceded that no documents
exist to support the Board's concern for the amendment to section 3.133.2.' 4
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Blue Circle Cement makes a significant
contribution to the analysis of RCRA issues regarding implied preemption.
The two part test articulated by the court," however, falls short of providing
a clear guide to the present state of the law. For example, the first part of the
test states: "ordinances that amount to an explicit or de facto ban on an activi-
ty that is otherwise encouraged by RCRA will ordinarily be preempted by
RCRA."' 49 Two problems arise in applying this part of the test to a given set
of facts. First, the opinion provides no definition of the term "ordinarily." By
including this term, the court correctly suggested that circumstances can exist
that allow an ordinance with a total ban effect to avoid RCRA preemption.
The court, however, did not address what constitutes such circumstances.
The second problem arises when the effect of an ordinance constitutes a
total ban, yet the elusive circumstances allowing such a total ban to survive
RCRA preemption are not satisfied. Theoretically, the district court could rule
on remand that the effect of the Board's ordinance constituted a permissible de
facto ban on HWF burning, an activity encouraged by RCRA. Without an
articulated standard, Blue Circle is unable to overcome such a determination.
This effectively removes the state from the purported cooperative federal/state
process.
The Tenth Circuit recognized the possibility that a total ban on hazardous
waste activity in a densely populated residential area, thereby constituting a
significant threat to health or safety, could be upheld as a reasonable exercise
of state and local authority over that of RCRA. 50 Such an example, with a
clearly articulated factual determination of risk in a densely populated area,
does little to guide the analysis of the next case in which the determination of
risk and density of population may fall more in the "gray zone" of legal and
factual certainty.
Perhaps a heightened degree of scrutiny should be built into part one of
the implied preemption test. With this heightened scrutiny, courts could re-
allows states to adopt more stringent regulations, it does not authorize them to defeat safe federal
solutions ... [or] to directly subvert RCRA and [EPA] decisions by outright bans on activities
federal authorities considered safe.").
145. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1505. Implied preemption prevents the frustration of the
full accomplishment of congressional purposes. Id.
146. Id. at 1510 n.10. Blue Circle had asked the Board to identify any documents that address
the "scope, necessity, or basis" for the amendment. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 1508.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1508 n.7.
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quire more than just a reasonable state or local interest for an ordinance that
results in an explicit or de facto ban: a state or local ordinance could only
survive preemption by RCRA if it constituted a means substantially related to
a compelling state interest.
Part two of the Tenth Circuit's implied preemption rule states: "an ordi-
nance that falls short of imposing a total ban on encourage activity will ordi-
narily be upheld so long as it is supported by a record establishing that it is a
reasonable response to a legitimate local concern for safety or welfare.''
Language such as "reasonable response" and "legitimate local concern" sug-
gests that the court is applying a rational basis standard of review. The fact
that the Tenth Circuit established a two part test, with the rational basis stan-
dard of review applied only to the second part, arguably suggests that the
court envisioned a heightened level of scrutiny for part one, even if it did not
explicitly articulate it as such.
The analysis of part two of the Tenth Circuit's implied preemption test
reveals that it actually consists of four sub-parts. The first sub-part focuses on
the effect of the ordinance. In essence, the effect of the ordinance determines
whether part one or two of the test is controlling. Anything short of an explicit
or de facto ban on the RCRA encouraged activity falls under part two of the
test. Sub-part two requires that a record support both sub-parts three and four.
Sub-parts three and four constitute the traditional elements of the rational basis
standard of review. For example, sub-part three requires the ordinance to be a
reasonable response to sub-part four, which requires a legitimate concern for
safety or welfare.
In summary, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Blue Circle Cement consoli-
dated a consistent body of law within the circuits regarding implied preemp-
tion in RCRA cases. It failed, however, to capitalize on an opportunity to set
forth a clear rule articulating the consistent body of law within the circuits.
CONCLUSION
In Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., the Tenth Circuit limited a state's
enforcement authority of federally approved SIPs. The court held that a state
may not pursue enforcement of federal sanctions when it has previously en-
forced state sanctions for the same violation. Under these facts, the Tenth
Circuit limits states' authority to state administrative and judicial review.
Whether this decision reserves all enforcement through the federal judicial
process to the federal agencies, however, remains unanswered. This decision
conforms to the congressional delegation of primary responsibility for the
prevention and control of air pollution to states and the supervision and en-
forcement authority delegated to federal authorities. 52 The decision departs
from accepted notions of claim preclusion, however, in that it implies that a
federal agency may relitigate the same issue against the same party that suc-
cessfully defended itself on that issue against a state agency.
151. Id. at 1508.
152. See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975).
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In Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners, the Tenth
Circuit described its approach to the issue of federal preemption of state ordi-
nances under RCRA. The court missed an opportunity to articulate a clear rule
regarding the respective standard of review applicable to ordinances that con-
stitute a total ban, or a partial ban of a RCRA encouraged activity. The deci-
sion, however, is consistent in structure with that of the Eighth Circuit and
various state Supreme Courts. It implied that Blue Circle Cement is an exam-
ple of federal RCRA preemption of a local ordinance due to the failure to
show, on the record, that the ordinance reasonably relates to a legitimate state
concern. The Tenth Circuit, in both Blue Circle Cement and Espinosa, af-
firmed the dominant role it ascribes to federal authority in the cooperative




This article addresses three Survey year' decisions in which the Tenth
Circuit affirmed lower court rulings regarding evidentiary admissions. These
resolutions continue recent trends in which the Tenth Circuit has broadly inter-
preted federal statutes and evidence rules. These trends favor an inclusive
approach to evidence admission which may aid a court or jury by providing
additional testimony for their consideration. This policy, however, may unfair-
ly prejudice the person who opposes the evidentiary admission. The circuit's
approach often furthers the legislative goals and Supreme Court interpretations
of federal statutes and evidence rules.
In the first case addressed, United States v. Overstreet,2 the issue was
whether federal prosecutors presented sufficient evidence to prove that a con-
victed felon3 possessed a firearm that had "travelled in interstate commerce."4
The court's decision makes it easier for federal courts to impose gun posses-
sion convictions. The second case, LWT, Inc. v. Childers,5 determined that a
person's pleadings from a prior state court action are admissible against that
person in a subsequent federal court action.6 This decision may frustrate the
liberal pleading and joinder policies prescribed by the federal rules of evi-
dence. Video animation prepared by an expert witness was admitted in the
third case, Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad.7 The Tenth Circuit based
its decision to admit the video on a recent Supreme Court case which expand-
ed the role of expert witnesses by admitting relatively new scientific opin-
ions.8
The resolution of these cases indicates that the Tenth Circuit will allow
district courts to push the boundaries of balance required by federal rules of
evidence.9 This policy permits admission of evidence that may be probative
1. The survey year spans from September 1, 1993 to December 31, 1994.
2. 40 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995).
3. The defendant was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1)-(2) which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person who, (1) has been convicted of a crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or (2) who is a fugitive from justice, to
ship or transport any firearm or ammunition in interstate commerce, or receive any fire-
arm or ammunition transported in interstate commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)-(2) (1988).
4. Overstreet, 40 F.3d at 1095. Proof that the firearm was transported in interstate com-
merce is an essential element of the statute under which the defendant was charged. Id. at 1095
n.4. See supra note 3. Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress to impose restrictions
related to items shipped via interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. 19 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. 1994).
6. Id. at 542.
7. 16 F.3d 1083, 1086 (10th Cir. 1994).
8. See id. at 1088 (discussing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2786 (1993)).
9. FED. R. Evil. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
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but is, at least arguably, prejudicial. In each of the three cases, the proponent
of the disputed evidence ultimately prevailed in the underlying trial.
In addition to detailing the Tenth Circuit's trend toward admission of
disputed evidence, this Survey examines the resolution of similar disputes in
other circuits and indicates that other circuits may exclude evidence similar to
that admitted in these cases. This Survey also reviews a significant difference
between the Tenth Circuit and a state court within its geographical region.
That difference may result in forum shopping between state and federal courts
within the geographical area of the Tenth Circuit.
I. EVIDENCE OF INTERSTATE TRANSPORT OF FIREARMS
A. Background
Possession of a firearm that was transported via interstate commerce may
violate federal law if the firearm possessor is a fugitive from justice or has
been convicted of a felony.'0 People who use firearms while committing
some federal crimes may face penalties in addition to the punishment they
receive for the underlying crime. For example, a person who carries or uses a
gun while committing a violent crime or a drug trafficking offense may face
additional penalties. The enhanced prison sentence will range from five to
thirty years, depending on whether the firearm is a handgun, short-barreled
rifle, or machine gun." A second conviction under the statute may result in
life imprisonment. 2 Under federal law, district courts are powerless to sus-
pend the additional sentence, which runs consecutively with other penalties. 3
Further, a person with three prior felony convictions who is later convicted of
possessing a firearm transported in interstate commerce could receive a
$25,000 fine and additional prison time of at least fifteen years. 4 The court
may not suspend the sentence, and the convicted person will neither receive
probation nor be eligible for parole under this conviction. 5 These enhanced
penalties are "designed to designate additional punishment for armed, repeat-
ing, criminals."' 6
The use of guns during the commission of violent or drug trafficking
crimes probably led to many of these penalty enhancement statutes. Neither
tion of cumulative evidence."
10. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l)-(2). The text of those subsections is provided supra note 3.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) provides: "Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of vio-
lence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for
five years ... " or thirty years if the firearm is a machine gun. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
12. Id. A second or subsequent conviction results in a sentence of twenty years im-
prisonment, and if the firearm is a machine gun, or equipped with a firearm silencer or muffler, or
is a destructive device, life imprisonment without release. Id.
13. Id. No person sentenced under this subsection shall be eligible for parole during the term
of imprisonment. Id.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988).
15. Id.




the application of these statutes nor the act of proving firearm possession or
use has been as easy as might be expected. One of the earliest cases involving
a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l), 7 a firearm use or possession statute,
was United States v. Jssacs.'5 The prosecution sought to introduce firearms as
evidence of drug trafficking and the defendant objected on grounds of double
jeopardy. 9 At a prior trial, the defendant had been acquitted of using a gun
while possessing drugs with the intent to distribute.20 The Ninth Circuit stated
that the "trial judge has discretion to admit evidence of firearms in drug traf-
ficking cases. '"2 ' Also, the dismissal of the gun counts relating to drug pos-
session did not preclude admission of the firearms if that evidence was rele-
vant to prove gun use during drug trafficking.22
Proving possession or use of firearms is often difficult when there are
multiple parties to the crime. In a Seventh Circuit case, United States v.
Missick, a the court was asked to decide whether a person who supplied drugs
could be given an enhanced sentence for possessing or using a gun during an
illegal drug sale when only the purchasers had a gun with them during the
transaction. The purchasers were charged with using the gun during the drug
trafficking crime.24 The court stated that the seller might have similarly been
charged based on the purchasers' gun possession under a co-conspirator theory
of liability. 5 However, the defendant's enhanced penalty for firearm use was
dismissed because the prosecution failed to show that the defendant was in-
volved in a conspiracy with the purchasers. 6
A recent Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Medina,2 affirmed an en-
hanced penalty for gun use in a conspiracy.28 Evidence showed that the de-
fendant housed guns in his apartment during the course of the conspiracy.29
The court attributed gun possession to the defendant since the prosecution
demonstrated that a member of the conspiracy possessed a gun and the posses-
sion was reasonably foreseeable to other members of the conspiracy."0
The Tenth Circuit employs an interesting approach to prove that firearms
17. The text of the section is provided supra note 11.
18. 708 F.2d 1365, 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983).
19. Id. at 1371.
20. Id. A judge had granted Issacs' motion for acquittal on two counts of using a gun to
commit the drug possession crimes. That first trial ended in a mistrial. Id. at 1366. The Circuit
found no merit in Issacs' double jeopardy argument. Id. at 1371.
21. Id. at 1371.
22. Id.
23. 875 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1989).
24. Id. at 1301. They were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Id.
25. Id. See also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946) (stating the require-
ments necessary to show conspiracies and resulting liabilities).
26. Missick, 875 F.2d at 1302. The defendant had not been charged as a conspirator. The
underlying conviction of drug trafficking was affirmed. The case was remanded for resentencing
because the trial judge erred in enhancing the penalty for firearm use or possession. Id.
27. 992 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
28. Id. at 592.
29. Id.
30. ld. Extensive evidence was presented at trial regarding the intricacy and interrelationship
of the conspiracy and its members. The Circuit did not elaborate on why gun use was foreseeable.
Id.
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were transported via interstate commerce. The approach makes it relatively
easy to obtain gun possession convictions and seems biased in favor of the
prosecution. Essentially, it allows federal district courts to rely on evidence of
an absence of gun manufacturers in the state where the defendant is charged to
prove a gun found in that state must have travelled via interstate commerce.
In United States v. Gregg,3' the defendant was charged with possessing a
firearm previously shipped in interstate commerce and for robbing an Oklaho-
ma bank.32 Two hand guns were found in Gregg's car when he was ar-
rested.3 3 Finding the guns, however, was not a prerequisite for a firearm pos-
session conviction.34 Proof of firearm possession was shown by detailed testi-
mony at trial given by the bank's employees and customers.35
Evidence that the gun was transported interstate was shown by testimony
of a firearms expert that there were no major gun manufacturers in Oklahoma,
and that Ruger single action weapons are manufactured only in Connecticut.
36
The Tenth Circuit therefore concluded that the gun used by Gregg was trans-
ported interstate. This evidence, and the fact that Gregg had a prior felony
conviction, was sufficient to affirm the firearm possession charge. 8
In another Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Hamilton,39 a gun posses-
sion charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)' was affirmed.4 The defendant
confessed to using a gun obtained in West Virginia during a service station
robbery in Oklahoma. The gun was never found.42 The defendant, represent-
ing himself at trial, stated that he carried a carved wooden replica of a gun
during the robbery. Although this contradicted his earlier confession, he ar-
gued he could not be convicted of a firearm possession charge.43
On appeal, Hamilton argued for reversal because the prosecution failed to
produce the gun at trial and the indictment stated he used a gun, not a wooden
31. 803 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 920 (1987).
32. Id. at 569.
33. Id. at 571 n.2. "One of the hand guns was a Ruger Security Six .357 Magnum revolver
with dark finish and handle, and the other was a Sterling .380 automatic, with a silver type fin-
ish." Id.
34. Id. at 571. The Circuit stated "[tihe government was not required to produce an actual
firearm at trial, or prove the specific manufacturer or serial number of the firearm in question." Id.
35. Id. The bank president described the gun as "kind of a blue steel revolver." Another
employee described the gun as "about so long ... like a cowboy gun that you see in the mov-
ies ... it had white handles." Other witnesses described the gun as looking like a Ruger and a
single action revolver. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. "Proof that a firearm is manufactured outside the state in which the possession oc-
curred is sufficient to support a finding that the possession was in or affected commerce." Id. See
also United States v. Johnson, 722 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). The trial court in that
case admitted a serial number report provided by the gun manufacturer to show that the gun re-
covered at the crime scene was manufactured out of state. Id. at 409.
38. Gregg, 803 F.2d at 571. Gregg had three prior felony convictions. Id. at 569.
39. 992 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1993).
40. See supra note 3.
41. Hamilton, 992 F.2d at 1130.
42. Id. at 1128. Hamilton stated, shortly after his arrest, that he used a .38 revolver, obtained
in a Benwood, West Virginia burglary, in the Oklahoma service station robbery. Id.
43. Id. at 1129. Hamilton maintained that a wooden replica of a gun was not a "firearm."
The jury found him guilty. Id.
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replica."M The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument by stating that convictions
will not be set aside for simple variances between the facts presented at trial
and the indictment as long as the crime at issue is proved.45 The court relied
on the service station employee's testimony to prove firearm use.' Both par-
ties had stipulated that there were no gun manufacturers in Oklahoma,"' so
the court concluded that the gun was transported interstate.4 Based on this
evidence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the firearm possession charge.49
Together, these cases indicate the Tenth Circuit's willingness to affirm
firearm possession convictions if the guns are recovered. The court may also
affirm convictions in situations where the gun is not recovered but is accurate-
ly described. Even in the absence of confessions regarding firearm transport,
the Tenth Circuit may still uphold convictions. Such convictions are made
possible by testimony that the specific type of firearm described is manufac-
tured outside the state where it was used by the defendant. As such, the issue
in United States v. Overstreet," was whether a defendant may be convicted if
a gun is either not recovered or accurately described. Also at issue was the
admissibility of speculative testimony regarding interstate transport despite the
lack of an accurate description of the gun.5'
B. United States v. Overstreet
1. Facts
In Overstreet," the defendant was charged with armed carjacking," us-
ing a firearm while committing a violent crime,4 and possessing a firearm as
a convicted felon." Early in 1993, the defendant and the victim, Miles Hold-
en, agreed to swap the defendant's Jeep Cherokee for Holden's Chevrolet
Camaro.56 When the defendant determined that the Camaro was not perform-
ing to his expectations, he decided to retrieve the Cherokee from Holden. He
accomplished this retrieval late one evening, approximately one month after
the initial swap, by holding a gun to Holden's face. 7 The defendant was ar-
44. See id. Hamilton claimed there was insufficient evidence to convict him on the firearms
violation because there was insufficient evidence to show that he, as alleged in the indictment,
used a .38 caliber gun in the robbery. Id.
45. Id. at 1130. The Circuit also concluded that Hamilton was not prejudiced in his defense
by the variance. Id.
46. Id. at 1128. She described the gun as "either dark gray or black with a checkerboard
design cut into a brown handle." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1130.
49. Id. The store clerk's testimony also played a key role for the jury. She stated she knew
the gun was real because it sounded heavy and made of metal when Hamilton laid it on the coun-
ter. Id.
50. 40 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995).
51. Id. at 1095.
52. Id. at 1092.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1993).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
56. Overstreet, 40 F.3d at 1092. The parties met through a mutual friend. The case does not
indicate whether actual titles to the vehicles were ever exchanged. Id.
57. Id. The Camaro had mechanical problems and the defendant had to spend money having
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rested later that evening and was initially charged with carjacking and using a
firearm. 8 The first trial resulted in a hung jury.59 The government then filed
a superseding indictment adding the gun possession charge.' The gun in
question was never recovered and was not available at trial.6 Holden testified
that the defendant approached him early in the morning of the carjacking and
pointed a silver revolver at him. Holden also stated that "he could see bullets
in the chamber and that he recognized defendant's face and voice." 2 The
jury in the second trial convicted the defendant on all three counts.63
The Tenth Circuit exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to
review the district court decision." The defendant raised three objections on
appeal: 1) the constitutionality of the carjacking statute; 2) the issues of double
jeopardy; and 3) the admission of evidence regarding the interstate movement
of the firearm.6' The Circuit affirmed the convictions on all three counts.'
Overstreet's primary objection on appeal regarding the firearm transport
charge was the trial court's admission of testimony given by Richard Turn-
er.67 Mr. Turner had not examined any particular firearm in connection with
the case and had no knowledge or opinion about the firearm mentioned in the
indictment. He testified that there were not, and had never been, any revolver
manufacturers in Oklahoma."
Overstreet argued that the gun was not sufficiently identified to provide
foundation for Agent Turner's testimony.69 Overstreet based this argument on
United States v. Gregg,0 which admitted similar testimony only after a de-
tailed description of the gun was provided by witnesses to the crime.7 The
Tenth Circuit recognized that the gun in the instant case was described in
much less detail than in Gregg.72 In this case, however, Holden's testimony
that a revolver was used, and that it looked like the large, silver gun used in a
courtroom demonstration, was sufficient foundation for Mr. Turner's testimo-
it repaired. On the evening of the carjacking, Holden drove to an apartment complex to pick up
the parties' mutual friend. When Holden returned to the vehicle, the defendant was waiting for
him, apparently to take back the vehicle. Id.




61. Id. at 1095.
62. Id. at 1092.
63. Id. The defendant was sentenced to 77 months for carjacking and gun possession and a
consecutive term of 60 months for gun use. Id.
64. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides: "The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States .... 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1988).
65. Overstreet, 40 F.3d at 1092.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1095. Mr. Turner is a federal Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agent. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 803 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 920 (1987).
71. See id. at 571. The testimony regarding Gregg's gun, which was recovered and available
at trial, is provided supra note 35.




ny.73 The court concluded that since no revolvers were manufactured in Okla-
homa, any gun used in Oklahoma during a carjacking must have travelled via
interstate commerce.74
2. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision reveals a decline in the requisite foundation
for speculative testimony regarding interstate firearm transport. In both Gregg
and Hamilton, the guns were accurately described. An accurate gun description
was not a prerequisite in Overstreet. This increasingly liberalized policy of
evidence admission is also seen by comparing Gregg, in which guns were
recovered, accurately described, and available at trial, to Hamilton, in which
the defendant confessed to using a gun transported interstate, and Overstreet,
in which there was no recovery or accurate gun description. Based on this
transition, unless a convicted felon lives within a state in the Tenth Circuit
region in which firearms are manufactured, he or she may receive enhanced
penalties for gun possession regardless of whether the firearm is recovered or
even accurately described.
Admittedly, if there are no gun manufacturers in the Tenth Circuit region,
it seems disingenuous to argue against speculation that any gun found in the
region must have travelled interstate. This trend is disturbing, however, be-
cause the Tenth Circuit is, arguably, eroding the defendant's constitutional
protection." Limiting gun use in the commission of violent crimes is a desir-
able goal. However, the Tenth Circuit may exceed constitutional bounds when
imposing gun possession penalties.
Completely absent from discussion in these cases was a determination of
when the defendant obtained the gun. It is possible the guns at issue in Gregg
and Overstreet were obtained prior to the statute's enactment.76 Following
these cases, the Tenth Circuit may require convicted felons to dispose of any
firearm, which travelled interstate, even if they obtained the firearm prior to
the statute's enactment.77
The Tenth Circuit's transition from Gregg to Overstreet, is likely frustrat-
ing to felons because of the lowered requisite foundation for testimony regard-
ing transport of unrecovered firearms. This transition will make it much easier
in the Tenth Circuit for federal district courts to penalize convicted felons who
73. Id. at 1095. A real gun was used in a courtroom demonstration of the carjacking. Id.
74. Id.
75. The Tenth Circuit's policy may infringe on the Second Amendment (the right to bear
arms) and the Fifth Amendment (protection against taking of private property). See U.S. CONST.
amend. II & V.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was enacted on June 19, 1968. That statute makes it unlawful for
a convicted felon to transport a gun in interstate commerce. There is no mention in the statute of
whether it is unlawful for a convicted felon to possess a gun that travelled interstate prior to the
statute enactment.
77. This retroactive approach is counter to a recent Supreme Court decision. In Landgraf v.
USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1508 (1994), the Court stated that there is a strong presump-
tion against retroactivity. The Court also concluded that justification sufficient to validate the
statute's prospective application under the Due Process Clause may not adequately justify a retro-
active application. Id. at 1497.
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possess firearms. However, the Tenth Circuit's policy regarding sufficiency of
gun possession evidence furthers the legislative goal of penalizing armed
and/or repeat offenders.
II. ADMISSION OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT PLEADINGS
A. Background
Prior inconsistent statements made under oath by witnesses are not hear-
say78 and are admissible at trial.79 Accordingly, these statements may be in-
troduced to impeach a person's testimony at trial or to prove the truth asserted
by the prior statement.
Numerous factual situations may subject a person to multiple lawsuits in
one or more jurisdictions. 0 The question of whether a person's inconsistent
pleadings from an earlier litigation are admissible against that party in subse-
quent litigation has not received an unanimous answer in the circuit courts that
have addressed the issue."' The Eighth Circuit has indicated that one reason
to deny admission of prior inconsistent pleadings 2 is to prevent the frustra-
tion of the liberal pleading and joinder rules, which encourage parties to plead
alternative theories of liability.83 Thus, to admit prior inconsistent pleadings
would cause prejudicial error.8 4
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be construed to deny admis-
sion.85 Rule 36 allows a party to focus on a particular case and broadly state
theories of recovery in its pleadings. Open discovery rules can fill in the gaps
with facts or discard the theories after discovery is complete. 6 Modem trea-
tises state that any restriction on the liberality of pleading rules should be dis-
78. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
79. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)-(2). Hearsay does not include admissions made by a party when
the statement is offered against that party. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). Regardless of the fact that a
prior statement is not hearsay, it is only admissible if, under the balancing test of FED. R. EvID.
403, supra note 9, the statement is more probative than prejudicial.
80. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 19 F.3d 514, 516 (10th Cir. 1994)
(involving wrongful death actions in a state court and a declaratory judgment suit brought by the
insurance company in federal court).
81. See Vincent v. Louis Marx & Co., 874 F.2d 36, 39-40 (lst Cir. 1989) (noting different
circuit opinions on the admission of inconsistent pleadings).
82. Prior consistent pleadings may be denied admission because of needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403.
83. Garman v. Griffin, 666 F.2d 1156, 1159-60 (8th Cir. 1981) (refusing to admit amended
inconsistent pleadings).
84. Id. at 1160. The court relied on FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) which allows for alternative
claims in pleadings. Id. at 1160 n.6.
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(b) states: "[any admission made by a party under this rule is for the
purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission for any other purpose nor may it be
used against the party in any other proceeding."
86. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26. These rules require opponents to disclose to the other party all
non-privileged facts and expert theories that will be presented at trial. See also Oiler v.
Kincheloe's, Inc., 681 P.2d 630, 636 (Kan. 1984) (discussing the evolving concepts of pleading).
The court noted that "technical pleading has vanished." Only a bare-bones pleading outlining the





In addition to the Eighth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit also denies admission
of prior inconsistent pleadings when the inconsistency resulted from settle-
ments by some defendants prior to trial.a The District of Columbia Circuit
excludes inconsistent pleadings made in third party proceedings because of the
allowable use of hypothesis in pleadings. 9
Other circuits, however, have allowed admission of inconsistent pleadings.
In Vincent v. Louis Marx & Co.,' the First Circuit held that admission of
inconsistent pleadings was left to the discretion of the trial court under FED. R.
EVID. 403,91 which requires a balancing test between the probative value of
the statement and the likely prejudicial effect it may have on the trier of
fact.92 Prior pleadings have been admitted as an impeachment tool under FED.
R. EVID. 61391 by the Sixth Circuit in situations where a person's testimony
materially differs from one lawsuit to the next.94
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has permitted the admission of prior inconsis-
tent pleadings. Admission of pleadings that were abandoned prior to trial was
allowed in Haynes v. Manning95 under the abandoned pleadings doctrine.
This doctrine was first discussed in Friedman v. Sealy, Inc.,96 in which prior
inconsistent pleadings were admitted because the opposing party had an oppor-
tunity to explain why the pleadings were abandoned. 97
87. See 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 425, at
306 (1980) which states FRCP 8 allows parties to plead hypothetically, inconsistently, and in the
alternative. Where any variance between a pleading and evidence presented by a party is explain-
able as an attempt to take advantage of this liberality, use of the pleading as a evidential admis-
sion should be disallowed. Id. Pleadings are directed at giving notice "and lack the essential char-
acter of an admission." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265, at 781-82 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d
ed. 1984). "To allow them to operate as admissions would render their use ineffective and frus-
trate their underlying purpose." Id. at 781.
88. Whatley v. Armstrong World Indus., 861 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
doctrine of liberality in pleading, and flexible joinder rules, precluded the admission of inconsis-
tent pleadings made against defendants who had settled prior to trial).
89. See Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding
that the goals of efficient federal procedure would be frustrated if hypothetical pleadings from
third party proceedings were admitted into evidence), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982).
90. 874 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1989).
91. Id. at 38.
92. See supra note 9. This balancing test requirement was followed in a subsequent First
Circuit decision, Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935, 952 (1st Cir. 1989) (indicating that not all
statements in a prior inconsistent statement need be admitted, just the ones that will not confuse
the venire or unduly protract the proceedings).
93. FED. R. EVID. 613 allows a party to question a witness regarding prior statements made
by the witness.
94. Williams v. Union Carbide Corp., 790 F.2d 552, 556 (6th Cir.) (admitting statements
made by the plaintiff's attorney during a previous lawsuit to impeach testimony in a subsequent
trial), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 992 (1986).
95. 917 F.2d 450, 454 (10th Cir. 1990). The plaintiff filed claims against several car dealers,
then settled with all but the defendants. Id. at 451-52. The court affirmed the lower court's ruling
that pleadings for the settled claims were abandoned. Id. at 454.
96. 274 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1959) (noting that because admissions were contained in
pleadings does not make them inadmissible, nor does it matter that the representation was made
against a third party).
97. See id. at 260-61.
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Prior pleadings were admitted in Glaesman v. Shop-Rite Foods, Inc.98
because the allegations from a prior complaint were considered evidentiary
admissions against interest.' The plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit
against a business operator who had previously filed suit against their landlord
alleging that dangerous conditions existed on the premises."s The court held
that the prior pleadings against the landlord were admissible in the current ac-
tion.
1 1
In Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc.,"°2 the Tenth Circuit reversed a deci-
sion that had precluded introduction of prior pleadings from an ancillary com-
plaint. The court held that the inconsistent pleadings were admissible because
the plaintiffs had argued at trial that the defendants were the sole cause of the
accident.' °3 The issue centered on who was at fault when a medical evacua-
tion helicopter crashed. The allegations of fault made prior to trial were in-
consistent with the position the plaintiff took at trial. The pleadings were ad-
missible as admissions against interest."
Dugan was recently followed in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Dyer. 5 An appellant, Colley, filed a wrongful death action against
Dyer in a Wyoming state court." Colley alleged that Dyer was a Wyoming
resident in that complaint.0 7 State Farm filed a declarative action in federal
court to establish that it did not have a duty to defend Dyer against, Colley in
the state action."' Colley filed a motion with the federal court objecting to
the declarative action on the grounds that State Farm lacked diversity with
Dyer." In his motion, Colley alleged that Dyer, like State Farm, might be
an Illinois resident."0 Relying on Dugan, the court admitted the inconsistent
state court complaint, which asserted Dyer was a Wyoming resident, to contra-
dict the assertion Dyer made in federal court."'
These recent Tenth Circuit cases seemingly emphasize only whether the
prior statements are inconsistent with present statements. There is little men-
tion in the opinions of the balancing test required by other circuits. There is
also no indication that the Tenth Circuit places much emphasis on the opportu-
98. 438 F.2d 341, 342 (10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
99. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) provides that an admission by a party-opponent is not hearsay if
it is the party's own statement in either an individual or representative capacity.
100. Glaesman, 438 F.2d at 341-42.
101. Id. at 342.
102. 915 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1990).
103. Id. at 1434. The prior allegations were considered factual, not hypothetical. Thus, the
Circuit was more easily inclined to admit those relevant facts in the subsequent trial. Id.
104. Id. The Tenth Circuit stated the district court erred by not conducting a rule 403 balanc-
ing test which would have resulted in admission of the prior complaint. Id. at 1434-35.
105. 19 F.3d 514 (10th Cir. 1994).
106. Id. at 516.
107. Id. at 519.
108. Id. at 516.
109. Id. at 516-17. Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction when the matter in controversy
exceeds $50,000 and is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1988). Colley
also alleged that Dyer was an indispensable party to the action, and that State Farm had waived a
defense of non-cooperation by Dyer. Dyer, 19 F.3d at 516.
110. Dyer, 19 F.3d at 517.
111. Id. at 519.
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nity to explain why prior pleadings were abandoned, or why different theories
of liability were introduced. Thus, the admissibility of prior inconsistent
pleadings containing a claim subsequently dropped prior to trial was the issue
in LWT, Inc. v. Childers.'
2
B. LWT, Inc. v. Childers
1. Facts
The plaintiff, LWT, purchased a hot oil heater from Childers." 3 LW1T
later sold the hot oil heater to RJR Mechanical. RJR sued LWT regarding the
heater's performance and maintenance record. The suit was brought in a South
Carolina state court."4 In answering RJR's complaint, LWT asserted the
manufacturer's limited warranty as a bar to RJR's recovery."' That defense
was dropped prior to the beginning of the state trial, for reasons not discussed
in the opinion."6
After the state court action, LWT commenced suit against Childers in the
New Mexico Federal District Court." 7 In that suit, LWT claimed that there
was no limited warranty,' and that Childers breached a warranty of mer-
chantability." 9 Childers lost on a summary judgment motion.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Childers prevailed on the question of
whether material facts were at issue regarding the warranty. 2 ' The Tenth
Circuit also addressed the issue of whether the state court allegations were ad-
missible in the subsequent federal action.' 2' The district court decision, re-
fusing admission of the state pleadings, was reviewed under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard. 22 The appellate court followed Dugan by stating that in-
consistent allegations contained in prior pleadings are admissible as evidence
in subsequent litigation. The state court allegations that asserted the limited
warranty were inconsistent with the federal court allegations that denied a lim-
ited warranty. Therefore, those state pleadings were admissible as substantive
evidence under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 123 Without determining why the
limited warranty defense was dropped prior to the state trial, the circuit court
concluded that the abandonment at the state level was irrelevant to the federal
112. 19 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. 1994).
113. Id. at 541.
114. Id. at 542.
115. Id. U.C.C. § 2-316 provides that warranties may be limited unless such restrictions are
unreasonable. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1991).
116. 19 F.3d at 542. LWT did not specifically plead that the warranty was a defense. Id.
117. See id. at 539, 541.
118. See id. at 541. LWT claimed that the limited warranty never became part of the agree-
ment. Id.
119. Id. U.C.C. § 2-314(1)-(2) provides: "unless excluded or modified, a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied. Merchantable goods are fit for the ordinary purposes for
which they are used." U.C.C. § 2-314(1)-(2) (1991).
120. LWT, 19 F.3d at 542-43.
121. Id. at 542. The Circuit did so because the prior pleadings may play a key role in the trial
after remand. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The Circuit stated that LWT's reliance on the limited warranty in the South Carolina
litigation was directly contrary to the position LWT took against Childers in the federal action. Id.
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decision admitting the pleading.'24
2. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision admitting prior inconsistent pleadings can be
criticized in two ways. First, such admissions are counter to federal procedural
rules. Using prior pleadings against parties punishes them for following the
federal rules. Second, the decision may encourage forum shopping' 25 in the
Tenth Circuit region because at least one state court denies admission of prior
inconsistent pleadings.
The Tenth Circuit's decision is inconsistent with modem pleading rules
that encourage parties to assert all possible theories of liability. This modem
policy allows discovery practice to determine the validity of any claims. Not
all theories, however, must be presented at trial. Presumably, some theories
may be discarded if, upon discovery, they are found to be invalid. The Tenth
Circuit punishes parties who follow pleading rules by using the pleadings they
filed before discovery against them.
In LWT, it is possible that LWT dropped the limited warranty defense in
the state action after learning more about the issue in discovery. The Tenth
Circuit did not address the question of why the defense was dropped. Nor did
the court indicate that on remand the district court should conduct a FED. R.
EvID. 403 balancing test to determine whether such admission would be over-
ly prejudicial. The Circuit merely concluded that because the prior allegations
were inconsistent, they were admissible.'26
This decision may also result in forum shopping within the geographical
area of the Tenth Circuit. At least one state in the Tenth Circuit region refuses
to admit prior inconsistent pleadings. 27 Plaintiffs who have a choice between
bringing actions in either federal or state courts may choose a state court in an
attempt to keep their prior inconsistent pleadings out of evidence.'28
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Lytle v. Stearns, refused to admit incon-
sistent, abandoned pleadings. 29 The court reasoned that admitting such
pleadings would unfairly punish the party because clients are rarely in a posi-
tion to explain the legal theories and strategies chosen by their attorney in
various stages of the proceeding. 3 ' The court was not persuaded by the fact
124. Id.
125. "Forum shopping" is referred to in this Survey as the practice that occurs when a party
selects a jurisdiction in which to commence litigation based on anticipated favorable application of
procedural or substantive law. Eliminating forum shopping between federal and state courts was
one goal of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (establishing that there is no general
federal common law, and state law governs in disputes in which federal courts have diversity
jurisdiction).
126. LWT, 19 F.3d at 542.
127. Lytle v. Steams, 830 P.2d 1197 (Kan. 1992).
128. Some defendants may successfully remove state actions to federal courts pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (1988). Removal to federal court may permit the defendant to escape state proce-
dural rules. However, in diversity actions removal is allowed only when the defendants are
noncitizens of the state in which the action is brought. DAVID W. LOUISELL ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE STATE AND FEDERAL 526 (6th ed. 1989).




that the party could be cross-examined regarding the prior pleadings. 3' It
recognized that inconsistencies may result from the fact that not all liability
theories are known prior to trial.'32 A jury may not understand why the attor-
ney would pursue various legal theories. Thus, requiring the party to testify
regarding prior or abandoned pleadings would deny a party a fair trial' 3 a
In light of Lytle, parties with the choice of federal or state courts in the
Tenth Circuit region may select a forum based on whether prior inconsistent
pleadings are admissible. Arguably, the outcome of disputes that may be
brought in either state or federal court should not turn upon procedural matters
such as evidentiary admissions.'34
The LWT decision further demonstrates, as did the interstate transportation
of firearms issue, the Tenth Circuit's liberalized policy of admitting most
relevant evidence without providing cautionary measures against prejudice.
Opponents of these evidentiary admissions would not face such prejudice if
they were litigating in other jurisdictions. The Tenth Circuit's policy is counter
to federal procedural rules and could unfairly prejudice opponents to evidentia-
ry admissions.
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF VIDEO ANIMATION
A. Background
"Video animation adds a new and powerful evidentiary tool to the trial
scene."' 35 It is used primarily to demonstrate theories presented in documents
or testimony by expert witnesses.'36 The animation may be so "technically
unique and scientifically accurate" as to be admissible as substantive evi-
dence."37
Video animation may have dramatic power over the trier of fact. 3
131. Id. at 1205. The court assumed, arguendo, that the pleadings could be construed as ad-
missions against interest, but still found the cross-examination of plaintiff was inadequate because
clients cannot explain the legal theories chosen by their attorneys. Id.
132. See id. at 1208. The Lytle's initial complaint was brought against Steams and a few
other parties. Steams filed a comparative negligence motion naming several additional parties.
Lytle's amended complaint named these additional parties. Id. at 1201. Lytle was cross-examined
regarding why the initial complaint was abandoned. Id. at 1204. Each claim in the second com-
plaint was set out as a separate count against separate defendants. Id. at 1207.
133. Id. at 1208. The court stated that a lay witness, such as Mr. Lytle, should not be cross-
examined regarding theories asserted against a former party who is no longer in the lawsuit if that
party was brought into the litigation after being designated by the initial defendant for comparative
negligence purposes. Id.
134. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (concluding that
federal procedural rules affecting the outcome of decisions which our constitutional system leaves
to state regulations must yield to the state rule). See also Olin G. Wellborn III, The Federal Rules
of Evidence and the Application of State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 TEx. L. REv. 371, 374-75
(1977) (discussing whether Federal Rules of Evidence are procedural, rather than substantive, and
whether the federal rules supersede conflicting state law).
135. Robinson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 16 F.3d 1083, 1088 (10th Cit. 1994).
136. Robert Simmons and J. Daniel Lounsbery, Admissibility of Computer-Animated
Reenactments in Federal Courts, TRIAL, Sept. 1994, at 78 (discussing the admissibility of video
animation and overcoming objections by establishing authenticity and relevance).
137. Id.
138. See J. Stratton Shartel, Computer Animation Often Provides Winning Edge for Litigators,
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Some courts have declined to admit video animation because of the possible
prejudicial impact.'39 Other courts admit computer generated evidence only
after a determination that the machine generating the information, and those
who supply its data, have "performed their functions with utmost accura-
cy.,,'
One of the first cases admitting such simulations was Perma Research &
Development v. Singer Co. 4' The plaintiff provided the defendant an exclu-
sive license to perfect an anti-skid device.42 The defendant abandoned the
project claiming that the device was not perfectible 43 and the plaintiff sued
for breach of contract.'" At trial, the plaintiff was allowed to introduce com-
puter simulations that indicated that the device was perfectible. 45 The
plaintiff won at the trial court level and the appellate court affirmed the
verdict.'" The Second Circuit found no reversible error regarding admission
of the computer simulation, because the defendant had ample opportunity to
cross-examine the expert presenting the simulation. 47
Video animation is not necessarily a new classification of evidence;" it
simply involves new technology. 49 Movies depicting recreations of accidents
were the precursors to videos of accident reenactments. The Tenth Circuit has
long recognized the importance of filmed reenactments to illustrate an expert's
theory of causation. In Brandt v. French,' a motorcycle accident case,
filmed reenactments created by an expert engineering firm were admitted to
show angles of "lean" and radii for turns of different positions for the purpose
of illustrating how the motorcycle turned in front of the defendant's car. 5'
The primary objection to the video was that hypothetical conclusions were
formed which were not based on facts brought out at trial. The Tenth Cir-
7 No. 5 INSIDE LITIG. 1, (1993) (discussing strategies for using computer animation).
139. Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc., No. CIV.A.92-3404, 1994 WL 124857, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994) (refusing to admit computer generated animation). "[S]eeing is believing,"
reasoned the court, and held that the animation was more prejudicial than probative and could not
be overcome by cross-examination. Id.
140. United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 895 (9th Cit. 1969) (Ely, J., concurring). The
issue in this case centered on admissibility of computer generated business records. Id. at 891. See
also Strock v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., No. 92-2357, 1993 WL 279069 (4th Cir.
July 12, 1993) (per curiam). The court, in an unpublished disposition, held that the decision to
admit computer animation should be left to the discretion of the trial judge and reversed only for
abuse of discretion. Id. at *1. The opponent of the video stipulated that he was given ample evi-
dence to cross examine the expert that prepared the animation. Id. at * I n.2.
141. 542 F.2d III (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
142. Id. at 113.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 115.
146. Id. at 113.
147. Id. at 115.
148. Simmons & Lounsberry, supra note 136, at 78.
149. See Daniel Tynan, Evidence in Motion, 13 CAL. LAW. 85 (1993) (discussing new techno-
logical advances in animation, the presentation of such at trial, and the conclusions that the mate-
rial presented is an old message brought through a new medium).
150. 638 F.2d 209 (10th Cir. 1981).
151. Id. at 211. "The content of the film was not meant to depict the actual event of the acci-
dent but rather to show mechanical principles relative to two vehicles ..... Id. at 212.
152. Id. at 212.
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cuit stated that demonstration of experiments, such as those shown on the film,
used merely to illustrate the principles in forming an expert opinion, do not
require strict adherence to the facts. Admission is proper if the experiments
were conducted under conditions similar to those of the accident, and as long
as the jury is instructed regarding the theoretical basis and the limited purpose
for which it is offered.
1 53
A recent 1993 United States Supreme Court case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,54 will likely make admission of video animation
more commonplace. That decision set aside the long standing Frye Rule,
which premised admissibility of scientific evidence on whether the scientific
community had generally accepted the theory offered by the expert testimo-
ny. "'55 General acceptance, however, is no longer necessary. "New" theories
are admissible if the trial judge ensures that the proposed testimony rests on
reliable data and foundation and is relevant to the action before the court.'56
The Daubert court based its decision on the federal rules of evidence,
primarily those rules pertaining to expert witnesses. The Court deferred to the
trial court in determining whether scientific evidence is admissible.57 pursu-
ant to FED. R. EvID. 104(a)' and 702.' The Court provided assistance to
trial judges to help make this preliminary assessment, but it essentially en-
trusted them with the capacity to determine admissibility."6
Since a video reenactment is likely to be based on expert testimony, the
admissibility of such evidence is made possible under the guidelines presented
in Daubert. The confidence and deference placed in the trial judge will likely
make the admission of video animation illustrating expert opinions easier to
obtain. Daubert played a key role in determining the admissibility of the ani-
mation at issue in Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad.6 '
153. Id. See also Gilbert v. Cosco Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that exper-
iments should demonstrate a similarity of circumstances and conditions, but strict adherence to the
facts is not required if illustrating principles upon which the expert based his opinion). The court
noted that the jury should be advised of the limited purposes of the admission. Id.
154. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
155. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under the Frye Rule, expert
opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is generally accepted
as reliable in the relevant scientific community. Id. Frye recognized that it is difficult to deteimine
when a scientific principle crosses the line from experimental to demonstrable. One way to do so
is to rely on the theory's acceptance rate in the particular scientific field in which it belongs. Id.
156. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
157. Id. at 2796.
158. FED. R. EviD. 104(a) provides: "Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be de-
termined by the court ......
159. FED. R. EVID. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
160. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796. Those considerations include: whether the theory can be
and has been tested; whether the theory has been subject to peer review and publication; as to a
particular scientific technique, the court should consider the known rate of error; and a less re-
strictive consideration of whether the theory has received some level of general acceptance. Id. at
2796-97.
161. 16 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 1994).
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B. Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
1. Facts
The Robinsons brought a wrongful death action against Missouri Pacific
Railroad (MOPAC) for damages resulting from a collision between a passen-
ger vehicle and a train. 62 At trial, the Robinsons claimed that the accident
occurred because the crossing gates at the intersection did not lower at the
proper time and that, despite the oncoming train, the driver was not warned
about the train. To support that theory, the Robinsons pointed to the wreckage,
indicating the car was pushed 2,000 feet down the track. They argued this was
evidence that the train struck the vehicle at a perpendicular angle.'63
MOPAC countered with the theory that the cause of the accident was the
vehicle driver's attempt to go around the lowered gates. MOPAC claimed the
train struck the car at a sharp angle. The Robinsons argued that if the train
had struck the vehicle at a sharp angle, the car would have been pushed off
the track, not pushed the length of the track. MOPAC countered that the loca-
tion of the vehicle after impact was not dispositive since the train and vehicle
were locked together by the impact, and thus, the vehicle could not have been
pushed off the track."6
In order to prove their theory, the Robinsons presented video animation
prepared by their expert to illustrate his testimony. 65 The jury awarded dam-
ages to the estates, but found the vehicle driver thirty per cent at fault. Both
parties appealed the verdict."6 MOPAC objected to the video admission on
appeal. 67
The Tenth Circuit applied an abuse of discretion standard and affirmed the
trial judge's decision to admit the video animation."6 The court recognized
that the issue was close, but nonetheless rejected MOPAC's claim of error."6
Following Daubert, the court deferred to the trial judge's balancing test re-
garding the scientific evidence and the probative nature of the video anima-
tion. ° The Tenth Circuit reviewed the steps taken by the Robinsons prior to
162. Id. at 1084. Julia Ann Turnbull, the driver of the vehicle and her infant son were killed
in the collision. The Robinsons sued on behalf of the infant son's estate. Three other people, a
mother and her two children, were also killed in the collision; their personal representative settled
with MOPAC prior to trial. Id. at 1084-85.
163. Id. at 1085. A witness also testified to having a near-miss at the same crossing six days
earlier. Id.
164. Id. MOPAC presented witnesses who testified to seeing a car, presumably Julia
Turnbull's, drive around the gates and into the crossing. Id. at 1086.
165. Id. The expert created the video by first making a scale model of the accident scene. The
model included a train and car which could be moved along simulating the scene. The expert then
had a video camera record the scene every 1/10 of a second as he moved the train at a scale speed
of 49 m.p.h. and the car of 13 m.p.h. (these were the expert's estimated speeds of the vehicles).
The video first depicted the theory that the train struck the car at a perpendicular angle. The car,
in the video, was pushed the length of the track. The video then depicted the theory that the train
struck at a sharp angle. The car, in the video, was pushed off the track. Id.
166. Id. at 1085.
167. Id. at 1086.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1088. The Tenth Circuit specifically recognized that under FED. R. EVl). 403, the
judge may admit the relevant evidence if the probative value substantially outweighs the danger of
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and during trial regarding admissibility. A pre-trial conference was held re-
garding the video. 7' During trial, before the jury viewed the video, the ex-
pert testified regarding how the video was prepared. The judge instructed the
jury that the video was not a recreation of the accident, but was created only
to illustrate certain principles.'
The Tenth Circuit held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
given the solely illustrative purpose of the video, the limiting instruction given
the jury, and the opportunity for cross-examination.' The court, however,
recognized that the video may have created undue prejudice. The court rea-
soned that the prejudice did not survive the entire trial, as evidenced by the
fact the jury determined the driver was partially at fault.'
In discussing how Daubert controlled this case, and will control future
cases, the Tenth Circuit categorized video animation as scientific evidence
presenting the principles of physics.'75 Accordingly, FED. R. EVID. 702 ap-
plied and the district court should act as the "gatekeeper" to "meticulously
make an early pretrial evaluation" of the proffered animation.'76 Admission
of animation requires evaluation under the flexible standard of Rule 702, but
the animation must have evidentiary relevance and reliability.1
77
2. Analysis
Robinson is the first published circuit opinion regarding admissibility of
video animation to illustrate an expert's accident causation theory. With the
increasing use of technology in courtrooms,' 78 future challenges in the Tenth
Circuit may soon involve admissibility issues regarding computer generated
animation. 79 The increasing use of technology may add new opportunities
unfair prejudice. Id.
171. Id. at 1086 n.2. MOPAC conceded in the pre-trial conference that admission of the video
was within the trial judge's discretion. See id.
172. Id. at 1086. The specific instructions stated: "The only reason this is shown is that the
witness will testify about certain principles that he feels that this video would show to the jury
and perhaps it would be helpful to you. So just bear in mind that you cannot recreate an acci-
dent." Id.
173. Id. at 1088.
174. Id. The driver was 30% at fault. Id. at 1085.
175. Id. at 1088. The Tenth Circuit admitted that an argument could be made that "it is out-
side scientific knowledge to opine in a crash such as this" that a car struck at an angle will "nec-
essarily leave the railroad tracks on impact." Id. at 1089.
176. Id. at 1089. Regarding pretrial disclosure, effective December 1, 1993, the Federal dis-
covery rules were amended so that all parties and the court should possess full information well in
advance of trial regarding proposed expert testimony. Each expert witness is required to prepare a
report containing a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and any exhibits, such as
video animation, to be presented at trial. Id. at 1089 n.6. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (requir-
ing initial disclosure of non-privileged information regarding expert testimony); FED. R. Civ. P.
16(c)(3) (encouraging advance rulings from the court regarding evidentiary admissions).
177. Robinson, 16 F.3d at 1088. The same flexibility should inform the trial court's consider-
ation of objections to the animation. Those objections may include FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (authenti-
cation); FED. R. EVID. 801 (hearsay); FED. R. EVID. 403 (undue prejudice as an attempted reenact-
ment). Id. at 1089 n.7.
178. See Mark Curriden, Courtroom of the Future is Here, 81 A.B.A. J. 22 (1995) (discussing
new technology available for courtroom use).
179. See Simmons & Lounsbery, supra note 136 for a discussion of anticipated steps to ad-
missibility of computer animated reenactments in federal courts.
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for creative experts to use computers to their favor. Under Robinson, trial
courts are granted deference to decide expert opinion admissibility issues,
requiring them to keep abreast of technology. While this is clearly the mandate
of Daubert, the possibility of undue prejudice may increase. Judges, like lay
people, may be swayed by computer simulations that seemingly portray what
occurred in fact. It may be difficult to discern that the simulation is only the
expert's opinion. The transition from admitting videos showing actual motor-
cycles to video animation, created either by expert staging or by computer,
indicates the confidence the circuit places in both the trial court and the jury.
That confidence requires triers of fact to understand that animation presents
only a theory, not a reenactment. The possibility of unfounded persuasion is
manifest. Other courts do not have such confidence in their juries.8 0
Robinson is a clear example of the Tenth Circuit's willingness to admit
new and controversial evidence to assist the trier of fact. The Tenth Circuit's
policy regarding video animation furthers the Supreme Court's interpretation
of expert opinion testimony. Opponents to these evidentiary admissions, how-
ever, argue that the evidence is unfairly prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of these three survey-year opinions reveal the Tenth Circuit's
trend affirming rulings which allow evidentiary admissions. According to the
Tenth Circuit, admission of controversial evidence is left to the discretion of
the trial court. In all three of the cases addressed, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's admission.
Presumably, in any given case, one party may object to this liberalized
policy of admitting probative evidence that appears too prejudicial. However,
the Tenth Circuit's policy generally complies with legislative goals to punish
armed and/or repeat offenders. The lowered requisite foundation for evidence
to prove gun possession fosters the achievement of those goals. Additionally,
the Tenth Circuit's approach regarding admissibility of expert testimony fol-
lows Supreme Court decisions. Visually enhanced demonstrative evidence is
admissible to help explain expert testimony. The Tenth Circuit's approach
regarding admissibility of inconsistent pleadings, however, is contrary to the
federal pleading rules and may unduly prejudice parties litigating in multiple
courts or against multiple parties.
The Tenth Circuit embraces new technology and controversial methods of
proof. This policy allows the trier of fact to consider all relevant evidence to
separate the probative from the prejudicial in order to determine the ultimate
issue. Based on these Survey cases, future appeals to the Tenth Circuit regard-
ing district court admissions of disputed evidence are unlikely to succeed.
Richard C. Jennings




During the 1993-94 survey period, the Tenth Circuit addressed a variety
of insurance issues. Regional Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.'
gave the Tenth Circuit an opportunity to rule on the application of a "pollution
exclusion" contained in a comprehensive general liability ("CGL") insurance
policy.' In Regional Bank, the court departed from typical pollution exclusion
issues and focused instead on the definition of "irritant" or "contaminant" as
contained in the pollution exclusion of a CGL policy
In Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co.,4 the Tenth Circuit
applied Oklahoma law and held that Oklahoma public policy prohibits liability
insurance from covering punitive damages except where the insured has been
held liable under the principles of vicarious liability. In Magnum Foods, the
Tenth Circuit also addressed the issue of punitive damages and insurance bad
faith, holding that a jury should not consider a settlement payment for punitive
damages claim by the insured in determining any compensatory award on a
bad faith claim against the insurer.'
The Tenth Circuit separately addressed the assessment of punitive damag-
es against an insurance company acting in bad faith in Thompson v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co.6 In Thompson, the court denied an award of puni-
tive damages because State Farm legitimately believed it had no obligation to
honor the plaintiffs' claim.7
1. 35 F.3d 494 (10th Cir. 1994).
2. At the completion of the survey period and after the writing of this survey, the Tenth
Circuit again ruled on a pollution exclusion in Red Panther Chem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 43
F.3d 514 (10th Cir. 1994). This case involved a "total pollution exclusion," which the court also
referred to as a third generation pollution exclusion. The Tenth Circuit found the critical inquiry to
be whether the total pollution exclusion was ambiguous when applied to the facts of that case. The
question was whether the word "escape" in the exclusion was "meant to include the expulsion of a
container of pollutants from a moving vehicle." Finding the provision to be ambiguous, the court
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer. On remand, as
the total pollution exclusion involved in this case has not been subjected to extensive litigation
like the other pollution exclusions, the district court must explore the intent and factual back-
ground of the exclusion and then determine whether the facts fall within the intended scope of the
exclusion. Id. at 517-19.
3. Regional Bank, 35 F.3d at 498.
4. 36 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1994).
5. Id. at 1506.
6. 34 F.3d 932 (10th Cir. 1994).
7. Id. at 943; see also Willis v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 42 F.3d 607, 615 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding that while there was sufficient evidence for the bad faith claim to survive a summary
judgment motion, there was no showing of fraud, oppression, or malice to also allow the issue of
punitive damages to go to the jury).
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I. POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSES IN COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE POLICIES
A. Background
The comprehensive general liability ("CGL") insurance policy has tradi-
tionally provided businesses and governmental entities the broadest coverage
available For over forty years, the standard form CGL policy has been a
mainstay for commercial liability protection.9 The CGL policy furnishes
insureds with broad protection against third-party liability claims and the re-
sulting sums they become legally obligated to pay."
Prior to 1966, CGL policies typically provided coverage for property
damage and bodily injury "caused by accident."" According to insurers, the
"accident" language was intended to provide coverage for a boom event, or
one that was instantaneous and unintended. 2 Most courts rejected this read-
ing and interpreted "accident" in the CGL policy to provide coverage for
unintended injuries, even those not occurring instantaneously. 3 In 1966, the
National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters ("National Bureau"), and other
similar insurance industry drafting and rating organizations, revised the CGL
policy to provide coverage for liability caused by an "occurrence."' 4 An oc-
currence was defined as unintended or unexpected damage, including continu-
ous or repeated exposure to conditions.' The revision was an effort by the
insurance industry to expand the scope of coverage afforded by the courts.
6
Thus, both accidents and gradual exposures were covered as long as the dam-
age was unexpected or unintended. The insurance industry presented the revi-
sion to each state's insurance commissioner, all of whom subsequently ap-
proved the new policy form. Most, if not all, American insurers use the same
CGL policy language making litigation over these policies important to all
insurers and insureds.
7
8. INSURANCE CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES 4 (Lynne M. Miller & Mary J.
Mallonee eds., 1989).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id.; see also Brian J. Coyle & Harwood Lloyd, The Drafting History and Regulatory
History Debate: The Pollution Exclusion from the Insurer's Perspective, in 2 ENVIRONMENTAL
INSURANCE COVERAGE AND LITIGATION 1994, at 109, 118 (PLI Comm. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. A-691, 1994); James A. Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental
Damage Claims, 15 FORUM 551, 552 (1979-80).
12. Coyle & Lloyd, supra note 11, at 118; Wondie Russell et. al., Insurers, Policyholders
Fight for the Last Word, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 14, 1992, at 32, 32.
13. INSURANCE CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES, supra note 8, at 5; Russell et. al.,
supra note 12, at 32.
14. INSURANCE CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES, supra note 8, at 5; Russell et. al.,
supra note 12, at 32.
15. Coyle & Lloyd, supra note 11, at 118-19.
16. INSURANCE CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES, supra note 8, at 5.
17. The proliferation of similar suits in each circuit over the pollution exclusion evidences
the importance of the litigation. See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc.,
40 F.3d 146 (7th Cir. 1994); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc., 39 F.3d 1324
(6th Cir. 1994); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp., 26 F.3d 1195 (1st Cir.
1994); Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Tonka Corp., 9 F.3d 51 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1834 (1994); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551 (9th Cir. 1991).
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In 1970, due to various environmental disasters and the rise of public
sentiment against polluters, the insurance industry drafted the "pollution exclu-
sion clause," which was specifically designed to exclude knowing polluters
from coverage. The pollution exclusion clause returned coverage for pollut-
ing events to the "caused by accident" basis.' 9 The exclusion accomplished
this purpose by expressly barring pollution coverage, except for injuries or
damages arising out of "sudden and accidental" pollution discharges."
In light of early cases that interpreted the "sudden and accidental" pollu-
tion exclusion as ambiguous, the insurance industry acted in the early 1980s to
replace it with an absolute pollution exclusion that eliminated the sudden and
accidental exception."' In 1986, the ISO 2 placed the absolute pollution ex-
clusion in its standard CGL policy.23 However, the sudden and accidental
pollution exclusion policies continue to create massive amounts of litigation. 4
Many of these policies, purchased years ago, continue to provide coverage
for sudden and accidental pollution. Pollution is not generally discovered until
random tests reveal a polluting event that may have occurred years earlier.
Through scientific testing, a fairly accurate estimation may be obtained regard-
ing how long the pollution has been occurring and when it first began. For
example, in the leakage from an underground gasoline storage tank, hydrolo-
gists can estimate how long the pollution has been present by the distance the
gas traveled and the amount present. Thus, an initial polluting event that oc-
curred in 1980, may have been discovered only recently. The policy in effect
in 1980 would be the one to which the insured would look for coverage. Most
of the policies at this time had the sudden and accidental pollution exclusion.
Because the standard CGL policy does not define the terms "sudden and
accidental,"25 the overwhelming majority of litigation surrounding the pollu-
tion exclusion has been based upon these words.26  The insurance industry
18. See MITCHELL L. LATHROP, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS §
3.07[1]-[2], at 3-82 to -83 (1994); INSURANCE CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES, supra
note 8, at 5; Coyle & Lloyd, supra note 11, at 119; Russell et. al., supra note 12, at 32.
19. Coyle & Lloyd, supra note 11, at 119.
20. Id. The 1970-Form or "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion reads:
This Policy Shall Not Apply:
To bodily injury or property damage arising out of a discharge, dispersal,
release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals,
liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants
into or upon the land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water; but
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is
sudden and accidental.
LATHROP, supra note 18, § 3.07[2][a].
21. Id. § 3.07[3].
22. The ISO, or Insurance Services Office, is an industry consortium organization that pro-
vides basic, standardized insurance policies and coverage options. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTER-
PRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 10.5, at 298 n.1 (1994).
23. Id.
24. See id. § 3.07[l]; Russell et. al., supra note 12, at 32.
25. LATHROP, supra note 18, § 3.07[2l[b][i].
26. See Russell et. al., supra note 12, at 32. The Tenth Circuit, prior to Regional Bank, has,
for the most part in litigation involving the pollution exclusion, only had occasion to discuss the
"sudden and accidental" exception. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison
Grain Co., 999 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the term "sudden and accidental" in a
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argues that "sudden" provides a temporal component, requiring that the dis-
charge began abruptly or was short in duration." The insured policyholders
argue that the phrase "sudden and accidental" is ambiguous,28 and as such,
the policy should be construed in favor of the insured.29 The policyholders
further argue that the phrase is merely a restatement of the "expected or in-
tended" language contained in the definition of "occurrence."3 °
Though the debate over the proper interpretation of the pollution exclusion
focuses primarily on the meaning of "sudden and accidental," a side debate
has emerged over what qualifies as a pollutant or contaminant. This side de-
bate has occurred in the context of a pollution exclusion3 and an absolute
pollution exclusion.3 2 In most cases it is assumed that a pollutant was dis-
charged.3 In some situations, however, it may be difficult to decide what
constitutes a pollutant.
In Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City of Keene,34 the court held that
excessive light and noise were not within an exclusion that defined a pollutant
as any liquid, solid, gaseous, or thermal irritant. Although the court indicated
that it may be possible for excessive light and noise to be irritants, they were
not liquid, solid, gaseous, or thermal irritants. 35 As irritant was undefined, the
court used it in conjunction with the term pollutant. Therefore, although some-
thing could be an irritant, it also had to meet the definition of pollutant in
order for the exclusion to apply.'
In Staefa Control-System, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.,3  the insured claimed that petroleum products did not qualify as pollut-
ants. The court noted that although there was "no controlling case law on this
point," there was no merit in the argument.38 The court stated that Staefa's
claim "belied both ... science and common sense," and held that petroleum
was an environmental contaminant or irritant.39
In City of Salina v. Maryland Casualty Co.,' the court concluded there
pollution exclusion has an objective temporal meaning); Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chem.
Co., 990 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that where the discharge was gradual and intended,
the pollution exclusion barred coverage even where actual contamination was not expected or
intended).




31. See, e.g., Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 768 F. Supp. 1463 (D. Kan.
1991), affd sub nom., Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 987 F.2d
1516 (10th Cir. 1993).
32. See, e.g., Staefa Control-System Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 847 F. Supp.
1460 (N.D. Cal. 1994), amended on recons., 875 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
33. LATHROP, supra note 18, § 3.07[2][a], at 3-84.
34. 898 F.2d 265 (Ist Cir. 1990).
35. Id. at 268; see also Titan Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 27 Cal. Rptr.2d 476 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that debris, although both a solid and waste, was not a contaminant).
36. See Titan Holdings Synd., Inc. v. City of Keene, 898 F.2d 265, 268-69 (1st Cir. 1990).
37. 847 F. Supp. 1460, 1471 (N.D. Cal. 1994), amended on recons., 875 F. Supp. 656 (N.D.
Cal. 1994).
38. Id. at 1471.
39. Id.
40. 856 F. Supp. 1467, 1478 (D. Kan. 1994).
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was no genuine dispute that alkaline wastewater was a pollutant. The decision
of whether a substance is a pollutant depends upon its classification as a con-
taminant or irritant.4' As the alkaline wastewater was hazardous to individu-
als, vegetation, and aquatic life, the court concluded that even a narrow con-
struction of the terms contaminant or irritant included a substance with these
destructive properties.42
Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. City of Pittsburg43 was a case involv-
ing direct harm to an individual by an alleged pollutant rather than environ-
mental harm. The court in Westchester Fire Insurance refused to stretch the
definition of pollutant to include insecticide." It ruled that the terms irritant
and contaminant must be construed as substances generally recognized as
causing harm to the environment.4 As the insecticide, malathion, was consid-
ered safe and approved by the government, the court removed it from the
realm of pollutants. '
Courts, therefore, do not have a clear view of what constitutes a pollutant
or a contaminant. 47 Because the issue recently developed in insurance law,
many courts decide it as an issue of first impression. The Tenth Circuit recent-
ly considered this issue for the first time in Regional Bank of Colorado v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance.
B. Regional Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.'
1. Facts
On January 27, 1988, Debra Seibert rented from Regional Bank of Colo-
rado an apartment for herself and her son. Ms. Seibert was pregnant at the
time. Two days after renting the apartment, Ms. Siebert and her son were
admitted to the hospital suffering from carbon monoxide inhalation allegedly
caused by a faulty water heater. Ms. Siebert and her son filed a civil action in
Garfield County District Court against Regional Bank.49
At all relevant times, Regional Bank had in effect a CGL policy issued by
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company ("St. Paul"), containing a provi-
41. Id. at 1478.
42. Id.
43. 768 F. Supp. 1463 (D. Kan. 1991), aff d, sub nom, Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins.
Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 987 F.2d 1516 (10th Cit. 1993).
44. Id. at 1470.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co. 22 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that tri-
chloroethylene was a pollutant even though it was not listed as such by the EPA); Regent Ins. Co.
v. Homes, 835 F. Supp. 579 (D. Kan. 1993) (holding that formic acid causing injury to one child
and no discernable injury to the environment was not a pollutant); Crabtree v. Hayes-Dockside,
Inc., 612 So.2d 249 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) was an "irritant"
or "contaminant" within the meaning of the pollution exclusion even though it was not listed as
hazardous or toxic); Board of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1994)
(holding that asbestos contamination was contemplated by "other irritants, contaminants or pollut-
ants" language of policy due to their irritant effects on the human body).
48. 35 F.3d 494 (10th Cir. 1994).
49. Id. at 495.
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sion excluding coverage for bodily injury, property damage, or medical ex-
penses resulting from pollution at or from the insured's premises, waste site,
or work site."0 Pollution was defined in the policy to mean "actual, alleged,
or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants."'" Pollut-
ants were further defined to mean "any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irri-
tant or contaminant" including smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals, and waste.52
Regional Bank requested coverage under the policy and St. Paul denied,
citing the pollution exclusion. Regional Bank filed a declaratory judgment
action against St. Paul with regard to the coverage and St. Paul's duty to de-
fend on the claim of carbon monoxide poisoning under the CGL policy. The
district court ruled that the pollution exclusion did not bar coverage for the
injuries suffered by the Bank's tenants when they inhaled carbon monoxide
from the faulty heater. The district court stated that the reasonable policyhold-
er would expect to be afforded complete comprehensive coverage under the
CGL policy and a broad interpretation of the exclusion would be unreasonable
because it would exclude coverage for smoke inhalation from a fire but would
not exclude coverage for burns resulting from the same fire. The district court
granted a summary judgment in favor of Regional Bank and St. Paul appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
53
2. Opinion
On appeal, the parties agreed that the issue before the court was whether
the policy's pollution exclusion barred coverage for the injuries and damages
caused by the inhalation of carbon monoxide. 4 St. Paul alleged that because
the malfunction of the heater caused an emission of carbon monoxide, its
"absolute pollution exclusion" barred coverage. 5 As a result, the plain and
ordinary meaning of the terms contained in the pollution exclusion barred
coverage for personal injuries caused by carbon monoxide inhalation. 6 St.
Paul further claimed that carbon monoxide is a gaseous "irritant" and coverage
for bodily injury resulting from inhalation on the premises of the insured was
excluded.57
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the emission of carbon monoxide was not
barred by the pollution exclusion clause in the CGL policy.5t Because the
accident occurred in Colorado, the Tenth Circuit followed Colorado law.59
When interpreting insurance contracts, Colorado law recognizes the "reason-
able expectations doctrine," under which the meaning of the terms in an insur-
50. Id. at 495-96.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 495-97.
54. Id. at 498.
55. Id. The absolute pollution exclusion removes the "sudden and accidental" exception. See
supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
56. Regional Bank, 35 F.3d at 498.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 497.
59. Id. at 496 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
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ance policy are determined according to the reasonable expectation of an ordi-
nary policyholder.' The Tenth Circuit determined that the Colorado Supreme
Court would have applied the reasonable expectations doctrine to the terms of
the policy, regardless of whether any ambiguities existed.'
The court stated that the interpretation promoted by St. Paul stretched the
policy's plain meaning. Relying on Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. City
of Pittsburg,3 the Tenth Circuit held that the terms "['irritant' and
'contaminant'] must occur in a setting in which they would be recognized as a
toxic or particularly harmful substance in the industry or by governmental
regulators."' 4
Because the policy at issue left the terms "irritant" and "contaminant"
undefined, the court turned to the dictionary definition of "irritant" and found
that it only further begged the question.' The court concluded that the rea-
sonable policyholder would not understand the policy to bar coverage for
anything that irritates, and that irritant "must be construed in the context of
how it is used in the policy, i.e., defining 'pollutant."'' A reasonably intelli-
gent person might understand carbon monoxide to be a pollutant when emitted
in an environmental or industrial setting, but the reasonable policyholder
would not understand that carbon monoxide emitted from a malfunctioning
heater was pollution.'"
C. Analysis
Regional Bank gave the Tenth Circuit its first opportunity to decide a
pollution exclusion case based upon whether a substance was an "irritant" or
"contaminant" under the CGL policy.' The Tenth Circuit went out of its way
60. Id. (citing Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 989 (Colo. 1986)).
61. Id. at 497. The court did not determine whether the pollution exclusion was ambiguous.
It held that the incident was covered regardless of any ambiguity because an ambiguous policy is
always construed against the insurer in favor of coverage. Id.
62. Id. at 498.
63. 768 F. Supp. at 1470. "The terms 'irritant' and 'contaminant' ... cannot be read in
isolation, but must be contrued as substances generally recognized as polluting the environment."
Id.




68. Prior to Regional Bank, the Tenth Circuit only had occasion to decide cases involving
the pollution exclusion based upon the "sudden and accidental" exception or whether there was a
"discharge" and a subsequent contamination that "arose out of" the discharge. See, e.g., United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrision Grain Co., 999 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
the term "sudden and accidental" in pollution exclusion was unambiguous and had an objective
temporal meaning); Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chem. Co., 990 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993)
(holding that discharge at plant was not "sudden and accidental"); Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casu-
alty Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 987 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that spraying of motor-
ist during mosquito fogging was "sudden and accidental"); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that under Utah law,
unintentional discharge of harmful pollutants as part of its regular and continuous business prac-
tice of discharging waste products directly into environment was not "sudden and accidental"),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992); Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 954
F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that placement of waste materials into holding containment
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to hold that the absolute pollution exclusion contained in Regional Bank's
CGL policy with St. Paul did not bar coverage for the inhalation of the carbon
monoxide. This holding may be explained by the fact that St. Paul attempted
to deny coverage for physical injuries sustained by a pregnant woman and her
young child.
To succeed on summary judgment motion, the moving party must demon-
strate no genuine issues of material fact exist and that they are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.' To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving
party must only show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. In Regional
Bank, the court reviewed de novo the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of Regional Bank." The court held, as a matter of law, that
under the reasonable expectations doctrine, a reasonable person of ordinary
intelligence would not characterize carbon monoxide emitted from a malfunc-
tioning residential heater as "pollution.'
Courts have split as to whether the classification of a particular substance
as a pollutant or an irritant is a question of fact or of law, and whether the
decision should be based on objective or subjective standards.7" Since what
one person would find an irritant could be pleasant to another, it follows that
the standard should be objective. Moreover, the reasonable expectations doc-
trine is objective by definition. The First Circuit treated the issue as a matter
of law by finding that excessive light and noise alleged in a complaint by
neighbors against a landfill were not pollutants under the definition of the
exclusion.73
In Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. City of Pittsburg,4 the district court
ruled that there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded a motion
for summary judgment on the issue of whether malathion was a pollutant
within the meaning of two separate insurance policies. Likewise, in Sargent
Construction Co. v. State Auto Insurance Co.,75 the Eighth Circuit ruled that
material issues of fact existed as to whether muriatic acid was an "irritant" or
"contaminant" under the policy, thus precluding summary judgment for the
insurer. In both cases, a genuine issue existed as to whether the substance was
a pollutant in any sense of the word.
In Regional Bank, the court recognized that carbon monoxide is normally
considered a pollutant or contaminant. 76 Applying the reasonable expectations
doctrine, however, the court ruled that a person of ordinary intelligence would
not consider carbon monoxide emissions from a malfunctioning heater as
ponds was "discharge" into or upon land within meaning of pollution exclusion clause, even if
damage to groundwater was unintended), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 189 (1992).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
70. 35 F.3d at 495-96.
71. Id.
72. LATHROP, supra note 18, § 3.07[2][a].
73. Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City of Keene, 898 F.2d 265 (Ist Cir. 1990).
74. 794 F. Supp. 353, 355 (D. Kan. 1992), affd sub nom., Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty
Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 987 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1993).
75. 23 F.3d 1324, 1327 (8th Cir. 1994).
76. 35 F.3d at 498.
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pollution within the meaning of the policy." This very easily could have
gone the other way, and it appears the court manufactured a decision based on
the particular facts of the case. The court overlooked that Regional Bank,
rather than the pregnant woman and her child, was the plaintiff in this cover-
age dispute.
Title 25, section 5-502(10) of the Colorado Revised Statutes" defines a
"hazardous substance" as either a substance or a mixture of substances that is,
among other things, an irritant. The statute further defines "irritant" as "any
substance ... which on immediate, prolonged, or repeated contact with normal
living tissue will induce a local inflammatory reaction.""
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), under the title of "Air emission
monitoring and reporting," states that "[t]he more common pollutants that are
monitored include ... carbon monoxide. . 0.. 80 Also, under "Housing quali-
ty standards" the CFR states that acceptable criteria for interior air quality
means that "[t]he dwelling unit shall be free from dangerous levels of air
pollution from carbon monoxide."'"
This supports the conclusion that the Tenth Circuit circumvented poten-
tially applicable precedent and support to find coverage for the insured. The
court exceeded its authority by concluding that, in this context, no reasonable
person would view carbon monoxide as pollution. Other courts have, in fact,
treated the threshold issue of whether a substance was a pollutant at all as a
matter of fact for the jury. Although the court conceded that carbon monoxide
is normally a pollutant, it stated that the facts of the case warranted a depar-
ture from this norm. 2 This evidences that reasonable people may differ as to
whether carbon monoxide should be considered pollution. As such, the court
should have followed the example set by other courts and let the jury decide
what a reasonable person would believe.
An additional argument can be made that the "reasonable person of ordi-
nary intelligence" standard is not applicable. CGL policies are not purchased
by the average, unsophisticated consumer unaware of insurance company
practices, but by businesses and corporations. Such entities should be held to a
standard such as the "reasonable corporation" and not the reasonable person of
ordinary intelligence. As evidenced by Regional Bank, the current standard
makes it much easier for courts to favor the policyholder.
The Tenth Circuit declined the opportunity to determine if the policy was
ambiguous because it would hold for coverage either way. 3 Once a policy is
found ambiguous the definition favoring the insured is followed.84 Hence, the
holding would have been more justifiable had the court chosen to find the
77. Id.
78. COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-5-502(10) (1989).
79. Id. § 25-5-502(12).
80. 32 C.F.R. § 650.92(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
81. 24 C.F.R. § 882.109(g)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
82. Regional Bank, 35 F.3d at 498.
83. Id. at 497.
84. Id. (citing Broadrick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 954 F.2d 601, 606
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 189 (1992)).
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policy ambiguous. The insured could have introduced the history of the exclu-
sion: it was designed to deny coverage to intentional polluters. Because this
was not a case of intentional pollution, the court could have found coverage
that way.
II. INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Background
The punitive damages concept developed late in English Common Law
history.8" Punitive damage awards began during the mid-eighteenth century in
England with the dual purpose of compensating injured plaintiffs for non-
physical injuries and punishing the wrongdoer.8 6 By the end of the eighteenth
century, courts in the United States began to recognize the punitive damages
concept.8 In the early 1800s, United States courts broadened compensatory
damages to include mental anguish and pain and suffering, making punitive
damage awards unnecessary to compensate for non-physical injuries." By the
mid-1800s, due to the increasing number of awards for mental anguish, the
focus of punitive damage awards shifted from compensation to punishment
and deterrence.89
The punishment and deterrent theory, which still exists in most American
jurisdictions,' is coming under increasing criticism. One attack is based upon
the concept that civil actions are primarily designed to compensate the plaintiff
rather than punish the wrongdoer.9 Another attack, recognized in at least
eight jurisdictions, questions the utility of punitive damages by noting the
ineffectiveness of punitive damages as a deterrence to misconduct.'
In addition to different interpretations as to the proper function of punitive
damages, jurisdictions also differ on whether public policy allows individuals
to insure themselves against punitive damages.93 Historically, the question of
insurability of punitive damages was simply a matter of contract interpretaion.
Currently, the insurability of punitive damages is a two part determination.94
The first part examines the language of the insurance policy, and the second,
85. Griffen B. Bell & Perry E. Pearce, Punitive Damages and the Tort System, 22 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1987).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90 (N.J. 1791).
88. Bell & Pearce, supra note 85, at 4.
89. Id.
90. Gregory J. Sextro, Note, Corporate Insurability of Punitive Damages Arising from Em-
ployee Acts, 11 J. CORP. L. 99, 101 (1985).
91. See Significant Court Decisions, Punitive Damages--Justifications, Criticisms and Limi-
tations, 30 DEF. L.J. 189, 202 (1981).
92. These jurisdictions include Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon, Ten-
nessee, and Vermont. See David A. Sprentall, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 84 DICK.
L. REV. 221, 229 & nn.59-60 (1979).
93. See generally M. Gino Brogdon, Insuring Punitive Damages: A Closer Look at Public
Policy Analysis, 37 FED'N. INS. CORP. CouNs. Q. 369, 369-83 (1987) (discussing numerous cases
dealing with the insurability of punitive damages).
94. BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE COVERAGE
DIsPuTEs § 14.02 (7th ed. 1994).
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assuming coverage for punitive damages, looks to the state's public policy
regarding whether the insured has a right to shift the punitive damage award
to the insurer."- This second part was officially added in the 1960s,9, but the
earliest adoption goes back to 1934 in Colorado.97 If it is determined that the
insurance policy does provide coverage for punitive damages, then it must be
decided whether insurability of punitive damage awards is against public
policy in the state whose law governs.98
In the first part of the test, courts will look to the language of the insur-
ance policy. 9' The provisions relating to punitive damage awards in a liability
insurance policy usually will take one of five basic forms:
(a) To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages arising out of an occur-
rence - i.e., the words "punitive damages" never appear in the policy;
(b) The word "damages" wherever used in this policy shall include
actual damages or statutory damages ... and the word "damages"
shall also include punitive damages;
(c) This policy shall include actual as well as punitive damages,
wherever it is legal for the insurer to provide indemnification for a
punitive damage award;
(d) Exclusion: This policy shall not apply to the commission of an
intentional act for which coverage would otherwise be afforded;
(e) Exclusion: Punitive damages are not covered hereunder."°
The majority of jurisdictions hold that an insurance policy providing coverage
for damages will include coverage for punitive damage awards unless such
coverage is excluded expressly.'' A minority of jurisdictions read "damag-
es" to deny coverage for punitive damages.1
0 2
Most insurance companies provide that the insurer will not provide cover-
age for punitive damages "if to do so would violate the law."'0 3 This type of
provision, option (c) from above, does not differ from (a) or (b) because, if
the insurance is illegal, the court will invalidate the coverage even without the
exclusion. This type of provision, however, is attractive because it affords the
insurer protection against punitive damage awards while still collecting premi-
ums in those jurisdictions whose public policy prohibits insurance against
punitive damages."
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Tenn. 1964).
97. See Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 39 P.2d 776, 779 (Colo. 1934). "The injured
will not be allowed to collect from a nonparticipating party for a wrong against the public." Id.
98. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 94, § 14.02.
99. Id.
100. Id. § 14.02[a].
101. Id.; see also Ridgway v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 578 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1978); Dayton Hud-
son Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1980).
102. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 94, § 14.02[a]; see also Brown v. Western Casualty
and Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
103. Katherine B. Posner, Coverage for Punitive Damages: Choice of Law Shell Game, 60
DEF. CouNs. J. 399, 400 (1993).
104. Id.
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Jurisdictions disagree over whether public policy forbids insuring against
punitive damage awards. 5  Northwestern National Casualty Co. v.
McNulty"° represents those cases holding that public policy prohibits insur-
ing against punitive damages. Applying Florida law, the Fifth Circuit held that
punitive damage awards are levied to punish and deter."° Traditionally,
insuring against criminal fines violates public policy, which "should invalidate
any contract of insurance against the civil punishment that punitive damages
represent.""
Ridgway v. Gulf Life Insurance Co."° reaches the opposite conclusion
and holds that insuring against punitive damages does not violate public poli-
cy. In Ridgway, the insurer agreed to indemnify the insured for all sums it
became legally obligated to pay."' Applying Texas law, the Fifth Circuit
held that even though "[t]here may be sound policy reasons why some states
have not allowed punitive damages to be covered by liability insurance," Tex-
as does share in that policy."' The comprehensive and unqualified wording
of the insurance policy stating that the insurer agreed "[t]o indemnify the
insured for all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay"
necessarily included actual and punitive damages." 2 To otherwise construct
the policy would "twist the language of the policy.""' 3 Thus, some jurisdic-
tions value the freedom of contract over the public policy concerns that allow-
ing insurance against punitive damages undermines any punitive effect of
those awards.
The majority of jurisdictions follow the holding of Ridgway and allow
insurance against punitive damages." 4 Some jurisdictions, however, only al-
low insurance against punitive damages where the liability of the insured is
based upon vicarious principles. "' Others have modified the Ridgway hold-
ing by making a distinction between punitive damages awarded for intentional
and unintentional conduct." 6 Jurisdictions which make this distinction permit
insuring against punitive damages for negligent or reckless misconduct, but bar
insurance for intentional misconduct.' '
7
105. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962)
(holding that, under Florida law, public policy prohibited insuring against punitive damages);
Ridgway v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 578 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that, under Texas law,
insurance policy insuring against punitive damages did not violate public policy).
106. 307 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1962).
107. Id. at 436.
108. Id. at 440. The court limited its holding to damages awarded to punish and deter and by
punitive damages they did not mean damages awarded for simple negligence. Id. at 442.
109. 578 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (5th Cir. 1978).
110. Id. at 1029.
111. Id. at 1030.
112. Id. at 1029.
113. Id.
114. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 94, § 14.06. A 1993 survey of the insurability of
punitive damages in various jurisdictions shows that twenty-five jurisdictions permit insurance of
punitive damages. Seven jurisdictions do not allow insuring against punitive damages under any
circumstances. The issue is undetermined in five jurisdictions. Id.
115. Id. Nine jurisdictions allow insuring against punitive damages where the liability of the
insured is vicarious. Id.
116. Id. Five jurisdictions allow insurance of punitive damages except when arising from
intentional wrongs. Id.
117. See, e.g., Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 440 S.W.2d 582 (Ark.
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B. Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co."'
1. Facts
On September 3, 1989, James Martina, employed as an associate manager
of one of Magnum's Little Caesar's Pizza restaurants, raped a female minor
employee who was on duty with Martina. The victim and her parents brought
suit in Oklahoma state court against Martina for assault and against Magnum
for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Martina. Evidence at the
state trial showed that Martina had a prior felony conviction for attempted
sexual assault on a child in New York and that Martina lied on his Magnum
employment application regarding his criminal record. Evidence was also in-
troduced showing that Martina had repeatedly sexuallly harassed other em-
ployees and that some of the young female employees refused to work closing
because it would require them to work alone with Martina." 9
Prior to the rape, Martina's coworkers apprised store managers of
Martina's misconduct. One of the store managers complained to the area su-
pervisor who in turn spoke to the area director. One of the store managers
reprimanded Martina on three separate occasions regarding his misconduct,
and the other manager issued a written warning that was sent to the home
office to be placed in Martina's personnel file. While this misconduct violated
written policy against sexual harassment, Martina was neither suspended nor
fired. At trial, the jury returned a verdict against Martina and Magnum for
$750,000 each in compensatory damages. In addition, Magnum was assessed
$750,000 in punitive damages, while Martina was assessed $5 million in puni-
tive damages. 2
Magnum was insured by Continental Casualty Co. ("CNA") under a poli-
cy that did not expressly exclude coverage for punitive damages. In response
to a request for coverage, CNA sent a letter to Magnum reserving its rights
and advising Magnum that CNA would provide a defense, but a potential for
uninsured punitive damages existed. 2 '
Following the award against it, Magnum filed this declaratory judgment
action against CNA asking the court to decide whether the CNA policy cov-
ered the award of punitive damages. Magnum also sought damages against
CNA for an alleged breach of good faith and fair dealing.'22 The district
court entered a partial summary judgment for CNA in the federal declaratory
judgment action, and ruled that Oklahoma public policy prohibits insuring
against punitive damages except in cases of vicarious liability. Consequently,
1969) (allowing insurance of punitive damages except when rising from an intentional tort); Abbie
Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 511 P.2d 783 (Idaho 1973) (hold-
ing a negligent driver insured); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn.
1964) (allowing insurance of punitive damages from wrongs not intentionally inflicted).
118. 36 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1994).
119. Id. at 1495-96.
120. Id. at 1496-97.
121. Id. at 1496. Plaintiffs offered to settle against Magnum for $495,000 and, even though
Magnum requested CNA to settle, CNA refused to offer more than $350,000. Id.
122. For a discussion regarding the bad faith claim see infra notes 200-17 and accompanying
text.
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the court denied insurance coverage to Magnum because the punitive damages
award was based on Magnum's direct liability. The court also denied CNA's
motion for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether CNA's conduct consti-
tuted bad faith. The jury ultimately awarded Magnum $750,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $750,000 in punitive damages on its bad faith claim.'23
Magnum appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment
for CNA that denied insurance coverage for the punitive damage award. CNA
appealed the federal judgment against it on the bad faith claim.'24
2. Majority Opinion
The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the punitive damage
award was imposed upon Magnum under vicarious liability principles or
whether it was imposed based upon Magnum's own gross negligence.'25 Ap-
plying Oklahoma law in a de novo review of the grant of partial summary
judgment in favor of CNA, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
26
Oklahoma public policy prohibits the insurability of punitive damages
except where the insured has been held accountable based upon the principles
of vicarious liability. 27 The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Dayton Hudson
Corp. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. 2 ' reasoned that because
punitive damages punish and deter wrongdoers, allowing the wrongdoer to
shift liability for punitives to its insurer defeated that purpose."' In contrast,
vicarious liability cases do not involve the conduct of the policyholder, so
public policy does not prevent insurance coverage of punitive damages in
these instances. 3°
To determine which liability theory the jury based its award of punitive
damages upon, the Tenth Circuit examined the totality of the jury instructions
given."' The only jury instructions given concerned negligent hiring and re-
tention:3 2 An employer's liability for negligent supervision and hiring is sep-
arate and distinct from an employer's liability under respondeat superior."'
As such, the court held that all of the jury instructions "indicate[d] that it was
Magnum's own negligence, by violating its nondelegable duty by its hiring
123. Magnum Foods, 36 F.3d at 1496-97.
124. Id. at 1497. CNA also appealed the order awarding Magnum attorney fees. Magnum
cross-appealed the same order as it denied prejudgment interest. Both were reversed and remand-
ed. Id. at 1509.
125. Id. at 1498.
126. Id. at 1497, 1509.
127. Id. at 1497 (citing Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d
1155, 1156 (Okla. 1980). In Dayton Hudson the Oklahoma Supreme Court followed the McNulty
rule disallowing insurance coverage for punitive damage awards. Dayton Hudson, 621 P.2d at
1160.
128. 621 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1980).
129. Id. at 1160.
130. Id.
131. Magnum Foods, 36 F.3d at 1499.
132. Id.




and retention of Martina, that provided the basis for the punitive liability im-
posed by the state court jury and not respondeat superior for the liability of its
employees."'34 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the case fell
within the Dayton Hudson rule disallowing insurance coverage of punitive
damages,'35 and that the district court was correct in concluding that Mag-
num was directly liable.'36
3. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Kelly dissented from the court's opinion. Intially, Judge Kelly noted
that as a corporation, Magnum was responsible for the breach of a nondelega-
ble duty. 37 However, "even though duties are nondelegable, liability for their
breach has no automatic characterization as 'direct' because liability may arise
vicariously."' 38 He felt that "an unequivocal showing of actual corporate
knowledge" was necessary to decide corporate liability in this case. 39 There
was no evidence suggesting that any officer of director of Magnum had actual
knowledge of Martina's misconduct."4
Judge Kelly's main contention was that due to precedent, 4' the jury
could have based the award of punitive damages on a vicarious liability theo-
ry.42 The evidence showed that only the store managers had knowledge of
Martina's misconduct, not that any officer or director of Magnum had knowl-
edge.'43 If correct, then the award would have been based upon principles of
vicarious liability and not direct liability.
C. Analysis
Once the court determined that the punitive damage award against Mag-
num was based upon Magnum's liability for negligent hiring and retention and
not upon vicarious liability, the Tenth Circuit applied Oklahoma law, followed
established precedent, and held that public policy prohibited insurance against
punitive damages for direct liability. The court feared two unwanted
consequnces of insuring punitive damages: 1) the punishment and deterrent
purpose would be defeated; and 2) the burden of punitive damages would
ultimately fall upon the public in the form of higher insurance premiums."4
There are several arguments in favor of the insurability for punitive dam-
ages: (a) the sanctity of private contracts; (b) the insurer has elected to accept
134. Id. at 1501.
135. Id. at 1502.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1510 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1511.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Dayton Hudson, 621 P.2d at 1161 (declining to make a per se rule that would re-
quire a corporation to "stand directly liable and uninsurable for punitive damages stemming from
the torts of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, regardless of which employees have actual
knowledge of the wrongdoer's behavior").
142. Magnum Foods, 36 F.3d at 1511 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1498.
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the premium dollar for the coverage afforded; (c) the potential danger of bank-
ruptcy of insureds and businesses if denied the pass-along right; and (d) the
presence or absence of insurance coverage does not realistically serve as a
deterrent. 45
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma had previously followed the reasonable
expectations doctrine when construing insurance contracts."4 The Tenth Cir-
cuit departed from this doctrine here because Oklahoma public policy prohibits
insurance of punitive damages based upon direct liability. 47 The insurance
contract did not specify on what basis, if any, it would provide coverage for
punitive damages. In fact, the insurance contract made no mention of exclud-
ing coverage for punitive damages.
It is reasonable to expect a corporation to know the law in the jurisdiction
in which it is based. It is also reasonable, however, that Magnum, when look-
ing only to its policy, would not have understood that no coverage existed for
its direct liability but would be afforded in cases of vicarious liability. Thus,
this policy should have explicitly set forth this distinction. Nonetheless, the
court denied Magnum's reasonable expectations in regard to the contract for
insurance and allowed CNA to accept premiums and then deny coverage."
These are policy concerns that seem just as important, if not more so, than
those attached to the insurability of punitive damages. Courts are allowing
companies to manipulate the system.
Presently, the potential exists for a choice of law shell game. Depending
upon the choice of law theory a particular court follows, 49 and assuming the
insurance policy does not specifically exclude coverage, punitive damages may
or may not be covered based upon the public policy of the chosen state. This
forum shopping permits the insurance company to accept premiums paid by
the insured for coverage of all sums the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay, then allows the insurer to deny coverage due to the application of a par-
ticular state's public policy. An insured pays for coverage and then is later
denied that coverage. This potential for manipulation of the law and the resul-
tant uncertainty has the potential to increase rates, transaction costs, and per-
haps coverage disputes. 50 Courts or legislatures should force insurance com-
panies to include a specific exclusion for punitive damages in policies. Other
possibilities, such as requiring insurers to warn insureds that coverage for
punitives is not available under the law of many states, would not adequately
145. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 94, § 14.02[b][1].
146. See, e.g., Phillips v. Estate of Greenfield, 859 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1993). The court held
that to construe the contract as providing coverage would require a rewriting of the clear language
of the policy or a tortured reading of the plain language of the exclusion and to follow either
course "would be to negate the reasonable expectations of the parties as expressed in their con-
tract .... "Id. at 1106.
147. Magnum Foods, 36 F.3d at 1497.
148. Id. at 1502.
149. To establish the governing law of a contract, five general choice of law theories have
been developed by United States courts: "place of making" rule; "most significant relationship"
test; "center of gravity" test; "governmental interest" analysis; and "choice-influencing factors"
approach. Posner, supra note 103, at 400-01.
150. Id. at 399.
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solve the problem because insurance companies continue to accept premiums
for coverage they will not provide.
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Magnum Foods is confusing. In discussing
whether the award was based upon vicarious liability, the Court found "[a]ll of
these instructions indicate that it was Magnum's own negligence, by violating
its nondelegable duty by its hiring and retention of Martina, that provided the
basis for the punitive liability imposed."'' One jury instruction stated the
jury could assess punitives against Magnum if it found Magnum's conduct
amounted to "Fraud; Oppression; Gross Negligence; Malice (actual or pre-
sumed); Evil Intent; Reckless or Wanton disregard of another's rights."'52
The court said only that this instruction put the question of whether Magnum's
liability was direct or vicarious in proper perspective.'53 While direct liability
was not one of the prerequisites for awarding punitive damages, the court does
not discuss whether Magnum's conduct could properly be considered mali-
cious, grossly negligent, etc.
Furthermore, the dissent correctly states there was no record evidence
suggesting that any officer or director of Magnum had actual knowledge of
Martina's misconduct. 4 The evidence on appeal showed only that the store
managers had actual knowledge of Martina's misconduct.'55 Having this
knowledge and failing to act accordingly amounted to negligence on the part
of those managers. Basing Magnum's liability, and the subsequent punitive
damage award against them, on the store managers' negligence would be an
example of vicarious liability as there was no showing of actual corporate
knowledge.'56 Punitive damage awards based upon vicarious liability are in-
surable.'57
The record does not support the court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of CNA. Rather, the court should have reversed the summary judgment
grant and remanded the case for trial to allow the intoduction of evidence
sufficient to decide the basis of liability. Genuine issues of material fact ex-
isted as to whether there was actual corporate knowledge, which precluded the
granting of summary judgment.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND BAD FAITH
A. Background
Bad faith in insurance law emerged as one of the dominant legal topics in
1993.58 According to a recent survey of top litigation awards, two insurance
bad faith cases, Amoco Chemical Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of
151. Magnum Foods, 36 F.3d at 1501 (emphasis added).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1502.
154. Id. at 1511 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 1496.
156. Id. at 1511 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1497.
158. J. Stratton Shartel, Breach of Contract, Bad Faith Verdicts Dominate 1993 Top Verdicts
List, 8 No. 2 INSIDE LIT1G. I Feb.Mar. 1994.
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London 59 and Hedrick v. Setry Insurance Co., 6 were among the top ten
verdicts of the year.'6'
Bad faith liability for insurance companies commenced with two landmark
decisions in California, Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 62 and Fletcher v.
Western National Life Insurance Co. 63 In Crisci, the court stated that an in-
surer owes an implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing to its in-
sured.' A violation of that duty sounds in tort, notwithstanding that the
violation may also constitute a breach of contract.'65 The duty in the case of
a liability insurance policy includes the duty to act in good faith when attempt-
ing to settle third party claims against the insured."6
In Fletcher, the court held that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
existing in every insurance contract requires that neither party act to injure the
other's right to receive the agreement's benefits.'67 California courts have
allowed punitive damage awards against insurers for breaching the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing."6 California courts also hold that the
implied covenant is not an obligation stemming from the contract but is an
obligation imposed by the law and therefore a breach will sound in tort. 69
Thus, damages are not limited to strict contractual damages. 7 '
The rule from Crisci has been followed by the Seventh Circuit in Craft v.
Economy Fire & Casualty Co.'' and other cases.'72 For example, the court
in Craft held that although the insurance company did not control the in-
sured's litigation, the insurer can still be required to act in good faith based
upon the insured's reasonable expectations and the unequal bargaining posi-
tions."' The court further held that punitive damages could be levied against
insureds.'74
159. No. BC030755 (L.A. County Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 1993).
160. No. 96-128100-90 (Tarrant County, Tex., Dist. Ct. Dec. 10, 1993).
161. Shartel, supra note 158. The $425.6 million dollar jury award in Amoco Chemical Co.
was the second largest punitive damage award in 1993. The $102.7 million dollar jury award, in
Hendrick, was the tenth largest punitive damages award in 1993.
Large punitive damage amounts, in general, have been approved by the United States Su-
preme Court. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2718-23 (1993)
(raising the spector of Due Process Clause limits but approving a $10 million punitive damage
award, which was 526 times the amount of the actual award, as not being "grossly excessive").
162. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
163. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
164. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176.
165. Id. at 178-79.
166. Id. at 176.
167. Fletcher, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93; see also Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103
(Cal. 1974).
168. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied and ap-
peal dismissed, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
169. Silberg, 521 P.2d at 1108-09.
170. Id. at 1109.
171. 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1978). In Craft, the insured brought suit under an automobile
liability insurance policy against the insurance company for tortious breach of contract in its han-
dling of the claim. Id. at 566-67.
172. See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972).
173. Craft, 572 F.2d at 569.
174. Id. at 574. Indiana law allows punitive damages for the tortious breach of an insurance
contract if the insurer's conduct amounts to malice, gross negligence, or oppression and the
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The Eighth Circuit, applying Iowa law in Northwestern National Insur-
ance Co. v. Pope,"' recognized an independent action in tort when an insur-
er acted in bad faith to settle a first party claim for property damage. Under
Iowa law, if the cause of action against the insurer lies in tort as well as con-
tract, punitive damage awards can be made to the insured if the insurer acts
with malice, fraud, gross negligence or commits an illegal act.'76 The court
in Pope, however, held that the handling of the claims by the insurer did not
amount to malice or impropriety of the type that would justify punitive dam-
ages under Iowa law.' The delay in settling the claim was due to late fil-
ing, time allowed for negotiations, and the fact that plaintiff changed attorneys
twice during the process.'
There are a number of jurisdictions that do not recognize the tort of bad
faith as an independent cause of action and therefore do not allow punitive
damages.'79 Kansas, a Tenth Circuit state, is one such jurisdiction.' The
Supreme Court of Kansas, in Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance
Co.,' ' held that an insurer, in defending and settling third party claims
against its insured, owed a duty to its insured to act in good faith. Kansas law,
however, does not recognize bad faith as a separate tort, and therefore denies
punitive damages." 2
In Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.," 3 the Tenth Circuit,
applying Oklahoma law, followed Crisci' and held that an insurance
company's violation of its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing will
give rise to an action in tort for which punitive damages may be sought.'85
In Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co.'86 the court, also
applying Oklahoma law, ruled that the presence of an uninsurable punitive
damages claim did not allow the insurer to relinquish its obligation to act in
good faith.' In remanding for a new trial, the court further ruled that the
jury should be instructed not to consider the payment by Magnum to settle a
punitive damage award when deciding compensatory damages on the bad faith
claim against CNA.' 8
deterrent effect of the punitive damages would serve the public interest. Id.
175. 791 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1986).
176. Id. at 652.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Wilson v. Colonial Penn Life Ins. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Minn. 1978)
(applying Minnesota law); Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015 (Or. 1978).
180. See Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149 (Kan. 1980).
181. Id. at 155.
182. Id. at 158.
183. 34 F.3d 932 (10th Cir 1994).
184. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
185. Thompson, 34 F.3d at 942-43.
186. 36 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1994).
187. Id. at 1503.
188. Id. at 1506.
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B. Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co."8 9
1. Facts
On June 6, 1991, an intentionally set fire destroyed the Thompsons' unoc-
cupied rental house in Oklahoma. The Thompsons filed a claim with State
Farm Insurance under their policy covering the house, its contents, and the
loss of rental value. State Farm sent a claims representative to review the
Thompsons' financial condition to determine if they had a motive to set the
fire. As part of the investigation, and as required by the policy, the Thompsons
gave statements under oath.'9
During the investigation, the Thompsons told the claims representative,
Morty Sands ("Sands"), that the sale of their jewelry store business, for be-
tween $700,000 and $750,000, was imminent. The recorded statement of the
realtor, Helen Morris ("Morris"), with whom the business was listed not only
negated any imminency of a sale but stated that there had been no offers or
serious lookers. 9'
Morris testified at trial that she listed the building alone for $275,000 and
the entire property, including the jewelry business inventory, for $775,000.
She denied telling the Thompsons she had a buyer willing to pay $700,000 to
$750,000 for the store. Morris testified that the only offer was one of $90,000
for the real estate. After some appraisal differences, Morris inquired as to the
valuation for tax purposes and, at that time, learned that Orville Munson
("Munson") owned the property and building, while the Thompsons owned
only the business.'92
During the examination, the Thompsons told Sands of another "imminent"
sale involving stock in Honduran Gold Mines, Ltd. ("Honduran"). The
Thompsons' lawyer gave Morris a phone number for Honduran that was no
longer in service and upon investigation, she could not find the company's
current location.
93
Jerry Griffin ("Griffin"), the President of Honduran, in his deposition
entered at trial, testified that on the day before the fire, the Thompsons had
shown up unannounced at his home in Dallas. At that time, Griffin told the
Thompsons that two offers to purchase Honduran had been rejected. Griffin
did state in his deposition that at the time of the Thompsons' visit he believed
that "an infusion of cash was likely" due to the interest of another buyer.
Munson, also a stockholder in Honduran, testified that as of June 1991, he
also thought there would be a sale.' 94
As a result, State Farm did not honor the Thompsons' insurance claim
under the belief the Thompsons had started the fire. 95 The Thompsons
brought suit against State Farm to collect on the insurance policy for the
189. 34 F.3d 932 (10th Cir. 1994).
190. Id. at 935.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 935-36.
193. Id. at 936.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 942.
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building and for other damages arising from State Farm's handling of the
Thompsons' claim. A jury returned a verdict in favor of State Farm, and the
Thompsons appealed on several grounds. One of the grounds on appeal was




The district court's refusal to submit to the jury the issue of punitive
damages was, in effect, the equivalent of a judgment as a matter of law on
that issue in favor of State Farm. 97 The Tenth Circuit ruled that the district
judge correctly stated Oklahoma law on the issue. 9
Under Oklahoma law, in order to present the issue of punitive damages to
a jury, the trial judge must determine if there is sufficient evidence of "fraud,
oppression, gross negligence or malice, actual or presumed" from "wilful
acts.... . "The record in the case amply discloses evidence in support of the
legitimate belief of State Farm that it had no obligation to honor the
Thompsons' claim."22" The actions of State Farm in investigating the validity
of its belief, cannot, as a matter of law, be said to have been egregious enough
to constitute bad faith or to allow the award of punitive damages."'
C. Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co.2"2
1. Facts
For a complete discussion of the facts please refer to section II(b)(1).
2. Opinion
The Tenth Circuit ruled that where compensatory and uninsurable punitive
damages were sought and the insurer ("CNA") defended the entire suit, the
mere presence of a claim for uninsurable punitive damages did not allow CNA
to relinquish its obligation to act in good faith in its handling of the entire
case.
203
The parties disagreed as to whether the presence of a claim for uninsur-
able punitive damages abrogated the insurer's obligation to act in good
faith. 24 The court stated that an insurer's good faith requirements in the
circumstances of this case differ from the requirements in a typical excess
liability case. 5 In the typical case, Oklahoma law places a heavy duty on
196. Id. at 934. The court concluded that all the grounds for appeal were without merit. Id.
197. Id. at 942.
198. Id.




202. 36 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1994).
203. Id. at 1506.
204. Id. at 1503.
205. Id.
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the insurer to determine if the claim against the insured should be settled, if
possible, within policy limits.2" The situtation is different when the insured
assumes the risk due to exposure to uninsurable punitive damages. The
insurer's failure to settle merely deprives the insured of a chance to avoid the
possibility of punitive damages for its own conduct. 7
Regardless of the conduct of the insurer, punitive damages might still be
awarded due to the insured's blameworthy behavior.2"' The court agreed that
the "risk that a wrongdoer will suffer the consequences of his own malfea-
sance is not one that may be shifted to an insurer." An insurer, however, is
not insulated from bad faith in handling the entire case whenever uninsurable
punitive damages are sought.2"
CNA claimed that the district court improperly denied its motion for
directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the bad faith
claim asserted by Magnum. The Tenth Circuit held that CNA was not entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, but that CNA was entitled to a new trial to
determine if its conduct violated its duty of good faith. The basis for this
violation was that the bad faith claim judgment in favor of Magnum improper-
ly included the $600,000 Magnum paid to settle the punitive damage
award.
210
In the new trial, the court held that the jury should be instructed not to
consider the payment of $600,000 by Magnum to settle the punitive damage
award on the bad faith claim. The jury should further be instructed that Okla-




Allowing the punitive damage award against the insured to be considered
by the jury in assessing compensatory damages for bad faith by the insurer in
effect shifts the liability for the punitive damages to the insurer, which violates
Oklahoma public policy.2 12 Therefore, at the new trial, the court held that
Magnum may seek compensatory damages based on any injury but may not
include the payment of $600,000.2 3 Adequate evidence existed to submit the
compensatory damages issue to the jury regardless of the $600,000 Magnum
paid to settle the puntive damages award. '4 In the course of the new trial,
the district judge must determine if there is sufficient evidence to justify sub-
mitting the claim for punitive damages against CNA to the jury.2"5
206. Id. at 1504 (citing Hazelrigg v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 241 F.2d 871, 873
(10th Cir. 1957)).
207. Id. (quoting Soto v. State Farm Ins. Co., 635 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (N.Y. 1994)).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1505-06.
210. Id. at 1502.
211. Id. at 1506.
212. Id. at 1507 (citing Dayton Hudson, 621 P.2d at 1156; Oliver v. Producers Gas Co., 795
P.2d 1090, 1091-92 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990)).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1508.
215. Id. The court expressed no opinion as to whether it was proper for the district judge to




The dissent opted for an approach that would "not recognize any claim
based upon a bad faith refusal to settle where policy limits were not exceeded
and the only exposure to the insured was for an uncovered event. 21 6 Further,
the dissent argued that it was inconsistent to refuse to include, as compensato-
ry damages, damages that flow both logically and naturally from a bad faith
refusal to settle, while at the same time requiring that good faith consideration
be given to the insured's concerns over possible exposure to uninsured puni-
tive damages.2 ' The dissent felt that if an insurer does not settle at a reason-
able offer within the policy limits, and this failure to settle subjects the insured
to liability not included in policy coverage, "the insurer should be responsible
for any losses incurred as a result of its bad faith refusal to settle." ' The
settlement amount demanded of the insurer, however, must be reasonable,
taking the injuries into account as well as the covered exposure and the final
jury verdict on the covered portions."9
D. Analysis
In Thompson, the Tenth Circuit correctly affirmed the district court's
refusal to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury, even though, in
effect, it was tantamount to a judgment as a matter of law for State Farm.
Under Oklahoma law, it is the trial judge's duty to determine, as a matter of
law, if sufficient evidence exists as to whether there was oppression, fraud,
malice, or gross negligence from willful acts to submit the punitive damage
issue to the jury.22 Due to the evidence presented, it was reasonable for
State Farm to believe it had no obligation to honor the Thompsons' claim.22
This was not a difficult case for the court to decide. It was established defini-
tively that the fire was intentionally set.222 State Farm's belief that it had no
obligation was legitimized by the evidence, and its conduct could not amount
to gross negligence or malice, both of which are required for an award of
punitive damages.223 In addition, the jury found no bad faith on State Farm's
behalf and thus, even if submitted to the jury, punitive damages could not
have been awarded.224
The court's ruling in Magnum Foods presents a more difficult issue. An
insurance company has to act not only in its own best interest but also in the
best interest of its insured as well.225 Sometimes these interests conflict.
There is sound logic in the court's ruling that where compensatory and unin-
216. Id. at 1512 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 1513.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. 34 F.3d at 942.
221. Id. at 943.
222. Id. at 935.
223. Id. at 943.
224. Id.
225. 36 F.3d at 1504 (quoting American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co., 173
F.2d 830, 832 (10th Cir. 1949)).
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surable punitive damages are sought, and the insurance company agreed to
defend the entire suit, the mere presence of a claim for punitive damages does
not allow the insurance company to relinquish its obligation to act in good
faith in its handling of the entire case.226 To hold otherwise would allow the
insurer to disregard the best interests of the insured and take only its own best
interest into account, thus violating the basic concept of insurance law articu-
lated above. This would, in effect, legitimize an insurer's bad faith and insu-
late it from recourse.
The dissent validly notes a flaw in the majority's opinion that the
$600,000 paid by Magnum to settle the punitive damages claim should not be
included in the compensatory damages claim against CNA. The punitive dam-
ages Magnum paid flowed logically and naturally from a bad faith refusal to
settle.227 It seems at odds to exclude this in compensatory damages while at
the same time requiring, as good faith, that fair consideration be given to the
insured's concerns due to exposure to the possibility of uninsured punitive
damages. 28
The majority's attempt to distinguish the instant situation from that of a
typical excess liability case is not compelling. The victim made reasonable
settlement offers that were well within policy limits and did not include puni-
tive damages.229 In fact, the offers were far less than the eventual jury
award. 3° Acceptance of the settlement offers would have been in the best in-
terests of both Magnum and CNA. For whatever reason, CNA rolled the dice
and subjected Magnum to a considerable punitive damage award. While the
court held that the punitive damages stemmed from Magnum's own
wrongdoing,' the punitive damages would have been avoided had CNA
acted in good faith and settled. Thus, the punitive damage award was properly
included in Magnum's compensatory damages claim as it was directly related
to Magnum's failure to act in good faith by not settling the case.
CONCLUSION
During the 1993-94 survey period, the Tenth Circuit addressed, for the
first time, what constitutes an "irritant" or "contaminant" under the "pollution
exclusion" in a comprehensive general liability insurance policy.2 32 The
Tenth Circuit held that although carbon monoxide is a pollutant in the environ-
mental context, a reasonable person would not understand carbon monoxide to
be a pollutant in the context of insurance coverage. 231 It can be argued, how-
ever, that it is just as likely that a reasonable person would believe carbon
monoxide to be a pollutant in any context. This potential factual dispute indi-
226. Id. at 1506.
227. Id. at 1513.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1507 (victim offered to settle for $495,000).
230. Id. at 1496 (jury found insured liable for compensatory damages in the amount of
$750,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $750,000).
231. Id. at 1497-98.




cates that the case should have been submitted to the jury and not decided on
summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit showed that it will uphold coverage in
the context of residential pollution, while it will be less inclined to do so in an
environmental pollution case.
With respect to punitive damages, the Tenth Circuit followed established
precedent that Oklahoma public policy prohibits insuring against punitive
damages based upon direct liability. 34 The court ruled that an insurer's rea-
sonable belief that it was under no obligation to honor a claim precluded an
award of punitive damages.235 Further, a punitive damage award against the
insured, when the insurer refused to settle, may not be considered when




234. Magnum Foods, 36 F.3d at 1497.
235. Thompson, 34 F.3d at 943.





The intellectual property area in the Tenth Circuit was relatively quiet
during 1994 with only one trademark case surfacing. In Universal Money
Centers., Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,' the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the Kansas district court's grant of summary judgment to American
Telephone and Telegraph Co. ("AT&T"), concluding as a matter of law that
AT&T's use of the word "Universal" was unlikely to cause confusion among
consumers.2 In doing so, the court approved the application of the "likelihood
of confusion" test3 and clarified its position regarding two factors of the test:
similarity of services and degree of care exercised by consumers.4 More im-
portantly, the court endorsed the addition of another component, "strength of
the mark," to the "likelihood of confusion" test.'
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Universal Money, while not surprising,
demonstrates its understanding of trademark rights. The court set forth a clear
framework for district courts to follow in trademark infringement disputes by
systematically analyzing each factor of importance in the "likelihood of confu-
sion" test and balancing the evidence accordingly.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Fundamentals of Trademark Law
The most important intellectual property asset owned by a business is its
trademark. A trademark is defined as "any word, name, symbol, or device"
used by any person "to identify and distinguish his or her goods ... from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods
even if that source is unknown."7 Thus, trademarks promote various functions.
They identify the good's origin, guarantee quality consistency, and serve as an
advertising device!
1. 22 F.3d 1527 (10th Cir. 1994).
2. Id. at 1536.
3. Id. at 1530; see Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925 (10th Cir.
1986) (articulating the application of the likelihood of confusion test) [hereinafter Beer Nuts i];
Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940-41 (1983), rev'd, 805 F.2d 920
(10th Cir. 1986) (stating the criteria for the likelihood of confusion test) [hereinafter Beer Nuts I].
4. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532-33.
5. Id. at 1533 (noting that "strength of the mark" was not specifically listed as a relevant
factor in Beer Nuts I).
6. ROBERT C. DoRR & CHRIsToPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS, PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS 124 (1990) (noting that simply mentioning certain trademarks
such as Edsel, McDonald's or Exxon elicits either a favorable or unfavorable reaction).
7. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
8. See EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETI-
TIVE PROCESS 246 (rev. 4th ed. 1991); see also Educational Dev. Corp. v. Economy Co., 562 F.2d
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Trademark law, however, is concerned with more than protection of the
trademark owner. In fact, to address additional concerns, such as shielding the
consumer from confusion over the source and identity of products,9 Congress
enacted the Lanham Act.'" Of specific interest are §§ 1 14(1)(a) and 1125(a)
of the Act. Section 1114(a) relates to trademark infringement by one who uses
a registered mark which is likely to cause confusion." Section 1125(a) is
concerned with marks that indicate false designations of origin and are likely
to cause confusion. Therefore, the unauthorized marketplace use of a regis-
tered mark that is likely to cause confusion as to the origin of the product
establishes an action for trademark infringement. 3
B. Likelihood of Confusion Test
The touchstone for trademark infringement is "likelihood of confusion."' 4
As previously noted, the Lanham Act requires that defendant's use of the
mark be "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."' 5
Various market factors are set out in the RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION to identify proof of likelihood of confusion. 6 The elements considered
include the degree of resemblance between the marks, the similarity of mar-
26, 28 (10th Cir. 1977) (defining a trademark as a "distinctive mark, symbol, or emblem used by
a producer of manufacturer to identify and distinguish his goods from those of others"); Jacqueline
Stem, Note, Genericide: Cancellation of a Registered Trademark, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 666
(1983).
9. See KITCH & PERLMAN, supra note 8, at 247; see also McGraw-Hill Pub. Co. v. Amer-
ican Aviation Assocs., 117 F.2d 293, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (noting that the purpose of trademark
law is "to safeguard the consumer by helping him get what he thinks he wants").
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1l14(l)(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) provides that the unauthorized use of
"any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with
the sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods ... is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive."
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1988) states:
Any person who ... uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device.., or
any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact ... which ... is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake ... as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or ap-
proval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.., shall
be liable.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a); see Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1484
(10th Cit. 1987); Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, Inc. 809 F.2d 656, 658 (10th Cir. 1987); Beer
Nuts 1H, 805 F.2d at 924.
14. See, e.g., Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1993); Americana Trading
Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284, 1285, 1287 (9th Cir. 1992); DeCosta v. Viacom Int'l.,
Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 605-06 (1st Cir. 1992); Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978
F.2d 947, 958 (7th Cir. 1992); Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Technologies, Inc., 935 F.2d 1122, 1125
(10th Cir. 1991); Beer Nuts 1H, 805 F.2d at 925; Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc.,
710 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983); DoRR & MUNCH, supra note 6, at 148 (noting that the test
is also utilized by the Patent Trademark Office (PTO) to determine whether to approve a trade-
mark application).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a).
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 (1993) ("Whether an actor's use
of a designation causes a likelihood of confusion with the use of a trademark ... by another...
is determined by a consideration of all the circumstances involved in the marketing of the respec-
tive goods .... ).
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keting techniques of the two parties, the characteristics of the prospective
consumers and the degree of care exercised in making purchasing decisions,
the degree of distinctiveness of the mark, and the product and geographic
markets in which the competing marks are used. 7
A majority of courts utilize a variation 8 of the "sight, sound and mean-
ing" test set out in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS.'9 The Tenth Circuit en-
dorsed the Restatement of Torts approach by laying out the relevant factors to
consider in Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co.2" Beer Nuts 11 involved
a trademark infringement action over the registered and incontestable trade-
mark name "BEER NUTS" owned by Beer Nuts, Inc." Clover Club sold the
same product, sweetened, salted peanuts, under the name "BREW NUTS.
'22
Beer Nuts sued Clover Club in an action for trademark infringement. The
District Court ruled that there was no likelihood of confusion concerning the
origin of the competing products.23 The Tenth Circuit repeated the factors to
consider for the "likelihood of confusion" test.24
The court cautioned that the list was not exhaustive, nor was one factor
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Nikon, 987 F.2d at 94 (listing eight factors: strength of the mark, the similarity
between the two marks, the similarity between the products, the likelihood that the senior user will
overlap with the junior user, the sophistication of buyers, quality of defendant's product, actual
confusion, and the defendant's bad faith in adopting the mark); DeCosta, 981 F.2d at 606 (listing
eight factors: similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and services, relation of the "chan-
nels" which parties trade through, similarity of advertising, types of prospective buyers, actual
confusion, junior user's reason for using mark, and strength of the mark); Americana Trading, 966
F.2d at 1287 (listing six factors: strength of the mark, similarity in appearance, sound, and mean-
ing, class of goods in question, marketing channels used, actual confusion, and intent of the junior
user); In re E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (listing thir-
teen factors: similarity of appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression, similarity of
goods, similarity of trade channels, conditions under which purchase is likely to be made, fame of
the mark, number of similar marks, actual confusion, length of time concurrent use of the mark
has created confusion, variety of goods on which a mark is used, market interface between junior
and senior user, extent to which the junior user could exclude others from using mark, extent of
potential confusion, and any other probative fact).
19. THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938) outlines the following criteria:
(a) the degree of similarity between the designation and the trademark or trade name in
(i) appearance;
(ii) pronunciation of the words used;
(iii) verbal translation of the pictures or designs involved;
(iv) suggestion;
(b) the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;
(c) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the goods or services marketed
by the actor and those marketed by the other;
(d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers.
20. Beer Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 940 (stating that to determine whether likelihood of confusion
exists, the "court has used the criteria set out in the Restatement of Torts § 729 (1938)"). The
Tenth Circuit confronted the likelihood of confusion issue first in Beer Nuts I. After laying out the
relevant criteria to be analyzed, the case was remanded to make a determination. However, the
Tenth Circuit had an opportunity to revisit Beer Nuts I when the case was once again appealed to
review the district court's determination that it was unlikely that confusion would exist between
the two marks. Beer Nuts 1I, 805 F.2d at 925 (reiterating the Restatement of Torts factors set forth
in Beer Nuts 1).
21. Beer Nuts 1I, 805 F.2d at 922.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 925. For a list of the factors, see supra note 19.
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determinative." After applying the factors, the Tenth Circuit held that both
trademarks, "BEER NUTS" and "BREW NUTS," identified the source of the
products.26 However, because of the similarity between the marks and
products, there was a likelihood of confusion. Thus, the court concluded that
Clover Club's use of "BREW NUTS" constituted infringement of the "BEER
NUTS" trademark."
7
1. Similarity of the Marks
The similarity of marks should be tested according to the three levels
encountered in the marketplace: sight, sound, and meaning." Four relevant
factors to consider when evaluating "similarity" are the marks' appearance,
pronunciation of the words used, verbal translation of the designs used, and
suggestion or meaning.29 A "side-by-side" comparison, however, should not
be made.' Instead, the court must ascertain whether the public will be con-
fused when individually presented with the infringing mark.3 Moreover,
when balancing the factors, the similarities between the marks should be
weighed more'heavily than the difference.32
a. Similarity of Appearance
The first subtest of similarity of the marks relies solely on the comparison
of the visual appearance of the marks.33 When analyzing the similarity of
designs, the overall impression created by the mark is most important, not the
dissection and comparison of individual features.34 For example, the visual
appearance of a gold horse's head compared with that of a large brightly col-
ored pig head with two hooves was strikingly dissimilar.35 On the other hand,
there was similarity in the designs of EXXON and Texon since both utilized
red block letters on a white background with a blue bar underlining EXXON
and with an address in blue letters beneath Texon.36
25. Beer Nuts I1, 805 F.2d at 925.
26. Id. at 928.
27. Id.
28. Beer Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 940; see Americana Trading Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966
F.2d 1284, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1992).
29. See Beer Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 940; see also Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828
F.2d 1482, 1484-85 (10th Cir. 1987) (listing the four factors and stating that "[tlrademarks may be
confusingly similar if they suggest the same idea or meaning").
30. Beer Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 941.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 940.
33. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 6, at 148.
34. See Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 502 (5th Cir. 1979); see
also Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(stating that the dominant portion of a mark justifiably has greater weight in evaluating the likeli-
hood of confusion but the mark must be considered as a whole).
35. Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485 (noting that the striking dissimilarities in the designs used
greatly outweighed any similarities).
36. Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch. Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1980).
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b. Similarity of Pronunciation
The second subtest relies upon phonetic similarity.37 Again, courts em-
phasize that the similarity is based upon the total impression and not on indi-
vidual similar features.3" Thus, while the marks "Alpha" and "Alpa" were
found to be closely related in appearance and sound, other factors mitigated
the total effect.39 However, the marks "BREW NUTS" and "BEER NUTS,"
although clearly different, were found to have "phonetic and semantic similari-
ties" which outweighed other differences.'
c. Verbal Translation of the Designs
The third subtest involves the translation of the design. If the translation
suggests the same meaning as the opposing mark, then the trademarks may be
confusingly similar.4' Therefore, when the term "BREW NUTS" was com-
bined with a stein of an overflowing head of foam, there was no other reason-
able translation of the design except that it was meant to be beer.42
d. Similarity of Meaning or Suggestion
The final subtest is the similarity of the meaning of the marks. For exam-
ple, the word "brew" is a synonym for "beer" and was found to convey the
same meaning.43 A contrary result, however, was found for the terms "Dawn"
and "Daylight.""
2. Intent of the Actor
The Tenth Circuit, in Beer Nuts I!, noted that when a junior user deliber-
ately adopts a similar mark, this implies an "inference of intent" that the junior
user is trying to pass his goods off as those of the senior user.45 However,
knowledge of the existence of the mark, without more, is insufficient to fore-
close further inquiry.' Thus, the focal point for the issue of intent is whether
a benefit is derived from the reputation of the plaintiff.47
37. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 6, at 148.
38. See Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (5th
Cir. 1981).
39. Id. (noting that similar marks are less likely to be confusing when used in conjunction
with clearly displayed names or logos); see Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485 (acknowledging the pho-
netic similarity of "Jordache" and "Lardashe" but finding striking dissimilarities in the overall
design).
40. Beer Nuts II, 805 F.2d at 926 (noting that "brew" and "beer" are both "one syllable
words having four letters three of which are the same, and they both begin with the same letter").
41. Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485.
42. Beer Nuts I1, 805 F.2d at 926.
43. Id. (stating that "brew" could not "reasonably be taken to mean coffee or tea or bever-
ages in general; it can only be understood to mean beer").
44. Dawn Donut Co. v. Day, 450 F.2d 332, 333 (10th Cir. 1971) (defining "Dawn" as "the
first appearance of light at morning" and "Daylight" as including "all of the period when the sun
is shining on a particular area of the earth").
45. Beer Nuts 11, 805 F.2d at 927.
46. GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998
(1990).
47. Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485; see Americana Trading Inc., 966 F.2d at 1289 (stating that
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3. Similarity of Services and Manner of Marketing Services
a. Similarity of Services
An additional factor to consider is whether likelihood of confusion exists
in the similarity of the products or services provided by the plaintiff and the
defendant.' "The greater the similarity between the products and services,
the greater the likelihood of confusion."'49
b. Similarity in Manner of Marketing Services
The method of advertising is another relevant factor to consider.0 If the
products are marketed similarly, it increases the possibility of confusion.5
4. Degree of Care
The fourth element to analyze is the degree to which the consumers are
likely to be careful buyers of the product.52 In consideration of this factor, the
cost and nature of the product are helpful in determining if purchasers would
impulsively buy the item or if the price was such that it would require more
deliberation.53 The sophistication of the purchaser should also be considered
in determining the degree of care which would be exercised. 4
C. Additional Factors
1. Actual Confusion
Actual confusion within the marketplace provides the best evidence of the
"[a] latecomer who adopts a mark with intent to capitalize upon a market previously developed by
competitors in the field must at least prove that his effort has been futile"); Sicilia Di R. Biebow
& Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 431 (5th Cir. 1984).
48. Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. AT&T, 797 F. Supp. 891, 894 (D. Kan. 1992).
49. Exxon, 628 F.2d at 505.
50. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532.
51. Id.; see Universal Money, 797 F. Supp. at 895; Beer Nuts IH, 805 F.2d at 926; Victory
Pipe Craftsmen, Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 551, 558 (N.D. 111. 1984).
52. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 959 (7th Cir. 1992);
Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1487; Beer Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 940-41.
53. Coherent Inc. v. Coherent Technologies, Inc., 935 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1991)
(noting that Coherent's customers are likely to be careful buyers because the products are expen-
sive); Beer Nuts 11, 805 F.2d at 926-27 (stating that items purchased impulsively are generally not
on one's shopping list and thus, little degree of care is exercised when purchasing the item); Beer
Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 941 ("[B]uyers typically exercise little care in the selection of inexpensive
items that may be purchased on impulse. Despite a lower degree of similarity, these items are
more likely to be confused than expensive items which are chosen carefully."); Omaha Nat'l Bank
v. Citibank, 633 F. Supp. 231, 235-36 (D. Neb. 1986) (holding that customers who select between
ATM card providers are likely to exercise a relatively high degree of care).
54. Coherent, 935 F.2d at 1125 (noting that "Coherent's customers are likely to be careful
buyers for several reasons: They are sophisticated persons, such as engineers, project managers
and corporate officers .... ); Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, Inc., 809 F.2d 656, 662 (10th
Cir. 1987) (stating that "[t]he public is not so naive as to believe that any business that employs a
rainbow as part of its name is affiliated with Rainbo Oil"); Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91,
95 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting "[t]he more sophisticated and careful the average consumer of a prod-
uct is, the less likely it is that similarities . . . will result in confusion concerning the source or
sponsorship of the product").
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likelihood of confusion.55 The absence of evidence indicating confusion, how-
ever, will not necessarily support a finding that it is unlikely that confusion
will exist. 6 Indications of confusion among consumers can be determined by
using a survey, 7 but the survey must measure marketplace confusion.58 Ad-
ditionally, actual confusion may be demonstrated by evidence of consumer in-
quiries to the plaintiff as to affiliation of the alleged infringing product. How-
ever, this evidence will not be weighed heavily.59
2. Likelihood of Expansion of Product Lines
In Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Technologies, Inc., the District Court of
Colorado added to its analysis the likelihood of expansion of product lines.'
The Tenth Circuit did not directly comment on this element. The court merely
noted that review of the lower court's record confirmed the overall findings.6
Thus, one could infer that this factor could be considered along with the likeli-
hood of confusion test.
3. Strength of the Mark
The District Court of Utah, in Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, Inc.,
considered the strength of the plaintiff's mark as a factor.62 Again, the Tenth
Circuit chose not to comment upon the addition of another element to the
likelihood of confusion test. Instead, the court noted that the findings were not
clearly erroneous.63 The court preferred to rely upon the substantial evidence
of the district court's findings that related to the factors outlined in Beer Nuts
11.' Consequently, it was unclear whether "strength of the mark" was a via-
ble factor to consider.
However, in Universal Money, the Tenth Circuit endorsed the use of
"strength of the mark" as an additional element and clarified its meaning of
55. Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1487; see Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65, 74
(10th Cir. 1958) (holding that "[t]here can be no more positive proof of likelihood of confusion
than evidence of actual confusion").
56. See, e.g., Beer Nuts ii, 805 F.2d at 927 (noting that consumers are unlikely to bother
informing the plaintiff that they are confused); Nikon, 987 F.2d at 95.
57. See, e.g., Coherent, 935 F.2d at 1126 (noting that surveys may be used to show actual
confusion); Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1487 (finding that "the evidentiary value of such surveys de-
pends on the relevance of the questions asked and the technical adequacy of the survey proce-
dures."); Standard Oil, 252 F.2d at 75 (stating that the results of a survey may be received as
evidence to establish the existence of confusion).
58. Coherent, 935 F.2d at 1126 (holding that "[blecause Coherent's survey did not measure
marketplace confusion, neither of these cases indicates it should be given more weight").
59. Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1487 (holding that customer inquiry evidence is admissible, but
even when combined with other evidence it is of comparatively little value).
60. 736 F. Supp. 1055, 1064 (D. Colo. 1990).
61. 935 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that Coherent did not intend to expand
into defendant's product line, nor did Coherent Technology intend to expand into the plaintiff's).
62. 809 F.2d 656, 663 (10th Cir. 1987).
63. Id.
64. id. (noting that there was ample evidence of the dissimilarities between the two marks,
lack of intent to create confusion, different marketing techniques, and the degree of care likely to
be exercised by consumers).
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similarity of services and degree of care."
II. THE UNIVERSAL MONEY 1166 DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
Universal Money Centers, Inc. ("UMC"), a Missouri Corporation, owns
the following registered trademarks: "UNIVERSAL MONEY CARD," "UNI-
VERSAL MONEY CENTER," "UNIVERSAL MONEY" and design, and
"UNIVERSAL MONEY."7 UMC provides electronic banking services and
contracts with various financial institutions to provide plastic "debit" cards for
its customers. The cards bear one of the UMC trademarks and are used for
accessing automatic teller machines ("ATMs") and for retail purchases at
selected stores.'
AT&T introduced the "AT&T Universal Card," a combination telephone
and retail card, on March 26, 1990. In the following twelve months, AT&T
spent over $60 million in advertising to promote its card.' The AT&T Uni-
versal Card is affiliated with Visa and MasterCard and may be used at retail
stores, to place telephone calls, and to withdraw from ATMs displaying the
"Plus" or "VISA" logos.
70
UMC filed an action in the District of Kansas alleging trademark infringe-
ment and sought a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin AT&T from using
the term "Universal. 71
B. District Court Holding
On August 30, 1990, the district court denied UMC's motion for a prelim-
inary injunction.72 Two years later, on June 16, 1992, the court granted
AT&T's motion for summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that the
concurrent use of the word "Universal" was not likely to cause confusion as to
the origin of the two products.73
The district court adhered to the Beer Nuts 11 test for likelihood of
65. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532-33.
66. Id. at 1527.
67. Id. at 1528 (noting that the terms "MONEY," "MONEY CARD," and "MONEY CEN-
TER" were disclaimed from the trademark).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1528-29. However, the AT&T Universal Card cannot be used at UMC ATMs since
AT&T and UMC are not affiliated. Id. at 1529.
71. Id. at 1529. UMC employees were alerted to AT&T's use of the word "Universal" on
March 26, 1990 when AT&T began their advertising campaign. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The district court acknowledged that "likelihood of confusion is a question of fact,
[however], 'summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute about the facts
material to the [likelihood of confusion] analysis, and those facts could lead to only one reason-
able conclusion."' Universal Money 1, 797 F. Supp. at 893 (citation omitted) (quoting Lang v. Re-




confusion."4 The court found that the degree of similarity between the marks
was minimal and that there was little chance of consumer confusion. 5 Like-
wise, there was no indication that AT&T intentionally selected "Universal" in
order to "pass off its goods as the product of another."76 While acknowledg-
ing that there were similarities in the services of the products, the primary pur-
pose of the cards was different." The court also found that the UMC card
and the AT&T card were marketed through different channels." Furthermore,
the purchasers of debit cards were found to exercise at least a moderate degree
of care in selecting a particular card.79 Thus, the consumer would be con-
scious of the services provided by the card and also the source of the card.0
In support of its decision, the court noted that there was an insignificant
amount of actual consumer confusion over the origin of the cards."' Finally,
the term "Universal" was regarded as a weak trademark since it is frequently
used by businesses. 2 UMC appealed from the district court's finding of lack
of confusion.
C. The Tenth Circuit Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit began with a reminder that the burden of proof is on
UMC to demonstrate that the concurrent use of the term "Universal" by
AT&T was likely to cause consumer confusion over the source of the prod-
ucts." The court repeated the factors to consider in determining likelihood of
confusion between two marks. 4 However, it cautioned that since the factors
are interwoven, the "list is not exhaustive" and "no one factor is disposi-
tive."85
74. Universal Money, 797 F. Supp. at 893.
75. Id. at 894. Specifically, the court noted that (1) even though both AT&T and UMC use
the word "Universal," the "dominant portion" of the competing marks was dissimilar; (2) "the
marks have different sounds and cadences;" (3) the overall design of the two cards (lettering
styles, logos, and color schemes) were significantly different; and (4) the two marks, in the court's
view, failed to communicate "the same idea or stimulate the same mental reaction." Id.
76. Id. (quoting Beer Nuts 1, 711 F.2d at 941). The court noted that instead AT&T chose the
term because of its meaning and because of the favorable response of AT&T's customers. Id.
77. Id. at 895 (finding that the primary purpose of the UMC card was for ATM use com-
pared to the primary purpose of the AT&T card was to purchase items on credit).
78. Id. at 895-96 (stating that AT&T markets its card directly to the public through media
sources compared to UMC which markets indirectly to the public through financial institutions).
79. Id. at 896.
80. Id. (noting that a card such as UMC's and AT&T's was unlikely to be purchased impul-
sively since it could only be obtained by exercising a certain degree of effort).
81. Id. at 896-97 (noting that AT&T offered survey results, consumer affidavits and deposi-
tions to show the lack of actual confusion, whereas UMC had "offered little but allegations and
denials").
82. Id. at 897 (pointing out that there are over 200 businesses which use the term "Univer-
sal").
83. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1530 (stating that it was irrelevant that UMC's registered
trademark had become incontestable. "The party alleging infringement has the burden of proving
likelihood of confusion.") (quoting Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1484).
84. Id. For a list of the factors, see supra note 19.
85. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1530 (quoting Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1484).
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
1. Similarity of the Marks
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that there
was a minimal degree of similarity between UMC's and AT&T's marks. 6
The two marks were strikingly dissimilar in their appearance, thus confusion
would not occur even when they were "singly presented.""7 Also, the two
marks did not sound the same - "Universal Money" versus "AT&T Universal
Card."88 Furthermore, the two marks did not even "convey the same idea or
stimulate the same mental reaction." 9 Therefore, any similarities between the
marks were greatly outweighed by the differences.'
2. Intent of the Actor
The court concurred with the district court that the evidence did not reveal
any intent on the part of AT&T to copy UMC's mark.9 It was not enough to
show that AT&T knew about UMC's registered trademark.92 Instead, the in-
quiry focused on whether AT&T was trying to acquire an advantage "from the
reputation or goodwill" of UMC.93 Since no evidence pointed to this, AT&T
lacked the requisite intent.94
3. Similarity of Services & Manner of Marketing Services
a. Similarity of Services
The Tenth Circuit regarded the district court's analysis of this factor as
"overly technical." '9 The services provided by AT&T and UMC cards were
similar; however, since the marks themselves were "strikingly dissimilar," it
carried little weight."
b. Similarity in Manner of Marketing Services
The court held that it was unlikely that consumers would be confused due
to the differing methods of advertising engaged by AT&T and UMC.97 More-
over, the fact that the cards were distributed in the same manner could not "be
86. Id. at 1531.
87. Id. The court remarked on the differences in the overall design of the two cards. Id.
UMC always combined "Universal" with the term "Money." On the other hand, AT&T combined
"Universal" with the AT&T mark but never with "Money." Id. Also, the AT&T card had a Visa




91. Id. at 1532.
92. Id. "Mere knowledge [of a similar mark] should not foreclose further inquiry." Id. (quot-
ing GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990)).
93. Id. (quoting Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (acknowledging that similarity of services weighed in UMC's favor).
97. Id. (comparing the methods of advertising: AT&T promotes their card directly to the
public; UMC does not).
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said to create confusion." 8
4. Degree of Care
The court agreed with UMC that the degree of care exercised by consum-
ers should be measured at the time they used their cards." This contrasted
with the district court's inquiry into the degree of care that consumers exer-
cised when selecting a provider of ATM cards."° The court refused, how-
ever, to find that AT&T cardholders' attempts to use UMC ATMs were a
result of any similarities between the marks."' Instead, the court noted that it
was common to confuse any ATM card with other ATM cards or ma-
chines." 2
5. Strength of Mark
The Tenth Circuit endorsed the district court's consideration of the
strength or weakness of UMC's marks.' 3 Since the term "Universal" is
"widely used" by other business entities, it is a "relatively weak mark."" °
6. Actual Confusion
The court found that despite some evidence of actual confusion, it was not
sufficient to warrant a finding of likelihood of confusion. The small
amount of evidence supporting likelihood of confusion was undermined by the
"sheer lack of similarity between the marks.""'°
D. The Dissent
The dissent disagreed with the weight of authority given to AT&T's sur-
vey results, which indicated a small amount of actual confusion. 7 UMC had
presented sufficient evidence of four hundred AT&T cardholders who had
attempted to use an UMC ATM.' The dissent also indicated that the testi-
98. Id. at 1532-33.
99. Id. at 1533 (noting that "the purpose of the inquiry is to determine the degree of care




103. Id. (noting that it was not a specific factor listed in the Beer Nuts 1H test).
104. Id. at 1533-34. "A strong trademark is one that is rarely used by parties other than the
owner of the trademark, while a weak trademark is one that is often used by other parties." Id. at
1533 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 626 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir.
1980)).
105. Id. at 1535 (noting that "isolated instances of actual confusion [were] de minimis").
106. Id. at 1535-36 (concluding that AT&T submitted "substantial" and "reliable" evidence to
rebut the inference of likelihood of confusion).
107. Id. at 1538 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (pointing out that UMC's evidence raised a material
issue of fact of the validity of AT&T's survey results).
108. Id. (describing the AT&T card as displaying "Universal" in the upper right comer, the
AT&T logo in the upper left comer, and the Visa logo in the lower right comer). The dissent
regarded this evidence as sufficient proof that an AT&T cardholder would presume that both
Universal and Visa sponsored the card. Id. at 1539. Moreover, actual confusion was found by
AT&T's own expert. Id.
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mony and affidavits submitted by UMC employees should have been given
more credence." When conflicting evidence is submitted, according to the
dissent, it is for the jury to determine the truth of the matter. "'
III. ANALYSIS
Although the Tenth Circuit did not make any extraordinary findings in
Universal Money, the opinion was helpful because it clarified certain factors
and also gave insight into what criteria should be considered within the
subtests of likelihood of confusion. Hopefully, the decision will provide better
.guidelines for those who engage in trademark clearance searches.
For example, in the court's discussion of the degree of similarity in ap-
pearance of the two marks, the court specifically contrasted the lettering styles,
logos and coloring schemes."' Also of importance was the combination of
the term "Universal" with other words."2 Thus, if the term was coupled with
other logos or marks, then confusion would be unlikely." 3 Even though the
terms "Money," "Money Center," and "Money Card" were disclaimed as
descriptive of services, the terms still must be considered in the likelihood of
confusion determination." 4 UMC argued that it was for the jury to determine
if AT&T's card was confusingly similar to that of UMC's since the term
"Universal" was set off from the accompanying AT&T logo."5 However, the
court dismissed UMC's contentions since "the distinctive AT&T house mark
[was] prominently displayed on the front of AT&T's card."" 6
Other helpful guidelines were provided by the court in its analysis of
AT&T's intent in adopting the term "Universal." Special attention was focused
on the amount of money that was expended on promotional activities,' how
109. Id. at 1539 (giving weight to a phone survey of 64 AT&T cardholders and the testimony
of UMC's Senior Vice-President stating actual confusion).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1531; see Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485 (noting that the word "Jordache" was written
in either white block letters or blue block letters and sometimes was in script. Whereas,
"Lardashe" was written in script accompanied by additional marks); Beer Nuts 11, 805 F.2d at 926
(commenting that both logos "brew" and "beer" have one syllable, four letters, and begin with the
same letter); Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(noting that the "dominant portion" of both logos is the term "Giant" within a circular or oval-
shaped object with the letters "G" and "T" partially outside the circular portion of the designs);
Exxon, 628 F.2d at 505 (noting that both marks utilized red, block letters on a white background
with either blue lettering underneath or a blue bar).
112. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1531.
113. See id.; see, e.g., Pignons, 657 F.2d at 487 (stating that "in certain circumstances oth-
erwise similar marks are not likely to be confused where used in conjunction with the clearly
displayed name and/or logo of the manufacturer").
114. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1531. The court refused to focus solely on the term "Uni-




117. Id. at 1532 (pointing out that AT&T spent more than $60 million on promotional servic-
es, thereby allowing the inference that AT&T was "relying on its own publicity and reputation");
see also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185, 1201 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (noting that the defendant had spent nearly $10 million on publicity, promotion and other
related activities), affd, 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1980).
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the term "Universal" was selected,"' and the diligence of trademark counsel
in searching for interference of the word "Universal.""' 9 While not pertinent
in this case, an additional factor examined in Beer Nuts II was the existence of
a prior relationship between the two parties. 20 Mere knowledge of the exis-
tence of a term is not enough; rather, the focus is whether a benefit was de-
rived from the plaintiff. 2'
With regard to similarity of services, the court criticized the district
court's approach as being "overly technical for the purposes of 'likelihood of
confusion. " "" The district court engaged in a dissection of the services of
the two products and found that UMC cards were primarily used at ATMs,
while AT&T cards were credit cards used for long-distance telephone calls
and retail purchases.'23 The Tenth Circuit suggested a more general approach
should be taken for comparison of services and that it was not necessary to
engage in contrasting technical differences such as manner of operation and
purpose. 24 Similarities in products or services will carry little weight if the
marks are strikingly dissimilar.'25
As for the similarity in manner of marketing services, the court focused
on the amount of money spent on advertising'26 and the means used for
product promotion.'27 Even though the card distribution process through the
mail to the customers was identical for both UMC and AT&T, AT&T's pro-
cess was not regarded as "promotional."' 28 Thus, they were dissimilar in
118. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1531 (noting that the selection process taken by AT&T in-
volved consumer reaction studies and a "name game" whereby employees suggested the term); cf.
Proctor & Gamble, 485 F. Supp. at 1201 (noting that name selection resulted from "extensive
lengthy consumer testing and research during which hundreds of names were considered and many
were tested").
119. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1531-32. Approximately 200 registered marks were found
to include the term "Universal," including UMC's. Their marks were analyzed for likelihood of
confusion, but counsel determined that confusion was unlikely. However, AT&T was cautioned
that the use of the word "posed a risk" because of its popularity and because AT&T was "vulnera-
ble to complaints of infringement because we are AT&T." Id.
120. Beer Nuts 11, 805 F.2d at 927 (noting that "[s]uch a relationship provides evidence of the
alleged infringer's intent to trade on the plaintiff's goodwill").
121. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532 (stating that the benefit is the reputation or goodwill
of the plaintiff).
122. Id.
123. Id.; see Universal Money, 797 F. Supp. at 895.
124. See Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532 (noting that both cards can be used at ATM's, at
selected retail stores, and to access selected insurance benefits); see also Exxon, 628 F.2d at 505
(finding a "strong similarity" between Exxon's reputation of providing petroleum products and car
care services and defendant's automotive repair business). But see Pignons, 657 F.2d at 487 (not-
ing that even though both products are single lens reflex cameras, "their functional characteristics
are equally distinct").
125. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532.
126. Id. (noting that AT&T had spent "millions" on advertising).
127. Id. (noting that AT&T promoted their card directly to the public using various media
sources, whereas UMC markets directly to financial institutions who market the cards to account-
holders); see also Exxon, 628 F.2d at 506 (finding that even though Exxon's advertising was "na-
tional in nature, both parties aim at the Houston market" through identical advertising media).
128. See Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532-33 (pointing out that in order to obtain an AT&T
card, the customer must "reach out" and select AT&T as a provider, whereas account-holders at
the sponsoring financial institution could receive a UMC card.); cf Pignons, 657 F.2d at 488
(noting that plaintiff's cameras were sold through "exclusive distributorships" which sell to the
public, whereas defendant mass-marketed their cameras through camera stores, discount stores and
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marketing.
The district court focused upon the degree of care consumers would exer-
cise in selecting between providers of ATM cards.'29 However, the Tenth
Circuit agreed with UMC that consumers may exercise a higher degree of care
in choosing an ATM card, but the degree of care is low when they are actual-
ly using the card. 3 Thus, when analyzing this criterion, it is important to
determine when an actual purchase is being made in order to determine the
degree of care.
The Tenth Circuit approved of the application of a "strength of mark"
test. 3' The more similar the trademarks used on various goods, the less like-
ly the potential for confusion between specific products which incorporate the
"weak mark."'32 Factors for consideration include the length of time the par-
ty has used the mark'33 and how widely used the mark is by other active
parties.'34 Of significant importance is the concurrent use of similar trade-
marks by parties similarly engaged in selling the same product or service.'35
The court concluded that the term "Universal" was a "relatively weak mark"
and thus did not favor UMC.
36
Evidence to consider for actual confusion can be gleaned through surveys
which ask relevant questions and use technically adequate survey proce-
dures.'37 The court seemed to be favorably impressed by the "thorough mar-
ket research survey" which was conducted by "an expert in the field of mar-
keting research, consumer behavior and marketing and consumer communica-
tions., 131 On the other hand, the court was less influenced and even skeptical
of the meager evidence supplied by UMC.'39 Thus, the importance of actual
drug stores, etc.).
129. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1533 (finding that moderate care would be exercised in the
selection of an ATM card).
130. Id. (noting that one does not make a "purchase" when selecting an ATM card). The court
noted that a purchase was made when the ATM card was being used. Id.
131. Id. (stating that the district court was proper in considering the strength of UMC's mark).
132. Id.
133. See id. (acknowledging that UMC has "used its mark for a substantial period of time");
see also Giant Food, 710 F.2d at 1569 (noting that the opposer had used the mark continuously
for more than 45 years); Pignons, 657 F.2d at 491 (noting that plaintiff had used the mark "Alpa"
for over 30 years). It is of interest to note that Giant Food lists three items to measure strength or
"fame" of the mark: volume of sales, advertising, and duration of use. Giant Food, 710 F.2d at
1569.
134. See Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1533 (noting that over 200 active businesses use the
term "Universal"); see also Exxon, 628 F.2d at 504 (finding "that EXXON is a strong trademark
deserving wide protection" because no "other party besides Exxon Corporation uses EXXON").
135. See Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1533 (pointing out that six financial institutions and
two credit card companies use the term "Universal" on their ATM or credit cards). But see Vic-
tory Pipe Craftsmen, Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 551, 557 (N.D. I11. 1984) (noting that a
weak mark has limited protection applicable "only to similar goods similarly marketed" compared
to a strong mark which provides protection against dissimilar goods).
136. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1533-34.
137. Id. at 1534 n.3 (noting that the expert was Dr. Thomas DuPont).
138. Id. at 1534 n.3 (finding that only 2.6% of the AT&T cardholders interviewed were actu-
ally confused by the "Universal" mark on both the AT&T card and UMC ATM's).
139. See id. at 1535 (stating that the court assumed that UMC's evidence constituted some
actual confusion, but this would be a "generous interpretation of the record"); see also Universal
Money, 797 F. Supp. at 896-97 (criticizing UMC for offering "little but allegations and denials"
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confusion should not be understated."4 Perhaps if UMC had given more
weight to this factor and performed their own "professional" survey, the out-
come of the case may have been different. 4'
While stating that none of the factors analyzed were "dispositive," the
Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that use of "Univer-





Although the Tenth Circuit claimed that no one factor in the likelihood of
confusion test was dispositive, 43 the court deferred to the "big guy" in the
dispute.'" Nevertheless, the court did shed light on several factors which
should be considered within the likelihood of confusion test. Specifically, the
strength of the mark should provide additional guidance for those engaged in
trademark clearance searches. A registered trademark that is "weak" is essen-
tially worthless 145 and should be avoided. Trademark infringement cases are
very fact-specific and absent a showing of "overt" infringement, it may be
difficult to determine whether one has a "safe" trademark. In fact, some com-
mentators have noted that "the entire system of trademark protection seems
questionable" given the subtests of the likelihood of confusion test and the
decisions interpreting them."4
Martha Munchhof
and finding the evidence unpersuasive "in light of the ample time UMC has had to obtain con-
sumer" survey results). But see Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1540 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (noting
sarcastically that "Although UMC's telephone survey may not have conformed to the level of
scientific methodology ascribed" to by Dr. DuPont, it nonetheless was entitled to some weight
since it opposed the validity of AT&T's survey).
140. See DORR & MUNCH, supra note 6, at 175 (stating that "[elvidence of 'actual confusion'
may be vital in winning a trademark infringement case").
141. See id. (warning businesses that it would be "prudent" to watch for "actual confusion").
142. Universal Money, 22 F.3d at 1536.
143. Id.
144. The tone of the opinion seemed slanted towards AT&T. I mention this not to say that I
disagree with the holding of the case, but rather as a side-note. The court quoted AT&T's
trademark counsel's warning that the use of the term "Universal" was risky "because AT&T was
'particularly vulnerable to complaints of infringement because we are AT&T."' Id. at 1531-32.
This seems to suggest that the court also considered another factor: what economic status does the
alleged infringer have? Moreover, the court gave substantial weight to AT&T's "expert" who no
doubt was paid a hefty sum. See id. at 1535. However, this brings to light a disturbing thought:
What about the little guy who can't afford an expensive expert and comprehensive survey? Should
he lose out in a "close call" just because he had an inadequate survey showing actual proof of
confusion? I hope not.
145. I describe it as worthless because absent a finding of substantial similarity in appearance,
UMC could not enforce its trademark rights. The court acknowledged that the services provided
by the two competing cards were similar. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. With
this concession, it seems that a higher scrutiny should be afforded for the other factors in the test
since they are competing products.
146. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 6, at 174 (exclaiming "[w]ho would think to do a clearance
search on Cyclone when the mark is Tornado?").
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LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution gives Congress the power to control federal land.' Much
of this power has been delegated to federal agencies. The continual flow of
statutes and regulations that affect land and natural resources indicate the
import of this authority. This Survey examines two cases that pit private in-
terests against congressional and administrative power to control federal land.
Deference to the federal government's use of this power played a key role in
two Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal's opinions during the Survey term.
Part I explores the federal government's control of roads that cross public
land to access private land. In United States v. Jenks,2 an individual chal-
lenged Forest Service regulations that govern access to private inholdings.3
The Jenks court held that all owners of road accessible inholdings had to
comply with the permit scheme regardless of any private patent or common-
law access rights.4 This was a case of first impression for the Tenth Circuit
and ended the confusion created by the myriad of past and present federal
policies governing access rights.
Part II explores the Tenth Circuit's deference to federal administrative
control of public land. In Sierra Club v. Cargill,5 the Tenth Circuit upheld a
Forest Service determination that a change from an illegal seven-year regener-
ation standard for timber production to the congressionally mandated five-year
standard was not significant.6 The ruling allowed timber sale contracts to be
carried out notwithstanding that they were still premised on the seven year
standard. This case was the Tenth Circuit's first opportunity to interpret the
new regeneration standard.
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, states that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States .... The authority granted to Congress in the property clause to manage federally
held land is "without limitation." Kleppe v. New Mexico, 436 U.S. 529, 539 (1975). Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr. similarly interpreted this power: "[t]he state has an interest independent of
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. Georgia v. Tennes-
see Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
2. 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994).
3. An inholding is private land surrounded by public land. United States v. Jenks, 804 F.
Supp. 232, 234 (D.N.M. 1992), affd in part as modified, rev'd in part, 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir.
1994).
4. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1518.
5. 11 F.3d 1545 (10th Cir. 1993).
6. Id. at 1550.
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I. LAND USE
A. Regulating Access to Privately Held Land over Public Land:
United States v. Jenks.7
1. Background
Current federal policy regarding public land focuses on land manage-
ment.' Prior to its current policy regarding public land, the federal govern-
ment had utilized overlapping stages of acquisition,9 disposal,'" and reten-
tion" of public land. The transition from the policy of disposal of land for
private use, to the policy of retaining land for public use, created problems re-
garding access rights to private inholdings. The history of public land poli-
cy,' 2 therefore, represents a "tangled array of laws granting right-of-ways
across federal land"'3 to inholdings.
a. Creation of Access Rights
Access to private land became an important issue when the federal gov-
ernment began to dispose of the public land. Federal land grants to private
individuals dramatically increased under the policy of disposal in the late
Nineteenth Century because the government sought to promote expansion into
the unsettled Western United States.'4 The Homestead Act of 1862 granted
160 acres to settlers who agreed to live on, and make improvements to, the
land for five years.'5 Access to land held by homesteaders was not explicitly
7. 22 F.3d 1513 (1Oth Cir. 1994).
8. See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94
Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C., 48 U.S.C.)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing management schemes and guidelines for Alaskan lands); Fed-
eral Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C §§ 1701-1784 (1988) (establishing
guidelines for management of forest land); Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 528-531 (1988) (authorizing and directing the Secretary of Agriculture to balance and manage
economic and non-economic uses of public land); National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C §§ 4321-4370(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Congress has created various agencies to manage
federal lands including the Bureau of Land Management, the United States Forest Service, and the
National Parks Service.
9. Examples include the Louisiana Purchase, the annexation of Texas (Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo), the Oregon Territory, and the acquisition of all other lands that currently represent the
boundaries of the United States. James L. Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public
Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 241, 247 (1994).
10. See, e.g., The Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (repealed 1976) (pro-
viding free land to settlers of the frontier).
11. Examples of lands reserved from the private domain for public use by Congress include
land reserved for National Parks, National Forests and National Wildlife Areas.
12. See Huffman, supra note 9, at 245-255 (providing a brief history of the stages of federal
land policy).
13. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1515.
14. See Huffman, supra note 9, at 247-50; see also The Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12
Stat. at 392.
15. Id. The acreage that could constitute a homestead was later enlarged by Congress. See
Desert Lands Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-339 (1988)) (provid-
ing for homesteads larger than 160 acres on arid western lands); The Enlarged Homestead Act, ch.
[Vol. 72:3
LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES
provided for in the Homestead Act of 1862; however, it was presumed that the
act granted "unimpeded access to their property." 6
Revised Statute 2477 (R.S. 2477) was enacted pursuant to disposal poli-
cy." This statute preserved rights of access across public land; "[t]he right-
of-way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for
public uses, is hereby granted."'"
In 1976 the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)9 re-
pealed R.S. 2477.20 Congress included a savings clause in FLPMA that pre-
served the right to assert an R.S. 2477 right-of-way claim, if the right existed
prior to the passage of FLPMA.2 R.S. 2477, therefore, still protects those
who have properly asserted the statute for access to their land. R.S. 2477 has
never been a grant of rights, but a statutory recognition of permissible en-
croachment upon public land.22 The existence of right-of-ways varies from
state to state because the right is dependent on the state law interpreting R.S.
2477.23
The elements necessary to establish an R.S. 2477 right-of-way are pecu-
liar in that the right remains dormant; roads may have been established that
satisfy the elements but may not be recognized as such until the right to use
them has been asserted.24 To establish a recognized right to a R.S. 2477 road,
the proponent of the right must establish that the road is for a public high-
way, that the land traversed by the road is in fact public land,26 that the
public land is not reserved for other uses, 7 and that the right existed prior to
298, 36 Stat. 531 (1910) (repealed 1976) (homesteads for dry farming could be 320 acres).
16. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1515 (citing Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890)).
17. Mining Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251. R.S. 2477 was originally section 8
of a law entitled "An Act Granting Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public
Lands, and for Other Purposes," commonly known as the Mining Act of 1866. The law was re-
codified in 1878 as Revised Statute 2477. In 1938, R.S. 2477 was recodified at 43 U.S.C. § 932.
This section was repealed in 1976 by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No.
94-579, Title VII, § 706(a), Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2743, 2793 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1784 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
18. Mining Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. at 253.
19. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
20. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. at 2793.
21. 43 U.S.C. § 1769(a) (1988).
22. See United States v. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. 232, 235 n.5 (D.N.M. 1992).
23. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1082-83 & n.13 (10th Cir. 1988), affd sub nom.,
Sierra Club v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1991).
24. Typically the right has been asserted as a defense to de facto trespass by miners and
settlers. See, e.g., Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 456 (1878); Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining
Co., 101 U.S. 274, 275 (1879). The right is also asserted in quiet title actions. See Jenks, 22 F.3d
at 1518.
25. See Luchetti v. Bandler, 777 P.2d 1326, 1327-28 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that a
road may be a highway even if it reaches only one home, but public use must be more than mere-
ly occasional), cert. denied, 777 P.2d 1325 (N.M. 1989); Brown v. Jolley, 387 P.2d 278, 281
(Colo. 1963) (holding that a road to a single home may be a public highway); United States v.
Rogge, 10 Alaska 130 (D. Alaska 1941) (finding that a toll road may be a public highway), aff d,
128 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 656 (1942).
26. See Haynes v. Virgin Islands, 392 F. Supp. 48, 50 (D.V.I. 1975) (holding that the lands
must be owned by the United States at the time the claimed public use began).
27. Designation of land for a national forest effectively reserves the federal land from the
assertion of subsequent public user right-of-way claims. See Adams v. United States, 3 F.3d 1254,
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the passage of FLPMA.2"
The transition from the policy of disposal of land for private use, to the
policy of retaining land for public use, generated questions regarding access
rights to inholdings. The transition was marked by an act in 1891 that autho-
rized the Executive Branch to withdraw land from the public domain for the
creation of national forest land." Six years later, Congress enacted the Forest
Service Organic Administration Act (the Organic Act) to create an agency to
manage this land.3" Section 478 of the Organic Act statutorily reaffirmed the
inholder's access rights over national forest land.3 Courts have construed this
section to apply to rights of access that existed prior to the reservation of such
land.32
b. Conditioning the Rights of Access
The retention of public lands by the federal government required that
management schemes be adopted for these lands. To understand the recent
changes in this area it is essential to review the history of the controlling
statutes and regulations. The Organic Act provided that rules and regulations
may be applied to an inholder's access roads.33 The policy of management
was also instrumental in the passage of the FLPMA, the act that repealed R.S.
2477 right-of-ways. FLPMA granted the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Secretary of the Interior the power to issue or renew right-of-ways. 34 The Act
also provided that right-of-ways could be subject to regulations proscribed by
the department that managed the land at issue.35
1258 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding right-of-ways to be dependent upon the land's status); see also
Bennet County v. United States, 394 F.2d 8, 13 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that land reserved for
Indian reservations pursuant to treaty are unavailable for R.S. 2477 claims). But see Wilderness
Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 882 n.90 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that reserved land can be made
amenable to an R.S. 2477 right-of-way by discretionary repeal or modification of reservation by
federal authorities), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
28. 43 U.S.C. § 1769(a); see also supra text accompanying note 22.
29. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (repealed 1976).
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 472-482, 551 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 478 provides in part:
Nothing ... [herein] ... shall be construed as prohibiting the egress or ingress of actual
settlers residing within the boundaries of national forests, or from crossing the same to
and from their property or homes; and such wagon roads or other improvements may be
constructed thereon as may be necessary to reach their homes and to utilize their proper-
ty under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture. Nor shall anything ... [herein] prohibit any person from entering upon such na-
tional forests for all proper and lawful purposes, including that of prospecting, locating
and developing the mineral resources thereof. Such persons must comply with the rule
and regulations covering such national forests.
Id.
32. See Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 496 F. Supp. 880, 888 (D.
Mont. 1980), affd in part, 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). This
right has not been construed as absolute. Id. at 889. Section 478 provides the United States Forest
Service with the discretion to deny access if the right does not exist otherwise. Id.; accord Jenks,
22 F.3d at 1515.
33. 16 U.S.C. § 478.
34. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
35. 43 U.S.C. § 1764(c) (1988).
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Congressional concern that the statutes had created vague rights of access
prompted further legislation. Congress passed section 1323 of the Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) to eliminate any linger-
ing questions regarding access. 36 Section 1323(a) secures the right of access
to inholdings across land managed by the Department of Agriculture and re-
quires compliance with rules and regulations proscribed by the Secretary of
Agriculture.37 Although the Act was directed at Alaskan public land, section
1323(a) has been held to apply to all National Forest System land.38 Section
1323(b) of ANILCA similarly affirmed the same right of access over land
controlled by the Secretary of the Interior. ANILCA section 1323 clarified that
access to inholdings remained intact, tempered only by mandated compliance
with administrative rules and regulations.
In response to the management authority granted under the Organic Act,
FLPMA, and ANILCA, access road regulations were enacted.39 These regula-
tions require owners of inholdings to apply for a special use permit from the
Forest Service in order to continue using access roads.' The permits must as-
sure reasonable use and enjoyment of the inholdings.4" Established R.S. 2477
rights that provide access to inholdings are not subject to these regulations.42
ANILCA and the subsequent regulations seek to ensure landowner access to
private inholdings while retaining agency control over the public lands in order
to preserve and accommodate the land for other uses.
2. United States v. Jenk
43
In United States v. Jenks, the Tenth Circuit upheld the permit procedures
enacted by the Forest Service and found that they were not inconsistent with
asserted statutory, patent or common-law rights."
36. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371, 2488 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3210 (1988)).
37. Id. 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) provides:
[Tihe Secretary [of Agriculture] shall provide such access to nonfederally owned land
within the boundaries of the National Forest System as the Secretary deems adequate to
secure to the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment thereof: Provided, That such
owner comply with rules and regulations applicable to ingress and egress to or from the
National Forest System.
Id.
38. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. United States, 655 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). See also Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 91 Interior Dec. 165 (1984) (the
Interior Board of Land Appeals held that § 3210 ensures access across all land managed by the
BLM).
39. See Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1517-18.
40. 36 C.F.R. § 251.112(a) (1994).
41. 36 C.F.R. § 251.110(c) (1994).
42. Section 251.1 10(b) provides in part. "The regulations of this subpart do not affect rights-
of-ways established under authority of R.S. 2477." 36 C.F.R. § 251.110(b) (1994); see aso Jenks,
804 F. Supp. at 232 n.1L
43. 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994).
44. Id. at 1517-18.
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a. Facts
Jenks owned three ranches in Catron County, New Mexico,45 which are
completely surrounded by the Apache National Forest.' Three different roads
provided access to the ranches and pass through the Apache National For-
est.47 The Forest Service requested that Jenks apply for a special use permit
before he used any of the three access roads to his inholdings.' The pro-
posed permit included regulations governing use of the road to prevent harm
to the public land,49 and required a yearly fee of seventy-eight dollars be paid
in order to continue using the roads."0 Jenks refused to apply for the permit
and claimed that the permit scheme was inconsistent with his patent, common
law, and statutory rights."'
b. The District Court Opinion
The Forest Service brought suit in federal district court to compel Jenks to
apply for a permit in order to use each road. 2 Jenks filed a counterclaim pre-
mised on preexisting common law and statutory rights.53 Additionally, Jenks
brought a quiet title action to determine the status of his patent and common
law easement claims. 4
The parties agreed that Jenks had a right of access to his inholdings but
disputed the source of that right and whether the regulations were applica-
ble.55 The United States argued that Jenks did not have a R.S. 2477 right that
survived the passage of FLPMA because his roads were established after the
reservation of the forest, and therefore were subject to the permit scheme. 6
Jenks argued that the permit was not necessary because he had a common law
easement by necessity or an implied easement from the original grant of land
under the Homestead Act.
57
The district court found that the access roads were developed after the
1899 reservation of the Gila River Forest Reserve." This ruling barred the
finding of a R.S. 2477 right-of-way because the elements of that right were
not met.59 The court made no specific finding regarding whether the access
45. Id. at 1516. The land was granted to Jenks's predecessors in interest pursuant to the
Homestead Act. Id.
46. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. at 236. The Apache National Forest was created as part the Gila
River Forest Preserve in 1899. Id.
47. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1516.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1516-17.
50. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. at 234.




55. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. at 234-35.
56. Id. at 236; see also cases cited supra note 27 and accompanying text.
57. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. at 236.
58. Id.
59. See cases cited supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. Construction of the roads
began after the reservation of the forest land, thus the second element of a R.S. 2477 road was not
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roads were in fact R.S. 2477 roads, and did not address Jenks's claim of an
established common-law easement. Instead, the court concluded that if such
easements existed, they were subject to regulation under FLPMA and
ANILCA.' The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the For-
est Service,6 and enjoined Jenks's further use of the roads until a special use
permit was applied for and granted.62
c. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the United States.63 The court agreed that Jenks had to file an
application.' This requirement was tempered by the court's finding that sum-
mary judgment was not proper since the district court failed to consider the
validity of Jenks's common law, statutory and patent claims that could have
alleviated the necessity of securing a permit for further use of the roads.65 In
light of these claims, which are now before the district court on remand, the
Tenth Circuit modified the injunction by making it effective only until Jenks
applied for the special use permit.' The court of appeals also reversed the
district court's finding that the terms and conditions of the permit were reason-
able.67
3. Analysis
ANILCA section 1323 insures an inholder's right of access, and requires
the land owner to comply with the applicable rules and regulations. 6 Con-
gress sought to balance the inholder's right of access to their land with the
federal interest in protecting the national forests.' The court found that the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture,7 ° were
consistent with the balance that ANILCA sought to achieve." Finding that
met. The New Mexico Courts stated that R.S. 2477 was enacted in order to promote the construc-
tion of public roads on unreserved public lands. See Jenks, 804 F. Supp. at 235 (citing Lovelace v.
Hightower, 168 P.2d 864 (N.M. 1946)). However, this interpretation may not encompass a road
devoted to private access, rendering the first element unsatisfied as well.
60. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. at 237 (citing Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 496 F. Supp. at 889).
61. Id.
62. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1517.
63. This case was considered by Circuit Judges Barrett, Ebel and Baldock. The opinion was
written by Judge Baldock. No concurring or dissenting opinions were issued.
64. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1518.
65. Id. at 1518-19.
66. Id. at 1519.
67. Id. at 1520. Because the permit was subject to negotiation and may not have been ap-
plied to Jenks, the Tenth Circuit believed that the proposed permit's terms were merely illustra-
tive; as such, commenting upon the terms would have been an improper advisory opinion. Id. The
court remanded that portion of the district court's opinion with instructions that it be vacated. Id.
68. 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (1988); see supra note 37.
69. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1517.
70. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
71. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1518. The court relied on case law that addresses the proper degree of
deference to be afforded to an agency's interpretation of a statutory mandate. The court noted,
"[a]s long as an agency's procedures are reasonably designed to permit an agency to 'discharge
[itsl multitudinous duties,' a court should not interfere." Id. at 1518 (alteration in original) (quot-
19951
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the permit scheme was statutorily permissible allowed the court to address
whether the scheme infringed upon Jenks's asserted patent or common law
rights.72 The Tenth Circuit held that a scheme that required the filing of a
permit application was permissible regardless of the patent or common law
rights asserted by the landowner.73 The court reasoned that the federal gov-
ernment, as the dominant landowner, may exercise control over the land that a
servient easement holder uses.74
The court affirmed the lower court's ruling that an inholder must file a
permit application, and that the common law claims do not immunize the
landowner from this requirement. The Tenth Circuit found that the district
court had erred by not considering the validity of the asserted common law
claims." The court separated the regulatory scheme into two parts for this
analysis by distinguishing the requirement to file an application from the actu-
al permit approval process. According to the agency rules in question, an
inholder is required to file an application for a special use permit.76 However,
the court's holding that regardless of the claims asserted an application must
be filed, does not mean that all right-of-ways are subject to regulation. An
agency determination during the approval process may render the right-of-way
immune from regulation because a landowner may not need such a permit if it
ing Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 773 F.2d 1561, 1571 (11th Cit.
1985)). The Eleventh Circuit in Southern Motor Carriers relied on Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Vermont Yankee
provided two constraints on agency deference. The first constraint questions whether there exists a
constitutional bar to the rules promulgated. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543. The second con-
straint asks whether "extremely compelling circumstances" should preclude a court from deferring
to the rules promulgated by the agency. Id.
These constraints were not addressed by the district court nor by the Tenth Circuit in Jenks.
The Tenth Circuit noted that the rulemaking authority must arise from a statutory mandate. See
Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1517-18. This statement implicated the issue in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984), which asked "whether Congress has
spoken directly to the precise question at issue." Congress enacted ANILCA section 1323(a),
which provides for rules and regulations to be adopted by the Secretary of Agriculture. 16 U.S.C.
§ 3210(a). But see Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the Forest Service was not entitled to deference for ignoring Endangered Species Act man-
dates and enjoining certain timber sales due to the presence of the Spotted Owl); Citizens for
Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp 970, 989-90, 996 (D. Colo. 1989) (finding no defer-
ence when statutes and regulations mandate procedures and requirements which are not followed
and enjoining an increase in the amount of timber to be sold because the Forest Service did not
look at alternatives and failed to delineate technology to be used to reach timber sale goals).
72. In addressing this issue, the Tenth Circuit adopted the logic of two Ninth Circuit rulings
which upheld the regulatory scheme against such common law claims. See Montana Wilderness
Ass'n, 496 F. Supp. at 889; Utah v. Adrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1009 (D. Utah 1979).
73. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1518.
74. Id. The court cited the 1944 version of the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, section 484,
entitled "Change in Use of Dominant Tenement," which requires the contemplation of the normal
use, and development of that use, in determining whether an easement still exists when the use of
the easement changes. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 484 (1944). Land burdened with an ease-
ment is a servient tenement while the dominant estate is the land that the easement favors. See
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 323 (1980). The Federal Government, as the servient owner of
the easement appurtenant to Jenks's land, can prevent use of land not required by the normal
development of the dominant estate. Id.
75. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1518.
76. 36 C.F.R. § 251.112(a) (1994).
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can be demonstrated that a common law right of access exists." This dis-
tinction is appropriate because prior to issuance of a special use permit, the
regulations require the agency to determine that the applicant has no existing
patent, state or common law access rights.78 On remand, the district court
must evaluate the validity of such claims because "they may affect the terms
of the permit or play a pivotal role in the decision to issue a permit."'79
The order of the district court enjoined Jenks's use of the access roads
until the special use permit was obtained." The Tenth Circuit modified the
order to enjoin use of the roads until Jenks filed a permit application." The
court relied upon the distinction drawn between the requirement to file such an
application and the permit approval process. If the agency concludes during
the approval process that the access roads are not subject to permit scheme, a
permit need not be issued. The court reasoned that an injunction, that is in
effect until a permit is obtained, is overbroad because it fails to take into
account the possibility that the roads may not be subject to regulation.82
The court recognized that an injunction that precludes the use of access
roads until the special use permit is approved may be proper in some circum-
stances.83 In discussing the district court's failure to address the validity of
the asserted common law claims, the Tenth Circuit noted that these claims
were properly before the court in a quiet title action.84 If these claims were
not raised in such a manner, the court presumably may enjoin use of the road
until the permit is obtained if no defense to the permit requirement has been
asserted.
The Tenth Circuit refused to address the validity of Jenks's claims be-
cause the government had not indicated that his access would be denied during
the approval process.85 If access would be denied during this time, Jenks can
assert these claims for interim relief, which may enjoin the denial of access.86
Jenks claimed that the permit terms were unreasonable because they im-
posed a fee for further use of the easement. Jenks objected to the conditional
nature of the easement permit, the Forest Service's ability to terminate the
easement, and the Service's discretion over all transfers of the easement.87
The United States argued for the first time in its brief that the permit at issue
was merely a proposed special use permit and was subject to negotiation.88
77. 36 C.F.R. § 251.114(f)(1) (1994).
78. Id. The regulations provide in part that the officer issuing the permit must ensure that
"[t]he land owner has demonstrated a lack of any existing rights or routes of access available by
deed or under State or common law." Id. Furthermore, R.S. 2477 roads are unaffected by the
regulations. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
79. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1518.
80. Id. at 1519.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Cablevision of Tex. v. Oklahoma W. Tel., Co., 993 F.2d 208, 210 (10th Cir.
1993)).
84. Id. at 1518.
85. Id. at 1519 n.6.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1520 n.7.
88. The United States did not inform the district court that the permit was merely a proposal.
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The court refused to evaluate the reasonableness of the permit since there was
no indication that the permit at issue would be issued to Jenks. 9 The Tenth
Circuit remanded this issue to the district court with instructions to vacate the
portion of the opinion based on the proposed permit scheme.'
The Tenth Circuit also did not address Jenks's claim that the terms consti-
tuted a taking.9' This claim may be compelling on remand if the district court
finds that the roads are subject to regulation and if Jenks successfully demon-
strates that his roads emanate from a right granted under R.S. 2477. The fact
that such roads are immune from regulation,9" implies that they constitute
vested property rights and any infringement of these rights may represent a
taking under the Fifth Amendment.
The Tenth Circuit provided a much sharper focus on the procedural re-
quirements that a landowner must fulfill in order to comply with, and benefit
from, access regulations. The court drew the proper distinction between the
requirement to file, and the approval process, to give effect to the laws and
regulations governing access roads to inholdings. The Jenks court correctly
interpreted the regulations to allow for a land owner to assert that an access
road based on R.S. 2477 is immune from regulation, or to show that a com-
mon-law easement by necessity exists which may limit the terms of the per-
mit.93 This defense precludes or limits the agency's regulatory power over
certain access roads and can only be properly asserted during the permit ap-
proval process. The process of evaluating an inholder's potential claims can
only be reached upon requiring the landowner to file an application regardless
of the rights asserted.
II. NATURAL RESOURCES
A. Amending the Regeneration Standard of the Bighorn National Forest
Plan: Sierra Club v. Cargill94
1. Background
a. Provisions for Forest Resource Planning
In 1905, the United States Forest Service was granted the authority to
manage the national forests.95 Management of such lands necessitated ad-
vanced planning.96 Federal land planning initially focused only on timber har-
Id. at 1520.
89. Id. Courts established under Article Ill of the United States Constitution are limited to
resolving issues involving a case or controversy, and prohibited from providing advisory opinions.
This matter was not justiciable because the permit terms were not in their final form. Id.; see also
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968).
90. Jenks, 22 F.3d at 1520.
91. See id.
92. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 42, 72 and accompanying text.
94. 11 F.3d 1545 (10th Cir. 1993).
95. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482, 551 (1988).
96. See generally George C. Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning on the
Federal Lands, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 307, 333-48 (1990) (discussing the history of forest planning
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vesting and grazing rights. Dramatic increases in the demands for timber and
recreational uses of forest land, however, strained the planning framework that
had developed.97 In 1960, Congress passed the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield
Act (MUSYA). 9s The Act implicitly created the need for increased planning
to accommodate the various uses of forest land that the Act requires. The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 99 requires an environmental im-
pact statement (EIS) for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment."'" Detailed planning became critical with
the passage of NEPA because failure to consider all implications and alterna-
tives of a project in the EIS operated as a bar to implementation of a desired
plan.'
°1
The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA) °2
was passed in 1974 to ensure that long range plans were implemented.' 3
The RPA planning requirements were incorporated into the National Forest
Management Act of 1976 (NFMA).' °4 Congress passed the NFMA to pro-
vide a management scheme for the national forests and to maintain the renew-
able resources on those lands. The NFMA provides the Forest Service with the
authority to adopt regulations necessary to implement the Act.' 5
and current timber planning schemes); Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and
Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REv. 1 (1984).
97. Coggins, supra note 96, at 334.
98. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988). This Act directs the Secretary of Agriculture to consider
various potential uses of the land that will benefit the public in coordinating management plans.
16 U.S.C. §§ 530, 531 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). "Multiple use" in the forest context includes
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, fish and wildlife, and wilderness. 16 U.S.C. §
1604(e)(1) (1988).
99. 42 U.S.C §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1988).
101. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 162-63, 194-95 (1978) (enjoin-
ing the completion of a dam because the EIS failed to consider all the implications of the dam's
impact on the Snail Darter, an animal protected by the Endangered Species Act).
102. Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 (1974) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C §§ 581(h),
1600-1610 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
103. Id. The Act requires a ten year assessment of the renewable resources in all the national
forests. 16 U.S.C. § 1601(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Some of the considerations the assess-
ment addresses include the present and anticipated uses, and demands, of the resources. Id. Every
five years a program proposing long term planning objectives is to be prepared for all Forest
Service activities. 16 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The third planning requirement is
an annual evaluation of current Forest Service activities that are to be compared to the long term
planning objectives. 16 U.S.C. § 1606(c) (1988). Finally, a statement of policy is to be prepared
every five years which frames budget requests for the various programs. 16 U.S.C. § 1606(a)
(1988).
104. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1982).
105. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988). The regulations must adhere to the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988). The regulations must also comply with NEPA by direct-
ing when the LRMP must include an EIS as required by 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The regulations
must also meet the goals of the planning program. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) (1988). These goals in-
clude assurances that considerations of economic and environmental aspects and diversity of plant
life will be considered. Id. Continuing research on the effects of each plan to avoid impairment of
the land's productivity must also be insured by the regulations. Id.
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b. Developing a Forest Plan for Timber Production
Section 1604 of the NFMA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to devel-
op, maintain, and revise a land and resource management plan (LRMP or
plan) for each national forest." The LRMP must include planned timber
sales and the harvesting methods that will meet the timber sales goals. °7 The
planning procedure calls for cooperation between the regional forester, the
forest supervisor, and an interdisciplinary team which is responsible for the
preparation of the LRMP and the EIS."°8 The LRMP and the EIS are subject
to public scrutiny." An amendment to the plan may be made by the forest
supervisor after the final plan has been adopted."' An amendment does not
require the Forest Service to redesign the LRMP and the EIS if the change is
insignificant. " '
The process of forest planning, as governed by the regulations enacted by
the Forest Service, require compliance with the MUSYA and NEPA." 2 The
forest plan must consider many factors and alternatives to ensure compliance
with NEPA." 3 One factor is the ability to preserve the land in compliance
with the management guidelines." 4 The management guidelines generally
require the forest plan to protect all the resources to ensure their productivi-
ty."
5
Congressional timber harvest management guidelines seek to ensure con-
tinued productivity and availability of timber."6 Congress mandated that the
LRMPs and the regulations guarantee that timber will be harvested only if
"such lands can be adequately restocked within five years after harvest.""' ?
The regulations enacted by the Forest Service, under the authority of the
NFMA, provide a three stage process for identifying land suitable for timber
harvest in the LRMP." The first stage excludes land that is not physically
suitable for harvesting timber."9 Without assurances that the land can be re-
stocked within five years, it is considered physically unsuitable for timber
production. 2 ° Land that is not excluded in stage one must proceed through
106. 16 U.S.C. § 1604.
107. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(0.
108. See 36 C.F.R § 219.10 (a)(3) (1994).
109. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(b).
110. 36C.F.R. §219.10(0.
111. Id. If the change is not significant the plan may be implemented after public comment
and compliance with NEPA procedures. Id. The determination of whether the amendment is sig-
nificant is typically made in the environmental assessment. See Sierra Club v. Cargill, 11 F.3d
1545, 1549 (10th Cir. 1993).
112. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.10, 219.12 (1994).
113. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.12 (detailing the regulatory scheme for considering and evaluating
various alternatives).
114. 36 C.F.R. § 219.27 (1994).
115. Id.
116. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(ii) (1988).
117. Id.
118. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14 (1994). See Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp.
970, 978-79 (D. Colo. 1989) (discussing and interpreting of the three stage suitability analysis as
part of the LRMP process).
119. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14.
120. Id. Land is unsuitable for timber production if "[tihere is not reasonable assurance that
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two stages of economic analysis.'
Stage two evaluation focuses on the costs and benefits of the particular
area under analysis.' This stage is designed to "provide information on the
financial attractiveness of the various proposed alternatives."'23 This econom-
ic analysis does not exclude or add land to timber production; the focus is on
generating raw data to be used in the third stage of the suitability analysis.
The third stage involves a broad economic analysis of the LRMP. This
stage evaluates land suitable for timber production with regards to cost effi-
ciency of including or excluding land from timber production.'24 This stage
considers the long term objectives of the LRMP for the entire forest, as well
as the returns and the costs of managing the existing timber inventory. 25 The
allowable sale quantity (ASQ) is used in the third stage of the timber suitabili-
ty analysis.'26 The ASQ, which is prepared by the interdisciplinary team and
is included in the LRMP, represents the ceiling for long term timber produc-
tion objectives in the forest plan.'27
The planning process for timber harvest in each national forest ends with
the completion of the LRMP, the accompanying EIS as required by NEPA,
such lands can be adequately restocked as provided in § 219.27(c)(3)." 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(3).
Section 219.27(c)(3) provides in part:
When trees are cut to achieve timber production objectives, the cuttings shall be made in
such a way as to assure that the technology and knowledge exists to adequately restock
the lands within 5 years after final harvest. Research and experience shall be the basis
for determining whether the harvest and regeneration practices planned can be expected
to result in adequate restocking. Adequate restocking means that the cut area will con-
tain the minimum number, size, distribution and species composition of regeneration as
specified in regional sivilcutural guides for each forest type.
36 C.F.R. § 219.27(c).
Other stage one factors may render the land unsuitable for timber harvest: land that is not
forest land (currently and historically having less than ten percent tree cover) is not suitable for
harvest, technology must exist to insure that timber production will not irreversibly damage soil
productivity or watershed conditions, and land withdrawn from timber production by Congress, the
Secretary of Agriculture or the Chief of the Forest Service, is also to be excluded at stage one. See
36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(1),(2),(4).
121. Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 978.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. "Cost efficiency" is meant to include "concepts of cost effectiveness and economic
efficiency." Id. at 978 n.7. This term acknowledges that many important variables cannot be as-
signed a value. Numerical values are not easily ascertainable for measuring the other forest objec-
tives such as preserving recreation, watershed, range, fish and wildlife, and wilderness. Stage three
is therefore a flexible analysis that considers these indeterminable values and the objectives of the
overall forest plan. Id. see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(c).
125. Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 978; see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(c).
126. The ASQ is "[tihe quantity of timber that may be sold from the area of suitable land
covered by the forest plan for a time period specified by the plan." 36 C.F.R. § 219.3 (1994).
Traditionally, timber quantities are represented in million board feet (MMBF).
127. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(c) provides the regulatory framework for the third stage of the land
suitability analysis. Section 219.14(c)(3) excludes land if "[tjhe lands are not cost-efficient, over
the planning horizon, in meeting forest objectives, which include timber production." Id. §
219.14(c)(3) (emphasis added). A long term objective that includes timber production is represent-
ed by the timber production limit, the ASQ. The Citizens for Environmental Quality court found
that the ASQ is a relevant consideration for the third stage of the analysis, even though that figure
is predetermined. 731 F. Supp. at 988.
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and the record of decision. 2 The regional forester selects and approves the
appropriate management plan in the record of decision from the alternatives
presented.'29 Upon approval, the plan and the EIS are subject to administra-
tive appeal. 3
2. Sierra Club v. Cargill
131
In Sierra Club v. Cargill the Tenth Circuit deferred to the Forest Service's
determination that an amendment to the Bighorn LRMP that corrected an
improper seven year forest regeneration standard to a five year standard, was
not significant. 32 The court held that this determination was neither arbitrary
and capricious, nor an abuse of discretion.'33
a. Facts
This dispute involved the Bighorn National Forest ,(the Bighorn) which is
located in north-central Wyoming, and is part of the Big Horn Mountain
Range. The Bighorn is comprised of 1,115,172 acres of land.'34 The forest
lies between 4,000 and 13,175 feet of elevation. 33 Average precipitation in
this arid region is below twenty-five inches per year; only five to six inches of
the precipitation falls during the summer growing season. 36 Tree growth is
slow under these conditions and much of the forest is barren.
37
The Forest Service developed the first Bighorn Forest LRMP in 1985.38
This plan allotted 14.9 million board feet (MMBF) of timber to be harvested
annually for ten years. 39 The 14.9 MMBF figure represents the ASQ for the
Bighorn plan. The ASQ was based upon a seven year regeneration stan-
dard."4 This regeneration standard conflicted with the NFMA and Forest
Service regulations, which called for a five year standard, 4' and led the Sier-
ra Club to administratively appeal the LRMP. 42 The appeal was denied by
the Forest Service and the Sierra Club brought the matter before the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming seeking injunctive and de-
128. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(c).
129. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(i) & (j); see also Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at
978.
130. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(d). As of 1989, sixty-two of the forest plans had been adminis-
tratively appealed. Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 976. The Citizens for Environmen-
tal Quality court noted that their opinion was one of the first to provide judicial review of forest
service decisions regarding forest plans. id.
131. Sierra Club v. Cargill, II F.3d 1545 (10th Cir. 1993).
132. Id. at 1550.
133. Id.
134. Sierra Club v. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. 1095, 1097 (D. Colo. 1990).
135. Appellee's Brief at 4, Sierra Club v. Cargill (Nos. 92-1277 & 92-1316) (citing FINAL
ENVIRONMENT IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE BIGHORN NATIONAL FOREST LAND AND RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT PLAN, October 1985 at II-1 to II-2).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 12.
139. Id.
140. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1547.
141. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E); see also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
142. Sierra Club, 731 F. Supp. at 1095.
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claratory relief.'43 Wyoming Sawmills, an employer in Sheridan County, and
the Sheridan County Economic Development Council intervened to protect
vested timber contract rights.'T
b. The District Court Opinion
The Sierra Club filed the action in federal court in July 1989. The Forest
Service issued directives to replace the seven year restocking standard with the
five year standard in December of the same year.'45 The directives affected
the planning and project stage of the LRMP.' Under the first directive, the
plan would have assured that the lands were capable of being adequately re-
stocked within five years.'47 The second directive required a finding, at the
project level, that all land would meet the five year standard prior to all timber
sales. " The Forest Service admitted that the Bighom LRVP would have to
be revised to include a recalculated ASQ value based on the five year stan-
dard. 49 This revision of the plan was scheduled to occur in 1989.5 The
Forest Service claimed that the directives would correct the forest planning
calculations that were premised on the improper seven year standard and
moved to dismiss the action as moot."S' The district court held that the suit
was justiciable since the violation could occur again, concluded that the effects
of the seven year standard had not been adequately removed,'52 and enjoined
certain logging pursuant to the plan.
The district court held that the first directive, which was meant to ensure
compliance with the NFMA and the regulations at the planning stage, was
ineffective.' The Forest Service argued that the five year standard requires
only that technology exists to comply with the standard.'54 The court inter-
preted the five year standard to require identification and implementation of
143. Id. at 1098.
144. See id. at 1096-97. Intervention was limited to participation in the discovery process and
submission of briefs on the issues presented by the formal parties. Id.
145. Id. at 1098.





151. Id. at 1098.
152. Id. The district court applied the County of Los Angeles v. Davis test for determining
when an action is moot should a party voluntarily cease the alleged illegal conduct. County of Los
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979). This test has two prongs that the movant must satisfy
to render a case moot: 1) that the violation will not recur and, 2) "interim relief or events have
completely" removed the effects of the alleged violation. Id. The district court found that the
Forest Service had abandoned the seven year standard for this plan but "ha[d] not repudiated the
legality of the longer standard." Sierra Club, 732 F. Supp. at 1098. The court found that the first
prong had not been met since there was no guarantee that the standard, which the Forest Service
maintained did not violate federal law, would not be used in the future. Id. at 1098-99. The Forest
Service did not satisfy the second prong either because the effects of the violation have not been
entirely removed. The court found that the LRMP had not yet been fully amended by the direc-
tives. Id. The court also noted that the directive was contradictory; it assured that the five year
standard would be met, however the ASQ continued to be based upon the seven year standard. Id.
153. Sierra Club, 732 F. Supp. at 1100-01.
154. Id. at 1100.
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the technology in the LRMP to insure that the standard is met.'55 The inter-
venors contended that because the five year standard requires that the land
can,"' instead of will, be restocked, the regulation is not absolute.'57 The
court dismissed this argument, stating that "[tiechnological feasibility" is a
standard that would render the regulation meaningless since "[h]ypothetically,
the technology exists to restock an area the size of the whole Bighorn National
Forest (or the entire State of Wyoming) within five years. The Forest Service
could potentially adopt a restocking standard of any length while the technolo-
gy exists to restock within five years."' 58 The district court rejected this hy-
pothetical, potential regeneration analysis in favor of maintaining the integrity
of the congressional mandate.'59
The district court also held that the directives and the LRMP failed to
meet the legal guidelines at the project level."6' The second directive re-
quired a finding for every timber sale that the five year standard was to be
met. The court found the directive to be meaningless because there was no
criteria included in the directive that could serve as a basis for such a find-
ing. '6 This case-by-case analysis was judged to be an inadequate method to
assure that the proper standard was met absent a formal redetermination of the
land's suitability for timber production pursuant to the NFMA.'62
The district court enjoined any timber harvesting emanating from future
contracts based on the seven year standard.'63 The court ordered the Forest
Service to revise the LRMP to comply with the five year standard within the
three stage suitability analysis required by the regulations before it could offer
more land for timber sales." 4 The court refused to retroactively apply the
injunction to contracts that had been approved prior to the directives."' Al-
though the contracts were based upon the impermissible seven year standard,
the court found that an injunction would "unreasonably disrupt milling opera-
155. Id. The court based this finding on an interpretation of a similar regulation in Citizens
for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1989), where the court analyzed
36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(2), which removes land from timber production if "[tiechnology is not
available to ensure timber production from the land without irreversible resource damage to soils
productivity or watershed conditions." Sierra Club, 732 F. Supp. at 1100. In Citizens for Environ-
mental Quality, the court interpreted this regulation to require that the technology be identified and
implemented into the LRMP when timber production is "contemplated on potentially unsuitable
lands." Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 985. The two regulations, the five year stan-
dard and the soil/watershed protection requirement, are similar in that they both demand that tech-
nology be available to ensure that the regulation is met. The court noted that compliance with the
five year standard is to be determined based on "research and experience." Sierra Club, 723 F.
Supp. at 1100 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(c)(3) (1994)). This regulatory language supported the
court's position that the LRMP shall identify and implement technology that assures compliance
with the regulations.
156. See supra note 120.
157. Sierra Club, 732 F. Supp. at 1100.
158. Id.




163. See id. at 1101-02.
164. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
165. Sierra Club, 732 F. Supp. at 1102.
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tions in Sheridan County."'" This finding was premised on the Forest
Service's assurance that continued monitoring of those sales would guarantee
that the five year regeneration standard would be met. 67
The Forest Service then amended the Bighorn LRMP to comply with the
district court order. Use of the five year regeneration standard rendered 74,022
acres of land physically unsuitable for timber production under stage one
analysis."6 The Forest Service, however, reincorporated 69,645 acres of this
land into the amended plan as suitable for timber production based upon the
second and third stages of the analysis.69 The amended plan therefore re-
moved only 4,377 acres from the original LRMP."7 ° The Forest Service con-
tended that this was permissible because stage one only identifies land that is
tentatively unsuitable, whereas the third stage allows the inclusion of such land
to meet the overall objectives of the timber production goals, the ASQ. 7'
This revision of the LRMP was deemed not to be significant by the Forest
Service based on the results of the three stage analysis.'
The Forest Service did not include a recalculated ASQ figure in the
amended LRMP and adhered to the production goals established under the
seven year standard.'73 However, the Forest Service did begin a reformula-
tion of the ASQ independent of the revision of the LR!MIP.' 74 The Forest Ser-
vice recognized that the recalculation may result in an amendment that is
significant to the Bighorn LRMP. 75 The forest supervisor approved the
amended plan and the Forest Service denied the Sierra Club's administrative
appeal of the decision.
Based upon the revised LRMP, which incorporated the five year standard,
the Forest Service moved to dissolve the injunction.' 6 The district court de-
nied the motion,' reasoning that no alternatives had been considered, the
three stage analysis was not adequately adhered to, and the ASQ for the plan
represented unrealistic production goals.' 8 The Forest Service appealed the




168. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1549.
169. See id. The court noted that after stages two and three of the analysis were conducted the
decrease amounted to only 4,377 acres.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 1548-49; see also supra note 127 and accompanying text.
172. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1549.
173. Id. at 1549.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1547.
177. Id. (citing Order Regarding Motion for Dissolution of Injunction (D. Colo. Aug 13,
1992)).
178. Id. (citing Clarification of Order Regarding Motion for Dissolution of Injunction at 1-2
(D. Colo. October 23, 1992)).
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c. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision not to dissolve the
injunction.'79 The Tenth Circuit stated the three stage multiple-use analysis is
to be undertaken only upon the initial development of the LRMP or when an
amendment to the plan is deemed significant. 8 ' The court held that the For-
est Service's determination that the amendment to the plan was not significant
was neither arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion.'' The Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court, finding the district court had abused its
discretion by applying an improper standard of review that led to the applica-
tion of the wrong analytical framework to resolve the issues.'82
The dissenting opinion noted that the injunction itself had not been ap-
pealed and was therefore not subject to judicial review. 3 The dissent framed
the issue as whether the district court had abused its discretion by finding that
the Forest Service had not properly complied with the injunction.'84
3. Analysis
The majority framed the issue as whether the Forest Service's actions in
response to the injunction complied with the regulations, and whether the
district court's refusal to dissolve the injunction constituted reversible er-
ror.' The court focused on whether the Forest Service correctly determined
that the LRMP amendment, which changed the regeneration standard from
seven to five years, was not significant.8 6 If the Forest Service had deemed
the amendment to be significant, the regulations require the Service to "follow
the same procedure as ... that required for development and approval of a
forest plan."'8 7 This would mean that the LRMP process, the preparation of
the EIS and the calculation of the ASQ would have to begin anew. The stan-
dard of review to be applied to this determination is whether the agency action
was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law. 8
The threshold issue, the significance of the amendment, did escape ex-
press review before the district court.8 9 However, because the district court's
order included instructions to completely revise the LRMP in accordance with
the three stage suitability analysis, the amending of the regeneration period
179. Id. at 1545 (Tacha, J., writing for the majority was joined by Barrett, J.).
180. Id. at 1548.
181. Id. at 1550.
182. Id. at 1548.
183. Id. at 1550 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1548.
186. Id.
187. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(f).
188. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1548; see also Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(a), 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1988). The court stated that the deferential standard of review is important
because the agency's determination of such an amendment is "extremely fact bound." Sierra Club,
11 F.3d at 1548 (citing Securities Exch. Comm'n v. Blinder, Robinson, & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 679
(10th Cir. 1988)).
189. See Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1548.
[Vol. 72:3
LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES
may have been impliedly deemed significant by the district court.
The Forest Service determined that the change in the restocking standards
was not significant in its environmental assessment that reconsidered the Big-
horn plan."9° The finding of insignificance by the Forest Service was pre-
mised on the conclusion that only 4,377 acres were affected, 9' and that the
land unaffected was the same in character and location as the land originally
incorporated into the allowable sale quantity.'92 The Tenth Circuit upheld the
agency's determination that the amendment was not significant even though
the ASQ was determined based upon the seven year standard.
9 3
The Sierra Club argued that the Forest Service improperly amended the
LRMIP because the ASQ was not recalculated.'94 The ASQ, an important
long term objective in the three stage suitability analysis'95 for the Bighom
plan, remained at 14.9 MMBF per year. The Forest Service admitted that the
ASQ had proven to be unrealistic and had begun a recalculation of the number
which may result in a significant amendment to the Bighorn LRMP.' The
court disagreed with the Sierra Club's argument that the failure to recalculate
the ASQ was an error.'97 That a significant change was on the horizon did
not require the Forest Service to "to cease all 'non-significant' adjustments in
the Bighorn plan, such as an otherwise 'non-significant' change in the regener-
ation standard."'98
Sierra Club's position that the implementation of the correct regeneration
standard affected the plan significantly"9 is not without merit. Applying the
five year standard to the first stage of the suitability analysis removed 74,022
acres from timber production as physically unsuitable for timber harvest. The
forest Service recouped this acreage through the two stages of economic anal-
ysis. Congress, however, mandated a five year regeneration standard and made
no mention of deviating from the standard through economic analysis.2 " To
effectively apply the correct regeneration standard, the Forest Service should
have revised the ASQ since this figure was based upon the seven-year stan-
dard and had a direct effect on timber sale calculations."' Instead the court
190. Id. An environmental assessment is a document that is prepared to decide whether an
environmental impact statement (EIS) is necessary under NEPA, or alternatively, whether to pre-
pare a finding of no significant impact which precludes the preparation of an EIS. 40 C.F.R. §
1508.9(a)(2) (1994); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
191. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1549.
192. Id. The Forest Service Handbook 1909.12, ch. 5.31, presents several factors for deter-
mining whether an amendment is significant: "1) timing; 2) location and size of area involved; 3)
the degree to which goals, objectives and outputs are affected; and 4) whether management pre-
scriptions are modified." Id.
193. Id. at 1548-49.
194. Id. at 1549.
195. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.




200. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
201. See Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1551. Applying the long term goals to the stage three analy-
sis reincorporated most of the timber excluded under stage one, resulting in only 4,377 acres being
removed from timber production. Id.
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
separated these seemingly intertwined components, by characterizing the revi-
sion of the ASQ as "a significant change ... on the horizon" that need not be
addressed for a finding of insignificance.2' 2 The regulations, however, appear
to conflict with this decision: land is to be considered not suitable for timber
production and suitable for the alternatives if "[t]he lands are not cost-effi-
cient, over the planning horizon, in meeting forest objectives, which include
timber production. 2 °3 The contention that the ASQ required revision with
the correct standard is viable assuming that cost efficiency includes adherence
to the mandated, shorter regeneration standard since that ensures quicker re-
growth and greater forest productivity.
The Forest Service used updated information for their reanalysis of the
land suitable for timber production. This additional data was gathered from a
new computer data base,20 4 more precise mapping capabilities, and additional
regeneration criteria.0 5 The Sierra Club argued that the Forest Service should
have used this data to recalculate the ASQ so as to change the long term ob-
jectives.'2° The Tenth Circuit held that the regulations do not require a read-
justment of a LRMP whenever new data is available and held that a failure to
do so is permissible.2"7
The dissent illuminated the Forest Service's sleight of hand that disguised
the change as insignificant. The majority held that since the amendment is not
significant, a full reanalysis of the ASQ was not necessary at that time. Al-
though the regulations do not require the Forest Service to revise the ASQ, the
dissent pointed out that the only reason that the change was insignificant was
because the ASQ had not been recalculated with new data as had been done
for the suitability analysis." If this figure had been recalculated with the
new data, the long term objective would have been presumably much lower,
and the amount of land excluded under the three stage analysis would have
been much greater. This would have resulted in a significant amendment to the
Bighorn LRMP. The dissent reprimanded the Forest Service for what it
viewed as the selective application of new data to portions of the reanalysis
which allowed the agency to avoid a significant change in the LRMP: "[tihis
was done in the face of the district court's injunction requiring the Forest
Service to revise the plan and to use its 'research and experience' in determin-
ing whether the land is suitable for timber production."'"
The dissent also focused on the fact that the injunction itself was express-
202. Id. at 1549.
203. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(c)(3); see also supra note 120.
204. The Forest Service relies heavily upon information contained in computer data bases and
programs for the planning process. The programs used, FORPLAN I & II, are forced to choose
one management scheme amongst the alternatives. The chosen scheme represents the greatest net
benefit for the public. See generally Coggins, supra note 96, at 342-44 (discussing the FORPLAN
programs used in the planning process).
205. Sierra Club, II F.3d at 1459.
206. Id.
207. Id. The majority interpreted the regulations as implicitly allowing new data to be incor-
porated into non-significant management decisions. Id.; see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(f).
208. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1552-53.
209. Id. at 1553 (citation omitted).
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ly raised on appeal.2 ' From this position, the only issue to be addressed was
whether the Forest Service complied with the injunction."' The district court
"was concerned about the plan as a whole and the Forest Service's blatant
refusal to follow the statutory mandate regarding regeneration.""2 2 The dis-
sent, therefore, believed that the Forest Service could only be judged to have
not complied with the district court order because the agency did not incorpo-
rate the correct regeneration standard into every aspect of the plan as a whole,
which included the ASQ.213
The majority separated the three stage suitability analysis from the LRMP
by holding that significant changes on the horizon in the LRMP's long term
objective did not affect the three stage suitability analysis.2 4 This holding
does not recognize that the two are intertwined as the suitability analysis is
dependent on the long term objective represented by the ASQ.2 5 The majori-
ty reached this apparently disjunctive result by granting great deference to the
Forest Service's determination that the amendment was not significant.2"'
The district court opinion, and the subsequent order denying the motion to
dissolve the injunction, did analyze the effects of the amendment. Both found
that the implementation of the proper regeneration standard was required for
the whole of the Bighorn LRMvP which included the ASQ.2 7
The majority opinion arguably deferred too much to the finding of signifi-
cance by ending the analysis without acknowledging the significant effects of
such a determination. The court's refusal to acknowledge such effects could be
explained by the deference extended to fact bound agency decisions.2 8 The
Sierra Club court could have used this case as a means to clarify the
regulation's procedural requirement regarding the finding of significance. Had
the Tenth Circuit not simply deferred to that finding, but instead evaluated the
effect of such a finding, the court could have demonstrated the strict degree of
compliance with congressional mandates and agency regulations to which
agencies must adhere.
The court's decision may also be explained as an expansion of the discre-
tion given to the Forest Service in the area of timber production. The Tenth
Circuit stated that a contrary ruling would "improperly tie the hands of the
Forest Service and thereby thwart the purpose of the regulations."2 9 The reg-
ulations and the statutes were meant to allow for timber production while pre-
serving the forest for future productivity. The five year standard and the multi-
ple use doctrine address this concern. The effect of the deference afforded to
210. Id. at 1550.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1552.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1549.
215. See supra note 120.
216. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1548-49 (citing Wilderness Soc'y v. Tyrrel, 918 F.2d 813, 818
(9th Cir. 1990)).
217. Id. at 1102-03. The district court ordered the Forest Service to implement the "five year
regeneration standard in all aspects relating to harvest of lodgepole pine." Id. (emphasis added).
218. Sierra Club, 11 F.3d at 1548.
219. Sierra Club, I1 F.3d at 1549.
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the agency is the continued impact of the harmful seven year regeneration
standard that is repugnant to the congressionally mandated five year standard.
CONCLUSION
The decisions in United States v. Jenks and Sierra Club v. Cargill were
both based upon an examination of procedural requirements. The episodic
nature of these decisions reveals that the court may not always view land and
natural resource cases in their entirety. This may indicate the court's willing-
ness to allow agencies considerable discretion because much of the land that
provides the nation's natural resources is located in the Tenth Circuit's geo-
graphic jurisdiction. More likely however, the court's deference is the result of
an unwillingness to reevaluate an agency's decision when applying complex
scientific data to a complex regulatory scheme. The Jenks court was presented
with a fairly simple task of evaluating the straight-forward procedural require-
ments. The Sierra Club court, on the other hand, was faced with a complex
regulatory scheme and detailed scientific considerations. In that situation,
deference to the agency's determination precluded an examination of the ef-
fects of the finding of non-significance, which could have shown the court that
agency's decision was incorrect. Ironically, the Jenks court cited one of its
own cases for the proposition that the Forest Service is required to follow its
own regulations.220 Apparently, the court did not follow this case in Sierra
Club because the regulations presumably would require a result contrary to
that reached by the court. Reliance on agency discretion and an evaluation of
legal procedure in these matters is not a departure from the court's jurispru-
dence; it simply reaffirms the Tenth Circuit's posture in deciding such cases.
Brian Widmann





This Survey examines selected 1994 opinions and unpublished orders' of
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals involving matters of federal tax law.2 The
Survey begins with an examination of two cases involving deductions. Part II
of the Survey addresses Brooks v. United States,3 involving the question of
whether a stock option was a qualified stock option eligible for preferential
income tax treatment. Part III explores the energy property credit for recycling
equipment which was formerly available under the Code. The Survey contin-
ues with a look at cases involving administration matters, penalties and inter-
est, last known addresses, refunds, bankruptcies, and criminal prosecutions.
Part XI of the Survey concludes with the annual round up of tax protestor
cases.
I. DEDUCTIONS
A. Black Gold Energy Corp. v. Commissioner
In Black Gold, the Tenth Circuit addressed the interplay of the worthless
business debt deduction of I.R.C. § 166 (1988) and the "economic perfor-
mance" rules of I.R.C. § 461(h)(1) (West Supp. 1994).' The taxpayer in Black
Gold guaranteed two obligations of Tonkawa Refinery of Oklahoma, an affili-
ated corporation.6 When the underlying obligations went into default, Black
Gold was forced to defend lawsuits brought by two creditors in 1984. The suit
settled in early 1985. In settlement of the litigation, Black Gold paid $850,000
to one creditor and delivered a promissory note payable over nine years to the
other creditor.7
Black Gold first asserted that it was entitled to a worthless business debt
1. The Tenth Circuit has concluded that
[c]itation of these unpublished decisions is not favored. Nevertheless, if it is believed
that an unpublished opinion or order and judgment has persuasive value with respect to
a material issue in a case and would aisist the court in its disposition, the decision may
be cited, provided that a copy of the decision is attached to the brief or other document
in which it is cited, or, if cited in oral argument, is provided to the court and all other
parties.
General Order of November 29, 1993, superseding 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995,
or further order.
2. This Survey examines the areas of federal income, estate, and gift taxation.
3. 1994-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 50,399 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'g 779 F. Supp. 512 (D. Kan.
1991).
4. No. 93-9002, 1994 WL 139019 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 1994), aff g 99 T.C. 482 (1992).
5. Id.
6. Black Gold Energy Corp. v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 482, 484 (1992).
7. Id. at 484-85.
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deduction8 in 1984, the year Tonkawa defaulted and Black Gold became lia-
ble under the guarantees.9 Black Gold argued that as an accrual basis taxpay-
er, it could deduct the entire amount of the debt settled in 1984, when the so-
called "all events" test was satisfied,'0 notwithstanding that it had made no
actual payments on the guarantee." The Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
however, pointed to Treasury Regulations which stated the deduction is avail-
able only in the year in which payment is actually made.' Black Gold con-
tended that these Regulations only apply to cash basis taxpayers.' 3 The Tenth
Circuit agreed with the IRS and concluded that the Regulations applied equally
to accrual basis taxpayers.' 4
Black Gold alternatively argued it was entitled to a bad debt deduction in
1985, the year that it delivered its promissory note to the creditor. 5 The abil-
ity of Black Gold to claim a bad debt deduction in 1985 was complicated by
I.R.C. § 461(h)(1), which states that the "all events" test is not to be treated as
met any earlier than when "economic performance" occurs with respect to the
item sought to be deducted. 6 Under circumstances where the liability of the
taxpayer requires it to provide property or services, the Code further provides
that "economic performance" occurs only when, and as, the taxpayer in fact
provides such property or services. 7 Black Gold argued that its delivery of
8. A guarantor may deduct payments made under its guarantee, if at all, under I.R.C. § 166,
and not under the more general loss rules of 1.R.C. § 165 (1988). Putnam v. Commissioner, 352
U.S. 82 (1956). In Putnam, the Supreme Court held that losses sustained by a guarantor are "bad
debts" under I.R.C. § 166 because, upon payment under the guarantee, the guarantor becomes
subrogated to the rights of the creditor against the debtor. Id. at 85. Thus, a "debt" arises between
the debtor to the guarantor, which is governed by the bad debt rules of I.R.C. § 166. Id. Only
when this debt becomes worthless can the guarantor claim a bad debt deduction under I.R.C. §
166. The loss can be deducted as an ordinary loss if the debt is a so-called "business debt," or less
beneficially, as a short-term capital loss if the debt is a "nonbusiness debt." I.R.C. § 166(d).
9. Black Gold, 99 T.C. at 485-86.
10. Under the accrual method of accounting, deductions are allowable for the "taxable year
in which all the events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability" giving rise to such
deduction and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (1987) (emphasis added).
11. Black Gold also argued that neither guarantee agreement contained a right of subrogation
in favor of Black Gold Energy against Tonkawa; therefore, no "debt" arose between Tonkawa and
Black Gold, and I.R.C. § 166 was not applicable. Black Gold, 99 T.C. at 484. The Tax Court
concluded otherwise, stating that "whether a guarantor achieves technical subrogation or. not, the
guarantor's loss arises by virtue of the worthlessness of the debtor's obligation to the guarantor."
Id. at 487.
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-9(a) (1983) provides that "a payment of principal or interest made
during a taxable year ... by the taxpayer in discharge of part or all of the taxpayer's obligation as
a guarantor, endorser, or indemnitor is treated as a business debt becoming worthless in the tax-
able year in which the payment is made." Id.
13. Black Gold, 99 T.C. at 485. Under the cash receipts and disbursements method of ac-
counting, "all items which constitute gross income (whether in the form of cash, property, or
services) are to be included for the taxable year in which actually or constructively received. Ex-
penditures are to be deducted for the taxable year in which actually made." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
l(c)(l)(i) (1993).
14. Black Gold, 1994 WL 139019 at *2.
15. Id.
16. I.R.C. § 461(h)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994). The section was added to the Code as
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 (Division A of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984). Pub. L.
No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 598-600 (1984).
17. I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(B).
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the promissory note satisfied the economic performance requirement referred
to by the Code. 8 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, concluding that "true econom-
ic performance under the settlement was the payment of the note, not its exe-
cution and delivery."' 9 Thus, Black Gold was not entitled to a bad debt de-
duction in 1985, and could only claim the deduction as it actually made pay-
ments under the note.2 °
B. True v. United States
21
The taxpayers in True were partners and shareholders in various partner-
ships and S corporations, through which they conducted business.2 The IRS
made certain adjustments to the taxpayers' taxable incomes. The adjustments
apparently arose out of increases made to the reported incomes of the partner-
ships and S corporations and flowed through to the taxpayers' personal income
tax returns.23 The taxpayers paid the resulting deficiency plus statutorily re-
quired interest on the deficiency.24
The taxpayers argued that since most of the deficiency interest paid to the
IRS was attributable to adjustments made to the reported operations of the
businesses, they should be entitled to deduct the interest as an "above the line"
business expense25 without being subject to the Code's restrictions on the
deduction of personal interest. 26 This is the rule when, for example, a tax-
payer operates his business as a sole proprietorship.27 The IRS countered that,
18. Black Gold, 1994 WL 139019 at *2.
19. Id.
20. Black Gold could, of course, deduct the $850,000 actually paid to the first creditor in
1985.
21. No. 93-8092, 1994 WL 461279 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1994).
22. Id. at*1.
23. Id. A partner in a partnership must include on his personal income tax return his alloca-
ble share of the partnership's income, gains, losses, deductions, and credits which are "passed
through" to the partner. I.R.C. § 704 (West Supp. 1994). Likewise, a shareholder in a so-called "S
corporation", see I.R.C. § 1361(a)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994), must include his pro rata share
of the corporation's income, losses, deductions, and credits, as well as certain other items. I.R.C. §
1366 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
24. True, 1994 WL 461279 at *1. See also I.R.C. § 6601 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
25. True, 1994 WL 461279 at *1 (pursuant to I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994)).
26. The deductibility of interest generally turns on the classification of the interest: "invest-
ment interest" is generally deductible only to the extent of net investment income, see I.R.C.
§ 163(d) (West Supp. 1994); "qualified residence interest" consists of either acquisition indebted-
ness or home equity indebtedness with respect to any qualified residence of the taxpayer, subject
to various definitional and other limitations, see I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(West Supp. 1994); interest paid
or accrued on indebtedness allocable to a trade or business is generally fully deductible; or "per-
sonal interest," generally, all types of consumer interest other than the foregoing, is fully nonde-
ductible for 1991 and later tax years, see I.R.C. § 163(h)(2) (West Supp. 1994). The actual contro-
versy in True centered around the taxpayers' liability for alternative minimum tax, and the further
limitations placed on nonbusiness interest under I.R.C. 56(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1994) for purpos-
es of computing a taxpayer's alternative minimum tax liability. True, 1994 WL 461279 at *1-2.
27. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 305 (D.N.D. 1993). Thus, to the extent
deficiency interest paid to the IRS is attributable to a deficiency arising out of the operations of
the sole proprietorship, the interest is deductible as a business expense under I.R.C. § 162, provid-
ed it qualifies as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense." See Miller v. United States, 95-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) $ 50,068 (D.N.D. 1994) (while not subject to the "personal interest" limita-
tions, expenditure nevertheless was not deductible under I.R.C. § 162).
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unlike sole proprietorships, partnerships and S corporations are separate legal
entities undertaking separate business operations, and that if a deduction was
allowable at all for the deficiency interest as a business expense, the deduction
would belong to the entity." Because such entities do not separately compute
their tax liability, they cannot bear responsibility for deficiency interest. Under
the IRS view, therefore, the deficiency interest could only be claimed as a
"below the line" personal deduction by the taxpayers. 9 This apparently re-
sulted in the taxpayer's interest deductions being in excess of the interest
deduction limitations of the Code.3
In a brief, unreported decision, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the IRS.3
Adopting the government's argument, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that partner-
ships and S corporations are separate legal, non-taxable entities that separately
compute and report the results of their operations. This makes them distin-
guishable from sole proprietorships.32 The nature, therefore, of the interest
deduction to the taxpayers in the instant case was strictly personal and was not
a business deduction. The interest must therefore be deducted, if at all, as an
itemized deduction subject to the personal interest deduction limitations.3
II. STOCK OPTIONS
A. Brooks v. United States34
The taxpayer in Brooks held a stock option to purchase 60,000 shares of
the common stock of Clinton Oil Company. Brooks's stock option was issued
under a plan adopted by the company irr 1974 and was exercised by Brooks in
1980. The controversy arose when Brooks filed a complaint in district court
seeking a refund of tax paid.33
Under the federal tax law in effect at the time,36 such options were eligi-
28. True, 1994 WL 461279 at *2.
29. "Below the line" deductions include, inter alia, personal itemized deductions for interest
to the extent allowable under I.R.C. § 163. See I.R.C. § 63(a) (West Supp. 1994).
30. True, 1994 WL 461279 at *2.
31. The Tenth Circuit affirmed an unreported district court order that had granted summary
judgment to the government. Id. at * 1.
32. Id. at *3. Both partnerships and S corporations file informational returns with the IRS.
Partnerships file on Form 1065 and S corporations file on Form 1120S. These forms are the basis
for calculating the taxable income or loss that flows through to the partners and shareholders. The
Schedule K-1 attached to each partner's or shareholder's income tax return reflects the income or
loss passed through.
33. Id.
34. 1994-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9 50,399 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'g 779 F. Supp. 512 (D. Kan.
1991).
35. Brooks, 1994-2 U.S, Tax Cas. (CCH) T 50,399, at 85,396.
36. Under the rules of former I.R.C. §§ 421 and 422, preferential tax treatment was extended
to "qualified stock options" meeting certain statutory requirements. I.R.C. §§ 421, 422 (1988)
(amended 1990). These rules contrasted with the general tax treatment of stock options under
I.R.C. § 83 (West Supp. 1994). Under the rules of former I.R.C. §§ 421 and 422, neither the grant
nor the exercise of a qualified stock option resulted in taxable income to the recipient. Only when
the stock acquired on exercise was ultimately disposed of was a tax imposed at capital gains tax
rates based on the difference between the sale price of the stock and its basis in the optionee's
hands (generally, the exercise price). I.R.C. §§ 421, 422. Former I.R.C. § 422 was repealed in
1990, but had been something of a deadwood provision for some time prior to that because under
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ble for preferential income tax treatment if they were so-called "qualified
stock options" under a series of requirements then set forth in the Code.37
One requirement stated that the options must have been issued pursuant to a
plan reflecting certain features and option terms. Further, the plan must have
been "approved by the stockholders of the granting corporation within 12
months before or after the date" the plan was adopted by the company (e.g.,
by its board of directors).3"
The question whether the stockholders of Clinton Oil had approved the
stock option plan within the required time period was clouded by the fact that
the company had been the target of an enforcement action by the Securities
and Exchange Commission.39 Under the terms of the settlement with the
SEC, the company agreed that it would be subject to judicial supervision by
Judge Wesley E. Brown.' Subsequently, on March 18, 1974, Clinton's board
of directors adopted the stock option plan under which Brooks's option was
later granted.4 ' According to the taxpayer, the plan was submitted to Judge
Brown and approved by him at a March 1974 meeting with Clinton manage-
ment. No written record of such a meeting existed. 42 The plan was not pre-
sented to Clinton's stockholders within the required 12 month period.43
Under Brooks' theory, Judge Brown's approval, if given, was sufficient to
constitute approval by the shareholders of the company, because Judge Brooks
was representing the interests of the shareholders at the time. Therefore,
Brooks' stock option was a qualified stock option, and the exercise of that
option did not give rise to a taxable event. The government, on the other hand,
asserted that because the plan was not actually submitted to or approved by
the shareholders, as required by the literal language of the statute, the option
was not a qualified stock option and the exercise of the option was a taxable
event."
its express terms, I.R.C. § 422 did not apply to options issued after May 20, 1976. I.R.C. §
422(b).
37. Under the current Code, "qualified stock options" have been replaced by so-called "in-
centive stock options," which are described in I.R.C. § 422 (West Supp. 1994). The tax treatment
of incentive stock options under current law closely resembles that of qualified stock options
under old law. Incentive stock options were originally governed by I.R.C. § 422A, which was
redesignated as I.R.C. § 422 in 1990 when the old I.R.C. § 422 was repealed.
38. Under then-applicable Treasury Regulations, such approval was required to
comply with all applicable provisions of the corporate charter and bylaws, and the law
of the State of incorporation and must represent the express consent of stockholders
holding at least a majority of the voting stock of the corporation voting by person or by
proxy at a duly held stockholders' meeting.
Former Treas. Reg. § 1.422-2(b)(1).
An identical rule governs the approval of plans under which incentive stock options are
granted. See I.R.C. 422(b)(1) (1988). Thus, the holding in Brooks would presumably have equal
relevance to incentive stock option plans under current law.
39. Brooks, 766 F. Supp. at 994. The SEC filed an injunction proceeding in 1973. Id.
40. United States District Court, District of Kansas. The SEC had originally sought ap-
pointment of a receiver, but because Clinton's oil and gas concessions were subject to cancellation
upon appointment of a receiver, the SEC and Clinton's management agreed to the appointment of
Judge Brown as a "judicial supervisor." Brooks, 1994-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,399, at 85,397.
41. Brooks, 766 F. Supp. at 995.
42. Id. at 997.
43. Id. at 995.
44. Id. at 996. The resulting taxable income would be measured by the difference between
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The district court concluded .that, despite the express language of the
statute requiring stockholder approval, "Judge Brown had the authority to
exercise stockholder approval within the meaning" of the statute.45 The dis-
trict court thus rejected a strict interpretation of the statute, concluding a con-
trary result would not further the legislative purpose of the statute.' The dis-
trict court further held that, based on the record - which included a deposi-
tion of Judge Brown taken by the taxpayer - Judge Brown did in fact ap-
prove the plan at the March 1974 meeting.47
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court's
finding that Judge Brown had approved the plan was "clearly erroneous."
'
The court of appeals concluded that "even if [Judge Brown's] approval could
satisfy the requirements of [the statute,] there is simply no evidence in the
record that Judge Brown approved the plan on behalf of the shareholders for
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) purposes."'49 Reviewing the record, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the "approval" alleged to have been given by Judge
Brown at the March 1974 meeting was at best given in only a very general
manner, and was not intended by Judge Brown to be a substitute for specific
shareholder approval if required.5t The court of appeals thus did not view the
general approval of the plan given by Judge Brown as rising to the level of
the stockholder approval required by the Code.
the fair market value of the stock on the date of exercise and the exercise price. I.R.C. § 83 (West
Supp. 1994). See also Treas. Reg. §1.83-7 (1978).
45. Brooks, 766 F. Supp. at 997.
46. Id. at 998.
47. Id. The district court originally ruled that the record was insufficient to support such a
conclusion, and granted summary judgment for the government. Id. at 998. However, the taxpayer
successfully obtained leave to conduct further discovery, and after taking Judge Brown's deposi-
tion, submitted it to the court. Based on the additional information reflected in the deposition, the
court granted the taxpayer's motion to reconsider the earlier summary judgment. Brooks v. United
States, 779 F. Supp 512 (D. Kan. 1991). After the subsequent trial, the district court ruled that
Judge Brown had in fact approved the plan. Brooks v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D.
Kan. 1992).
48. Brooks, 1994-2 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) l 50,399, at 85,398. Under the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court's findings of fact "shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Thus, the trial court's
findings of fact will be upheld unless the appellate court is firmly convinced a mistake has been
made. See Las Vegas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Far West Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir.
1990); LeMaire ex rel. LeMaire v. United States, 826 F.2d 949, 953 (10th Cir. 1987). The Su-
preme Court has instructed that "[a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when, although there is evi-
dence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
49. Brooks, 1994-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,399 at 85,398.
50. Id. at 85,399. The court considered several other factors as well: the tax consequences of
the plan were not discussed at the meeting, nor was the need to obtain shareholder approval either
from Judge Brown or the shareholders themselves; the plan itself stated that stockholder approval
was required within 12 months after its adoption; and Judge Brown routinely approved any matter
brought to him by Clinton management unless the SEC had an objection, and so did not exercise




A. Pepcol Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner5'
Pepcol Manufacturing provided the Tenth Circuit with an opportunity to
review the standards under which "legislative regulations" of the government
may be held invalid.52 On its 1980 Federal income tax return, the taxpayer in
Pepcol Manufacturing claimed the special "energy property" investment tax
credit which then extended to qualifying "recycling equipment."53 The IRS
disallowed the credit, but the Tax Court sided with the taxpayer and held the
credit was available. 4 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed.55
Pepcol Manufacturing Co. was engaged in, inter alia, the processing of
animal bones, obtained from local slaughterhouses, into gelatin bone, which is
used in the photographic industry as a raw material for use as a coating on
film.56 Pepcol maintained that its facility for processing bones was "recycling
equipment" and thus, eligible for the energy property credit.57 Noting that
there were four requirements to obtain the tax credit in respect to "recycling
equipment," the Tax Court focused on the first two of these requirements."
The court first addressed whether the process constituted "recycling." The
government's argument was that the term recycling envisioned only processes
under which waste products are processed back into their original form, such
as paper waste (e.g., newsprint) back into paper, metal waste (e.g., cans and
other containers) back into metal, and the like.59 Under the IRS view, this
"same type" or "similar end-product" requirement was supported by the legis-
lative history to the energy credit, which had articulated several examples of
recycling, all of which fell into this category.' Calling the dispute a "seman-
tical orgy," the Tax Court rejected the IRS's restrictive reading of the term
51. 13 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'g 98 T.C. 127 (1992).
52. Treasury regulations can be either "interpretative" or "legislative." An interpretative
regulation is issued pursuant to the Secretary of the Treasury's general authority to "prescribe all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the Code. I.R.C. § 7805 (West Supp. 1994).
Legislative regulations are those issued in response to provisions of the Code "that describe the
intended law in extremely general terms, expressly leaving it to the Secretary of the Treasury to
interpret the provisions in regulations." Fred Feingold and Mark E. Berg, Whither the Branches?,
44 TAX L. REV. 205 (1989). Such Regulations "are of a quasi-legislative character; Congress has
chosen to delegate to the Treasury authority it might have exercised itself." WILLIAM A. KLEIN,
JOSEPH BANKMAN, Er. AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 68 (8th ed. 1990).
53. Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 13 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1994). The credit, which ex-
pired in 1985, was equal to 10 percent of the taxpayer's investment in qualifying property. I.R.C.
§ 46(a)(2) (amended 1990).
54. Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 127, 137 (1992).
55. Pepcol Mfg., 13 F.3d at 355.
56. Pepcol Mfg., 98 T.C. at 128. Gelatin bone is also used as a coating of pharmaceutical
products and as an ingredient in food products such as gelatin. Id.
57. Id. at 130.
58. Id. The court summarized the requirements of former I.R.C. § 48(l)(6) as follows: (1) the
process must have constituted recycling; (2) the equipment must be used exclusively to process
or sort and prepare solid waste for processing; (3) the item produced in the process must be the
first marketable product; and (4) the product to be processed cannot contain more than 10 percent
virgin material. Id. The parties were in agreement that requirements (3) and (4) were met. Id.
59. Id. at 131-32.
60. See S. Rep. No. 95-435, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 83 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7855, 8014.
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recycling and held that Pepcol's processing of animal bones constituted recy-
cling for these purposes.6
The second requirement examined by the Tax Court was that Pepcol's
equipment must have been used exclusively to process or sort and prepare
"solid waste" for processing. The applicable regulations in effect specifically
provided that "solid waste," for purposes of the recycling equipment credit,
excluded "animal waste," and on this alternative ground the IRS had disal-
lowed Pepcol's credit.6 2 The Tax Court acknowledged that Treasury Regula-
tions, including "legislative regulations" such as these, are to be "sustained
unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes, and
should not be overruled except for weighty reasons."'63 The court nevertheless
concluded that for various reasons the Regulations were invalid.' The Tax
Court's holding meant that the energy credit for recycling equipment was
available to Pepcol in respect of its bone processing equipment.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the Tax Court on the strength of the
second requirement.65 Taking issue with the court below, the court of appeals
found the applicable regulations to be "not unreasonable or plainly inconsistent
with Congress' intent in enacting" the relevant statutory provisions.' Because
the IRS position reflected in the Regulations was therefore permissible, "the
Tax Court was constrained to follow it and erred as a matter of law in failing
to do so."67 The Tenth Circuit thus overturned the Tax Court's conclusion
that the Regulations were invalid. Noting that Pepcol had "for some reason"
stipulated that the bones were "animal waste," the court held that Pepcol was
therefore "not entitled to a recycling tax credit under the regulation."68
IV. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT 9
A. Gardner v. United States
70
The taxpayer in Gardner filed a quiet title action in federal district court,
seeking clear title to certain property that had belonged to her ex-husband and
61. Pepcol Mfg., 98 T.C. at 132-33.
62. Pepcol Mfg., 13 F.3d at 356. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.4 8-9(g)(1) (1987).
63. Pepcol Mfg., 98 T.C. at 133 (quoting Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 750 (1969).
64. Id. at 134-37.
65. Pepcol Mfg., 13 F.3d at 357.
66. Id. "This Court has held that Treasury regulations are generally presumed to be valid and
'are not to be invalidated except for weighty reasons.' The 'presumption of validity is even
greater' where regulations have been issued pursuant to a specific legislative authorization." Id.
(citations ommitted).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 356-57.
69. In addition to the cases described in the text, the Tenth Circuit has decided numerous
cases concerning administration and enforcement. See e.g., Burge v. United States, No. 94-1063,
1994 WL 596586 (loth Cir. Nov. 1, 1994) (upholding dismissal of taxpayer's suit against IRS for
wrongful levy under doctrine of sovereign immunity); Hancock v. Commissioner, No. 94-9001,
1994 WL 582140 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 1994) (upholding dismissal of Tax Court petition for failure
to prosecute); United States v. Boucher, No. 93-1453, 1994 WL 446780 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 1994)
(affirming district court's determination of taxpayer's tax liability over objection that he was not
given the opportunity to participate in the underlying trial).
70. 34 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1994).
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had been awarded to her in a divorce. The IRS claimed a federal tax lien
against this property." Billie and Terryl Gardner commenced a divorce action
in Kansas on January 22, 1985.72 On August 4, 1986, the IRS filed a Notice
of Federal Tax Lien for taxes assessed against Billie three days earlier." The
divorce decree was entered on January 12, 1987, granting virtually all the
marital property, including the property in question, to Terryl.74 On December
7, 1990, Terryl filed the instant action.
A federal tax lien attaches "only to the property interests of the delinquent
taxpayer at the time of assessment.",71 The government, therefore, merely
steps into the shoes of the taxpayer, and cannot accede to a property interest
greater than that held by the taxpayer.76 Thus, the remaining questions in-
volved the nature of the property rights held by Billie on August 1, 1986, after
the divorce was filed but was still pending, and whether it was sufficient for a
federal tax lien to attach to it. Resolution of the matter was acknowledged to
be a pure question of Kansas state law. 7' Examining Kansas law,7" the Tenth
Circuit concluded that upon the filing of a divorce decree in that state, both
spouses become the owners of a vested, but as yet undetermined, interest in all
the marital property, whether jointly or individually held.79 This species of
common or joint ownership is to be ultimately unraveled by the trial court
when the divorce decree is entered and the property is finally divided. This
determination, in essence, relates back to the filing of the divorce decree, with
the result that the property interest adjudicated in the divorce decree is seen to
retroactively vest on the date the divorce action was filed.
Applied to the instant case, this doctrine of relation back meant that, be-
cause Billie was ultimately determined in the divorce decree to have no inter-
est in the subject property, he did not have any property interest to which the
government's lien could attach in August 1986 while the divorce was pending.
Thus, Billie "had no rights to the property in question when the IRS made its
assessment against him, no tax lien could attach, and [Terryl] owns that prop-
71. id. at 985. I.R.C. § 6321 (1988) provides: "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects
or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount... shall be a lien in favor of the United
States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.
The lien secures the amount of the deficiency, plus any interest, additional amount, addition
to tax, assessable penalty, and costs. Id. The general rule under the Code is that the general federal
tax lien arises at the time assessment is made. I.R.C. § 6322 (1988). Assessments are little more
than bookkeeping notations entered by the IRS on the taxpayer's account indicating that the
amount has been administratively determined to be due and payable. The lien continues until the
liability for the amount so assessed is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of
time. Id.
72. Gardner, 34 F.3d at 985.
73. Id. at 986.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 987 (citing United States v. Wingfield, 822 F.2d 1466, 1472 (10th Cir. 1987)).
76. See 4 BORIS I. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFrs $ 111.5.4
(1981) ("[Tlhe tax collector not only steps into the taxpayer's shoes but must go barefoot if the
shoes wear out.").
77. Gardner, 34 F.3d at 986.
78. Id. at 987 (citing Smith v. AIFAM Enters., 737 P.2d 469, 472, 474 (Kan. 1987) and
Cady v. Cady, 581 P.2d 358 (Kan. 1978)). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-201(b) (Supp. 1994).
79. Gardner, 34 F.3d at 987 (citing Cady, 581 P.2d at 362-63).
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erty free of any such liei."'
B. Codner v. United States"'
The taxpayer in Codner filed a petition to quash several administrative
summonses served by the IRS 2 on various third-party recordkeepers s3 The
summonses were to determine if the taxpayer was in violation of the Internal
Revenue laws. 4 Affirming an unreported District Court determination, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the summonses had been issued in compliance
with the applicable statutory requirements 5 and were to be enforced, over the
taxpayer's objections that (1) the special agent who issued the summons ex-
ceeded his authority in doing so,6 and (2) the copies of the summonses de-
livered to the taxpayer were required to be attested
8 7 but were not.88
C. Home of Faith v. Commissioner 9
The Internal Revenue Code provides that partnership audits are to be
conducted at the entity level, and not the partner level." However, partner-
ships with less than ten partners, each of whom is a natural person, are exempt
from these entity-level audit and litigation procedures.9' The Code's treatment
of S corporations is analogous to the tax treatment of partnerships,92 and in
recognition of this, I.R.C. § 6244 states that the provisions of I.R.C. §§ 6221-
80. Id. at 989.
81. 17 F.3d 1331 (10th Cir. 1994).
82. The IRS has broad powers to issue such summons in support of its efforts to ferret out
unreported tax liabilities. See I.R.C. §§ 7601 and 7602 (1988).
83. For the rules delineating third-party recordkeepers, see I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3) (1988).
84. Codner, 17 F.3d at 1332.
85. Under relevant standards, a summons will be enforced if the IRS can show "that the
investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant
to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession,
and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed." United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). The government therefore need not meet a "reasonable cause"
standard. The burden on the government is slight, and is generally met through the affidavit of the
agent issuing the summons. See, e.g., United States v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 642 F.2d 388,
389 (10th Cir. 1981).
86. The court concluded that while the IRS's own rules precluded revenue agents from is-
suing summonses without prior approval of their supervisors, this prohibition did not apply to
special agents. Codner, 17 F.3d at 1333.
87. An attested copy is "one which has been examined and compared with the original, with
a certificate or memorandum of its correctness, signed by the persons who have examined it."
Mimick v. United States, 952 F.2d 230, 232 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Accord Henderson v. United
States, 778 F. Supp. 274, 277 (D.S.C. 1991)).
88. Codner, 17 F.3d at 1332-33. The summonses served on the recordkeepers in Codner had
been attested, but the copies sent to Codner had not. In Mimick, neither the summons served on
the third party nor the copy sent to the taxpayer was attested, and the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that both must be attested. Mimick, 952 F.2d at 231-32. Parsing through the techni-
cal requirements of I.R.C. §§ 7603 and 7609(a), which set forth the attestation rules relevant to
summonses, the Tenth Circuit concluded that only the summons sent to the recordkeeper must be
attested. See Codner, 17 F.3d at 1333.
89. 39 F.3d 263 (10th Cir. 1994).
90. I.R.C. § 6221-6231 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
91. I.R.C. § 6231(a)(1) (1988).
92. See I.R.C. § 704 (West Supp. 1994).
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6231 which relate to (1) assessing deficiencies and filing claims for refund
with respect to partnership items, and (2) the judicial determination of part-
nership items, are made equally applicable to "subchapter S items." '93 Wheth-
er or not the rule of I.R.C. § 6231(a)(1)(B) also applies to S corporations by
analogy, such that S corporations with fewer than ten shareholders are exempt
from the entity-level audit rules, was the issue in Home of Faith.94 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals previously ruled that the exemption does apply,95
while the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that it does not.96
In Home of Faith, the IRS had assessed deficiencies against Home of
Faith, an S corporation, and mailed notices of adjustment to certain of the
corporation's shareholders.97 One of the shareholders filed a petition in Tax
Court, claiming that the IRS was required to assess the deficiency against the
shareholders separately because the entity-level procedures are not applicable
to S corporations with fewer than ten shareholders. The shareholder also con-
tended that as to him, the statute of limitations had expired, and therefore the
IRS was untimely in asserting the deficiency.9"
In a brief opinion, the Tenth Circuit adopted the view of the Eleventh
Circuit and held that the exemption from the entity-level audit and litigation
procedures, which is extended to partnerships with fewer than ten partners, is
not also applicable to S corporations with fewer than ten shareholders.99
Therefore, the deficiency was assessed in a timely fashion against Home of
Faith.
D. Hall v. Commissioner"
In Hall, the Tenth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held, under the facts
presented, a minister had timely applied for exemption from self-employment
(i.e., social security) tax on amounts earned in the performance of services in
his ministry."' Under the Code, a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed
minister may apply for such an exemption. °2 The application for exemp-
tion"0 3 must be accompanied by a statement that the taxpayer is opposed to
the acceptance of public insurance such as social security, either conscientious-
ly or due to his religious principles."° Generally, however, the application
must be filed by the due date of the return for the second taxable year in
which the minister had self-employment earnings of $400 or more; otherwise,
93. See I.R.C. § 6244 (1988). For a definition of "subchapter S itnes," see I.R.C. § 6245
(1988).
94. Home of Faith, 39 F.3d at 263.
95. Arenjay Corp. v. Commissioner, 920 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1991).
96. Beard v. United States, 992 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1993).
97. Home of Faith, 39 F.3d at 263.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 264. In doing so, the Tenth Circuit affirmed an unreported decision of the Tax
Court. See id. at 263.
100. 30 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'g 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 374 (1993).
101. See id. at 1307.
102. I.R.C. § 1402(e)(1) (West Supp. 1994).
103. The application is filed on Form 4361.
104. I.R.C. § 1402(e)(1).
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the right to apply for exemption is lost forever. 0 5 Once made, the exemption
is irrevocable."'°
The taxpayer in Hall was ordained as a deacon in the Methodist Church
in 1979.'07 Although his application for exemption from self-employment tax
was due on April 15, 1982, the taxpayer, not being religiously or conscien-
tiously opposed to the acceptance of public insurance, did not file one.'0 8 Af-
ter his application for elevation within the Methodist Church to elder status
was denied, the taxpayer left the ministry in 1983 and went to work as an en-
gineer for five years. However, in 1988, the taxpayer was ordained as minister
in the Community Church of Southport, Indianapolis, and began his ministry
in Colorado Springs."° On January 9, 1989, the taxpayer - having now de-
veloped a belief in opposition to the acceptance of public insurance - filed an
application for exemption from self-employment tax. The application was
denied on the ground that it should have been filed by April 15, 1982.
Hall presented the question whether the taxpayer's "return to the ministry
after a five-year absence, combined with his ordination in a new church and
his acceptance of a new belief in opposition to public insurance" provided the
taxpayer with a second opportunity to elect exemption from self-employment
taxes.'' ° If so, his application would not need to be filed until April 15,
1990, and would be timely. Relying on its prior decision in Ballinger v. Com-
missioner,"' the Tenth Circuit answered this question in the affirmative, con-
cluding that "[w]hen an individual enters the ministry anew in a new church,
having adopted a new set of beliefs about the propriety of accepting public
insurance, it is logical and consistent with the statutory language ... to char-
acterize that individual as a 'new' minister for the purpose of seeking an ex-
emption.""' 2 While concerned that a contrary rule could "arbitrarily and un-
constitutionally interfere with the adherence to sincere religious beliefs by
individuals ... who undergo a genuine religious conversion,""' the court
was at the same time "not concerned that [its] decision will open the flood-
gates for conniving Elmer Gantrys to dupe the Internal Revenue Service and
opt out of the social security system without documenting a legitimate reli-
105. See I.R.C. § 1402(e)(3).
106. I.R.C. § 1402(e)(4).
107. Hall v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 374 (1993).
108. Hall, 30 F.3d at 1305.
109. Hall, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 374.
110. Hall, 30 F.3d at 1305.
111. 728 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1984). In Ballinger, the taxpayer had switched churches, but
his application for exemption was found to have been untimely even if it was true that he was
entitled to a second opportunity to so apply - it was filed five years after he assumed ministerial
duties in his new church, albeit the same year he was ultimately ordained. The Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that the event triggering the two-year application period was the assumption of duties, and
not the later ordination date. Although deciding against the taxpayer on the facts in Ballinger, the
court noted that it did not agree with the general proposition "that an individual who has a change
of belief accompanied by a change to another faith is not entitled to the exemption." Id. at 1290.
The court concluded that the statute "permits ministers who change churches to qualify" if, unlike
Ballinger, they timely do so. Id. at 1292. The Tax Court in Hall chose to treat this language as
dicta, rather than binding precedent. Hall, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 376.
112. Hall, 30 F.3d at 1307.
113. Id. at 1306.
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gious or conscientious reason to justify their exemption."'" The Tenth Cir-
cuit therefore held the taxpayer's application for exemption timely filed."'
V. PENALTIES AND INTEREST
A. Mauerman v. Commissioner"6
In Mauerman, the Tenth Circuit concluded that a taxpayer who relied on
his tax advisors as to the propriety of a claimed deduction, was not liable for
the "substantial understatement" penalty of former I.R.C. § 6661."' The tax-
payer was a surgeon who had purchased stock in Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc.
("Pre-Paid"), a company which sold prepaid legal service benefits, a species of
insurance under which legal service contracts are sold to individuals for
monthly premiums." 8 Subsequently, the taxpayer became involved as an in-
vestor in a reinsurance arrangement' sponsored by Pre-Paid, under which
the investors - which included the principal officers of Pre-Paid - partic-
ipated in a pooled purchase of contracts issued by Pre-Paid and became
reinsurers of the company. 2 Taking the position that this activity qualified
the individual investors as "insurance companies"'' eligible for preferential
tax treatment under certain now-repealed provisions of the Code, the investors,
including the taxpayer, deducted certain expenditures that would otherwise
114. Id. at 1307.
115. Id. The Tax Court had held that the plain language of the statute did not give "any indi-
cation that a change in faith would give rise to a second opportunity to file an application for ex-
emption." Hall, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 376.
116. 22 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'g 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1772 (1993).
117. Id. at 1005. See I.R.C. § 6661 (1988) (repealed in 1989), as in effect in 1984 and 1986,
the tax years in question. I.R.C. § 6661 was repealed by the Improved Penalty Administration and
Compliance Tax Act, Subtitle G of Tite VII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.
(West Supp. 1994)). The current penalty scheme is set forth in I.R.C. §§ 6662-6664 (West Supp.
1994). See also Dennis R. Schmidt and Thomas C. Pearson, Civil Penalty Provisions Revamped
by IMPACT, 68 TAxES, Mar. 1990, at 187; Richard C. Stark, IMPACT Makes Fundamental
Changes in Civil Penalties, 72 J. TAX'N, Mar. 1990, at 132.
The substantial understatement penalty of former I.R.C. § 6661 was reenacted as I.R.C. §
6662(b)(2) and (d) (West Supp. 1994). The "substantial authority" standard discussed in the text
was retained in I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1994). No penalty is imposed, however, if it is
shown that there was a reasonable cause for the underpayment (or a portion thereof) and that the
taxpayer acted in good faith with respect thereto. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (West Supp. 1994). There-
fore, the holding of the Tenth Circuit in Mauerman, to the extent it addresses circumstances under
which a taxpayer will be deemed to have acted in good faith and under which reasonable cause
will be seen to be present, will continue to be of import.
118. Mauerman, 22 F.3d at 1002. For the current tax treatment of such plans when offered as
a qualified employee fringe benefit, see I.R.C. § 120 (West Supp. 1994)
119.
Reinsurance is a common business practice for many insurance companies. Basically, it
is a contract whereby risk is transferred between two parties. The parties to the contract
are the ceding company (reinsured) which wrote the original policy, and the assuming
party (reinsurer) which pays a ceding commission and accepts the business risks and
rewards of the insurance (claims and premium income).
Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1774.
120. Id. at 1774-75.
121. For federal income tax purposes as relevant to the issue at hand for the years at issue,
"insurance companies" were defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(a)(1) (as amended in 1972).
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have been capitalizable under rules applicable to taxpayers other than insur-
ance companies. 122 These deductions were disallowed on audit, on the
ground that the taxpayer was a surgeon, not an "insurance company."1 23 Un-
der I.R.C. § 6661(a) as then in effect, the IRS further imposed a penalty equal
to 25 percent of the deficiency, concluding that the resulting underpayment
was attributable to a substantial understatement of tax and that the taxpayer
did not have "substantial authority" for his tax return position.'24
The only issue in Mauerman was the correctness of the substantial under-
statement penalty. The Tax Court first concluded that, based on applicable
law, the IRS was correct in asserting that the taxpayer did not have "substan-
tial authority" for taking the position that he qualified as an "insurance com-
pany."'2 5 Therefore, the substantial understatement penalty was properly im-
posed, and the only relief available to the taxpayer was to seek a waiver of the
penalty from the Commissioner on the grounds that there was reasonable
cause for the understatement and that the taxpayer acted in good faith.'26 The
taxpayer had done this, claiming that he acted in good faith because he had
reasonably relied on his accountants in the preparation of his return.'27 How-
ever, the Commissioner had denied the waiver. Both the taxpayer's accoun-
tants were attorneys and one was a C.P.A., and neither had any relationship
with Pre-Paid. However, as the Tax Court pointed out, in evaluating the de-
ductibility of the expenses in question, the accountants had relied on informa-
tion provided by sponsors of the program, without independent research.'28
Moreover, as the Tax Court further noted, the taxpayer had made several
investments over the years and "was not a 'babe in the woods"' and should
122. Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1775-76. The bulk of the amounts claimed as deduc-
tions were ceding commissions currently paid in respect of the contracts purchased, the premium
income from which would be earned over time. Rather than require capitalization of such
amounts, the Code formerly allowed insurance companies to currently deduct them, even though
the deduction would not be properly matched with the income subsequently to be derived. Former
I.R.C. §§ 809(c)(1) (1988). See also David B. Tatge, Tax Planning Opportunities Through Rein-
surance Still Available Despite TEFRA, 59 J. TAx'N, Oct. 1983, at 260. In the present case, nor-
mal tax accounting rules would have required the up-front ceding commissions to be capitalized
and amortized over the 5-year term of the purchased contracts. Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at
1781.
123. Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1776. Other participants in the arrangement likewise
had their deductions successfully disallowed by the IRS. See, e.g., Estate of Baxter v. Commis-
sioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 1706 (1992); Fisher v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1670 (1992);
Krizer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1598 (1991).
124. Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1777. An understatement was "substantial" if it exceed-
ed the greater of 10 percent of the correct tax or $5,000. I.R.C. § 6661(a) (repealed in 1989). This
requirement was satisfied in Mauerman. Under I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(B), the understatement could
be reduced by any portion thereof if either (1) the treatment of the item in question was based on
"substantial authority" or (2) the taxpayer adequately disclosed on the tax return or in an attached
statement the relevant facts affecting the item's tax treatment. The taxpayer in the instant case had
made no such disclosure. See Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1780.
125. See Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1777-80.
126. I.R.C. § 6661(c) (repealed in 1989).
127. Mauerman, 22 F.3d at 1004. Under the then-applicable Regulations, reliance on the
advice of an accountant or an attorney constituted a showing of reasonable cause and good faith if
"under all the circumstances, such reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith."
Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-6(b) (1985).
128. Mauerman, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1782
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have known to have the touted tax benefits of this investment thoroughly
"checked out."'29 Nevertheless, the Tax Court viewed the matter as "a close
question, on which petitioner might prevail" if it were viewing the matter
fresh. 30 The Tax Court, however, concluded that its limited inquiry in this
case was to determine whether the Commissioner had abused her discretion in
failing to grant the waiver, and had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without
sound basis in fact.' M The Tax Court concluded that such was not the case,
and upheld the denial of waiver.'32
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed this latter determination, holding
that the substantial understatement penalty should have been waived.'33 The
taxpayer argued that he had provided his tax accountants with all the informa-
tion in his possession, had not limited the scope of their research in any way,
and merely had "an honest misunderstanding as to the facts or the law which
was reasonable in light of his experience, knowledge, and education."' 34 The
Tenth Circuit agreed, concluding that because of the accountants' expertise
and the taxpayer's long-standing relationship with them, it was reasonable for
the taxpayer to trust their advice and not be required "to make sure they had
done sufficient research to give knowledgeable advice."'33
B. Littfin v. Commissioner'36
In Littfin, the Tenth Circuit joined the Second,'37  Fourth,3 ' and
Fifth "'39 Circuits in concluding that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to review
refusals by the IRS to abate interest under the IRS's discretionary authority to
do so." In so holding, the Tenth Circuit did not articulate its own analysis,
but simply adopted that of the Second Circuit. 4' Although the Tax Court has
been granted jurisdiction to make redeterminations of interest in certain cir-
cumstances, such jurisdiction is limited to those cases where the taxpayer has
paid the entire amount of the deficiency plus statutory interest.'42 In the pres-
ent case, the taxpayer had not prepaid the interest component, so jurisdiction
129. Id. The accelerated deductions claimed by the taxpayer eliminated 61 percent of his tax




133. Mauerman, 22 F.3d at 1006.
134. Id. at 1004.
135. Id. at 1006.
136. 17 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir. 1994). See also, Goetz v. Commissioner, No. 94-9000, 1994 WL
446766 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1994) (applying Littfin to another taxpayer involved in same
underlying transaction).
137. Bax v. Commissioner, 13 F.3d 54 (2d Ci. 1993).
138. Amlie v. Commissioner, No. 93-1120, 1993 WL 533249 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 1993).
139. Frantz v. Commissioner, 4 F.3d 990 (5th Cir. 1993) (table); Job v. Commissioner, 4 F.3d
990 (5th Cir. 1993) (table).
140. Littfin, 17 F.3d at 1346-47. I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) (1988) gives the Commissioner the dis-
cretionary authority to abate interest on deficiencies to the extent attributable to error or delay by
the IRS.
141. Littfin, 17 F.3d at 1346-47 (agreeing with the Second Circuit's reasoning in Bax v. Com-
missioner, 13 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1993)).
142. See § I.R.C. 7481(c) (1988).
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was lacking.'43 Moreover, even assuming the taxpayer had prepaid the requi-
site amounts, the relief sought - judicial review of the IRS's decision not to
abate interest - is beyond the scope of the determinations contemplated by
the statutory provision which grants such jurisdiction, and so in any case is
simply not available.'"
The decision of the Tenth Circuit in this regard is consistent with its
earlier decision in Selman v. United States,45 in which the court held that the
Federal district court below did not have jurisdiction to review an interest
abatement decision of the IRS." It now seems well-settled that the decision
whether or not to abate interest is committed to the IRS, and taxpayers may
not obtain judicial review of that decision in either the Tax Court or in district
court., '4
VI. NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY; LAST KNOWN ADDRESS
A. Background
The Code provides that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue must make
an assessment of taxes, if at all, within three years after a taxpayer files a
return." If the Commissioner determines that there is a deficiency 49 in
respect to any tax, the Commissioner is authorized to send a statutory Notice
of Deficiency to the taxpayer by certified or registered mail, informing the
taxpayer of the deficiency proposed to be assessed by the Commissioner.50
The mailing of the Notice of Deficiency is a prerequisite to the making of the
assessment. 5' The taxpayer to whom the Notice of Deficiency is sent may
then file a petition with the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of
143. Littfin, 17 F.3d at 1346. The taxpayer in Littfin was one of many who accepted settle-
ment offers arising out of the same tax shelter investment which had been challenged by the gov-
ernment. The matter had taken several years to come to a closure, and several of the investors
sought abatement of the statutory interest ultimately assessed on the ground of IRS delay. See id.
144. See Bax, 13 F.3d at 58. The Tax Court is only allowed to determine whether or not the
interest was correctly computed or otherwise exceeds the amount prescribed by the Code. I.R.C. §
7481(c). Here, the taxpayers were seeking an abatement based on alleged delays by the govern-
ment, but there was no claim that the amount assessed by the IRS was not otherwise correctly
calculated. Littfin, 17 F.3d at 1346.
145. 941 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1991). See James Serven, Taxation Survey, 69 DEN. U. L. REV.
1037, 1060-63 (1992).
146. Selman, 941 F.2d at 1064.
147. Review in the Claims Court is also not available. Brahms v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct.
471 (1989).
148. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (West Supp. 1994). Under certain circumstances, the three year statute
of limitations is extended. For example, if the return omits to include items of gross income that
exceed twenty-five percent of the amount of gross income otherwise reflected in the return, the
statutory limitations period is increased to six years. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1) (West Supp. 1994). In
addition, the statute of limitations is completely open-ended where there has been a false or fraud-
ulent return with the intent to evade tax, where there has been a willful attempt to defeat or evade
tax, or where no return has been filed. I.R.C. § 6501(c).
149. A "deficiency" is defined by I.R.S. § 621 l(a) (1988) to mean, in the context of the in-
come tax, "(1) the excess of statutorily imposed tax over the total of the amount shown on the
taxpayer's return, (2) plus previous assessments, (3) less abatements, credits, refunds, or other
repayments." Keado v. Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1209, 1210 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988).
150. I.R.C. § 6212(a) (1988).
151. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (West Supp. 1994).
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the deficiency set forth in the Notice.' Such a petition must be filed within
ninety days after the date of mailing of the Notice of Deficiency, assuming the
notice is addressed to a person within the United States.'53 During this ninety
day period, the Commissioner is precluded from entering an assessment
against the taxpayer in respect of the deficiency proposed in the Notice of
Deficiency.'54 However, if the taxpayer fails to timely file a petition for re-
determination with the Tax Court within the ninety day statutory period, the
Commissioner is directed to assess the deficiency.'55 The Commissioner may
then commence collection activities against the taxpayer and his assets.
The running of the three-year statute of limitations is tolled during the
time that the Commissioner is precluded from assessing a deficiency - that
is, for the ninety days following the mailing of the Notice of Deficiency -
and for sixty days thereafter.'56 Whether or not a Notice of Deficiency has
been validly delivered to the taxpayer so as to be sufficient to toll the statute
of limitations, can be a question of crucial importance to the Commissioner,
particularly where the Notice is sent just prior to the expiration of the three
year period. In the case of an income tax deficiency, the Code provides the
Commissioner with a safe harbor which states that a Notice of Deficiency will
be deemed sufficient if it is mailed by certified or registered mail to the tax-
payer at his "last known address."'5 Thus, if the Commissioner mails the
Notice by certified or registered mail to the taxpayer's last known address, the
Notice will operate to suspend the statute of limitations as to the taxpayer, de-
spite the fact that the taxpayer may never receive the Notice and may there-
fore be unaware of the proposed assessment. 5 Such a Notice provides a
form of deemed notification to the taxpayer that will ordinarily result in actual
notice; however, actual notice is not required.'59
Whether or not the Notice of Deficiency has been validly delivered is also
of importance to the taxpayer. If the taxpayer fails to file his Tax Court peti-
tion within ninety days of the date of a valid Notice of Deficiency, the taxpay-
er will be forever precluded from bringing his matter to the Tax Court, and
may only obtain redress by paying the asserted deficiency and suing for a re-
fund."6 Taxpayers who have failed to meet the ninety-day deadline often
152. Id. The Notice of Deficiency, also known as the "90 day letter," has been described as
the taxpayer's "ticket to the Tax Court." Delman v. Commissioner, 384 F.2d 929, 934 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 952 (1968).
153. I.R.C. § 6213(a).
154. Id. If the taxpayer does file a timely petition with the Tax Court, the Commissioner is
further precluded from assessing the deficiency "until the decision of the Tax Court has become
final." Id.
155. I.R.C. § 6213(c). An " 'assessment,' essentially a bookkeeping notation, is made when
the Secretary or Secretary's delegate establishes an account against the taxpayer on the tax rolls."
Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 170 n.13 (1976).
156. I.R.C. § 6503(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994). The statute of limitations is further tolled during
the pendency of court proceedings, if a Tax Court petition is timely filed. Id.
157. I.R.C. § 6212(b)(1) (1988).
158. See Tadros v. Commissioner, 763 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1985).
159. Brown v. Lethert, 360 F.2d 560, 562 (8th Cir. 1966).
160. See I.R.C. § 7422 (1988). The Tax Court is the only forum available for the litigation of
tax cases that does not require prepayment of the deficiency. "If the taxpayer fails to timely file a
Tax Court petition, but still desires to contest the merits of the deficiency, he must pay the defi-
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seek to invoke Tax Court jurisdiction after the fact by claiming that the Notice
of Deficiency was not properly mailed to the taxpayer's "last known ad-
dress." 6
The question of whether a Notice of Deficiency has been mailed to the
taxpayer's last know address is a mixed question of law and fact. 62 Howev-
er, because the inquiry usually is primarily one of fact, it is generally reviewed
at the appellate level under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 63 The phrase
"last known address" has been interpreted by the Tenth Circuit to mean "'that
address to which the IRS reasonably believes the taxpayer wishes the notice
sent.""' While the IRS is required to use "reasonable diligence" to ascertain
the taxpayer's correct address, "the burden is on the taxpayer to provide 'clear
and concise' notice of his current address to the IRS; the IRS is otherwise
entitled to rely on the address shown on the taxpayer's tax return for the year
in question.' 65 Clear and concise notice "is notice by which the taxpayer
indicates to the IRS that he wishes the new address to replace all old address-
es in subsequent communication."'" A "subsequent tax return bearing a new
address provides the IRS with 'clear and concise notice;' therefore, the ad-
dress on the taxpayer's most recent tax return is ordinarily deemed to be his
last known address. 167 "Reasonable diligence" on the part of the IRS does
not require the IRS to send duplicate notices to every address of the taxpayer
known to the IRS." t Moreover, the IRS's duty to exercise reasonable dili-
gence in ascertaining a taxpayer's last known address does not extend beyond
the time when the deficiency notice is mailed, and events subsequent to that
time are ordinarily irrelevant.'"
In 1994, the Tenth Circuit took up two cases which required the applica-
tion of these principles to determine whether a Notice of Deficiency was sent
to the taxpayer's "last known address."
B. Gille v. United States 70
Charles and Vicki Gille filed a joint income tax return for 1982, listing an
Orem, Utah, address.'' Neither Charles nor Vicki filed a tax return for 1983.
They moved to Oklahoma City in early 1985, and filed a change of address
form with the post office. However, they did not inform the IRS of their new
ciency in full and sue for a refund in a United States District Court or the United States Claims
Court." Keado, 853 F.2d at 1212 n.10.
161. See e.g., Gille v. United States, 33 F.3d 46 (10th Cir. 1994).
162. Armstrong v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d 970, 973 (10th Cir. 1994).
163. Id. (citing Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 1437, 1438 (10th Cir. 1992)).
164. Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 662, 664 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting United
States v. Ahrens, 530 F.2d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 1976)).
165. Id. It is the taxpayer's responsibility to notify the IRS of any address changes. Tadros,
763 F.2d at 91.
166. Cyclone Drilling, 769 F.2d at 664 (emphasis added).
167. Id.
168. Marks v. Commissioner, 947 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
169. See, e.g., Pomeroy v. United States, 864 F.2d 1191, 1195 (5th Cir. 1989).
170. 33 F.3d 46 (loth Cir. 1994), rev'g 838 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. Okla. 1993).
171. Gille, 838 F. Supp. at 522.
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address. A Notice of Deficiency in respect of their 1982 return, mailed to
Orem was forwarded to the Oklahoma City address.' In May 1985, Vicki
paid the 1982 deficiency proposed in the Notice, stating in a letter from her
attorney, that she did "not wish to involve her husband in her efforts to re-
solve this matter."' In a subsequent letter the next month, she wrote again
to the IRS, identifying herself as "Vicki Lynn Rebeck (Gille)," giving her so-
cial security number, and providing the IRS with her new address in Oklaho-
ma City.' The IRS recorded Vicki's change of address in October, but did
not record a change of address for Charles. In response to her July letter, the
IRS wrote back to Vicki, specifically referencing Charles' social security
number.'75
In early 1986, Vicki filed a "married but filing separately" return for
1985, reflecting the Oklahoma City address but containing no information
regarding Charles. 7 6 Soon thereafter, the IRS began to look into the couple's
failure to file a 1983 return, and in May 1986 issued a Notice of Deficiency to
Charles at the Orem address. This was returned as undeliverable, as was a
second Notice mailed soon thereafter.'77 Working on parallel tracks, the IRS
mailed a 1986 Form 1040 to Vicki at the Oklahoma City address in December
1986. Vicki completed the form and filed it in early 1987, again filing as
"married filing separately" and setting forth no information about Charles.'78
In January 1987, the IRS filed a "dummy" 1983 Form 1040 for Charles,
using his name and both spouses' social security numbers. The dummy return
still listed the Orem address, despite the IRS's separate correspondence with
Vicki. The tax deficiency shown on the dummy return was assessed on March
23, 1987.'79 A third Notice of Deficiency sent to Charles at the Orem ad-
dress in December of 1987, as well as two notices of assessment similarly
mailed in August and September of 1988, were returned as undeliverable."
In January 1989, Charles moved to Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, not having
filed a tax return since 1982. An IRS revenue officer finally located Charles
through postal tracers. In a letter to the IRS in June 1989, Charles protested
that he had never actually received any of the Notices of Deficiency sent to
him in respect of the unfiled 1983 income tax return.'
The district court agreed with Charles that the IRS has not used "reason-
able diligence" to ascertain Charles' address, particularly given the ease with
which the IRS could have cross-referenced Charles' social security number
with Vicki's and identified the Oklahoma City address as Charles' probable
new address.'82 The district court did not accept the IRS's argument that "ad-
172. Id.







180. Id. at 524.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 526.
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ministrative realities" precluded the IRS from having to cross-reference be-
tween husband and wife."8 3 The court therefore held that the Notices of Defi-
ciency sent to Orem were not sent to Charles's "last known address."'
8 4
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed in a brief opinion.' The court
noted that the fact that "Vicki had corresponded with the IRS and had notified
the agency of her new address is not tantamount to notice from [Charles] that
he had also moved, particularly since Vicki had filed separately and pointedly
stated earlier that she did not want to involve her husband in her tax mat-
ters."'8 6 The Tenth Circuit concluded that "[u]nder these circumstances, tax-
payer, who did not bother to file a tax return after 1982, will not now be
heard to complain that the IRS was not adequately diligent in its efforts to
track him down."'8 7
C. Armstrong v. Commissioner 88
The taxpayer in Armstrong filed a 1988 income tax return showing his
address as P.O. Box 74153, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74153.89 Preparatory to send-
ing taxpayer a Notice of Deficiency on March 2, 1990, the IRS had identified
this tax return as the taxpayer's most recent filed return, and therefore the
address given was considered by the IRS to be taxpayer's last known address.
However, in researching the file, the IRS revenue agent noted that the address
given on taxpayer's 1985 and 1986 tax returns was P.O. Box 35343, Tulsa,
Oklahoma 74153.'" In addition, in connection with the audits of the
taxpayer's returns, the taxpayer had in early 1989 filed a Form 872, Consent
to Extend the Time to Assess Tax, and a Form 2848, Declaration of Represen-
tative, both indicating his address to be P.O. Box 35343, Tulsa, Oklahoma
74153.' 9'
183. Id. The Tenth Circuit has held that cross-referencing between business-related and indi-
vidual return information amounts to an "unreasonable administrative burden." Howell v. United
States, No. 92-3016, 1992 WL 372409, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 1992) (citing Stein v. Commis-
sioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 211, 216 (1990)).
184. See Gille, 838 F. Supp. at 526. Finding that the IRS did not act in good faith in failing
to ascertain Charles' correct address, the district court also awarded $16,000 to Charles under
I.R.C. §§ 6103 and 7430 for 16 perceived unauthorized disclosures by the IRS of Charles' tax
return information (mainly as set out in various notices of levy arising from the assessment arising
out of the invalid Notices of Deficiency). Id. at 526-29.
185. Gille, 33 F.3d at 48.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 15 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 1994), affg 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3116 (1992).
189. Armstrong, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3117.
190. Id. The taxpayer had quite obviously and erroneously entered 74153 as both the ZIP
code and as the P.O. Box number on his 1988 return. Additionally, the taxpayer had made a trans-
position error on his 1986 return and listed the ZIP code as 74135. However, the revenue officer
had caught this mistake, and used 74153 on the Notice of Deficiency. See id. at 3118 In any case,
while it is "recommended" by the courts that ZIP codes be used, "the ZIP code is not a require-
ment for proper delivery" and the use of an incorrect ZIP code on a Notice of Deficiency and the
mailing envelope "is a de minimum error not fatal to a notice of deficiency." Watkins v. Commis-
sioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 1710, 1711 (1992).
191. Armstrong, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3117. The incorrect ZIP code was spotted again and
corrected by the revenue agent in the Notice of Deficiency. Id. at 3118.
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The taxpayer previously filed a 1987 tax return indicating his address to
be 4150 S. 100th E. Ave., Ste. 308, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74146.'9' However,
this was the address of his then-accountant, and in response to a letter sent to
that address during the audit in 1989, the accountant informed the IRS that he
was no longer engaged by the taxpayer. 93 The accountant named in the sub-
sequent Form 2848 advised the revenue agent by telephone that the taxpayer's
business address was 417 West 7th, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and that the taxpayer
could be reached there. 94 A series of phone calls to that address by the reve-
nue agent were not returned, and at no time did either the taxpayer or his
accountant inform the IRS that the West 7th address was intended by the
taxpayer to be the address to replace the taxpayer's previously-provided
addresses.'
In late 1989, the revenue agent sent a second Form 872 to the P.O. Box
35343 address which was returned marked "unclaimed." In addition, a Form
870, Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Deficiency in
Tax and Acceptance of Overassessment mailed in January 1990, were also re-
turned marked "unclaimed." Finally, the IRS sent a Notice of Deficiency to
the P.O. Box 35343 address, which likewise was returned unclaimed.
9 6
In the Tax Court, the taxpayer asserted that the Notice of Deficiency
should have been sent to the West 7th address, not the P.O. Box 35343 ad-
dress, and therefore was not sent to his "last known address."'97 The court
noted, however, that the only indication the IRS had of this address was a
phone call from the taxpayer's accountant, and that the IRS was unsuccessful
in ever reaching the taxpayer at this address by telephone.' 98 In response to
the taxpayer's contention that the IRS should have used more diligence in
ascertaining the address after the last three pieces of correspondence sent to
the Post Office address were returned "unclaimed," the court countered that
they were not returned marked "address unknown", "insufficient address", or
"no such street." '99 The fair implication of this was that the correspondence
was correctly addressed, but simply refused by the taxpayer.2t" In light of all
the facts, the court concluded that the Post Office address was in fact the
taxpayer's correct and last known address, and that the IRS "reasonably be-
lieved that petitioner wished the notice of deficiency in this case to be sent to
P.O. Box 35343, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 74153."2'
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Tax Court's conclusions
that the taxpayer had failed to carry his burden of proof in showing that he
192. Id. at 3117.
193. Id.




198. Id. The IRS did in fact contact the taxpayer at that address by telephone, but not until
after the Notice of Deficiency had been mailed. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. The taxpayer testified that he had not refused delivery of the correspondence, but the
Tax Court found that he was not a credible witness. Id.
201. Id. at 3119.
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provided the IRS with "clear and concise" notice that his last known address
was the 7th Street address, and that the IRS had exercised reasonable diligence
in ascertaining his last known address, were not "clearly erroneous. ' '2° In so
doing, the Tenth Circuit reiterated that "reasonable diligence does not require
that the IRS send duplicate notices to every address of which it has
knowledge, ' '2°3 and that "the IRS's duty to exercise reasonable diligence in
ascertaining a taxpayer's last known address extends only to the point in time
when the deficiency notice is mailed."' 4
VII. REFUND CLAIMS
A. Richards v. Commissioner"°5
In Richards, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a Tax Court decision, which de-
nied the taxpayer's refund claim as untimely.2' During 1987, Richards had
$14,131 of income taxes and $1,158 of excess Social Security taxes withheld
from her wages. °7 Under the Code, these amounts were deemed paid in re-
spect of her 1987 income tax return as of April 15, 1988.2' However, Rich-
ards did not file her 1987 tax return until January 23, 1991, subsequent to her
receipt of a statutory notice of deficiency mailed by the IRS on October 22,
1990. Her return claimed a refund of the entire amount of $15,289 of taxes
described above.2" The IRS determined that the refund claim was
untimely." '
The ability of a taxpayer to claim a refund is dependant on at least two
factors: the "filing period" within which the refund claim must be filed; and
the "refund period" for calculating the amount of the refund. Under the Code,
the filing period depends on whether the taxpayer ever filed a return. If a
return is filed, the refund claim must be filed within the later of "3 years from
the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid." ''
However, if no return is filed, the claim must be filed "within 2 years from
the time the tax was paid."2"'
The refund period is dependant upon which of the filing periods the tax-
payer has satisfied. If the taxpayer has met the general three-year filing period
requirement, then "the amount of the.., refund shall not exceed the portion
of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the
202. Armstrong, 15 F.3d at 974-975.
203. Id. at 974.
204. Id. at 975.
205. 37 F.3d 587 (10th Cir. 1994), affg 65 T.C.M.(CCH) 2137 (1993). See also Devich v.
United States, No. 93-1067, 1994 WL 247028 (10th Cir. June 8, 1994) (rejecting taxpayer's
convoluted argument that a past overpayment, now time-barred as to the refund claim, should be
credited to a current underpayment, with the difference refunded to the taxpayer).
206. Richards, 37 F.3d at 587.
207. Richards, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2137.
208. Id. See also I.R.C. § 6513(b)(1) (1988).
209. Richards, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2137.
210. Id. at 2138.




claim, equal to 3 years, plus the period of any extension."2"3 On the other
hand, if the taxpayer did not meet the three-year filing period requirement,
then "the amount of the ... refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid
during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim."2 4
When a refund claim is asserted in a Tax Court proceeding, however, a
further refund period limitations is applicable. The Tax Court may determine
that an overpayment of tax exists and may allow a refund, but the amount of
the refund depends upon whether, alternatively, (i) the tax was paid after the
mailing of the notice of deficiency,215 (ii) the tax was paid and the refund
claim was filed before the date the notice of deficiency was mailed,2"6 or (iii)
the tax was paid before the notice of deficiency was mailed but no refund
claim had yet been filed on the date the notice of deficiency was mailed (in
which case, notably, the refund claim is deemed filed on the date the notice of
deficiency was mailed).2 7 In Richards, the latter circumstances were present;
therefore, Richards' refund claim was deemed filed on October 22, 1990.8
In the circumstances present in Richards, the Code provides that the
amount of the refund depends upon whether the three-year filing period or the
two-year filing period described above is applicable.2 9 The question in Rich-
ards was, which of the filing periods was applicable? The Tax Court conclud-
ed that a refund claim made on October 22, 1990, would be timely for either:
(i) a return filed on or after October 22, 1987, and before October 22, 1990, or
(ii) taxes paid on or after October 22, 1988, and before October 22, 1990.220
Richards did not qualify under either of these filing periods, and therefore her
refund claim was untimely.
22'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court. The court of
appeals first noted that the phrase "3 years from the time the return was filed,"
as used in the Code, "implies that the taxpayer must file the return prior to
filing the claim in order to benefit from the three-year refund period." '222
However, under a technical reading of the Code, Richards's return was filed
after the date her refund claim was deemed filed. This relegated her to the
two-year refund period. Because the taxes in question were deemed paid on
April 15, 1988, however, her October 22, 1990, refund claim was not time-
ly.
223
The implication of the Tenth Circuit's decision is that a taxpayer seeking
213. I.R.C. § 6511 (b)(2)(A).
214. I.R.C. § 6511 (b)(2)(B).
215. I.R.C. § 6512(b)(3)(A) (1988).
216. I.R.C. § 6512(b)(3)(C).
217. I.R.C. §§ 6512(b)(3)(B).
218. Richards, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2138.
219. I.R.C. §§ 6512(b)(2)(B).
220. Richards, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2138.
221. Id. at 2139.
222. Richards, 37 F.3d at 589 (emphasis added).
223. Id.; cf Galuska v. Commissioner, 5 F.3d 195 (7th Cir. 1993) (reaching the same con-
clusion as the Richards court on similar facts). In Galuska, however, the taxpayer's refund claim
would not have been timely even if he had brought the suit in a federal district court. Id. at 197.
Thus, the "choice of forum" anomaly was not present in Galuska.
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a refund may be adversely affected by her choice of forum when the taxpayer
receives a notice of deficiency and has not yet filed a tax return for the rele-
vant period. If Richards had filed a refund suit in a federal district court, her
refund claim would have been deemed made by virtue of-and therefore not
earlier than-her filing of the tax return, and not by the earlier date of the
notice of deficiency. 24 Therefore, she would have been eligible for the three-
year filing period, and in turn, the three-year refund "look-back" period would
have been measured from the date of the return. Under the circumstances
present in her case, her refund claim would have been timely because the date
the taxes were deemed paid-April 15, 1988-was within three years of Janu-
ary 23, 1991. While the Tenth Circuit recognized "the potential inequities and
ramifications when the outcome may be dependent on the forum in which the
case was litigated,"" the court nevertheless acknowledged that its "task is




A. Tanaka Brothers Farms, Inc. v. Berger
2 7
The taxpayer in Tanaka Brothers was engaged in the onion farming busi-
ness. The corporation filed a Chapter 11 petition for reorganization on January
7, 1991.28 The case was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation in May
1991, and a bar date of September 3, 1991, was set. During March of that
year, the IRS had filed a timely proof of claim, clearly indicating that a por-
tion of the claim-that relating to fourth quarter 1990 payroll taxes-was an
estimate, and that the debtor had yet to file payroll tax returns for that period.
Subsequent to the bar date, the debtor filed the relevant tax returns. Based on
the information contained therein, on May 8, 1992, the IRS filed an amended
proof of claim which was some $355,000 greater than the estimated proof of
claim. In the meantime, however, the trustee had negotiated settlement of the
two most substantial claims against the bankruptcy estate, and the bankruptcy
court had approved the settlements. The trustee objected to the second proof of
claim "on the basis that the increased amount was so substantial as to consti-
tute a new and untimely claim rather than a mere amendment. '229 Following
notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court determined that the increased claim
constituted "unfair surprise" to other creditors and the trustee. The district
court affirmed.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court had
224. Richards, 37 F.3d at 590.
225. Id. at 591.
226. Id. The court concluded, "[a]lthough we find the statutes and their cross-references some-
what convoluted, their import is clear to us and compels the conclusion we have reached in this
case, notwithstanding the fact that a contrary result may have been reached had this case been
litigated in a different forum." Id.
227. 36 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1994).
228. Id. at 997.
229. Id. at 997-98.
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abused its discretion.23 The court of appeals noted that in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, "amendment of a proof of claim is freely permitted so long as the
claim initially provided adequate notice of the existence, nature, and amount
of the claim as well as the creditor's intent to hold the estate liable."23' The
only question in Tanaka Brothers was whether the IRS's original proof of
claim provided adequate notice of the amount of the claim, since it clearly
provided notice of the existence and nature of the claim, and of the IRS's
intent to hold the estate liable.232 Considering all relevant equitable fac-
tors,233 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the original proof of claim provided
adequate notice of the amount of the claim despite its subsequent increased
amount, and reversed the lower courts' disallowance of the amended proof of
claim."'
IX. TAx SHELTERS
A. Hildebrand v. Commissioner235
In Hildebrand, the Tenth Circuit has, one hopes, finally laid to rest pro-
tracted test case litigation236 involving investors in Barton Enhanced Oil Pro-
duction Income Fund and Technology Oil and Gas Associates 1980, some-
times referred to as the Manhattan partnerships237 litigation and the Wichita
230. Id. at 997. The decision of a bankruptcy court to disallow an amended proof of claim is
reviewable under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Unioil, Inc. v. Elledge (In re Unioil), 962 F.2d
988, 992 (10th Cir. 1992). Under this standard, an appellate court will not disturb a bankruptcy
court's decision unless the bankruptcy court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the
bounds of permissible choice under the circumstances. Tanaka Brothers, 36 F.3d at 998.
231. Tanaka Brothers, 36 F.3d at 998 (quoting In re Unioil, 962 F.2d at 992) (emphasis add-
ed).
232. Id.
233. Courts consider a variety of equitable factors in deciding whether to allow a claim to be
amended. See, e.g., In re Oasis Petroleum Corp., 130 B.R. 89, 91-92 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991).
These factors include:
(1) Whether the parties or creditors relied on the IRS's initial claim, or whether they
had reason to know subsequent proofs of claim would follow pending the completion of
the audit.
(2) Whether other creditors would receive a windfall to which they are not entitled
on the merits by the court not allowing the amended proof of claim.
(3) Whether the IRS intentionally or negligently delayed in filing the amended claim.
(4) The justification, if any, for the failure to request a timely extension of the bar
date.
(5) Any other general equitable considerations.
Tanaka Brothers, 36 F.3d at 999.
234. Tanaka Brothers, 36 F.3d at 1000-01. Among other factors, the Tenth Circuit noted that:
(1) the estimate was clearly denoted and that all parties were aware that the corrected figures
would be provided when tax returns were filed for the debtor; (2) the creditors and the trustee
could have protected themselves from this eventuality by negotiating a settlement that was condi-
tional upon the final IRS figure; and (3) the increased figure was substantially less than was pres-
ent in the case of In re Stavriotis, 977 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1992), where the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed a bankruptcy court's disallowance of an amended IRS proof of claim. Tanaka Brothers, 36
F.3d at 1000.
235. 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 726 (1995).
236. Over 2,000 related cases are before the Tax Court pending resolution of the test cases.
Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132, 133 (1992), affd, 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 726 (1995).
237. Technology Oil and Gas Associates 1980 was one of several so-called Manhattan part-
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partnerships238 litigation.239 The tax deficiencies at issue in these cases re-
late back to the early 1980's, and aggregate to an estimated $2 billion.2"
The core issue in Hildebrand involved the validity of deductions claimed by
the partnerships in respect to certain "enhanced oil recovery" (EOR) opera-
tions proposed to be undertaken by the partnerships on land they leased in the
late 1970's and early 1980's.
Generally speaking, the net losses of a partnership may not be deducted
by its partners unless the partnership had actual and honest profit objec-
tives."' Whether the partnership had actual and honest profit objectives is
analyzed at the partnership level.24 The test is "whether profit [is] the domi-
nant or primary objective of the venture," and the burden of proof is on the
taxpayer.243 Whether a taxpayer engages in an activity with the objective of
profit is a question of fact, and is reviewable by the appellate court under a
"clearly erroneous" standard.2" The Treasury Regulations set forth nine ob-
jective factors to be examined in determining when a taxpayer engages in
activities with the objective of realizing a profit. 45 This list is nonexclusive,
and the courts are free to consider other factors.2"
Applying the relevant factors, the Tax Court concluded, in a lengthy opin-
ion, that the activities of the partnerships in question "were not engaged in
with actual and honest profit objectives. '247 Among other factors, the Tax
Court found that (1) the consideration the partnerships agreed to pay to license
the EOR technology they required and to lease their properties "bore no rela-
tion to the value of that which was acquired, did not conform to industry
norms, and precluded any realistic opportunity for profit,"'2" (2) the EOR
nerships. The partnership sold 211.5 units to 132 investors. Krause, 99 T.C. at 137.
238. Burton Enhance Oil Production Income Fund was one of three partnerships that com-
prised the Wichita partnerships. Id. at 150.
239. Id. at 133.
240. Id.
241. Nickeson v. Commissioner, 962 F.2d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1992); Cannon v. Commission-
er, 949 F.2d 345, 350 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3030 (1992).
242. Antonides v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 686, 694-95 (1988), affd, 893 F.2d 656 (4th Cir.
1990); Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471, 505 (1982), affd, 722 F.2d 695 (11 th Cir. 1984).
243. Cannon, 949 F.2d at 350.
244. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review).
245. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972) (listing nine factors indicative of a good faith intent
on the part of the taxpayer to recognize a profit). The Cannon court paraphrased the nine factors
as follows: (1) the extent to which the taxpayer carries on the activity in a businesslike manner,
(2) the taxpayer's expertise or his reliance on the advice of experts, (3) the time and effort the
taxpayer expends in carrying on the activity, (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity
may appreciate in value, (5) the taxpayer's success in similar activities, (6) the taxpayer's history
of income or loss in the activity, (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, (8) the taxpayer's
financial status, and (9) the elements of personal pleasure or recreation. Cannon, 949 F.2d at 350.
246. See Cannon, 949 F.2d at 350. Other important factors may include a heavy emphasis on
tax benefits of an investment in the venture, and the structure and amount of the fees agreed to be
paid by the venture. See, e.g., Karr v. Commissioner, 924 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (11th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1082 (1992).
247. Krause, 99 T.C. at 169.
248. Id. The Tax Court found that "all but two of the [EOR] technologies licensed by the
partnerships were undeveloped, untested processes for which no prudent investor would pay any
substantial fixed fees," and that the remaining two processes "could have been licensed by the
partnerships directly from the inventors thereof for running royalties based solely on income real-
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technology itself was for the most part recently developed and commercially
untested, a fact that was inaccurately and misleading disclosed to the partners
in the offering materials,249 (3) the partnerships' estimates of projected oil
recovery from the use of current EOR technology were "not supportable by
credible expert testimony in this case and were not reasonable,"5 0 (4) the
partnerships relied on economic projections that "did not even take into ac-
count or note the abnormal nature and high cost of the license fees and royal-
ties, nor the significant costs of conducting tests and of establishing commer-
cial operations," ' (5) the partnerships further reliance on "projections of tar
sands hydrocarbons or of oil in place, rather than projections of oil reserves"
was a "significant fla[w]" where "[p]rojections based on oil reserves...
would have provided a much more realistic basis" for projections and fees
associated with the EOR technology,252 (6) the partnerships further relied on
projections that "world oil prices would continue increasing from 1979 and
1980 prices on a continuing upward spiral for the next 20 years, 2 3 (7) in
general, the validity and reasonableness of the assumptions used in the offer-
ing materials "were never ascertained, nor was any meaningful or credible
comment or opinion as to the validity and reasonableness of those assumptions
set forth in the offering memorandum or other material, 254 (8) the partner-
ships marketed the investments largely on the basis of projected tax bene-
fits, 25 (9) the fees paid to sponsors and advisors were exorbitant and unwar-
ranted,256 (10) the properties which were to be drilled or mined were over 90
percent depleted, 257 and in some cases were controlled by affiliates of the
partnerships' promoters, who benefitted financially from the inflated and non-
arms'-length consideration paid for the rights to develop the properties,258
(11) the millions of dollars of debt incurred by the partnership in payment of
its licensing fee obligations did not constitute genuine debt and was to be
disregarded,25 9 and (12) the partnerships never did in fact turn a profit for
any year of their operations. In the final analysis, the Tax Court concluded
that the arrangement was "a chain or multilayered series of obligations,
stacked or multiplied on top of each other via the numerous partnerships to
produce debt obligations in staggering dollar amounts, using a largely undevel-
oped and untested product, in a highly risky, very speculative, and nonarms'-
length manner in an attempt to generate significant tax deductions for inves-
ized therefrom." Id. at 171.
249. Id. at 158-59.
250. Id. at 169.
251. Id. at 170.
252. Id. at 169.
253. Id. at 174. This assumption was derived from a "worst case" report published by the
Department of Energy in 1980, prepared at the height of the world energy crisis of the late
1970's. Id.
254. Id. at 169-70.
255. See, e.g., id. at 146.
256. See, e.g., id. at 150.
257. See, e.g., id. at 138, 155-56.
258. See, e.g., id. at 138-39.
259. Id. at 175.
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tors."
260
On appeal the Tenth Circuit determined that the findings of the Tax
Court, including its ultimate fact finding that the partnerships were not en-
gaged in activities with the actual and honest objective of realizing a profit,
were not clearly erroneous. 26' Affirming the decision of the Tax Court, the
Tenth Circuit noted that the Tax Court did a thorough job of considering the
profit motive issue, "ably addressed" all the taxpayers' arguments, and rested
"1262its conclusion on a "solid foundation.
X. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
263
A. United States v. Owen 2"
In United States v. Owen, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction of
David C. Owen, a former Kansas state senator and lieutenant governor, on two
counts of filing false tax returns.265 The tax returns in question were those of
two companies in which Owen was a founder. The first company, Owen &
Associates, had claimed deductions for certain expenses labelled as "consulting
fees."2" It was proven at trial, however, that these amounts were actually
reimbursements to associates of Owen for political contributions they had
made to Mike Hayden's 1986 campaign for governor, at Owen's request.
267
In addition, Owen & Associates failed to include in taxable income a
$100,000 payment received by Owen for assisting an associate to obtain race
track licenses. The company had classified the payment as a loan, but at trial
it was determined that the $100,000 was never expected to be repaid, and was
therefore includable in income when received.2" The second company, Eagle
Distributors, engaged in "a kind of Tinkers-to-Evers-to-Chance transac-
tion"" the end result of which was to reimburse political contributions made
260. Id. at 175-76.
261. Hildebrand, 28 F.3d at 1028.
262. Id.
263. In addition to the cases described in the text, see United States v. Holland, 19 F.3d 1444,
unpublished order reprinted at 1994 WL 56937 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding the district court's
refusal to dismiss a criminal tax prosecution because the government failed to act in good faith in
bringing the prior criminal prosecution); United States v. Wilson, 19 F.3d 34, unpublished order
reprinted at 1994 WL 75872 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming conviction on four counts of willful
failure to file income tax returns), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 360 (1994); United States v. Belcher,
41 F.3d 1516, unpublished order reprinted at 1994 WL 642195 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming a
district court order that (i) retrial after an initial reversal based on trial court's improper jury
instructions does not constitute double jeopardy, and (ii) date of original indictment was proper
measure for tolling of statute of limitations even as to charges set forth in subsequent superseding
indictment where charges not substantially dissimilar to those set forth in original indictment).
264. 15 F.3d 1528 (10th Cir. 1994), habeus corpus granted, 1994 WL 608607 (D. Kan.
1994).
265. Under I.R.C. 7206(1) (West 1994), it is a felony for an individual to make or subscribe
to a tax return which the individual "does not believe to be true and correct as to every material
matter."
266. Owen, 15 F.3d at 1531 n.1.
267. Such contributions, if made by Owen & Associates, would have been nondeductible
under I.R.C. § 162(e) (West 1994).
268. Owen, 15 F.3d at 1531, 1533-34.
269. Id. at 1532.
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to the Hayden campaign under the guise of expenditures for "storage/rent."27
Owen was tried before a jury and convicted. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the conviction over Owen's objections that (1) the government failed
to prove that Owen acted willfully,27" ' (2) the government had failed to show
that the payment for storage/rent was anything but that,272 and (3) the district
court had made errors under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 3
B. United States v. Hagedorn274
Lewis Hagedorn and two other persons were charged under a 15-count
indictment arising from certain loan brokerage activities."' In return for a
dismissal of all counts against him, Hagedorn pled guilty to one count of filing
a false corporate tax return.276 The presentence investigation report placed
Hagedorn's base level offense at level 12, on the assumption that Hagedorn
had failed to report income arising from a "criminal activity. 277 The district
court adopted this finding in sentencing Hagedorn. On appeal of his sentence,
Hagedorn argued that the district court erred in finding that the unreported
income came from criminal activity.270
The Tenth Circuit agreed with Hagedorn that the district court's finding of
fact on this issue was erroneous. 279 The only proof the government could of-
fer that Hagedorn was engaged in criminal activity was Hagedorn's admission
that the government could prove all the allegations contained in the Informa-
tion.8 However, Hagedorn had never admitted committing the offenses set
out in the Indictment, and the government had not proven that Hagedorn pos-
sessed the necessary criminal intent to commit the relevant crime.2 1' The
Tenth Circuit therefore reversed the district court's sentence, and remanded for
a redetermination.282
270. Id. at 1534-35.
271. Id. at 1532-34.
272. Id. at 1534-35.
273. Id. at 1535-38.
274. 38 F.3d 520 (10th Cir. 1994).
275. Hagedorn had agreed to act as a loan broker for the Centurion Group of Manhattan,
Kansas, after doing business with another Centurion broker, Vincent Perri. The principal of the
Centurion Group was Eduardo McIntosh. Hagedorn processed several loan applications for Centu-
rion and received advances from the potential borrowers, but Centurion failed to fund the loans.
After unsuccessfully pressing McIntosh for the funds, Hagedom and Perri broke away from Centu-
rion and attempted to get the loans funded from other sources. These efforts were also unsuccess-
ful. Following customer complaints, all three were indicted. Peri and McIntosh pled guilty to one
count each of mail fraud. Id. at 521.
276. See I.R.C. § 7203 (West 1994) (imposing criminal liability on persons who willfully fail
to file a tax return). Hagedorn also agreed to refund advance fees to the potential borrowers.
Hagedorn, 38 F.3d at 521.
277. See former U.S.S.G. § 2T1.2 (1987 version).
278. Hagedorn, 38 F.3d at 522.
279. The Tenth Circuit noted that in criminal cases it will approach claims that the lower
court erred in making a finding of fact deferentially, using a clearly erroneous standard of review.
Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 987 F.2d 1462, 1465 (10th Cir. 1993)).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 522-23. Under former U.S.S.G. § 2T1.2.(b)(l), the government was required to
prove that the defendant participated in "criminal activity," defined to mean "racketeering activity"
as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 as then in effect.
282. The only remaining issue related to whether the presentence investigation report improp-
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C. United States v. Fleming283
William Fleming was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to violate the
transfer tax provisions of the National Firearms Act284 and one count of
making false statements in order to avoid paying applicable transfer taxes on
firearms. 25 Fleming was found to have participated in a scheme whereby
machineguns and silencers were transferred between private citizens without
payment of the applicable transfer taxes. This was accomplished by employing
"straw" transfers through the Seminole, Oklahoma, police department and the
Creek County, Oklahoma, district attorney's office. 286 The Tenth Circuit up-
held Fleming's conviction... over Fleming's objections, inter alia, (1) that
the trial court erred in not granting his motion for acquittal,2 8 (2) that certain
counts of the indictments were multiplicitous, 289 and (3) that the government
failed to disclose certain evidence as it is required to do under Brady v. Mary-
land.290
erly failed to reduce the magnitude of Hagedorn's unreported income by neglecting to deduct
certain of Hagedom's expenses. If so deducted, Hagedorn would be guilty of committing a lesser
offense. Hagedorn, 38 F.3d at 523.
283. 19 F.3d 1325 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 93 (1994).
284. I.R.C. §§ 5811, 5812 (West 1994).
285. Fleming, 19 F.3d at 1327. I.R.C. § 5861(1) (West 1994) makes it unlawful for any per-
son to knowingly "make, or cause the making of, a false entry on any application required by the
Act."
286. Fleming, 19 F.3d at 1327. Transfers to or from such entities are exempt from payment of
the transfer tax under 27 C.F.R. § 179.90(a) (1993).
287. Fleming was sentenced to 46 months imprisonment and a $25,000 fine. Fleming, 19 F.3d
at 1327.
288. Id. at 1328. Fleming argued that he had not lied on the applicable transfer forms, be-
cause in form the transactions were structured just as disclosed on the forms. The Tenth Circuit,
however, invoking a familiar rule of construction, stated that it would look "to the substance and
not merely the form of the transfers." The court concluded that "[firom the testimony given, a
reasonable jury could decide that the alleged transfers to government agencies were sham transac-
tions." Id. at 1329.
289. Id. at 1330. Fleming claimed there was only one conspiracy. The Tenth Circuit dis-
agreed, finding instead that Fleming had entered into separate agreements to transfer weapons
without paying the applicable transfer taxes. Id.
290. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favor-
able to an accused violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment and
the defendant has requested its disclosure). The Tenth Circuit, however, found that the
prosecution's failure to disclose certain information to Fleming did not amount to a Brady viola-
tion. Fleming, 19 F.3d at 1331.
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XI. ANNUAL ROUND-UP OF TAX PROTESTORS29
A. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. United States2 92
An annual feature of the Tenth Circuit's calendar is the appearance of the
National Commodity and Barter Association293 and its service wing, the Na-
tional Commodity Exchange.294 In this year's case, the NCBA and the NCE
sued the government for a refund of penalties assessed under I.R.C. § 6698
(for failing to file a partnership tax return),295 and I.R.C. § 6700 (for promot-
ing an abusive tax shelter).296
As to the first penalty, the IRS determined that the NCBA was a "partner-
ship" for federal income tax purposes, 297 and therefore required the organiza-
tion to file partnership informational returns. On review, the district court
291. In addition to the cases described in the text, see Jacob v. United States, 39 F.3d 1191,
unreported decision reprinted at 1994 WL 596798 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1364
(1995) (rejecting "patently frivolous tax protestor rhetoric" and imposing a $500 sanction); United
States v. Scheckel, 21 F.3d 1123, unpublished order reprinted at 1994 WL 145991 (10th Cir.
1994) (rejecting tax protestor's claims); United States v. Moore, 21 F.3d 1122, unpublished order
reprinted at 1994 WL 95217 (10th Cir. 1994) (enjoining taxpayer from further filing of state UCC
documents, resembling financing statements or security agreements, improperly creating security
interests in personal assets of IRS agents). For background information regarding Moore's dispute
with the IRS, see Moore v. United States, unreported decision reprinted at 1993 WL 260701
(D.D.C. 1993).
292. 42 F.3d 1406, unreported decision reprinted at 1994 WL 664970 (10th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1995) (No. 94-1825).
293. The National Commodity and Barter Association (NCBA), conceived by libertarian John
Grandbouche and formed in 1979, is an organization which "'espouses dissident views on the
federal tax system and advocates a return to currency backed by gold and/or silver."' United
States v. National Commodity & Barter Ass'n, 1990-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 91 50,284 (D. Colo.
1990) (quoting Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir. 1985)). The NCBA's leaders
advocate and promote opposition to federal income tax laws. United States v. Stelten, 867 F.2d
446, 448 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 828 (1989). For a lengthy but by no means ex-
haustive list of reported decisions involving the NCBA, see National Commodity and Barter Ass'n
v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 655, 659 (D. Colo. 1993), affd, 42 F.3d 1406, unreported decision
reprinted at 1994 WL 664970 (10th Cir. 1994).
294. The National Commodity Exchange (NCE) is "operated by NCBA members as a private
or warehouse bank" which the government views as a vehicle designed, among other things, to
obscure the paper trail surrounding the financial affairs of its members. National Commodity &
Barter Ass'n v. United States, 951 F.2d 1172, 1173 (10th Cir. 1991). The NCE carries out a wide
variety of financial transactions in its own name, but on behalf of the NCBA's members. Thus,
individual NCBA members are afforded a "high degree of privacy." Id.
295. I.R.C. § 6698 (West 1994) imposes a penalty on any partnership that fails to file an
informational return in compliance with I.R.C. § 6031 (West 1994). The amount of the penalty is
$50 per month multiplied by the number of partners in the partnership. The IRS had assessed the
NCBA $4,223,000 in such penalties for failure to file informational returns for the period 1979-
1988. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n, 843 F. Supp. at 657.
296. I.R.C. § 6700 (West 1994) imposes a penalty upon persons who organize or promote an
organization, plan, or arrangement and, in connection therewith, either provide false or fraudulent
statements as to its tax benefits, or make a "gross valuation overstatement." The penalty is based
on the gross income derived therefrom. Id.
297. I.R.C. § 761(a) (West 1994) defines the term "partnership" to include a "syndicate,
group, pool, joint venture or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not... a corporation or a trust
or estate."
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upheld the IRS's penalty assessment,298 and rejected the NCBA's argument
that it was not a taxable entity and simply fell "through the cracks" of the fed-
eral tax laws."' The Tenth Circuit held that this issue was not preserved on
appeal.
300
As to the second penalty, the district court once again agreed with the
IRS, and concluded that the NCBA was an abusive tax shelter for purposes of
I.R.C. § 6700.3°0 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed this
determination."
B. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. Archer
3 3
The NCBA and NCE have also pursued so-called "Bivens claims"3"
against the IRS and several of its employees, alleging violations of the First
Amendment (right to free speech, press, and association) and Fourth Amend-
ment (right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures). In the latest
chapter to this prolonged saga, the NCBA was successful in winning a reversal
of the district court's dismissal of the organizations' First and Fourth Amend-
ment claims, at least as to several of the named defendants. 5
The original lawsuit had been dismissed on the grounds that the claims
against the individual defendants in their official capacities were barred by
sovereign immunity, and that the claims against the defendants in their individ-
ual capacities were barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.3" The dis-
missal was reversed in part in National Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs
("NCBA r).07 In NCBA I, the Tenth Circuit remanded NCBA's First and
Fourth Amendment claims for repleading and reconsideration."' The quali-
fied immunity defense was likewise remanded for possible reconsideration in
the event the district court determined that the amended complaint stated a
cause of action on the remanded First and Fourth Amendment claims.3 9 On
remand, in NCBA M, the district court once again dismissed the First and
Fourth Amendment claims for failure to state a claim with sufficient specifici-
298. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n, 843 F. Supp. at 663.
299. Id. at 662-63. The district court concluded that "[tlhe amount of economic activity en-
gaged in by the NCE and NCBA-buying and selling metals, selling books, underwriting an in-
surance program-simply cannot fall through the cracks of the federal tax laws." Id. at 663.
300. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n, 1994 WL 664970 at **2.
301. Id. at 665. The district court also rejected the NCBA's constitutional claims, holding that
the penalties did not violate any member's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
or First Amendment rights of free association and free speech. Id. at 665-66.
302. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n, 1994 WL 664970 at **3.
303. 31 F.3d 1521 (10th Cir. 1994).
304. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971) (allowing plaintiff to recover money damages where six federal agents violated his
Fourth Amendment rights).
305. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1989),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 31 F.3d 1521 (10th Cir. 1994).
306. See Archer, 31 F.3d at 1523 (explaining the background and procedural history of the
litigation).
307. 886 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1989).
308. Id. at 1248.
309. Id. at 1249.
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ty.3" The dismissal of these claims mooted the qualified immunity de-
fense."' The instant appeal challenged this dismissal.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that the NCBA had pleaded its First
Amendment claim with sufficient specificity." 2 The court made a similar de-
termination with respect to the organizations' Fourth Amendment claim,
1 3
particularly because some of the warrants at issue had previously been found
constitutionally defective in Voss v. Bergsgaard"4  The remaining
defendants' qualified immunity defenses in respect to the First and Fourth
Amendment claims were also remanded for certain determinations concerning
the availability of the defenses as to each of the claims. 3 5 The Tenth Circuit
did not remand with directions for trial, and if the qualified immunity defense
is found to exist, the defendants would be entitled to summary judgment (al-
though the NCBA would presumably appeal such a result).316
C. Conklin v. United States3 7
One of the NCBA's more litigious members is William T. Conklin.
Conklin, a self-described "known tax protestor like Jesus Christ, Thomas Jef-
ferson, Benjamin Franklin and George Washington,"3  has frequently ap-
peared before the courts3 19 in his individual capacity,"' as a member of the
NCBA,32" ' and as representative of various putative church organizations, in-
cluding the Universal Life Church,32 the Church of World Peace,323 and
the Church of Ethereal Joy.324 In the most recent controversy, Conklin was
310. National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 790 F. Supp. 233, 238 (D. Colo. 1991).
311. Id.
312. Archer, 31 F.3d at 1527-31.
313. Id. at 1531-32.
314. 774 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1985).
315. Archer, 31 F.3d at 1532-35.
316. Id. at 1532 n.8.
317. 1994-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,263 (D. Colo. 1994), afftd, 36 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 583 (1994).
318. Id. Conklin also describes himself as a "house-husband and homemaker." Church of
Ethereal Joy v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 20, 23 (1984).
319. Conklin has been described as "'an active participant in a widespread abuse of the reve-
nue laws through the promotion of mail-order "churches"' based on findings of fact showing his
connection to the Universal Life Church in Denver and various other 'churches."' Church of
World Peace, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2282, 2287 (1994) (quoting Church of
Ethereal Joy, 83 T.C. at 27).
320. See, e.g., Conklin v. United States, 812 F.2d 1318 (10th Cir. 1987); Conklin v. Com-
missioner, 91 T.C. 41 (1988), rev'd, Conklin v. United States, 897 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1990).
321. See, e.g., Pleasant v. Lovell, 974 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1992).
322. The Universal Life Church's tax exemption was originally upheld by the courts. Univer-
sal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Cal. 1974). Some years later, as the
true activities of the church came to light, the Claims Court held that this earlier determination did
not bar the IRS from later revoking the church's tax-exempt status based on a new issue or theory.
Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 614 (1986). The church's tax exemption
was subsequently revoked by the IRS. See Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct.
567 (1987), affd, Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 862 F.2d 321 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
323. The Church of World Peace was founded by Conklin in 1977 and was operated from his
residence. The Church's tax-exempt status has now been revoked. See Church of World Peace, 67
T.C.M. (CCH) at 2295.
324. The Church of Ethereal Joy has also had its tax-exempt statuts revoked by the IRS. The
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assessed a penalty under I.R.C. § 6702(a) for filing a frivolous tax return.325
Conklin paid the tax due and filed a refund suit. Conklin's 1987 income tax
return contained little information, was unsigned,326 and reflected a general
Fifth Amendment objection to the return. The district court upheld the imposi-
tion of the penalty and entered summary judgment for the government, con-
cluding -in line with Tenth Circuit case law327-that Conklin's Fifth
Amendment claim was without merit. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed, 32' and additionally, imposed attorneys fees and double costs against
Conklin.
D. Tavery v. United States
329
Mary Ann Tavery is the wife of William Conklin. 3 ' The case involving
Tavery, however, did not implicate her as a tax protestor. Conklin had been
issued a summons to produce certain records which the government needed for
its investigation of the Colorado Reform Baptist Church. The investigation was
initiated because the IRS did not believe the church qualified as a tax-exempt
entity. 31 Conklin did not respond to the summons. In subsequent contempt
proceedings, Conklin claimed the right to court-appointed counsel, alleging he
could not afford counsel of his own.332 A brief filed by the government con-
testing Conklin's lack of wherewithall contained certain statements of Tavery's
income level, and a list of tax refunds she had recently received.333 Tavery
then sued the government, alleging improper disclosure of tax return informa-
tion.
The district court held that, under applicable provisions of the Code which
sanction the disclosure of tax return information in a judicial proceeding if the
information is "directly related to the resolution of an issue in the proceed-
ing,""' 4 the government had acted within its rights when it disclosed the in-
revocation was affirmed in Church of Ethereal Joy v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 20 (1984).
325. I.R.C. § 6702(a) (West 1994) imposes a penalty of $500 on any individual who files
"what purports to be a return" but which "does not contain information on which the substantial
correctness of the self-assessment may be judged," and the conduct is due to "a position which is
frivolous" or due to "a desire ... to delay or impede the administration of Federal income tax
laws."
326. Conklin had filed his 1987 personal income tax return, Form 1040, "bereft of informa-
tion, except for a pre-printed label with plaintiffs name and address." Conklin, 94-1 U.S.T.C.
(CCH) 50,263, at 84,069. In an accompanying letter, Conklin explained that he had not com-
pleted the return because he had previously "given District Counsel power of attorney to sign my
returns for me if they can be signed without waiving my constitutional rights." Id. The IRS was
not amused and, after a further exchange of correspondence which resolved nothing, assessed the
$500 penalty against Conklin under I.R.C. § 6702(a).
327. See, e.g., Betz v. United States, 753 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that a general
Fifth Amendment objection to filing a tax return "is not a valid claim of constitutional privilege").
328. Conklin v. United States, 36 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 583
(1994).
329. 32 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir. 1994).
330. See Tavery v. United States, 897 F.2d 1032 (10th Cir. 1990).
331. Tavery v. United States, 32 F.3d 1423, 1425 n.1 (10th Cir. 1994).
332. Id. at 1426.
333. Id. at 1425.
334. See I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(B) (West 1994) (tax information may be lawfully disclosed "in a
Federal or state judicial or administrative proceeding pertaining to tax administration ... if the
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formation. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed, concluding that Tavery's
income level and tax refunds were relevant to the issue of Conklin's eligibility
for appointment of counsel. Therefore, the government's disclosure of the
information was permissible."
E. Okon v. Commissioner
3 6
Christa Okon, a paralegal living in Santa Fe, New Mexico, declined to file
federal income tax returns for 1985 and 1986. When contacted by the IRS
concerning the unfiled returns, Okon raised a series of specious tax protestor
arguments. 37 In response, the IRS issued Okon a statutory Notice of Defi-
ciency. Okon filed a timely petition33 s in Tax Court for review of the pro-
posed deficiency. The Tax Court dismissed her "very contrived" claims as
frivolous.
33 9
The Tax Court's order was entered on January 27, 1993."4 Okon had 90
days from that date to perfect an appeal to the Tenth Circuit.34' Okon filed a
motion with the Tax Court to vacate its decision, which tolled the appeal
period until April 23, 1993, at which time the motion was denied.342 Okon
then filed a second motion to vacate, not sanctioned by Tax Court rules. This
motion was denied on May 28, 1993, and Okon filed an appeal to the Tenth
Circuit within 90 days of that date, but beyond the original appeal period.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal as untimely, noting the general
principle that under existing case law "tolling motions may not be tacked
together to perpetuate the prescribed time for appeal. 3 3 This principle was
seen to be applicable to Okon's actions in filing successive motions to vacate.
Absent a tolling of her appeal period, Okon's appeal was deemed out of time.
The court proceeded to place future Tenth Circuit litigants on notice that,
treatment of an item reflected on such return is directly related to the resolution of an issue in the
proceeding").
335. Tavery, 32 F.3d at 1429.
336. 26 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 583 (1994).
337. Reflective of the tenor of her positions regarding the Federal income tax, Okon main-
tained that although she was a United States citizen, she was not liable for income tax unless she
worked abroad, imported goods into the United States, or manufactured or sold alcohol, tobacco,
firearms or narcotics. Additionally, she argued that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had no
jurisdiction over her or authority to determine deficiencies in her income tax. Okon v. Commis-
sioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1783, 1784 (1993), appeal dismissed, 26 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 583 (1994).
338. According to I.R.C. § 6213(a) (West 1994), Okon's petition had to be filed within 90
days following the date of the Notice of Deficiency. Okon's "petition" consisted of a letter to the
Tax Court requesting an extension of time in which to file a petition. The court accepted the letter
itself as a petition, and gave Okon 60 days to amend the petition with a further filing. Okon time-
ly filed her amended petition. Okon, 26 F.3d at 1026.
339. Okon, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1784. Okon's only claim of merit was that the Notice of
Deficiency had not been mailed to her last known address as required by I.R.C. § 6212(b)(1)
(West 1994). The Tax Court, however, noted that Okon received the Notice in plenty of time to
file a timely petition, and that she had in fact done so. Okon, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1786. There-
fore, the Notice was sufficient.
340. Id.
341. See I.R.C. § 7483 (West 1994).
342. Okon, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1784.
343. Okon, 26 F.3d at 1026.
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while the instant case involved successive motions asserting essentially the
same grounds, the doctrine applied by the court here was equally applicable
under appropriate circumstances to "litigants who parcel out objections over
successive post-trial motions,"3 even if on unrelated grounds.
F. Miscellaneous Tax Protestor Cases
In 1994, the Tenth Circuit was called upon to summarily dispose of a
variety of other tax protestor claims, including: (1) that citizens are not subject
to the jurisdiction of the IRS;34 (2) that judges who pay taxes or otherwise
have a "financial stake" in the outcome of a tax case should disqualify
themselves from presiding over the case;3" (3) that the jurisdiction of the
IRS does not extend beyond the boundaries of the District of Colombia and
federal territories;347 (4) that as a citizen of one of the states, such as Colora-
do or Wyoming, a person is a "nonresident alien" not subject to federal taxa-
tion;" (5) that the IRS has not been and cannot be delegated authority to
administer the Code; 349 (6) that there is no statutory authority for imposing
federal income taxes on individuals;35 and (7) that wages are not "in-
come."
351
The Tenth Circuit has ruled that a flat fee of $1,500 will be awarded to
the government as a sanction for frivolous tax protestor appeals.35 In 1994,
this sanction was imposed in several cases. 53
James Serven
354
344. Id. at 1027 n.2.
345. See, e.g., Booth v. Internal Revenue Serv., 37 F.3d 1509, unpublished order reprinted at
1994 WL 563437 (10th Cir. 1994).
346. See, e.g., id.
347. See, e.g., Cotton v. Unites States, 39 F.3d 1191, unpublished order reprinted at 1994
WL 563459 (10th Cir. 1994); Zabel v. Commissioner, 28 F.3d 114, unpublished order reprinted
at 1994 WL 263713 (10th Cir. 1994).
348. See, e.g., Cotton, 39 F.3d 1191 (loth Cir. 1994); Haines v. Commissioner, 21 F.3d 1121,
unpublished order reprinted at 1994 WL 117763 (10th Cir. 1994).
349. See, e.g., Haines, 21 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 1994); Zabel v. Commissioner, 28 F.3d 114
(10th Cir. 1994).
350. See, e.g., Haines, 21 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 1994).
351. See, e.g., Booth v. Internal Revenue Serv., 37 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1994).
352. See, e.g., Casper v. Commissioner, 805 F.2d 902, 906 (10th Cir. 1986).
353. See, e.g., Zabel, 1994 WL 263713 at *1-2; Cotton, 1994 WL 563459 at *2; Booth, 1994
WL 563437 at *2.
354. B.S.B.A., Accounting, University of Denver, 1977; Masters in Taxation, University of
Denver, 1978; J.D., Stanford University, 1981; Lecturer in Law, University of Denver.
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TORTS SuRvEY: GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
This Survey examines a citizen's right to sue the government in tort ac-
tion. Specifically, the Survey focuses on two legal issues which represent the
converse of one another: the special relationship exception to the public duty
doctrine, and the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA).'
The common law public duty doctrine protects the government against
suits rising out of negligent acts by government officials. This immunity,
however, does not apply where the injured individual can show that a "special
relationship" existed between herself and the government. In Taylor v. Phelan,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled on the special
relationship exception to the public duty doctrine for the first time.2 The court
construed the exception narrowly, and upheld a summary judgment for the
Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department in an action alleging breach of
duty.3 As discussed below, the court's decision is consistent with other courts'
narrow interpretation of the special relationship exception.
In Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United States, the Tenth Circuit barred a
private party's suit against the United States Government under the FTCA for
wrongful death and for negligent destruction of private property.4 The court
granted the government immunity under the FTCA's discretionary function
exception.' While acknowledging the function of government liability under
the FTCA,6 the court gave force to the discretionary function exception.7 Un-
der the court's broad interpretation, the exception threatens to swallow the
rule.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. Taylor v. Phelan, 9 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 1993).
3. Id. at 887.
4. 34 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 1994).
5. Id. at 972-76.
6. Id. at 972.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988). The exception provides that the FTCA shall not apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regu-
lation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
Id.
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I. THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE AND SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION
A. Background
The public duty doctrine provides immunity for state and local govern-
ments in situations where, had the defendant not been a public agent or entity,
she would be liable to an injured party for a breach of duty. The public duty
doctrine grew out of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which protected
governmental entities from tort liability. Sovereign immunity applied to feder-
al, state, and local governments, and arose out of the English maxim that "the
King can do no wrong."' In the United States, courts interpreted this immuni-
ty to mean that the government could not be sued without its consent.' Gener-
ally, sovereign immunity provided judicial protection when the tortious con-
duct represented a "function" of the government.' Given its broadest inter-
pretation, however, sovereign immunity amounted to blanket protection for the
state and its agents in tort claims."
Occasionally recognized as the "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine,1
2
the public duty doctrine rests on the principle that because the government
owes a duty to the public in general, it does not owe a duty to any individual
citizen. 3 The doctrine originated in the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in South v. Maryland.4 In South, a county sheriff refused to arrest the
plaintiff's alleged kidnappers and extortionists. The plaintiff sued the sheriff
for nonfeasance-failing to protect the plaintiff from kidnapping and extor-
tion."' The Court held that the sheriff could not be held liable for the breach
of a public duty, 6 the preservation of which he was required to uphold. 7
The Court, relying on common law principles, reasoned that the sheriff, as an
agent of the state, was only subject to civil liability in two circumstances.
First, the agent could be liable if he or she was acting in a ministerial capaci-
8. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1043
(5th ed. 1984).
9. Regarding federal government immunity, see United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4
How.) 286, 288 (1846) (noting that "the government is not liable to be sued, except with its own
consent, given by law," and denying relief to the plaintiff who sought to have the United States
enjoined from pursuing a judgment against him). As discussed below, this immunity continued
until the adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946. Regarding state government immunity,
see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1890).
10. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 978-79. Professor Prosser noted that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity divided government activities into two categories. Governmental func-
tions-activities that can only be performed by the government--received immunity from tort
liability. Id. Proprietary functions-activities that other entities could adequately perform and
from which the government receives revenue-were not immune. Id. at 980-81; see also STUART
M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERiCAN LAW OF TORTS § 6:9 (1985) (distinguishing governmental
functions from proprietary functions).
11. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, § 131.
12. See Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159-60 (Colo. 1986).
13. Id. at 195.
14. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855).
15. Id. at 398-99.
16. Id. at 402-03.
17. Id. at 403.
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ty." Second, the agent could be liable if his or her acts maliciously frustrated
a person's enjoyment of a "special individual right, privilege or franchise."' 9
Attempting to limit the government's potential liability for acts of government
employees or agents, courts began to adopt South's public duty doctrine."
Like the function of sovereign immunity, the public duty doctrine protected
public officers and agents. Courts following the doctrine pointed to the need to
protect the government from the delays, expense, and burdens accompanying
civil litigation.2' According to this reasoning, the government's efforts are
better spent performing traditional duties and obligations.
The public duty doctrine as enunciated in South, however, has met in-
creasing criticism.22 In some jurisdictions, courts have rejected the doctrine
all together.2 These courts pointed to the inequity of limiting the
government's liability as a tortfeasor, and to the potential hardship to victims.
Additionally, some state have abrogated the doctrine through legislation.24
Even those jurisdictions which follow the public duty doctrine, however,
do not provide the government with blanket, all encompassing protection.
Courts have provided exceptions which have narrowed the scope of protection.
18. Id. at 402-03.
19. Id. at 403.
20. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919) (holding that the Creek Nation,
like states and municipalities, was free from liability arising from injuries to persons and property
due to mob violence or failure to keep the peace); Cameron v. Janssen Bros. Nurseries, Ltd., 7
F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that public duty doctrine barred suit against agricultural depart-
ment for allegedly failing to monitor fumigator); Turbe v. V.I., 938 F.2d 427 (3rd Cir. 1991)
(while holding that Virgin Island Water and Power Authority did not owe a duty to plaintiff to
repair street lights, the court noted that the Virgin Islands have a limited form of tort immunity);
Reiser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (concluding that the public duty
doctrine prevented a suit against the department of corrections for failing to disclose parolee's past
sexual convictions); Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (holding that state
child abuse law created duty to the general public, but could not support an individual's cause of
action).
21. See Massengill v. Yuma County, 456 P.2d 376, 380-81 (Ariz. 1969) (contending that if
the protection afforded by the public duty doctrine was abolished, the government's potential
liability would be overwhelming); cf. Leak v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158-59 (Colo. 1886) (noting
that the loss of protection from the doctrine would have financial ramifications upon the govern-
ment).
22. See generally SPEISER ET AL., supra note 10, § 6:11.
23. Three of the six states that make up the Sixth Circuit have explicitly abrogated govern-
mental immunity. See Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (holding Commerce City liable
in wrongful death action when police officers released a minor who they knew was intoxicated
and who a short time later struck and killed two pedestrians); Schear v. Board of County Comm'r,
687 P.2d 728 (N.M. 1984) (concluding that the public duty doctrine, as part of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, was abolished by state's tort claim law); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643
(Wyo. 1986) (holding public duty doctrine inconsistent with legislature's abolition of sovereign
immunity); see also Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597 (Ariz. 1982) (concluding that the state's duty of
care parallels that of a private party); Stewart v. Schmeider, 836 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980).
24. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 9.50.250-.300 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.14 (1986); IDAHO
CODE §§ 6-901 to -928 (1979); LA. CONST. of 1974 art. XII § 10; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§§ 8101-8118 (West 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-6 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.260-
.300 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-31-1 to -7 (1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5601-5605
(1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.010-.200 (1988); see also William N. Drake, Jr. & Rich-
ard D. Oldham, III, The King Is Dead, Long Live the Emperor: Commercial Carrier Decision and
the Status of Governmental Immunity in Florida, 53 FLA. B.J. 504-09 (1979) (analyzing the law in
Florida in the aftermath of the legislature's abolition of the state's immunity under the public duty
doctrine).
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The most prominent and broadest of these exceptions allows for a cause of
action in negligence when the police fail to provide adequate protection. To
trigger the exception, the plaintiff must show that a special relationship existed
between herself and the police. Generally, a special relationship exists where
the police single out an individual from the general public and provide that
person with special attention or treatment.
In the seminal case, Schuster v. New York,25 the New York Court of Ap-
peals, while recognizing the public duty doctrine's applicability to the police
department,26 denied the city's motion to dismiss an action against the city
and police department for failing to protect an informant.2 The informant,
after providing the police with information which led to the apprehension and
arrest of a fugitive, began to receive death threats. The informant told the
police about the death threats and expressed concern over his safety. The
police, however, did not provide any protection. Three weeks after receiving
the threats, the informant was shot and killed outside his home. Basing its
reasoning on reciprocity,28 the court held that a special relationship existed
that altered the traditional police duty under the public duty doctrine.29 Due
to the nature of the relationship between the informer and the police, the court
reasoned that the police owed a "special duty to use reasonable care for the
protection of persons who aid in the arrest or prosecution of criminals, once it
reasonably appears that they are in danger due to their collaboration.' 30
Courts often cite, yet rarely apply, Schuster's special relationship excep-
tion." Plaintiffs generally invoke the exception in one of three limited situa-
tions.32 First, a special relationship may be found when the legislature,
through the enactment of a statute or ordinance, expresses an intent to provide
protection to a class of which the victim is a member.33 Under this situation,
the court is simply enforcing the legislature's mandate. Second, as in Schuster,
a special relationship exists when the plaintiff is injured as a result of her
efforts and actions in aiding the police. 4 Third, similar to contract law's the-
25. 154 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1958).
26. Id. at 537.
27. Id.
28. Id. The court noted that since members of the general public owe a duty to aid the police
in law enforcement, the police, in turn, owe a duty to protect citizens when their efforts place
them in danger. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Cameron v. Janssen Bros. Nurseries, Ltd., 7 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1993); Louie v. Unit-
ed States, 776 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1985); Texaus Inv. Corp. v. Haendiges, 761 F.2d 252 (6th Cir.
1985); see generally Turbe v. V.I., 938 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1991) (while holding that Virgin Island
Water and Power Authority did not owe a duty to plaintiff to repair street lights, the court noted
that the Virgin Islands had a limited form of tort immunity).
32. See John C. McMillan, Jr., Note, Government Liability and the Public Duty Doctrine, 32
VILL. L. REv. 505, 515-16 (1987).
33. Id. at 516 (citing Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984) (holding that a
state drunk driving statute created duty of the police to arrest driver when found to be legally
intoxicated); Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 530 P.2d 234 (Wash. 1975) (finding that city ordi-
nance created a special duty on the part of the electrical inspector to reasonably handle and dis-
connect electrical system)).
34. McMillan, supra note 32, at 516 (citations omitted).
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ory of promissory estoppel,35 a special relationship exists when the injured
party, through direct contact with an agent or entity of the government, detri-
mentally relied on express or implied assurances made by the government
agent or entity."
While courts have recognized the special relationship exception, the ex-
ception has limitations. Courts have refused to allow a cause of action when
the nexus between the two parties is too attenuated or lacks sufficient intima-
cy. Deficiencies in the relationship between the private party plaintiff and the
government generally fall in one of three categories. 7 Under the first catego-
ry, courts will not impose liability against the government when the agent,
aware of a specific and identifiable source of danger, is unable to reasonably
foresee a specific victim.3" Under a second category, courts will not impose
liability upon the government when the agent, while able to foresee a specific
and identifiable harm to a specific and identifiable victim, did not place the
victim in danger through any affirmative acts.39 Finally, under the third cate-
gory, courts will not impose liability on the government when the government
agent is aware of a broad form of danger, but fails to provide protection
against the danger.'
B. Taylor v. Phelan
1. Facts
On September 25, 1986, Michael and Brenda Taylor discovered that their
daughter was assaulted and sexually molested by Michael Moore, Mr. Taylor's
cousin.4' The incident occurred when Mr. Moore accompanied the Taylors on
a trip to Kansas City, Missouri.42 The Taylors learned of the event eleven
months later. After several medical examinations and consultations with social
workers, the Taylors, on October 21, 1986, contacted the Kansas City, Missou-
ri Police Department.43 The Taylors' case was assigned to Detective Paula
Phelan in the Sex Crimes Unit. On October 22, 1986, the Taylors filed a re-
port with Detective Phelan," who videotaped an interview of the Taylors'
daughter. 5 In the interview, the daughter described to Detective Phelan how
Mr. Moore sexually assaulted her.'
35. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACrs § 12.1 (2d ed. 1990).
36. McMillan, supra note 32, at 516-17 n.46 ("The rationale applied most frequently by
judges finding a duty to provide police protection where the plaintiff relied on assurances of such
protection, is that they are merely compelling police to perform a ministerial act in fulfilling their
voluntarily assumed obligations."). Cf. Hendrix v. City of Topeka, 643 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1982).
37. McMillan, supra note 32, at 518.
38. Id. (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 518-19 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 519.




44. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 884.
45. Id. at 885.
46. Taylor, 799 F. Supp. at 1097.
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Two days after the interview, Mr. Moore voluntarily turned himself in to
the Kansas City Police Department for questioning. Mr. Moore was released
that day on his agreement to submit to a polygraph examination scheduled for
October 28.' On the day of the scheduled polygraph examination, Mr. Moore
contacted Detective Phelan and informed her that he did not wish to take the
exam. Later that day, Mr. Moore called Detective Phelan back and told her
that he had changed his mind and now wished to take the examination.' The
examination was rescheduled for the following day, but Mr. Moore never ap-
peared for the rescheduled examination.49
During the week of October 24, plaintiffs made several calls to Detective
Phelan. The Taylors told the Detective that they were concerned for their
safety because Mr. Moore lived in close proximity to their home." Detective
Phelan advised them to continue with their daily routine, and told them not to
worry.
5'
The following week, Detectives Phelan and Wessler went to the Taylors'
home in Kansas City, Kansas, to obtain medical reports. Again, the Taylors
expressed concern for their safety and pointed out Mr. Moore's close proximi-
ty to their home.52 Detective Phelan responded that they were "paranoid" and
assured Mrs. Taylor that everything was being done to investigate the incident
and that a warrant would soon be issued for Mr. Moore's arrest.53 Over the
next ten days, the Taylors continued to contact the Sex Crimes Unit to check
on the status of the arrest warrant and to voice concern for their safety. 4
On November 7, 1986, the Clay County Circuit Court issued a warrant for
Mr. Moore's arrest on sodomy and sexual abuse charges." That day, Detec-
tive Wessler telephoned Mr. Moore and told him that a warrant had been
issued for his arrest.56 Mr. Moore told Detective Wessler that he would vol-
untarily surrender the next day, 7 but this was the last contact between Mr.
Moore and the police. He failed to turn himself in to the police the next day.
After the issuance of the warrant, the Taylors telephoned Detective Phelan and
expressed their concern over the delay in arresting Mr. Moore." Detective
Phelan continued to assure them that all efforts were being made, and told
them not to worry. 9
Five days after the issuance of the arrest warrant, Mr. Moore broke into
the Taylor's home, shot Mr. Taylor in the face, barricaded himself in a room
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1097-98.
50. Id. Both Mr. Moore and the Taylors lived in Kansas City, Kansas.
51. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 885. The Taylors inquired, while Mr. Moore's arrest was pending,
whether they should remove their children from school.
52. Taylor, 799 F. Supp. at 1098.
53. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 885.
54. Id.
55. Id. Because Mr. Moore lived in Kansas, the Missouri police were required to seek the
assistance of Kansas law enforcement.
56. Id.





with the Taylors' two children, poured gasoline over the children, and set
them on fire. The Taylors' daughter died as a result of her injuries, and their
son sustained severe bums. After setting the children afire, Mr. Moore com-
mitted suicide.'
2. Opinion
Circuit Judge Brorby, writing for a unanimous Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, first held that Kansas law applied to the case.6 He then narrowed
the issue to whether a special relationship existed between the police depart-
ment-through the action of its agent, Detective Phelan-and the Taylors
which would defeat the immunity afforded the police department under the
public duty doctrine.6"
The court explained that a special relationship between the police and a
member of the general public exists in two circumstances.63 First, a special
police duty arises when a specific act on the part of the police caused an inju-
ry. Second, a special duty exists when specific promises or representations by
the police create a "justifiable reliance."'
The Taylors, however, made three arguments for the application of the
special relationship exception. First, the Taylors argued that under Schuster v.
City of New York,65 Detective Phelan's assurances of safety or lack of danger
amounted to a promise.' The court, stating that Kansas law required-and
Schuster implied-a "specific promise" on the part of the police, characterized
the Detective's statements to the Taylors as mere "blanket assurances.' 67 The
court reasoned that because police regularly make such assurances, "invok[ing]
an exception to the general duty doctrine on similar remarks would virtually
swallow the rule.""
The Taylors' second argument asserted that Detective Wessler's telephone
call to Mr. Moore notifying Mr. Moore of his pending arrest amounted to an
affirmative act." The Taylors reasoned that this affirmative act caused their
injury. The court held, however, that the special relationship exception re-
quired the affirmative act to be more than a single 'but for' incident. It re-
60. Id.
61. Id. The court, in upholding the District Court's ruling below, held that the diversity of
parties to the conflict provided jurisdiction over the dispute and that the issue of choice of law
was correctly decided by the court below. The lower court held that "[a] federal court sitting in
diversity must apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits, including that state's choice
of law rules." Taylor, 799 F. Supp. at 1098 (citing Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, 814 F. Supp.
460, 465 (D. Kan. 1988)). This procedural ruling had a great impact on the case. Missouri law did
not recognize the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine. Additionally, Missouri
law offered governmental entities and their employees much greater immunity protection than did
Kansas law. Id. at 1098-99.
62. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 885-86.
63. Id. at 886. The court cited Dauffenbach v. City of Wichita, 667 P.2d 380 (Kan. 1983), in
which the Kansas Supreme Court delineated two circumstances creating special relationships.
64. Id. (citing Dauffenbach, 667 P.2d at 385). See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
65. 154 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1958).
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quired the affirmative act "to be a direct cause of an injury, and not merely a
contributing cause."7 The court reasoned that, "[e]ven assuming the Missouri
police increased the risk of injury through their actions or inaction, the Taylors
do not argue the police directly caused them harm.'
Finally, the Taylors argued that a special relationship arose when the
police allegedly compelled the Taylors to cooperate in Mr. Moore's arrest,
knowing that such cooperation placed the Taylors in danger.72 The Taylors
reasoned that they were members of a special class which commanded special
police protection. The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First,
while acknowledging the support for this reasoning in other jurisdictions,73
the court held that the Taylors' view extended the special relationship excep-
tion beyond Kansas's existing law. Second, the court held that the Taylors had
failed to show membership within a special class.74 The court noted that other
cases recognizing the special class argument required that the police compelled
or persuaded the individual into cooperating with law enforcement. 7 The
court found that the Taylors, in contrast, had volunteered, and were not solicit-
ed for help.76
3. Analysis
In the Phelan decision, the Tenth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the
special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine virtually eliminates
its applicability. Despite the court's acknowledgement of the exception, it is
difficult to imagine facts which would allow a private tort suit to proceed
against a state or municipal government.
The court's dismissal of the Taylors' first argument illustrates the court's
reluctance to apply the exception. The court held that the police department
did not make a representation or a promise that the Taylor family would be
protected. The court insisted that Kansas law requires a "specific promise."77
This assertion, however, has little support under Kansas law. The court pointed
to Hendrix v. City of Topeka78 as a precedent requiring a specific promise by
the government agent or entity. While the Hendrix court did find that a spe-
cific promise could defeat government immunity, it did not hold that such a
promise was necessary. Instead, the Kansas Supreme Court distinguished spe-
cific promises from "representations," and held that either one alone could
create a cause of action.79 Moreover, the Hendricks court pointed to the New
70. Id.
71. Id. The court noted that the leading Kansas cases on the subject required the affirmative
act to be a direct cause of the injury. Id.; see Dauffenbach v. City of Wichita, 667 P.2d 380 (Kan.
1983); Hendrix v. City of Topeka, 643 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1982); Bradford v. Mahan, 548 P.2d 1223
(Kan. 1976); Gardner v. McDowell, 451 P.2d 501 (Kan. 1969).





77. Id. at 886.
78. 643 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1982).
79. Id. at 137. The court stated that "[liability against a police officer may be predicated
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York high court's decision in Schuster as support for their interpretation of the
special relationship exception."0 Schuster found that a special relationship
exists where, as in Taylor, the police had "impart[ed] ... a false impression
of safety and lack of danger."
8'
Taylor marks the Tenth Circuit's departure from the broader interpretation
of the exception provided in Schuster and endorsed in Hendrix. The argument
that the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department made representations to
provide safety is consistent with Schuster, which is widely cited in Kansas
cases.82 Detective Phelan's assurances that the Taylors were not in danger
and that their fears over safety amounted to "paranoia"83 clearly imparted an
understanding of safety or lack of danger, albeit a false one. In light of the
court's specific promise requirement, however, the assurances and representa-
tions of safety were insufficient to overcome the government's immunity. 4
The court's refusal to accept the Taylors' second argument also represents
a departure from previous cases involving the special relationship test. In
Taylor, the Tenth Circuit required that the government entity directly cause the
injury. While the court did cite Kansas cases where the government entity was
the direct cause of injury," it did not cite any cases that specifically required
direct causation, or any cases that refused to provide relief without this con-
nection. This causation requirement contradicts the landmark cases that provid-
ed the foundation for the special relationship exception. 6
Finally, the court held that police solicitation for citizen cooperation
that-with reasonable foreseeability-endangered the citizen does not create a
special relationship, and that such a reading would require the court to expand
Kansas law. 7 The court's controlling precedent was Dauffenbach v. City of
Wichita," which delineated only two circumstances amounting to a special
relationship--a specific promise or direct causation." Other Kansas courts,
however, have considered the Taylors' third argument." The Tenth Circuit, in
relying so heavily on Dauffenbach while ignoring other Kansas cases consider-
ing this argument, seemed apprehensive to apply the exception on less than
upon breach of specific promise or representations." Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. (citing Schuster v. City of New York, 154 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1958)).
81. See Taylor, 9 F.3d at 886.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 885.
84. The court referred to the police assurances of safety as "blanket assurances," and rea-
soned that such assurances were regularly made by police in the performance of their duties. Id. at
886.
85. Id. at 886-87 (citing Bradford v. Mahan, 548 P.2d 1223 (Kan. 1976) and Gardner v.
McDowell, 451 P.2d 501 (1969)).
86. In Schuster, for example, there was no evidence that any member of the police depart-
ment murdered the informant. Rather, the court found the police guilty of not providing protection
to the informant. The police act, therefore, represented a cause of the death, but certainly not a
direct or proximate cause. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30 for a discussion of Schuster.
87. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 887.
88. 667 P.2d 380 (Kan. 1983).
89. Id. at 385. The court stated that a duty arises: "(1) where there is an affirmative act by
the officer causing the injury; and (2) when a specific promise or representation by the officer is
made under circumstances creating justifiable reliance." Id.
90. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 887.
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solid ground. The court's wariness resulted in its narrow interpretation of the
special relationship exception.
Additionally, while required to apply Kansas law,9 the court may have
been reluctant to subject the employees of Kansas City, Missouri to Kansas's
special relationship exception because Missouri, unlike Kansas, does not rec-
ognize the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine.92
With its decision in Phelan v. Taylor, the Tenth Circuit appears to have
joined other courts' efforts to reduce the impact of the special relationship
exception to the public duty doctrine. Taylor's facts do not significantly differ
from other cases which applied the exception. The court, through its decision,
narrowed the requirements needed to claim the exception.
II. THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION TO THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT
A. Background
Before Congress's adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),93
members of the general public could not sue the federal government for negli-
gent acts committed by government agents or officials. Regardless of the
merits of the case, the common law tradition of sovereign immunity-where
the "king can do no wrong"- prevented a citizen's suit from going for-
ward.
94
Those seeking redress could, however, file a request for compensatory
relief through a private congressional claim bill.95 As more claim bills were
filed, however, administration of these claims became unwieldy and over-
whelming.96 Congress, seeking a more manageable solution, introduced the
FTCA in 1946."7 Through the FTCA, Congress sought to impose liability
91. In upholding the district court's application of Kansas law, the court reasoned that
"[flederal courts sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law, including choice of law rules,
of the state in which they sit." Id. at 885 (citing Robert A. Wachsler, Inc. v. Florafax Int'l Inc.,
778 F.2d 547, 549 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Slentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,
496 (1941))).
92. Taylor, 799 F. Supp. at 1098-99. The defendants argued that "subjecting them to suit in
Kansas without affording them the sovereign and official immunity to which they would be enti-
tled under Missouri law [would] interfere significantly with their capacity to fulfill their sovereign
responsibilities" and "would have a chilling effect on investigations crossing the state line." Id.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
94. For a more detailed discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
95. Private claim bills require a considerable amount of political will. Bills must be intro-
duced by a member of Congress, deliberated in the Committee on Claims, and then submitted to
Congress for a consent by vote (the vote must be unanimous). The claims bill, on consent by both
houses, then requires the President's final approval. See Alexander Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort
Claims Against the Federal Government, 9 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 323-26 (1942); see
also Barry R. Goldman, Note, Can the King Do No Wrong? A New Look at the Discretionary
Function Exception to the Federal Torts Claim Act, 26 GA. L. REv. 837, 860 n.2 (1992).
96. From 1939 to 1942, 6,300 bills were introduced in Congress. Walter P. Armstrong &
Howard Cockrill, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, 9 LAW AND CONTEMP. PRoBS. 327, 327 n.3
(1942); see Goldman, supra note 95, at 860 n.2 (noting that during World War II, the claims bills
became particularly problematic for a nation with energy and resources committed elsewhere).
97. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946).
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upon the United States "to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances." '
The FTCA, however, provides several exceptions to this maxim." The
focus of this section is the discretionary function exception,"r which has
generated considerable litigation.' Under the exception, the United States is
immune from liability for any act or omission "based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused."'
0 2
Since the FTCA's adoption, courts have struggled over the meaning and
breadth of the discretionary function exception. In 1953, the United States
Supreme Court, in Dalehite v. United States,"3 broadly interpreted the ex-
ception and the meaning of "discretionary." In Dalehite, hundreds of people
were killed in an explosion in Texas City, Texas in 1947. The cause of the
explosion was the Government's negligent handling of ammonium nitrate. The
government was in the process of shipping the chemical, a fertilizer base, to
the French government. The Court held that the discretionary function excep-
tion barred a suit against the government."° The Court reasoned that the plan
to export the chemical, 5 and the implementation of that plan, involved gov-
ernmental discretion, thereby placing it within the meaning of the excep-
tion."°  The Court noted that the discretionary function exception "includes
more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determina-
tions made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications
or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and deci-
sion there is discretion.
' 
07
In Indian Towing Co. v. United States,"°a the Court pointed to its hold-
ing in Dalehite and introduced a new test to determine whether a government
act was "discretionary." The Court, in finding the Coast Guard liable for fail-
ing to maintain a lighthouse beacon,"° distinguished "operational" and "plan-
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1988). The exceptions include: discretionary functions of government
agents; negligent transmission of postal material; claims arising from tax or customs matters;
claims for title 50 administration; claims for United States quarantine decisions; certain law en-
forcement matters; claims for damages from fiscal operations of the treasury; claims for military
activities in time of war; claims arising in foreign countries; claims arising from the activities of
the Tennessee Valley Authority; claims arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company;
and claims arising from the activities of a federal land bank or intermediate credit bank or a bank
of cooperatives. Id.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
101. As discussed below, since its inception in 1946, the United States Supreme Court has
given considerable attention to the discretionary function exception.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
103. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
104. Id. at 36.
105. Id. at 37.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 35-36. While initially denied recovery because of the discretionary function excep-
tion, the victims of the explosion eventually recovered some damages through Congressional
claims bills.
108. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
109. In Indian Towing, the plaintiff sued the government for cargo lost when the plaintiff's
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ning" functions. The Court held that the discretionary function exception
barred suits implicating government functions at the planning stage,' 0 but al-
lowed suits implicating government functions at the operational stage."'
Lower courts over the next thirty years adopted and applied the plan-
ning/operational test."2
When the Court revisited the discretionary function thirty years later in
United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense ("Varig Air-
lines"),' it departed from Indian Towing's planning/operational distinction,
and adopted a focus on the "nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the
actor."' ' In Varig Airlines, the Court extended protection under the discre-
tionary function exception to the Federal Aviation Administration's planning
and implementation of aircraft safety regulations.' The Court found that the
governmental immunity included the decision to implement a spot-check pro-
gram on aircraft,"6 as well as the actions of the individual inspectors execut-
ing the spot-checks. In extending immunity to individual FAA inspectors, the
Court reasoned that the inspectors employed discretion in the execution of the
regulation.' After Varig Airlines, operational activities, even by lower level
government employees, were no longer always subject to liability.'"
The United States Supreme Court confirmed the Varig Airlines analysis in
Berkovitz v. United States.' The Court, while finding the discretionary func-
tion exception inapplicable to the Food and Drug Administration's failure to
follow vaccine approval mandates, 20 did not rely on the planning/operational
test from Indian Towing. Instead, the court held that the exception only applies
to policies allowing government discretion in execution, rather than those
policies-like the FDA policy before the Court-requiring strict adherence to
ship ran aground. The plaintiff alleged that the Coast Guard's failure to maintain the lighthouse
beacon caused the ship to lose its way. Id. at 62.
110. Id. at 64-69.
111. Id.
112. See Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal
Liability in Tort, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 871, 880 (1991) (noting the adoption of the plan-
ning/operational test in various forms by lower courts); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Discre-
tionary function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time For Reconsideration, 42 OKLA.
L. REv. 459, 461 (observing that the planning/operational test became standard practice).
113. 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
114. Id. at 813.
115. Id. at 821.
116. Id. at 819-20. The Court acknowledged that the decision to perform a spot-check in-
volved considerations of safety goals and budgetary considerations. Id.
117. Id. at 820. The court pointed to the individual inspector's judgment involved in assessing
the confidence in a given manufacturer, in maximizing compliance with FAA regulations, and in
determining the efficient allocation of agency resources. Id.
118. See Goldman, supra note 95, at 884. But see Krent, supra note 112, at 881 (noting that
after Varig Airlines, many lower courts continued to use the planning/operational test).
119. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
120. Id. at 547. The Berkovitzs sued the United States on two grounds. First, they alleged that
the Department of Biological Standards, a branch of the National Institute of Health, negligently
licensed a pharmaceutical company to produce orimune, an oral polio vaccine. Second, they al-
leged that the Food and Drug Administration negligently approved the disbursement of a particular
lot of Orimune. A dose of Orimune ingested by the Berkovitz's two month old child caused him
to contract polio, leaving him almost completely paralyzed.
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prescribed mandates.'2' Most importantly, the Court set forth a two step ap-
proach to determine whether the discretionary function exception protects
government actions from liability.'22 First, courts must determine whether
Congress endowed the government official with the discretion to make a
choice.'23 If no discretion to make a choice exists, the exception does not
apply. If, on the other hand, the official has some discretion, the reviewing
court must make a second determination. The court must determine whether
this discretion is the type Congress intended to immunize from liability. The
Court reasoned that Congress desired to prevent judicial second-guessing of
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, or politi-
cal policy.' Therefore, the exception prevented courts from evaluating gov-
ernment decisions for tort liability in matters grounded in social, economic, or
political policy.
In its latest visit with the discretionary function exception, the Court, in
United States v. Gaubert,'25 officially rejected the planning/operational test
for a broader interpretation of the discretionary function test. The Court looked
to the government act in dispute and, without regard to the level at which it
was executed, analyzed whether discretion was employed.'26 The Court ex-
plained that "a discretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment; there
is nothing in [the FTCA] ... description that refers exclusively to
policymaking or planning functions.... Discretionary conduct is not confined
to the policy or planning level."'27 The Court then applied the two step
Berkovitz test. First, it determined the degree of discretion the regulation or
statute provided the agent or officer.'28 Second, it determined whether the
agent or officer, in exercising this discretion, considered the social, economic,
or political policy in the regulation or statute. 29
While it is unclear how lower courts will ultimately apply Bekovitz and
Gaubert, they now have greater latitude in finding discretionary immunity.
121. Id. at 546-47.
122. Id. at 536-39.
123. Id. at 536.
124. Id. at 536-37. See generally David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer, The Discretionary Func-
tion Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO L. REV.
291.
125. 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
126. In Gaubert, federal regulators assumed control of the Independent American Savings and
Loan, which the plaintiff owned. The regulators assumed such day-to-day management as recom-
mendations of consultants and officers, advisement over subsidiary investments, and recommend-
ing that the savings and loan switch to a federal charter. After assuming control, the savings and
loan diminished to a negative net worth of $400 million. The plaintiff, having suffered personal
losses of $100 million, sued the government, alleging negligence in its day-to-day management.
Id. at 319-20; see generally Carolyn K. Dick, United States v. Gaubert: Potential Liability for
Federal Regulations Under the "Discretionary Function" Exception of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 36 S.D. L. REv. 180 (1991).
127. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.
128. Id. at 328.
129. Id. at 332-33.
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B. Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United States
1. Facts
In Black Hills, the plaintiffs brought action against the United States un-
der the FTCA, seeking damages for the wrongful death of Nathan Kolb and
for the negligent destruction of the aircraft he was operating. The plaintiffs
also alleged that the government was negligent in its investigation of the air-
craft crash. 30
The crash occurred on the United States Army White Sands Missile
Range, located in New Mexico. 3' Civilians may not enter the installation
without Army access permits, which are granted on a case-by-case basis. In
1987, the Army and the Department of Defense conducted ground-to-air mis-
sile tests on the installation for the Forward Area Air Defense System
(FAADS). As part of FAADS, the Department of Defense contracted with
Black Hills Aviation for aerial fire suppression services.'
On September 10, 1987, a FAADS missile started a fire on the installa-
tion. Black Hills Aviation dispatched an aircraft in response to an Army re-
quest for aerial fire suppression. Nathan Kolb and a co-pilot,'33 both employ-
ees of Black Hills Aviation, flew the aircraft, Tanker 07.
Tanker 07 obtained authorization to enter the missile range's airspace
from the air controller. Tanker 07 crashed fifteen miles into the interior of the
missile range and inside the FAADS testing site, killing both pilots.'34
An attorney from the Army Judge Advocate General's (JAG) office, antic-
ipating litigation concerning the crash, contacted the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) and the Army Safety Center and inquired whether they
wished to investigate the crash. Both declined to investigate the crash.'35
Pursuant to Army regulations, the Army appointed a colonel to investigate
the facts and circumstances of the crash.'36 The investigation covered only
the Army's activities regarding the crash; it did not seek to determine the
cause of the crash.
Arnold Kolb, Nathan Kolb's father and the owner of the Tanker 07, re-
quested access to the crash site. The Army allowed: (1) an overflight of the
crash site on September 11, 1987; (2) a visit to the crash site in its undis-
130. 34 F.3d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 1994). This Survey is limited to a discussion of the
plaintiff's claims relating to the Army's investigation and recovery of crash. The district court
allowed summary judgment in favor of the government, holding that the plaintiff had failed to
establish a material fact concerning the government's involvement. Id. at 972.
131. Id. at 970.
132. Id.
133. While the co-pilot had over forty years of experience, the flight was the pilot's first
flight without an instructor. Id. at 970-71.
134. Army records showed that the only missile fired near the time of the crash was the one
which started the fire. Id. at 972. That missile was fired approximately two hours before the crash.
Id. at 970.
135. The NTSB indicated, however, that it would investigate the crash if specifically request-
ed to do so by the missile range installation. Id.




turbed state on September 23, 1987; (3) a visit to the site in late February,
1988, to disassemble the landing gear of the aircraft; and (4) a visit to the
crash site area in late March, 1988, to retrieve the aircraft wreckage, which
had been airlifted to a range road.'37
In February, 1988, after allowing Arnold Kolb access to the crash site and
after obtaining his consent, the Army broke the aircraft into smaller pieces and
brought it down to an access road where Arnold Kolb could recover it. The
Army did not allow the Kolbs to perform their own investigation of the crash
site or allow them to participate in the Army's investigation. 3
When the Army completed its investigation report on December 7, 1987,
the Kolbs learned for the first time that the Army's investigation had not
sought to determine the cause of the crash. A few weeks later, the Kolbs be-
gan their own investigation of the crash. The Kolbs hired a team of aircraft
accident investigation experts. The experts analyzed the aircraft debris, and
found evidence that an external force had affected the aircraft before the crash.
For example, the coroner discovered a cone shaped piece of metal in the co-
pilot's back that did not match any part of the aircraft. 39 Additionally, the
experts discovered markings on a turbine blade in the right jet engine, indicat-
ing that an event had occurred on the right side of the aircraft just before the
crash."4
The plaintiffs sought damages for the wrongful death of Nathan Kolb and
for the negligent destruction of the aircraft. The plaintiffs also alleged that the
government tortiously failed to investigate the cause of the crash, tortiously
spoiled and destroyed evidence in the case, and committed the tort of trespass
to chattel or conversion regarding the aircraft's wreckage.
The district court barred the plaintiff's four claims regarding the investiga-
tion and recovery of crash debris, citing the FTCA's discretionary function
exception. 4'
2. Opinion
Judge Van Bebber,42 writing for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
upheld the district court's finding that the plaintiff's claims were barred under
the discretionary function exception.'43
Judge Van Bebber began his opinion by endorsing the two prong test for
the discretionary function exception from Berkovitz and Gaubert.'" First, the
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 971-72.
140. Id. at 972.
141. Id. at 970.
142. United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. Id. at 968.
143. Id. at 970. As indicated in supra note 130, this discussion is limited to the court's deci-
sion regarding the FrCA.
144. The court noted that the discretionary function exception represented "the boundary be-
tween Congress' [sic] willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to
protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals." Id. at 972
(quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 808). For a more complete discussion of Berkovitz and
Gaubert, and the tests they endorsed, see supra text accompanying notes 119-29.
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governmental act must involve judgement or choice. Second, this discretion
must be the kind that Congress-through the discretionary function excep-
tion-sought to protect.'45
The plaintiffs argued that Army regulations required an investigation into
the cause of the crash, placing the Army outside the ambit of the exception.
Specifically, the plaintiffs pointed to Department of Defense Instruction 6055.7
(DOD Instruction 6055.7), which establishes basic accident investigation crite-
ria and requires each branch of the military to promulgate specific regulations
implementing these criteria. 46
The plaintiffs argued that two of three regulations promulgated under
DOD 6055.7 obligated the government to investigate the crash. 47 First, the
government was required to perform a "Legal Mishap Investigation."'"6 Le-
gal investigations are triggered by specified factors, such as death. The Army
performs a legal investigation to determine responsibility for an accident. Sec-
ond, the government was required to perform a "safety" investigation. Safety
investigations serve to prevent the reoccurrence of mishaps. 49
In affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit held that the
DOD 6055.7 was inapplicable because it was limited to DOD mishaps, and
held that the crash did not fall under the definition of a DOD mishap."' The
court rejected the plaintiff's argument that because the language of the two
investigation regulations did not specify DOD mishaps, the regulations applied
to mishaps in general.' 5' Because prefatory language in the regulation limited
the investigatory requirements to DOD mishaps,'52 the court concluded that
the inclusion of the prefatory language evidenced the drafters' intent that the
entire regulation apply only to DOD mishaps.'"
Arguing in the alternative, the plaintiffs next contended that the crash fell
within the definition of a DOD mishap. DOD instructions define a DOD mis-
hap as "an unplanned event, or series of events, which results in damage to
DOD property. .. ; damage to public and private property or injury and ill-
ness to non-DOD personnel as a result of DOD operations.""'15 The plaintiffs
contended that the phrase "as a result of DOD operations" included any event
145. Black Hills Aviation, 34 F.3d at 972-73 (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37).
146. Id. at 973. The plaintiffs also pointed to Army Regulation 385-40 and Department of the
Army Pamphlet 385-95. The court ruled, however, that these regulations simply implemented and
supported DOD Instruction 6055.7, and were not an independent source of authority. Id.
147. The third type of investigation was the type that the Army performed, Army Regulation
15-6. A 15-6 investigation serves to provide the commander with information; its use, scope, and
requirements are discretionary. Id.
148. Id. (citing DOD Instruction 6055.7(E)(2)(a)(2)(c)).
149. Id. (citing DOD Instruction 6055.7(E)(2)(a)(2)(a)-(b)).
150. Id. at 974-75.
151. DOD Instruction 6055.7(E)(a)(2)(c) reads, "DOD Components shall prepare this type of
investigation report ... whenever a mishap involves one or more of the following: 1. Fatality 2.
Anticipated litigation for or against the government or a government contractor." Id. at 974 (em-
phasis added).
152. Id. (citing DOD Instruction 6055.7(E)(2)).
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing DOD Instruction 6055.7, Attachment 2, Definition 1).
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having a "direct connection with DOD operations.""'
The court, however, concluded that the plaintiffs had interpreted the regu-
lation too broadly.'56 The court reasoned that the plain language of the regu-
lation led to a far narrower construction. The court concluded that the regula-
tion included only events "caused by" DOD operations.'57
The issue then became whether the Army caused the crash.' The court
held that, at least at the time officials selected the type of investigation to be
performed, there was no reason to conclude that the Army was at fault in the
crash.'59 Moreover, without a reason to suspect Army involvement, the
government's decision not to conduct a safety investigation was justified."6
The court reasoned that, absent some indication of Army involvement, a civil-
ian aircraft crash was not the kind of accident that would give the Army in-
sight into the prevention of other accidents.
6'
The court, concluding that the crash was not a DOD Mishap mandating a
legal or safety investigation, held that the scope and manner of the investiga-
tion was a discretionary act under the first prong of the discretionary exception
test. 62 The court then proceeded to the second prong of the test.
Endorsing the district court decision, the court held that the refusal to
investigate the cause of the crash represented the type of policy discretion that
Congress intended to protect. 63 First, the officers, in making their decision,
evaluated the Army's limited resources to investigate accidents within its
control. 6" Second, the officers considered the Army's lack of expertise in
the investigation of technical aspects of an aircraft crash. 65 Third, the offi-
cers considered the importance and need to resume the scheduled missile
testing as soon as possible and without interference."
Finally, the court concluded that the officers' decision to exclude the
Kolbs from the crash site was clearly grounded in military policy not subject
to judicial review. 167 The plaintiff's argument failed because it questioned the
reasonableness of the Army's decision rather than the Army's authority to
make the decision."6






161. Id. at 975-76.
162. Id. at 976.
163. Id. (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. The plaintiffs, however, pointed to this factor in the district court and in their briefs
on appeal as evidence of the Army's negligence. The court responded that such military decisions
were the precise reason for the discretionary function exception. Id. (citing Boyle v. United Tech-
nologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988)).
167. Id. (citing United States v. Gourly, 502 F.2d 785, 785-87 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that
it is well-recognized that the commander of a military installation has the broad authority and
discretion to summarily exclude persons therefrom)).
168. Id. (noting that the exception clearly states that protection is afforded to the exercise of a
discretionary function "whether or not the discretion involved be abused").
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3. Analysis
Black Hills Aviation fits squarely with a judicial trend favoring govern-
mental immunity under the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. The
exception, with its acceptance and application by the courts on the rise, ap-
pears to be swallowing the rule. As Judge McKay observed in his concurring
opinion in Allen v. United States,'69
[i]t undoubtedly will come as a surprise to many that two hundred
years after we threw out King George III, the rule that 'the king can
do no wrong' still prevails at the federal level in all but the most
trivial of matters .... [T]he FICA... is largely a false promise in
all but 'fender benders' and perhaps some cases involving medical
malpractice by government doctors.'
While consistent with the trend toward government immunity,' 7' the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Black Hills Aviation illustrates the vigor with
which a court will seek to apply the exception. For example, the court refused
to characterize the civilian aircraft crash as a DOD Mishap. 7 1 This decision
effectively placed the crash outside the regulation's investigation mandate, a
non-discretionary function. Because the crash did not require an investigation,
the government was simply exercising a discretionary function.
The court interpreted the plain language of the phrase "as a result of' to
mean "caused by.' 73 The court, however, did not elaborate on its preference
for the narrow interpretation, "caused by," over the broader interpretation,
"connected with.' 74 Moreover, while the court stated that the plaintiff's in-
terpretation would give the phrase a broader meaning than its common usage,
the court did not address the alternative argument that the government's inter-
pretation would give the phrase a narrower meaning than its common usage.
More importantly, the plain language of the regulation could logically
support a finding that the damage to private property and to "non-DOD per-
sonnel" was a "result of DOD operations." The ground fires started because of
DOD operations, resulting in the crash of civilian fire suppressing aircraft.
The court also used a stringent definition of "cause" in adopting the
government's "caused by" interpretation.'75 The court believed that the regu-
lation required the government to directly or proximately cause the injury. 76
169. 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
170. Id. at 1424-25.
171. See Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal
Governmental Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. REV. 871 (1991); see also G. Michael Harz, Com-
ment, The Liability of the United States Government Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 66
DENV. U. L. REV. 601 (1989) (discussing the hardship imposed on a plaintiff who successfully
sued the government for five million dollars, but was required to forgo medical treatment while
the government relitigated the case).
172. Black Hills Aviation, 34 F.3d at 975.
173. Id.
174. The plaintiffs advocated such an interpretation. Id.
175. Id.
176. While the court implied the need for the government to have directly caused the aircraft




The court did not address the possibility that "caused by" could be interpreted
to require a simple "but for" relationship. Using a "but for" analysis, the plain-
tiffs could have argued that but for the government's involvement-the con-
tract with the plaintiff and the request for aerial fire suppression in the missile
range during FAADS operations-the injury to the pilots and the aircraft
would not have occurred. The government's involvement was much greater
than, for example, the case of a random, uninvited aircraft crashing inside the
installation.
Cases such as Black Hills Aviation raise doubt as to whether the law is
serving its own purpose. The avowed goal of the FTCA was to remove the
government's sovereign immunity and to impose tort liability upon the govern-
ment "to the same extent as [to] a private individual under like circumstanc-
es."17 The court's efforts to extend immunity to the government under an
exception, however, erodes the impact of the rule. In fact, the court's willing-
ness to find discretion where it might not otherwise exist does more than
dilute the rule; it contradicts the rule. Holdings defining statutes or regulations
as discretionary increase the scope of activities immune to liability. Holdings
that alter the meanings of words such as "shall"'' 78 or "will', 179 make the
FTCA a game of semantics.
One of the most prominent and widely held justifications for the discre-
tionary function exception was to prevent judicial "second guessing" of legis-
lative acts. 80 However, the court's broad reading and application of the dis-
cretionary function exception does what many sought to avoid: second guess
the legislature. Perhaps dubious of imposing large fiscal liabilities upon the
government, 8' the courts temper the reach of the IFTCA and frustrate the ob-
jectives of the legislature by extending the discretionary function exception be-
yond its original meaning.
The holding in Black Hills Aviation does not deviate from the trend estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court. Nor does the holding depart from
the decisions within the Tenth Circuit. The current interpretation of the discre-
tionary function exception, however, allows the court great latitude to find the
United States exempt from tort liability. The cliche of the "exception swallow-
ing the rule" aptly describes the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
178. See William P. Kratzke, The Supreme Court's Recent Overhaul of the Discretionary
Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 26 (1993); Brackin
v. United States, 913 F.2d 858, 860 (11 th Cir. 1990) (finding that the word "shall" in a regulation
did not mandate one system of crop allotment over another).
179. See Kratzke, supra note 178, at 26; Kelley v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 360-61 (lst
Cir. 1991) (finding DEA departmental manual concerning reporting of wrongful conduct a discre-
tionary writing).
180. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 320 (1991) (noting that the discretionary
function exception "prevent[s] judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions
grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort") (quot-
ing Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)).
181. See Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100
(1984) (noting that courts, when deciding cases brought against the government involving large
requests for damages, should be wary of exposing the government to fiscal liability because of the
effect on the general public).
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CONCLUSION
Through Taylor and Black Hills, the Tenth Circuit has demonstrated a
preference to defer to government expertise. While this stance is logical from
the government's perspective, it leaves many plaintiffs-like the Taylors, who
lost their daughter, and the Kolbs, who lost their son-without a cause of
action. Finally, the court's reluctance to review government decisions increases
the possibility that the government might abuse this broad discretion.
Timothy B. Richards
TORTS SURVEY: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
During the 1994 survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals hand-
ed down four noteworthy products liability decisions. While virtually every
jurisdiction has adopted some form of the Restatement (Second) of Torts'
provisions on products liability,' the application of those provisions varies
between jurisdictions and requires an oftentimes challenging application of the
Erie Doctrine.2 This survey will focus on the Tenth Circuit's ability to ascer-
tain state law given varying degrees of certainty as to how the respective
state's highest court would decide the issue. Part I examines the Tenth
Circuit's application of the Erie Doctrine given a relatively clear indication of
current law from the state's highest court. In Wagner v. Case Corp.3 and
Perlmutter v. United States Gypsum Co., the Tenth Circuit, after noting a
recent change in Colorado law, held that Colorado's statutory presumptions for
products liability actions are only applicable in cases where the plaintiff fails
to make out a prima facie case that the product is defective.5 These cases
demonstrate that the Colorado Supreme Court has rendered the statutory pre-
sumptions for products liability actions effectively meaningless.
Part II examines the Tenth Circuit's application of the Erie Doctrine in a
case without any authoritative pronouncement of state law from the state's
highest court. In Allen v. Minnstar, Inc.,6 the Tenth Circuit affirmed a Utah
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2. In products liability cases, the basis for federal court jurisdiction is most often diversity
of citizenship. A typical products liability lawsuit involves an injured plaintiff from state A suing
a manufacturer from state B. Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction requires: 1) that the plaintiff and
defendant are citizens of different states; and 2) that the plaintiff is seeking more than $50,000 in
damages from the defendant. See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §
2.6, at 27 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the diversity jurisdiction requirements).
In the landmark case Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the United States
Supreme Court announced what has become known as the Erie Doctrine. In cases where diversity
of citizenship is the basis for federal jurisdiction, federal courts must ascertain and apply the law
of the state whose law is controlling, under applicable choice of law principles, such that the
result reached in federal court is the same result that would have been reached had the case been
tried in state court. See id. at 78. Federal courts sitting in diversity must apply a state's law in
accordance with the decisions of that state's highest court. Id. at 79. If the state's highest court has
not decided the issue presently before the federal court, the federal court must make its best at-
tempt to predict how the state's highest court would decide the issue. Id. at 78-79.
The Erie Doctrine was necessary to prevent forum shopping and to create uniformity in
decisions. See generally FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra, §§ 4.1-4.5 (discussing the Court's reasoning
in Erie and tracing the modem development of the Erie Doctrine). If federal courts were not
bound to apply state law as the state's highest court would, there would be no uniformity of deci-
sions. Id. A plaintiff would sue in state court if the state's laws were more favorable to her case,
or in a federal court if its laws were of more help. Id. In Erie, the Supreme Court decided that, as
a matter of public policy, forum shopping would no longer be allowed. Erie, 304 U.S. at 76-79.
3. 33 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1994).
4. 4 F.3d 864 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. Wagner, 33 F.3d at 1254; Perlmutter, 4 F.3d at 874-75.
6. 8 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1993).
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District Court's ruling that in order to prevail in a products liability action
based on defective design, a plaintiff must prove that an alternative, safer
design existed at the time the product was placed into the stream of com-
merce.7 Although the Utah Supreme Court had not addressed the issue, the
Tenth Circuit's decision is in accord with the modem trend.
Part III examines the Tenth Circuit's application of the Erie Doctrine
when left with little guidance from the state's highest court as to how it would
decide the matter. In Holt v. Deere & Co.,' the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
Oklahoma District Court, holding that the district court did not err in submit-
ting the issue of voluntary assumption of risk to the jury.9 In reaching this
conclusion, the Tenth Circuit relied on various Oklahoma Supreme Court deci-
sions that indicated a willingness, in most cases, to submit the defense of
assumption of risk to the jury.
I. STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS: WAGNER V. CASE CORP.'0 AND
PERLMU7TER V. UNITED STATES GYPSUM CO."
A. Background
Colorado Revised Statutes section 13-21-403 establishes two presumptions
to be used in products liability actions when applicable. The statute states in
relevant part:
(1) In any product liability action, it shall be rebuttably presumed that
the product which caused the injury, death, or property damage was
not defective and that the manufacturer or seller thereof was not
negligent if the product:
(a) Prior to sale by the manufacturer, conformed to the
state of the art, as distinguished from industry standards,
applicable to such product in existence at the time of
sale ....
(3) Ten .years after a product is first sold for use or consumption, it
shall be rebuttably presumed that the product was not defective and
that the manufacturer or seller thereof was not negligent and that all
warnings and instructions were proper and adequate. 2
The Colorado courts, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, gave this
statute varying interpretations. The Colorado Supreme Court initiated the con-
fusion in 1983 when it stated in a footnote to its decision in Belle Bonfils
Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen 3 that the state-of-the-art presumption of
section 13-21-403(1)(a) "acts as rebuttable evidence of the non-defectiveness
7. Id. at 1477.
8. 24 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 1994).
9. Id. at 1295.
10. 33 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1994).
11. 4 F.3d 864 (10th Cir. 1993).
12. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403 (1987). These presumptions are referred to throughout
the Survey as the state-of-the-art presumption and the ten-year presumption.
13. 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983).
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of any product which may be the subject of a products liability action."'" Al-
though the state-of-the-art presumption was not at issue in Belle Bonfils, later
courts cited to that decision when holding that the state-of-the-art and ten-year
presumptions were rebuttable evidence.
Three years later, in Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc.,'5 the Colorado Su-
preme Court affirmed a trial judge's instruction informing the jury of the ten-
year presumption created by section 13-21-403(3). In Uptain, the trial court
allowed the defendant-manufacturer to introduce evidence that it had marketed
the allegedly defective product for twenty-five years, and that during that pe-
riod of time no claims were filed regarding the product's alleged defective-
ness. 6 The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, holding that
the evidence was admissible because it was relevant to the defendant's request
for a jury instruction on the ten-year presumption of section 13-21-403(3).'"
In 1989, the Tenth Circuit decided Tafoya v. Sears Roebuck & Co.'" In
Tafoya, an owner of a riding lawnmower brought action against the seller and
manufacturer claiming his injury was a result of the mowers defective de-
sign.'9 The Tenth Circuit held that both the ten-year and state-of-the-art pre-
sumptions of section 13-21-403 need not be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence; a simple preponderance of the evidence would suffice."
Finally, in Mile Hi Concrete, Inc. v. Matz,2' the Colorado Supreme Court
put an end to the confusion regarding the use of the ten-year presumption in
products liability actions. The Court held that the trial court should not have
instructed the jury on the ten-year presumption because the plaintiff, to make
out a prima facie products liability case, must come forward with sufficient
evidence of the product's defectiveness to withstand a motion for a directed
verdict.22 The court reasoned that once the plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence to defeat a motion for a directed verdict, the presumption has neces-
sarily been rebutted and no reason exists for an instruction to the jury regard-
ing the presumption.23 The court did not indicate whether its holding should
be expanded to apply to the other products liability presumptions found in
section 13-21-403.
14. Id. at 126 n.14 (citation omitted).
15. 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1986).
16. Id. at 1331.
17. Id.
18. 884 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled by Wagner v. Case Corp., 33 F.3d 1253 (10th
Cir. 1994).
19. Id. at 1331.
20. Id. at 1335-36.
21. 842 P.2d 198 (Colo. 1992).
22. Id. at 205.
23. Id.
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B. The Tenth Circuit Applies Mile Hi Concrete, Inc. v. Matz:24
Wagner v. Case Corp.25 and Perlmutter v. United States Gypsum Co.26
Following the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Mile Hi Concrete,
the Tenth Circuit has twice addressed whether Colorado's statutory presump-
tions are of any import in products liability actions brought in the federal
district courts. In Perlmutter and Wagner, two distinct products liability pre-
sumptions were at issue. In Perlmutter, developers of a shopping mall brought
strict products liability and negligence actions against the manufacturer of a
plaster product containing asbestos.27 The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the developers on the negligence and failure to warn claims, and in favor of
the manufacturer on the strict liability claim.2" On appeal, the manufacturer
argued that the trial judge erred by failing to give a jury instruction as to the
effect of the ten-year presumption.29 The Tenth Circuit cited Mile Hi Con-
crete and stated that an instruction based on the ten-year presumption "is not
necessary if the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to survive a motion
for directed verdict.
30
The Wagner decision presented a somewhat more difficult problem for the
Tenth Circuit. In Wagner, the plaintiff had been injured by a loader/backhoe
manufactured by Case corporation.3 The plaintiff alleged that the product
was defective because Case had failed to install a lockout mechanism to pre-
vent the inadvertent activation of the backhoe.32 Over the plaintiff's objec-
tions, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
[If you find that (1) prior to any sale by the Case Corporation,
the ... [b]ackhoe conformed to the state of the art, as distinguished
from industry standards, and (2) such state of the art was applicable
to such products as the ... [b]ackhoe at the time of such sale, then
the law presumes the . . .[b]ackhoe was not defective.33
The jury returned a verdict for the Case Corporation.34
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit cited Mile Hi Concrete.35 Although only the
ten-year presumption was at issue in Mile Hi Concrete, the Colorado Supreme
Court's holding seemed equally applicable to the other statutory presumptions
of section 13-21-403. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the logic in Mile Hi
Concrete should also apply to the state-of-the-art presumption.36 The Tenth
24. 842 P.2d 198 (Colo. 1992).
25. 33 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1994).
26. 4 F.3d 864 (10th Cir. 1993).
27. Id. at 867.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 874.
30. Id. at 875.
31. Wagner, 33 F.3d at 1254.
32. Id. at 1255.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1254.




Circuit stated that, similar to the ten year presumption, the state-of-the-art
presumption was merely a rebuttable presumption directed against the plaintiff
and was not applicable once the plaintiff presented a prima facie case and
withstood the defendant's motion for a directed verdict." The Tenth Circuit
held that the trial court's instruction was erroneous, and reversed and remand-
ed the case for a new trial.3
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit correctly ascertained and applied Colorado law in both
Perlmutter and Wagner. The Perlmutter decision was fairly simple to decide
because the Colorado Supreme Court had ruled on the exact issue the year
before in Mile Hi Concrete.39 The Wagner case would have been decided in
similar fashion if the Tenth Circuit had utilized the principle case cited by the
Colorado Supreme Court in Mile Hi Concrete: Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc.'
In Mile Hi Concrete, the Colorado Supreme Court relied on the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal's reasoning in Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc."1 In Sex-
ton, the Fourth Circuit was asked to determine what effect Kentucky's state-
of-the-art presumption42 . would have in products liability actions.43 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that Kentucky's state-of-the-art presumption should
not be given once a plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence of a product's
defectiveness." In Mile Hi Concrete, the court cited the Sexton decision and
stated, "[w]e share the view of the Fourth Circuit that an instruction based on
such a statutory presumption is meaningless."4
Possibly due to a citation error, the Colorado Supreme Court cited the
Sexton decision as though it involved Kentucky's time-based presumption
rather than its state-of-the-art presumption.' Had the Tenth Circuit analyzed
37. Id. at 1256.
38. Id. at 1257.
39. 842 P.2d 198 (Colo. 1992).
40. 926 F.2d 331 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
41. See Mile Hi Concrete, 842 P.2d at 205 n.12 (citing Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926
F.2d 331 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991)).
42. Kentucky has a state-of-the-art presumption similar to Colorado's section 13-21-
403(1)(a). The Kentucky statute states:
In any product liability action, it shall be presumed, until rebutted by a preponderance of
the evidence to the contrary, that the product was not defective if the design, methods of
manufacture, and testing conformed to the generally recognized and prevailing standards
or the state of the art in existence at the time the design was prepared, and the product
was manufactured.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992). Kentucky also has a time-based
presumption similar to Colorado's ten-year presumption:
In any product liability action, it shall be presumed, until rebutted by a preponderance of
the evidence to the contrary, that the subject product was not defective if the injury,
death or property damage occurred either more than five (5) years after the date of the
sale to the first consumer or more than eight (8) years after the date of manufacture.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
43. Sexton, 926 F.2d at 332-33.
44. Id. at 333.
45. Mile Hi Concrete, 842 P.2d at 205 n.12 (citation omitted).
46. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court cited KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1), as being the
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the Sexton decision, it could have avoided speculating as to whether the Colo-
rado Supreme Court intended its reasoning in Mile Hi Concrete to apply with
equal force to the state-of-the-art presumption. The Tenth Circuit could have
stated with certainty that the Colorado Supreme Court would have denied Case
corporation's request for an instruction on the state-of-the-art presumption
because Wagner had produced sufficient evidence that the loader/backhoe was
defective.
Mile Hi Concrete and its progeny essentially render Colorado's statutory
presumptions meaningless. A careful reading of Mile Hi Concrete reveals the
Colorado Supreme Court's desire to strip both the ten-year and state-of-the-art
presumptions of all effect in future products liability cases. The effect given to
the presumptions by the Colorado Supreme Court in Mile High Concrete does
not alter the burden of production or the burden of persuasion that would exist
without the presumptions. A plaintiff still needs to produce sufficient evidence
of a product's defectiveness in order to withstand a defendant's motion for a
directed verdict.47
Mile Hi Concrete was essentially a judicial repeal of state legislation. The
Colorado Supreme Court took two state statutes that were obviously intended
to have some effect in products liability actions, stripped them of all effect,
and left two empty statutory provisions on the books. The Tenth Circuit is
basically powerless to do anything about the proper function of the state
supreme courts and legislative functions since it is bound by the Erie doctrine
to apply state law as the state's highest court would.'
Perlmutter and Wagner do not stand for the proposition that state-of-the-
art evidence and evidence that a product has been marketed for many years
without any claims of defectiveness are no longer relevant in products liability
actions. On the contrary, the fact that a product conformed to the state-of-the-
art at the time of its manufacture, or that a product has been on the market for
statute at issue in Sexton rather than § 411.310(2). Id. Section 411.310(1) codifies the time-based
presumption, while 411.310(2) codifies the state-of-the-art presumption. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
411.310 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
47. In any case governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff must, at a
minimum, raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand a defendant's motion for
summary judgement. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A "directed verdict acts somewhat like a delayed
summary judgement motion in that it determines that there are no genuine issues of fact that need
to be sent to the jury." FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 2, § 12.3, at 544. A motion for a directed
verdict can "be made by either party at the close of their opponent's evidence." Id. § 12.3, at 543.
Thus, the Mile Hi Concrete holding, followed by the Tenth Circuit in Perlmutter and Wag-
ner, states no more than what is already stated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If a plain-
tiff, in a products liability case, did not introduce sufficient evidence of a product's defectiveness,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would compel a trial judge to grant the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict, regardless of whether a statutory presumption also compelled her to do so.
See Mile Hi Concrete, 842 P.2d at 205.
The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure requirements for summary judgements and directed
verdicts are nearly identical to the provisions found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dis-
cussed above. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 50 (concerning directed verdicts); Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Langdon, 532 P.2d 337, 340 (Colo. 1975) (stating that "[a] motion for a directed verdict can only
be granted where the evidence, when so considered, compels the conclusion that the minds of
reasonable men could not be in disagreement"); see also COLO. R. Civ. P. 56 (concerning summa-
ry judgements).
48. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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a substantial period of time without any claims of defectiveness, may be whol-
ly relevant in design defect and failure to warn products liability actions. For
example, the Colorado Supreme Court recently decided a case in which it held
state-of-the-art evidence relevant in a products liability action based on failure
to warn claims in order "to determine whether the product is defective and
unreasonably dangerous."'49 Perlmutter and Wagner simply hold that an in-
struction based on the state-of-the-art or ten-year presumption should not be
given once the plaintiff has introduced evidence from which a reasonable juror
could find that the product in question was indeed defective."0
II. THE ELEMENTS OF A PRIMA FACIE DESIGN DEFECT CASE IN UTAH:
ALLEN V. MINNSTAR, INC.5
A. Background
In the 1979 case Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.," Utah adopt-
ed the doctrine of strict products liability as set forth in section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 402A imposes liability on the manufac-
turer and/or seller of a product that is in a "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" to the user or consumer.53 Although the Restatement provides
comments that help explain section 402A, none of these comments were
adopted by the Hahn court. Thus, lower courts were provided no help in de-
fining a "defective condition [that is] unreasonably dangerous." T he U t a h
Supreme Court first attempted to define the phrase in the 1982 case Dowland
v. Lyman Products for Shooters.
4 In Dowland, the court applied comment g
of section 402A, which defines a defective condition." Comment g defines a
defective condition as "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer,
which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."
56 Although the Utah legisla-
ture has since addressed comment g's "consumer-contemplation" test, the
essence of the test remains the same. 7
Finally, in the 1991 case Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.,"8 the Utah Supreme
Court held that all drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration
49. Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Colo. 1993).
50. Perlmutter, 4 F.3d at 875; Wagner, 33 F.3d at 1257.
51. 8 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1993).
52. 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
54. 642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982).
55. Id. at 381 n.2.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965). The rule only applies when
the "product is in a defective condition when it leaves the seller's hands." Id. Comment g's defi-
nition of "defective condition" is often referred to as the "consumer-contemplation" test. See gen-
erally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 698-99 (5th
ed. 1984) (discussing the consumer-contemplation test).
57. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(2) (1992). The Utah Product Liability Act defines "unrea-
sonably dangerous" as "dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by the ordi-
nary and prudent buyer, consumer, or user of that product in that community considering the
product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses together with any actual knowledge,
training, or experience possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer." Id.
58. 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991).
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(FDA) were unavoidably unsafe products, and that as long as the drugs were
properly prepared, marketed, and distributed with appropriate warnings, sellers
of such drugs would not be strictly liable for unfortunate consequences attend-
ing their use.59 In Grundberg, the court used a "risk-utility" balancing test
and held that the utility of FDA approved drugs outweighed the reasons to
afford plaintiffs an additional means of recovery.' By explicitly adopting the
reasoning of comment k of section 402A, the court provided broad immunity
from strict liability claims based on design defects to manufacturers and sellers
of FDA approved drugs.6
B. The Tenth Circuit Defines a Prima Facie Design Defect Case:
Allen v. Minnstar, Inc.62
In Allen, the plaintiff, who had been struck and severely injured by a boat
propeller, brought a strict product liability action against the manufacturers of
the boat and engine. 63 The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendant manufactures and Allen appealed.' 4 Allen contended that the
trial court erred in holding that he was required to prove the existence of a
safer alternative design.65 Allen argued that the Utah Supreme Court, in ap-
plying the strict liability principles of section 402A, had previously not re-
quired plaintiffs to prove the existence of a safer alternative design.' Accord-
ing to Allen, the Tenth Circuit itself had previously held, in Karns v. Emerson
Electric Co.,67 that demonstrating the existence of a safer alternative design
and the state-of-the-art in the industry was not an essential element of a
plaintiff's prima facie case.' s Unpersuaded by Allen's argument, the Tenth
Circuit, relying on Pree v. Brunswick Corp.69 and Elliot v. Brunswick
Corp.,70 held in favor of the manufacturer.7
In both Pree and Elliot, plaintiffs injured by unguarded boat propellers
sued the manufacturer for defective design. 72 Applying the consumer-contem-
59. Id. at 90.
60. Id. at 99.
61. Id. Comment k recognizes that some products, like drugs, are "unavoidably unsafe." The
comment does not go as far as the Utah Supreme Court to state that all FDA approved drugs
should be given the label "unavoidably unsafe" in order to give their manufacturers and sellers
immunity from strict liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965); see also
Adam F. Trupp, Comment, A Step Backwards in Products Liability Law: The Utah Supreme
Court and Comment K, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 101, 122 (discussing how only a minority of juris-
dictions, including Utah, apply comment k as a form of broad immunity for all drugs approved by
the FDA).
62. 8 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1993).
63. Id. at 1472.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1477.
66. Id.
67. 817 F.2d 1452 (10th Cir. 1987).
68. Allen, 8 F.3d at 1477 (citing Karns, 817 F.2d at 1457).
69. 983 F.2d 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 65 (1993).
70. 903 F.2d 1505 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 (1991).
71. Allen, 8 F.3d at 1477.
72. Id. at 1477-78 (citing Pree, 983 F.2d at 864; Elliot, 903 F.2d at 1506).
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plation test embodied in comment i of section 402A,73 both courts held that
the dangers inherent in unguarded propellers should have been apparent to, or
within the contemplation of, the ordinary consumer.7 4 The courts held, there-
fore, that the unguarded propellers were not "unreasonably dangerous" within
the meaning of section 402A."
The Tenth Circuit noted that comment i of section 402A, relied upon by
the Pree and Elliot courts, had not been adopted in Utah."6 Nevertheless, the
Tenth Circuit found that the trial court did not err in holding that it was in-
cumbent on the plaintiff to prove that an "alternative safer design, practicable
under the circumstances, was available at the time the boat and engine were
sold."77
C. Analysis
Based on the majority of courts interpretations in this area, it is clear that
the Tenth Circuit correctly held that Allen needed to establish the existence of
a safer alternative design to prevail in his products liability claim.7" Although
some courts have erroneously held that such proof is not required, and is
merely one factor to be considered in determining whether a product is defec-
tive, 9 many other jurisdictions, and the tentative draft of the Restatement
73. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
74. Allen, 8 F.3d at 1477-78 (citing Pree, 983 F.2d at 867; Elliot, 903 F.2d at 1507).
75. Id. at 1478.
76. Id. at 1479.
77. Id. Plaintiffs are required to prove the existence of a safer alternative design because
public policy dictates that manufacturers should not be liable for injuries caused by their products
when those products could not have been made safer given the technology existing at the time the
product was originally manufactured. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, § 99, at 701 (discussing
how "[ilt is generally agreed that a product cannot be regarded as defectively designed when sold
simply because after the sale and prior to the time of trial or to the time of a claimant's injury,
there was a technological breakthrough ... making it possible to eliminate a risk of harm ... or
reduce the magnitude of the danger from the risk"); see also Jefferey N. Diamant, Comment,
Texas Senate Bill 4: Product Liability Legislation Analyzed, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 921, 941 (1994)
(discussing how the defectiveness of a product under the common law of Texas was almost al-
ways determined in relation to safer alternatives, and that recent legislation in Texas, which re-
quires plaintiffs to prove the existence of a safer design, does not really change Texas common
law on the issue, but merely codifies the standard of proof).
Allowing liability in situations where a product could not be safer would place an enor-
mous burden on manufacturers, which in turn would discourage manufacturing and result in high-
er consumer prices for manufactured products. Making the plaintiff prove that a safer design exist-
ed, or should have existed, essentially injects principles of negligence into the issue of whether a
manufacturer of a product should be liable for injuries occasioned by its use. If the manufacturer
could have designed a safer product, without excessive costs to itself or to the consumer, then the
manufacturer could be considered negligent for failing to do so, and the product sold would be
considered in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous because of such failure. See generally
WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 741 n.3 (8th ed. 1988)
(questioning whether incorporating state of the art evidence in products liability cases would re-
turn products liability law to negligence standards). For a discussion of the goals and underlying
policies of Section 402A and strict products liability in general, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmts. a, b, c (1965); Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal.
1963).
78. Allen, 8 F.3d at 1479.
79. See, e.g., Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987). In Kallio the court
held that: "[allthough normally evidence of a safer alternative design will be presented initially by
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(Third) of Torts, are in accord with the Tenth Circuit's holding in Allen."°
Provided that the Tenth Circuit's decision is not read as adopting the
"open and obvious" danger rule, as embodied in the consumer-contemplation
test. of section 402A comment i,8  it is probably an accurate application of
Utah products liability law. The Tenth Circuit reliance on the Pree and Elliot
holdings, however, does not mean that the court intended to adopt the per se
rule of non-defectiveness for certain products embodied in comment i. Com-
ment i's premise undermines the rationale of strict liability and does not pro-
mote the purposes behind the doctrine. In fact, comment i has been rejected by
the vast majority of states, 2 and by the American Law Institute in its tenta-
tive draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.83 Additionally, the "open and
obvious" danger rule arguably has been rejected in Utah.
the plaintiff, it is not necessarily required in all cases. Such evidence is relevant to, and certainly
may be an important factor in, the determination of whether the product was unreasonably defec-
tive." Id. at 96-97 (footnote omitted). At least one court has held that state of the art evidence is
irrelevant because the focus of the inquiry is the "defective condition of the product... not the
manufacturer's knowledge." See, e.g., Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo.
1984).
80. See, e.g., Glover v. BIC Corp., 987 F.2d 1410, 1421-23 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
there was insufficient evidence that an alternative design of a cigarette lighter was practicable and
feasible); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Or. 1978) (holding that the plain-
tiff did not produce sufficient evidence that a substitute design was practicable); Boatland of
Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. 1980) (stating "[wihether a product was de-
fectively designed must be judged against the technological context existing at the time of its
manufacture"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994)
("A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller ... and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe .... ").
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). Comment i is sometimes
referred to as the "inherent characteristics" rule. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS, 751 n.1 (8th ed. 1988). It essentially "means that liability should not be imposed when
harm results because of danger or risk that is inherent in a product." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) (stating that "[t]he article sold must be dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics").
Comment i stands for the proposition that certain products are per se not defective. Id. The
comment uses whiskey, butter, and tobacco as examples of products that are not unreasonably
dangerous, provided they are not contaminated. Id. According to the drafters of the Restatement,
"[g]ood butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cho-
lesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks." Id.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c, reporters' note, at 49 (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1994) (noting that "[a] strong majority of courts have rejected the 'open and obvious,' or 'pat-
ent danger rule' as an absolute defense to a claim of design defect" and instead consider the "ob-
viousness of the danger ... [as] one factor among many as to whether a product design meets
risk-utility norms").
83. See id. § 2 cmt. c, at 17 (stating "[t]he fact that a danger is open and obvious is relevant
to the issue of defectiveness, but does not preclude a plaintiff from establishing that a reasonable
alternative design should have been adopted that would have reduced or prevented injury to the
plaintiff").
If this principle is adopted, products such as whiskey, tobacco, and butter could be deemed
defective if the plaintiff could show that a reasonable alternative design would have reduced or
prevented her injuries. See id. at 17-18.
84. See House v. Armour of America, Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (hold-
ing "that the presence of an 'open and obvious danger' is merely one factor for the trier of fact to
consider when assessing the liability of the defendant in a strict liability case" based on a failure
to wam).
In House, the court cited Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), in
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The doctrine of strict products liability was adopted in most states for
public policy reasons. 5 Supporters of strict liability for manufacturers of de-
fective products argue that strict liability is appropriate because: 1) manufac-
turers are in a better position to protect against harm; 2) public policy dictates
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products be borne by the
manufacturers that placed such products in the market rather than by the per-
sons injured by them; 3) manufacturers can more readily obtain liability insur-
ance for harm, and in turn, pass that added cost on to the consuming public by
charging higher prices for the goods; and 4) public policy demands that the
costs of accidents be placed on the party best able to determine whether there
are means to prevent the harm.86
These public policy goals are not served by the per se rule of non-defec-
tiveness embodied in comment i. Manufacturers of dangerous products can
more readily insure against injuries occasioning their use and pass that cost
along to the consuming public. By making manufacturers bear the costs for
injuries caused by their products, manufacturers of dangerous products are
forced to consider carefully the relative worth of placing such products on the
market. Permitting a manufacturer to avoid liability whenever its product's
dangers might be considered open and obvious is simply inconsistent with the
entire rationale of strict liability.
This is not to say that a per se rule of non-defectiveness is inappropriate
in all circumstances. Comment k, for instance, establishes a per se rule of non-
defectiveness for some products, such as drugs, deemed "unavoidably un-
safe."87 This comment was applied by the Utah Supreme Court in Grunberg
v. Upjohn Co.88 to grant blanket immunity to manufacturers of FDA ap-
proved drugs. Unlike comment i's "open and obvious" immunity, comment k's
immunity does not undermine the doctrine and rationale of strict products
liability. Good reasons exist for granting blanket immunity for manufacturers
of FDA approved drugs. Imposing liability on manufacturers of FDA approved
drugs any time a user suffers an unfortunate reaction to those drugs could
have a chilling effect on manufacturers, and thereby keep possibly life-saving
products from being marketed. Additionally, the requirement of FDA approval
ensures that the drugs are safe for consumption by the vast majority of users.
Allen does not, however, adopt explicitly the logic of comment i and the
per se rule of non-defectiveness for products whose dangers are "open and
obvious." Allen only requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of a safer and
practicable alternative design when the dangers associated with a product are
support of its argument for abandoning the open and obvious danger rule as a complete defense.
House, 886 P.2d at 548. The Donahue court only abandoned the rule as a defense in negligence
cases. Donahue, 780 P.2d at 1279. However, the House court expanded the decision and aban-
doned the rule in strict liability cases as well. House, 886 P.2d at 548.
85. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, § 98, at 692-93 (listing some of the public policy
justifications that have been the basis for many courts decision to adopt strict liability in tort).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965) (listing the public policy argu-
ments in favor of strict liability); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, § 98, at 692-93 (listing
the public policy justifications for adopting strict liability in tort).
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
88. 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991).
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open and obvious.89 The tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
actually goes further than the Allen court. The tentative draft requires plain-
tiffs, in all design defect cases, to prove that a safer alternative design exist-
ed.' Such proof is also required by many states in design defect claims.9 In
contrast, under Allen it is possible that plaintiffs will not be required to prove
the existence of a safer design in cases where the dangers associated with the
product are latent rather than patent.
The Tenth Circuit struck a fair compromise between the needs of manu-
facturers and the needs of consumers by requiring proof of a safer alternative
design. Since plaintiffs can still prevail in design defect actions when manu-
facturers neglect to adopt reasonable alternative designs, the rule should en-
courage manufacturers to design safer products.
III. ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS A DEFENSE IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS:
HOLT V. DEERE & CO.
92
A. Background
The Oklahoma Supreme Court first recognized voluntary assumption of
risk as a defense in strict products liability actions in Kirkland v. General
Motors Corp.9a In Kirkland, the court stated that assumption of the risk in
products liability actions should be narrowly defined as "[violuntary assump-
tion of the risk of a known defect." ' The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not
discuss the defense again until 1979 in Jordan v. General Motors Corp.95 In
Jordan, the court held that, because there was evidence that the plaintiff knew
his car had a tendency to veer, a question of fact was presented as to whether
he had voluntarily assumed the risk of a known defect.96 The Jordan decision
clearly states a preference for submitting assumption of risk to the jury. Based
on the logic utilized by the court in Jordan, a plaintiff's general knowledge of
a defect is apparently sufficient evidence upon which to instruct the jury on
assumption of risk.97
In 1988, the Tenth Circuit decided McMurray v. Deere & Co.,9' a prod-
ucts liability case brought by the wife of a man who was killed when a tractor
he was using started in gear.99 The plaintiff argued on appeal that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant the trial court's instructing the jury on the
defense of voluntary assumption of the risk."° The Tenth Circuit agreed and
reiterated a statement it had made six years earlier in Bingham v.
89. Allen, 8 F.3d at 1479.
90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
91. See cases cited supra note 80.
92. 24 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 1994).
93. 521 P.2d 1353, 1366 (Okla. 1974).
94. Id.
95. 590 P.2d 193 (Okla. 1979).
96. Id. at 196.
97. Id.
98. 858 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1988).
99. Id. at 1441.
100. Id. at 1439-40.
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Hollingsworth Manufacturing Co.,"° that Oklahoma trial courts may not
grant summary judgments based on a plaintiff's assumption of risk if no proof
was introduced that the plaintiff had specific knowledge of the risk." The
Tenth Circuit further stated that for a manufacturer to avail itself of the as-
sumption of risk defense, it must prove that the plaintiff had "[s]ubjective
awareness of both the defect and consequent risk of injury."'0 3 The Tenth
Circuit stated that it was proper to submit the defense to the jury even where
the direct evidence of the plaintiff's knowledge of the risk was unclear."
One month after McMurray, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Thom-
as v. Holliday, 5 which described instances where assumption of risk would
be a valid defense in Oklahoma." Following the 1979 decision in Jor-
dan, '7 Oklahoma implemented a comparative negligence scheme, and the
Thomas decision was intended to clarify and distinguish assumption of the risk
from comparative negligence. In Thomas, the court noted that comparative
negligence was often mislabeled assumption of risk." In attempting to de-
fine the two defenses, the court stated, "[t]he touchstone of the assumption-of-
risk defense is consent to harm and not heedlessness or indifference.""°
Against this backdrop, the Tenth Circuit decided Holt v. Deere & Co."'
B. The Tenth Circuit Applies Oklahoma Assumption of Risk Principles:
Holt v. Deere & Co."'
1. The Majority Opinion
In Holt, a mechanic was severely injured when the road grader he was
working on started in gear."2 The jury returned a verdict finding that Holt
failed to establish the essential elements of his products liability claim, and
further, that Holt had voluntarily assumed the risk of a known defect."3 Holt
appealed both issues. Rather than affirm the jury's verdict based on its finding
that Holt had not proven the essential elements of his products liability claim,
the Tenth Circuit relied on the jury's finding that Holt had voluntarily as-
sumed the risk of a known defect."4 By affirming the jury's finding on the
assumption of risk issue, the majority found it unnecessary to address the
jury's conclusion that Holt had not proven the elements of his products liabili-
101. 695 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1982).
102. McMurray, 858 F.2d at 1440 (citing Bingham, 695 F.2d at 449).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1441 n.5 (citing Bingham, 695 F.2d at 449).
105. 764 P.2d 165 (Okla. 1988).
106. Id. at 169-70.
107. Jordan v. General Motors Corp., 590 P.2d 193, 196 (Okla. 1979); see supra text accom-
panying notes 95-97.
108. Thomas, 764 P.2d at 171.
109. Id. at 169.
110. 24 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 1994).
111. Id.
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ty claim."'
Holt argued on appeal that there was insufficient evidence presented at
trial to warrant an assumption of the risk instruction to the jury."6 The trial
record indicated that two of Holt's co-workers knew the road-grader could be
started in gear."'7 The record also revealed that Holt had explained the inci-
dent to his supervisor from his hospital bed, and had stated either "I don't
know why I did it," or "I knew better than that."
'" 8
Holt argued that Deere did not introduce sufficient evidence from which
the jury could find that Holt knew the neutral start switch had failed or was
prone to failure."9 Deere, on the other hand, argued that the test of subjec-
tive awareness enunciated in McMurray only required proof that Holt knew of
the road-grader's "defective condition" and that he appreciated the risk of
injury this condition presented to him when he tried to start the machine while
standing on the ground. 2 Although the evidence of Holt's knowledge of the
road-grader's defect did not appear to meet either articulation of assumption of
the risk, the Tenth Circuit nevertheless held that the jury could have deter-
mined, based on the evidence, that Holt had voluntarily assumed the risk of a
known defect.''
2. Judge Holloway's concurrence
Judge Holloway disagreed with the majority's holding that there was
sufficient evidence to support an instruction on the defense of voluntary as-
sumption of risk. 2 ' Holloway noted that the two men who knew the machine
could be key-started in gear admitted that they had never told anyone of the
fact.'23 Holloway also argued that the words spoken by Holt were obviously
uttered under the stress of great pain and were not very probative of Holt's
knowledge of the defect."4 Judge Holloway concluded that Holt's statement
was insufficient to warrant an instruction on assumption of risk without some
form of corroborating evidence. 25 While ultimately concurring in the opinion
because he believed sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's finding
that Holt had not proven the essential elements of his product's liability claim,




116. Id. at 1292.
117. Id. at 1294.
118. Id. at 1295.
119. Id. at 1292-94.
120. Id. at 1292.
121. Id. at 1293-94.
122. Id. at 1296 (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. ld. at 1297 & n.l.
124. Id.





The Restatement (Second) of Torts was instrumental in establishing as-
sumption of risk as a defense in strict products liability action. 27 The Re-
statement defines assumption of risk as "the form of contributory negligence
which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a
known danger.""'2 In expounding on this definition, section 402A comment n
provides, "[i]f the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the
danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product
and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery."'2 9 Oklahoma has adopted
section 402A of the Restatement, including comment n, but has yet to define
the exact degree of plaintiff's knowledge required to warrant an instruction on
assumption of risk. 3 While the modem trend has been to limit the circum-
stances in which the assumption of risk defense will be allowed to bar a
plaintiff's recovery, 3' Oklahoma law is essentially silent on the circumstanc-
es surrounding the appropriate use of assumption of risk in strict products
liability actions. Oklahoma courts have only stated that the defense can be
used in those situations in which the plaintiff has voluntarily and unreasonably
assumed the risk of a known defect. 32 This statement provides little more
guidance than comment n to section 402A.
Limited precedent existed to guide the Tenth Circuit in deciding Holt. The
precedent that did exist, most notably the Jordan decision, indicated that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court preferred submitting the issue of assumption of risk
to the jury whenever there was any evidence from which a reasonable juror
could conclude that the plaintiff had assumed the risk."' Thus, the Tenth
Circuit probably decided the issue as the Oklahoma Supreme Court would
have if confronted with the issue.
Judge Holloway's concurring opinion, however, is more in accord with
the majority of jurisdictions that have either abolished or extremely curtailed
the use of the defense."4 The Erie Doctrine mandates that federal courts are
to ascertain and apply state law so that the outcome reached in federal court is
the same outcome that would have been reached if the case had been tried in
state court. 3 From Holt's statement, "I don't know why I did it," or "I
knew better than that," an inference can be made that Holt knew the road-
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965) (specifically providing for
a defense of assumption of risk in products liability actions). See generally Ann D. Bray, Does
Old Wine Get Better with Age or Turn to Vinegar? Assumption of Risk in a Comparative Fault
Era-Andren v. White Rodgers, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1141, 1161-66 (1992) (discussing the
rationale underlying the assumption of risk defense in products liability cases).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965).
129. Id.
130. See Thomas v. Holliday, 794 P.2d 165 (Okla. 1988).
131. See Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict Products Liability, 95 HARV. L. REV. 872, 873
(1982).
132. See Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 135 (Okla. 1974).
133. Jordan, 590 P.2d at 196; see supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
134. See Note, supra note 131, at 873.
135. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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grader would key-start in gear and thus knew of its defective condition.
36
This inference, while somewhat tenuous, could nevertheless be made by a rea-
sonable juror. Because a reasonable juror could draw this inference, an instruc-
tion on assumption of risk was proper under Oklahoma law.
CONCLUSION
The four cases analyzed in this survey illustrate the different approaches
taken by Tenth Circuit when applying the Erie Doctrine. The Tenth Circuit's
Erie jurisprudence varies depending on the amount, nature, and quality of a
state court's treatment of a particular issue. In Perlmutter and Wagner, the
Tenth Circuit, given a clear indication from the Colorado Supreme Court as to
how it would decide the issue, correctly ascertained and applied Colorado law.
Allen presented more difficult problems for the Tenth Circuit because the Utah
Supreme Court had given no indication as to how it would resolve the issue.
Lacking any guidance from the Utah courts, the Tenth Circuit opted to decide
the case in accordance with the modem trend. In Holt, language from various
Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions indicated the court's preference for sub-
mitting the issue of assumption of risk to the jury in most instances. The
Tenth Circuit recognized this inclination, and, most likely, decided the issue as




136. Holt, 24 F.3d at 1293-94.
137. Presently, tort law is the subject of debate in the United States Congress. The Republican
Party's "Contract with America" could result in dramatic changes. One part of the "contract"
concerns legal reform. These reforms would significantly alter existing products liability law in
many respects. The reforms would create a uniform products liability law (covering state and
federal actions) in three different areas: punitive damages, joint liability, and seller liability.
GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994). While
these reforms will be the subject of heated debate, every attorney should become familiar with the
proposed legal reforms and keep them in mind when advising clients in the future, at least until
the issues are resolved.
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